Read City of God (Penguin Classics) Online
Authors: Saint Augustine
City of God (Penguin Classics) (49 page)
This Divinity, or, as I may call it, this Deity – for our Christian writers have no reluctance about using this word, as a more accurate translation of the Greek
theotês
2
– this Divinity, or Deity, is not to be found in the ‘civil’ theology which Marius Varro has expounded in sixteen books: that is to say, it is impossible to attain to the felicity of eternal life by means of the worship of such gods as have been established in the cities, together with the ritual of their worship. Any
reader who has not been convinced by my sixth book, just completed, will no doubt find, after reading the present book, that he needs no further elucidation of the subject.
It may be, in fact, that someone will imagine that at any rate the ‘select’ and ‘principal’ gods, which Varro has treated of in his last book, and about which I have as yet said all too little, ought to be worshipped with a view to a life of happiness, which can only mean eternal life. On this subject I am not going to echo what Tertullian said, perhaps with more wit than truth, ‘If gods are “selected” like onions, then the others are rejected as worthless.’
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I am not saying that; for I see that even among a select few, a further selection is made for some task of exceptional importance. For instance, in an army, when recruits have been selected, a choice is made from these for some important military operation; and when a choice is made of leaders in the Church, it does not mean that the rest are rejected, since all the truly faithful are rightly called ‘elect’. ‘Corner stones’
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are ‘selected’ for a building, but that does not imply the ‘rejection’ of the rest, which are appointed to a place in other parts of the structure. Grapes are ‘selected’ for eating, but the others, which are reserved for drink, are not ‘rejected’. There is no need to labour an abvious point. We can take it that the mere fact that certain gods have been selected out of a large number is not a reason for attacking the author, or the worshippers of the gods, or the gods themselves. Our task is rather to examine who those gods are and for what purpose they have, apparently, been ‘selected’.
2.
Who are these ‘select’ gods? Are
they
excused
the duties of the less considerable gods?
At all events, here are the gods to whom Varro, in the course of one book, gives the testimonial of ‘select’: Janus, Jupiter, Saturn, Genius,
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Mercury, Apollo, Mars, Vulcan, Neptune, the Sun, Orcus, Father liber,
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Earth, Ceres, Juno, the Moon,
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Diana, Minerva, Venus, Vesta – twenty in all, twelve males, eight females. Are these divinities called ‘select’ because of their more important responsibilities in the universe or because they are better known to the people in general and because a higher degree of worship is offered to them? If it is because of their more responsible functions in the universe, we should not expect to find them among what we may call the plebeian multitude of divinities
which are assigned to tiny tasks. In fact, to start with Janus himself, at the moment of conception – for that is where they start, all these tasks minutely distributed among those minute divinities – at that moment it is Janus who opens the door for the reception of the seed. Saturn is there too, in charge of the actual seed; Liber is there, for he liberates the male by the emission of the seed; Libera is there (some identify her with Venus) who performs the same good office for the female, to give her liberation by the emission of the seed. All these belong to the class of ‘select’ gods. But the goddess Mena
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is there as well, and she looks after the menstrual flux – an obscure divinity, although the daughter of Jupiter. Varro, in his book about ‘select’ gods, assigns this department of menstruation to Juno herself, who is queen even among the ‘select’ gods, and, in her capacity as Juno Lucina she presides over this haemorrhage in company with her stepdaughter, Mena. Among those present there, there are a couple of very obscure divinities of some sort, Vitumnus and Sentinus:
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the first gives vitality to the foetus, the latter bestows sensibility. And in spite of their utter obscurity those two perform a much more important office than all those noble and ‘select’ gods. For surely, without life and sense, what is it that a woman carries in her womb? Merely a lump of worthless matter, of the same order as dust and mud.
3.
There is no discoverable principle in the selection of certain gods, since more important responsibilities are assigned to many inferior deities
What drove all those ‘select’ gods to undertake these lowly tasks, where Vitumnus and Sentinus, who ‘are wrapped in complete obscurity’,
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are superior to them in gifts allotted for their bestowal? It is the ‘select’ Janus who gives access – opens the door (
janua
) as it were – for the seed; the ‘select’ Saturn confers the actual seed; the ‘select’ Liber procures for men the emission of the seed; Libera (or Ceres, or Venus) does the same for women; the ‘select’ Juno provides the menses for the growth of the foetus when conceived – and she does this not alone, but with the help of Mena, daughter of Jupiter. And it is the obscure and unknown Vitumnus who gives life, the obscure and unknown Sentinus
gives sensibility; and those are more important gifts than the others, in proportion as they themselves are inferior to intellect and reason. For just as beings endowed with reason and intelligence are by that very fact superior to those without those faculties, whose life is merely that of sense, so in the same way beings equipped with life and sense are rightly ranked above those which have neither life nor sensibility. Thus Vitumnus, giver of life, and Sentinus, giver of sense, have a better claim to a place among ‘select’ gods than Janus, the admitter of seed, Saturn, giver or sower of seed, and Liber and Libera, movers or emitters of seeds – seeds which are not worthy of consideration until they have reached the stage of life and sensibility; and life and sense are ‘select’ gifts which are not in the gift of ‘select’ gods but of unknown gods, gods regarded as negligible in comparison with the high rank of those others.
The reply may be that Janus is the authority concerned with all beginnings, and for that reason the opening made for conception is rightly assigned to him; and that Saturn is in charge of all seeds, and therefore the seeding of man cannot be separated from his operation; that Liber and Libera are in charge of the emission of all seeds, and must in consequence be concerned with the emission of seeds which are connected with the formation of men; that Juno presides over all purifications and all parturition, and therefore cannot fail to be present at the purification of women and the births of men. If so, let our antagonists decide what to reply about Vitumnus and Sentinus. Do they wish
them
to be the authorities over all living and sentient beings? If the answer is Yes, then they should give thought to the question of giving them a loftier position. For to be born by means of seed is to be born on earth and from earth, while to live and to feel are, in their view, attributes of the heavenly gods. If they say, on the other hand, that Vitumnus and Sentinus are only given responsibility for beings which live in the flesh and with the aid of senses, why does not their great god, who makes all things live and feel, confer life and sensibility on the flesh also, and, as part of his universal operation, bestow this gift on creatures at their birth? What need is there for Vitumnus and Sentinus? Let us imagine that the Supreme Being, who presides over life and sensibility in general, has entrusted to those whom we may call his servants the oversight of things of the flesh as being utterly remote from him and too lowly for his immediate attention. But are we to suppose that those ‘select’ gods are so deprived of domestic staff that they cannot themselves entrust those tasks to servants, but are compelled, for all their renown (which leads to their
being selected), to share such tasks with obscure deities? Juno is a ‘select’ goddess; she is queen, the ‘sister and consort of Jupiter’, yet she is Iterduca for children, and shares her task with those most obscure goddesses, Abeona and Adeona.
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In the same sphere they placed another goddess, called Mens
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(Mind), to give to children a good intelligence; and yet that divinity is not ranked among the ‘select’ deities – as if this gift were not the most valuable that could be given. Yet Juno is ranked as ‘select, because she is Iterduca and Domiduca – as if it were the slightest use ‘to find one’s way’ (
iter ducerc
) or ‘to be brought back home’ (
domum duel
), if one has not a good intelligence (
mens
).
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And yet the selectors never thought of entering the giver of this blessing among their ‘select’ divinities. But surely she (Mens) ought to have been preferred even to Minerva, who was made responsible for the memory of children in this allocation of detailed functions. For it can hardly be doubted that a good intelligence is a more valuable possession than a memory however vast. No one who has a good mind can be a bad man; whereas there are complete villains with remarkable memories, who are all the worse because they cannot forget their evil thoughts. For all that, Minerva is among the ‘select’ deities while Mens is lost to sight among the common herd. And what am I to say of Virtue? Or of Felicity? I have already said a good deal about them in my fourth book.
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Although our pagans consider them gods, they have refused them any place among the ‘select’, while giving places to Mars and Orcus, of whom the first ensures death, the second receives the dead.
We observe that in these tiny duties which are distributed in tiny fragments to a plurality of gods these ‘select deities themselves operate on a footing of equality, like a senate in conjunction with the plebs; and we find that some of the gods who have not been considered at all worthy of selection are in charge of more important and dignified functions than those performed by gods entitled ‘select’. We are left with the conclusion that the titles ‘select’ and ‘principal’ are not bestowed on account of more eminent responsibilities in the universe, but simply because those divinities have succeeded in winning greater renown among the general public. That is why Varro himself says that some father gods and some mother goddesses have received obscurity as their fate – just as it happens to human beings.
Now it may be that Felicity was not bound to find a place among the ‘select’, just because this dignified position is attained not by merit but by mere chance. But Fortune at least should have been ranked among them, or rather before them; for, they say, this goddess grants favours to each person not by any rational principle of distribution but by the random luck of the draw. She ought by rights to occupy the highest eminence among the ‘select’ gods, since it is there that she shows her power at its highest; for we see that they are selected, not for exceptional virtues, not in accordance with any rational principle of felicity, but by the random operation of the power of Fortune, or so their worshippers believe. It may be that the eloquent Sallust had those very gods in mind when he said, ‘But fortune, without doubt, is the dominant power in all that happens; it is fortune that brings fame or obscurity, according to her whim rather than on the basis of true desert.’
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For no one can find a reason why Venus should be held in honour and Virtue be hid in obscurity, although both are canonized deities, and their merits are very different.
Perhaps this honoured position is earned by the enthusiasm of devotees? Venus, to be sure, has more votaries than Virtue. But then why is Minerva so illustrious, and the goddess Pecunia (money) so obscure?
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Humanity in general finds wealth more alluring than artistic skill. Even among the practitioners of an art you would be hard put to it to find a man who does not regard his art as a means to pecuniary reward; and the end is invariably more highly valued than the means. If then the choice of ‘select’ gods depends on the judgement of the ignorant multitude, why is the goddess Pecunia not preferred to Minerva, seeing that artists in general practise their art for monetary gain? If, on the other hand, we owe this distinction of ‘select’ deities to a few philosophers, then why is Virtue not ranked higher than Venus, since reason should prefer Virtue by a long way?
At any rate, if that Fortune, who in the opinion (as I have said) of those who attach most importance to her, ‘is the dominant power in all that happens, and brings fame or obscurity according to her whim rather than on the basis of true desert’, if Fortune has such power even over the gods, that she brings fame or obscurity at her pleasure, according to her random decision, then she ought to hold an eminent place among the ‘select’ gods, seeing that she wields such eminent power over the gods themselves. Are we to suppose that Fortune herself had only ill-fortune in this case, so that she was unable to gain that position?
Then she has been her own adversary; for she has given to others a renown which she herself does not enjoy.
4.
The inferior gods are better treated than the select deities: They are not dishonoured by slanders, while the infamies of their superiors are widely publicized
Those whose main aim is renown and glory would congratulate those ‘select’ gods and call them fortunate, if they failed to see that they were selected more for insult than for honour. The mob of deities of the common sort are sheltered by their very obscurity, so that no slanders are heaped on them. No doubt we smile when we see them distributed, in the fantasies of human imagination, to the various tasks allotted to them, like sub-collectors of taxes, or like craftsmen in Silver Street, where one small piece of plate passes through many hands to achieve the final result, although it could be finished by one thoroughly competent craftsman. But this was thought to be the only way to suit the interests of the large number of craftsmen, by letting each individual acquire skill in a single part of the craft, which could be done quickly and easily, so as to obviate the long and painful process required to make them all masters of the whole art. For all that, it would be hard to find one of the unselected gods whose reputation has been smirched by any scandal, while it would be equally difficult to find a single ‘select’ god who has not suffered the stigma of some outrageous insult. The superior deities have descended to the lowly tasks of their inferiors; the inferiors have not reached the exalted level of the scandals of the greater gods.