Closing the Ring (15 page)

Former Naval Person (Quebec) to President Roosevelt

16 Aug. 43

I send you herewith four telegrams I have received from London about a renewed approach by Badoglio. The following is the kind of answer which I suggest should be made:

We note the statement of Italian envoy: “We are not in a position to make any terms. We will accept unconditional surrender, provided we can join as allies in fighting the Germans.” We, the Allies, for our part cannot make any bargain about Italy changing sides, nor can we make plans in common at this stage. If however serious fighting breaks out between the Italian Army and German intruders, a new situation would be created. The Italians know quite well that British and United States Governments do not seek to deny Italy her respected place in Europe. The Italian Government should therefore resist the Germans to the best of their ability as soon as possible, pending arrival of Anglo-American armies. In particular they should stop further invasion of Italy by German troops by blowing up bridges and tunnels and tearing up railway lines and roads in north of Italy, and thus cutting communications of German troops in south of Italy. Effective action of this kind would be regarded by victorious Allies as valuable service, and would render further co-operation possible against the common foe. There is no doubt of the ability of Italian Government and people to destroy and paralyse the German communications, and action of this kind would be proof of their sincerity. Another proof would be the safeguarding of British and Allied prisoners from being taken away to Germany. In any case where this is attempted by Germans, and Italian Government have not the power to resist, the prisoners should be set free and succoured by Italian people. A further vital service which Italian Government certainly has in its power to render to the Allies is to sail Italian warships to any ports in Allied occupation.

Fourthly, the furnishing by the Italian Government of any information of German dispositions, and by any assistance given by Italian troops and people to the disembarkations of Allies when they take place, especially if accompanied by fighting between Italians and Germans, would be favourably recognised. Fifthly, any co-operation between Italian troops in the Balkan peninsula and the various Patriot forces in the field, taking the form of resistance to the Germans and leading to bloodshed, would be favourably viewed.

Thus, by taking action against the common enemy, the Italian Government, Army, and people could without any bargain facilitate a more friendly relationship with United Nations. In particular we state that if Allied troops arrive at any point where they find Italians fighting Germans, we shall aid Italians to our utmost.

  Eden should be here tomorrow, and we can discuss the whole position together. I send you this budget in order that you may see the way my mind is working.

The Chiefs of Staff are considering the practical steps and timings required to make an Italian turnover effective.

*  *  * *  *

The President and I agreed that Eisenhower should send
General Bedell Smith and the British General Strong, head of his Intelligence Staff, to Lisbon to open negotiations there with the Italian emissary. They took with them the final military terms of surrender, which had now been thrashed out in our “Quadrant” Conference at Quebec.

The President and Prime Minister to General Eisenhower

18 Aug. 43

The President and the Prime Minister having approved, the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct you to send at once to Lisbon two Staff officers, one United States and one British. They should report upon arrival to the British Ambassador. They should take with them the agreed armistice terms which have already been sent to you. Acting on instructions, the British Ambassador in Lisbon will have arranged a meeting with General Castellano. Your Staff officers will be present at this meeting.

2. At this meeting a communication to General Castellano will be made on the following lines:

The unconditional surrender of Italy is accepted on the terms stated in the document to be handed to him. (He should then be given the armistice terms for Italy already agreed and previously sent to you. He should be told that these do
not
include political, economic, or financial terms, which will be communicated later by other means.)

These terms do
not
visualise the active assistance of Italy in fighting the Germans. The extent to which the terms will be modified in favour of Italy will depend on how far the Italian Government and people do in fact aid the United Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war. The United Nations however state without reservation that wherever Italian forces or Italians fight Germans or destroy German property or hamper German movement they will be given all possible support by the forces of the United Nations. Meanwhile, provided information about the enemy is immediately and regularly supplied, Allied bombing will so far as possible be directed upon targets which affect the movements and operations of German forces.

The cessation of hostilities between the United Nations and Italy will take effect from a date and hour to be notified by General Eisenhower.

Italian Government must undertake to proclaim the armistice immediately it is announced by General Eisenhower, and to order their forces and people from that hour to collaborate with the Allies and to resist the Germans.

The Italian Government must, at the hour of the armistice, order that all United Nations prisoners in danger of capture by the Germans shall be immediately released.

The Italian Government must, at the hour of the armistice, order the Italian Fleet and as much of their merchant shipping as possible to put to sea for Allied ports. As many military aircraft as possible shall fly to Allied bases. Any ships or aircraft in danger of capture by the Germans must be destroyed.

3. General Castellano should be told that meanwhile there is a good deal that Badoglio can do without the Germans becoming aware of what is afoot. The precise character and extent of his action must be left to his judgment, but the following are the general lines which should be suggested to him:

General passive resistance throughout the country, if this order can be conveyed to local authorities without the Germans knowing. …

Germans must not be allowed to take over Italian coast defences.

Make arrangements to be put in force at the proper time for Italian formations in the Balkans to march to the coast, with a view to their being taken off to Italy by United Nations.

  On August 19, the parties met at the British Embassy in the Portuguese capital. Castellano was told that General Eisenhower would accept the Italian Government’s unconditional surrender on the terms now handed to him. It is difficult to make hard-cut military negotiations fit in with flexible diplomacy. The Italian envoy general at Lisbon was placed in a hopeless position. The purpose of his visit, as he emphasised, was to discuss how Italy could take the field against Germany. Bedell Smith had to reply that he could only discuss unconditional surrender.

These talks coincided with the final conquest of Sicily. On the same day I telegraphed to General Alexander:

Prime Minister (Quebec) to General Alexander (Middle East)

19 Aug. 43

I am overjoyed at this new, brilliantly executed achievement. I
congratulate you most heartily upon all you have done. I will shortly send you a telegram for publication to your troops of the Fifteenth Army Group, but I think it better that President Roosevelt and the King should send their compliments to Eisenhower first, and I am so advising.

2. You are no doubt informed of General Castellano’s approaches to us and the answer we have sent from here. Our greatest danger is that the Germans should enter Rome and set up a Quisling-Fascist Government under, say, Farinacci. Scarcely less unpleasant would be the whole of Italy sliding into anarchy. I doubt if the Badoglio Government can hold their double-faced position until the present date fixed for “Avalanche,” so that anything that can be done to shorten this period without endangering military success will be most helpful.

General Alexander to Prime Minister (Quebec)

20 Aug. 43

Many thanks for your kind message, which I value very highly. Everything possible is being done to put on “Avalanche” at the earliest possible date. We realise here very clearly that every hour gives enemy more time to prepare and organise against us.

*  *  * *  *

The discussions in Lisbon with General Castellano continued throughout the night of August 19. The Italian general drew out on a map the dispositions of both the German and Italian forces in Italy after he had realised that there would be no yielding by Bedell Smith upon the question of terms. After a suitable delay in order to cover up his visit to Portugal, Castellano returned to Rome bearing the military terms of surrender and also a wireless set and Allied codes in order to remain in contact with Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers.

Yet another Italian emissary, General Zanussi, appeared on August 26 in Lisbon. He was the principal assistant to the chief of the Italian General Staff, and was accompanied by General Carton de Wiart, V.C., who had been released from a British prisoner-of-war camp to act as intermediary to this mission. The purpose of this latest visitor was far from clear. Perhaps Badoglio feared that Castellano had given too much
away and wanted to be clear as to what he was doing. Carton de Wiart had been told that “one dove had been sent out, but as it had not returned another was being dispatched.” Zanussi had instructions from Badoglio to try to reach London and press for an Allied landing north of Rome.

As discussions had already begun with Castellano, it was decided to send Zanussi to General Eisenhower’s Headquarters. Before he left however an incident of chivalry took place. The Italian general wished to return to Rome to report on the failure of his mission. He discussed the matter with his English companion, who quietly said that he was of course prepared to accompany him. Zanussi describes in his own words Carton de Wiart’s remarks: “I am a prisoner-of-war. I have been released to accompany you on a mission to London. Since the mission has not taken place and you are returning to Italy. I shall take my place again at the side of my comrades.” The Italian replied that he would not hear of such a plan. He knew that all had been done that was possible to get him to England, and he would go and see General Eisenhower as suggested. Carton de Wiart should therefore consider himself free. It was an Anglo-Italian episode which may well be remembered by both nations.

The latest Italian emissary was therefore sent to Algiers, where he gave further information about the movements of the Germans in Italy.

On August 31, General Bedell Smith, accompanied by General Zanussi, met Castellano in Sicily, as had been arranged, Castellano explained that if the Italian Government were a free agent they would accept and announce the armistice terms as the Allies desired. They were however under the control of the Germans. Since the Lisbon meeting the Germans had sent more troops into Italy, and the whole country was virtually under German occupation. It was therefore impossible for the armistice to be announced at the time required by the Allies—i.e., before the main Allied landing in Italy, details of which Castellano was most anxious to learn. The Italians wanted to be quite sure that these landings would be strong enough to guarantee the security of the King and Government in Rome.

It was clear that the Italian Government were particularly anxious that we should make a landing north of Rome to protect them against the German divisions near the city. Castellano talked in terms of fifteen Allied divisions taking part in such an operation. General Bedell Smith made it clear that he was not prepared to continue the talks on the basis that the armistice should be announced
after
the main Allied landings, and refused to give him any information on the strength of the impending Allied operations. Castellano thereupon asked to be allowed to consult his Government again. He was told that the terms were final and the time-limit had already expired, but that in view of the present discussion the Allies were willing to wait until midnight of September 1/2, by which time a firm acceptance or refusal must be given. That evening Castellano returned to Rome.

The Allied High Command perceived that the Italian Government was rapidly losing its nerve and would not have the courage to sign an armistice unless convinced of the overwhelming strength of the Anglo-American attack upon the mainland of Italy. General Eisenhower therefore decided to inform General Castellano of his plan to land an airborne force near Rome. This would depend upon a guarantee by Badoglio’s Government that “the armistice is signed and announced as desired by the Allies; that the Italians should seize and hold the necessary airfields and stop all anti-aircraft fire; that the Italian divisions in the Rome area would take action against the Germans.”

The President and I, now together in the White House, sent the following telegram to Eisenhower: “We highly approve your decision to go on with ‘Avalanche’ and to land an airborne division near Rome on the conditions indicated. We fully recognise military considerations must be dominant at this juncture.” The War Cabinet met in London on the same day and endorsed this view.

*  *  * *  *

We reported to Stalin the development of the Italian situation.

Prime Minister and President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin

2 Sept. 43

We have received from General Castellano statement that the Italians accept and that he is coming to sign, but we do not know for certain whether this refers to short military terms, which you have already seen, or to more comprehensive and complete terms in regard to which your readiness to sign was specifically indicated.

2. The military situation there is at once critical and hopeful. Our invasion of the mainland is beginning almost immediately, and the heavy blow called “Avalanche” will be struck in the next week or so. The difficulty of the Italian Government and people in extricating themselves from Hitler’s clutches may make a still more daring enterprise necessary, for General Eisenhower will need as much Italian help as he can get. The Italian acceptance of the terms is largely based on the fact that we shall send an airborne division to Rome to enable them to hold off the Germans, who have gathered Panzer strength in that vicinity, and who may replace the Badoglio Government with a Quisling Administration, probably under Farinacci. Matters are moving so fast there that we think General Eisenhower should have discretion not to delay settlement with the Italians for the sake of the difference between the short and long terms. It is clear that short terms are included in long terms, that they proceed on basis of unconditional surrender, placing the interpretation in hands of Allied Commander-in-Chief.