Closing the Ring (14 page)

2. Moreover, the rate of build-up to twelve divisions on the mainland by December 1 seems to me to open dangers of the gravest kind. First, no effective help can come to enable the Italians in Rome to turn against the Germans, and the dangers of a German Quisling Government being installed, or alternatively sheer anarchy supervening, will be aggravated and prolonged. Secondly, if your rate of build-up is no more than twelve divisions by December 1, and these only in the Naples area, what is to prevent the Germans in the same time from bringing far larger forces against them? They are at present said to have sixteen divisions in the Italian peninsula. I am not myself convinced that these are in fact complete divisions. On the contrary, it would seem likely that they are the leading elements and headquarters in several cases. But if the liberation of Rome and the gaining of the important political and military advantages following therefrom are to be delayed for more than three months from now, no one can measure the consequences.

3. I am most anxious to hear from you before I leave America, as the President was also much distressed by the date mentioned, and if it is really the kind of time-table that is being worked to, it would be better for us to face the worst in consultation. I hope however that you will chase these clouds away.

  I addressed myself to this administrative failure as soon as I got home. The measures to re-form our armoured divisions which I had asked for on August 2, and which had been pursued by General Brooke, were already producing results, and the pessimistic estimates of which General Whiteley had been the bearer were soon overcome. The British 1st Armoured Division was re-equipped and became again a magnificent fighting force. Two Polish divisions, the New Zealand Division, and the 4th British-Indian Division were brought to the highest pitch and transported to Italy. The extraordinary prowess of the United States engineers transformed the port of Naples from ruin into a first-class harbour. In the early days of October a hundred thousand men were added to General Alexander’s army. Had this not been achieved, a disaster might easily have occurred, for the Germans were arriving in strength.

¹
Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten.

²
My code-name was “Colonel Warden.”

²
The special substance for use in the Habakkuk project and named after its inventor, Mr. Pyke.

³
“Baytown”: the attack across the Straits of Messina. “Avalanche”: the attack on Naples (Salerno).

6
Italy: The Armistice

Italian Peace Overtures___My Telegram to President Roosevelt of August
5___
Final Meeting Between Italian and German Chiefs___Badoglio’s Problem___My Telegrams to Mr. Eden of August
7
and
9,
and His Reply___Italian Plenipotentiary from Badoglio Arrives in Spain___I Report to the President, August
16___
Our Joint Telegram to General Eisenhower, August
18___
Discussions in Lisbon Between General Castellano and General Bedell Smith___General Zanussi Arrives Accompanied by General Carton de Wiart___An Incident of British and Italian Chivalry___The Italian Envoys Unable to Reach a Decision___General Eisenhower’s Orders to Land an Airborne Force Near Rome___Joint Report by the President and Me to Stalin___Signature of the Armistice Terms by General Castellano Near Syracuse___The British Eighth Army Crosses the Straits of Messina, September
3___
Italian Fears of Immediate German Occupation of Rome___Eisenhower Resolves to Launch “Avalanche” as Planned___Announcement of the Armistice at
6.00
p.m., September
8___
The Germans Encircle Rome___The King of Italy Escapes to Brindisi___Imperative Need to Occupy the Italian Bases in the Eastern Mediterranean___The Italian Fleet Fights Its Way to Surrender at Malta___Mussolini Rescued by Hitler’s Orders, September
12___
Italy Becomes a Main Battleground.

D
ETAILED PLANS
had already been made between the British and United States Governments about the probable surrender by Italy. The drafting of armistice terms was begun before the end of July, and on August 3, I circulated the documents
to the War Cabinet “in case of an approach being made to us by Italy.” We wished to have time to deal by political or diplomatic channels rather than through Allied Military Headquarters. On this same day, the first peace overtures from Rome were made. Our Ambassador in Lisbon informed the Foreign Office that the new Counsellor of the Italian Legation there, who had just arrived from Rome, wished to see him, and hinted that he bore a message from the Badoglio Government. This Italian diplomat was Ciano’s former
chef de cabinet
, the Marquis D’Ayeta. He had American relations, and was an acquaintance of Sumner Welles. His mission to Lisbon had been planned under Badoglio’s instructions by the new Italian Foreign Secretary, Guariglia. On the following day, D’Ayeta was invited to the British Embassy. He made no reference to an armistice, but explained that, although the King and Badoglio wanted peace, they had to make the pretence of continuing the fight in order to avoid a German
coup d’état
in Italy. It was clear from what he said that Guariglia was particularly concerned to explain away to the Allies a meeting in Northern Italy with Ribbentrop which he was about to fulfil in order to soften German suspicions.

I immediately informed the President of this Italian approach.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

5 Aug. 43

The following story has been told to British Ambassador Campbell at Lisbon by a newly arrived Italian Counsellor. … I send it to you for what it is worth, which is substantial. Ambassador Campbell was instructed to make no comment. It certainly seems to give inside information. Though I am starting now for Quebec, Anthony will be here, and you can communicate both with him and me.

The King and the Army leaders had been preparing a
coup d’état
, but this was precipitated, probably by a few days only, by the action of the Grand Fascist Council. Fascism in Italy is extinct. Every vestige has been swept away. Italy turned Red overnight. In Turin and Milan there were Communist demonstrations which had to be put down by armed force. Twenty years of Fascism has obliterated the middle class. There is nothing between the King, with the patriots who have rallied round him, who have complete control, and rampant Bolshevism. The Germans have an armoured division just outside Rome, and will march in if there is any sign of Italian weakening. There are ten thousand scattered about inside Rome, mostly with machine-guns. If we bomb Rome again there will be a popular rising, and the Germans will then march in and slaughter everybody. They have actually threatened the use of gas. As many Italian troops as possible have been concentrated round Rome, but they have no stomach for fighting. They have practically no weapons, and are no match for even one well-equipped German division.

In these circumstances the King and Badoglio, whose first thought was to make peace, have no alternative but to put up a show of going on with the fight. Guariglia is to meet Ribbentrop, perhaps tomorrow, as a result of which there will be a communiqué stating in plainer terms than hitherto that Italy is still the active ally of Germany. But this will be only pretence. The whole country is only longing for peace, and above all to be rid of the Germans, who are universally execrated.

If we cannot attack Germany immediately through the Balkans, thus causing German withdrawal from Italy, the sooner we land in Italy the better. The Germans however are resolved to defend it line by line. When we land in Italy we shall find little opposition, and perhaps even active co-operation, on the part of the Italians.

D’Ayeta never from start to finish made any mention of peace terms, and his whole story, as you will have observed, was no more than a plea that we should save Italy from the Germans as well as from herself, and do it as quickly as possible.

He expressed the hope that we would not heap abuse on the King and Badoglio, which would precipitate the blood-bath, although a little of this would help them to keep up the pretence
vis-à-vis
the Germans.

*  *  * *  *

The desire of all the Italian personalities involved was for peace with the Allies, and the Italian High Command were already eager to fight against the Germans. Guariglia and the Italian Foreign Office hoped by time and caution to achieve the turnover without incurring German wrath and revenge
Thus, although we could not measure the forces at work, we came in contact with two Italian representatives. So did the Germans. On August 6, Guariglia and General Ambrosio met Ribbentrop and Keitel on the frontier. The military discussions were acrimonious. Ambrosio requested the return home of the Italian divisions in France and the Balkans. Keitel, on the contrary, during the meeting ordered the German units poised at the border posts to enter Italy. Meanwhile, Foreign Secretary Guariglia conducted a bland and meaningless conversation with Ribbentrop in the hope of postponing a German onslaught.

*  *  * *  *

On August 6 another Italian diplomat, Signor Berio, approached our diplomatic representative in Tangier. His instructions were direct from Badoglio. Again a plea for time was made, but on this occasion a genuine desire to treat was expressed, and Berio was authorised to open negotiations.

I was on my way by sea to the Quebec Conference when this news reached me, together with Mr. Eden’s comments. The Foreign Secretary wrote:

  We are entitled to regard it as an offer by the Badoglio Government to negotiate on terms. … Should we not then reply that, as is well known, we insist on unconditional surrender, and the Badoglio Government must as a first step notify us that Italy surrenders unconditionally? Subsequently, at a later stage, if the Badoglio Government were to do this, we should then inform them of the terms on which we should be prepared to cease hostilities against Italy.

  On receiving this message I minuted in red ink in the margin, “Don’t miss the bus”; and again, “If they surrender immediately we should be prepared to accord conditions as acts of grace and not as a bargain.” I then sent the following reply, dated August 7, to the Foreign Secretary:

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary

7 Aug. 43

We agree with the course you have taken. Badoglio admits he
is going to double-cross someone, but his interests and the mood of the Italian people make it more likely Hitler will be the one to be tricked. Allowance should be made for the difficulties of his position. Meanwhile, the war should be carried forward against Italy in every way that the Americans will allow.

And again, on the day of my arrival in Canada:

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary

9 Aug. 43

Badoglio must state that he is prepared to place himself unreservedly in the hands of the Allied Governments, who have already made it plain that they desire Italy to have a respectable place in the New Europe.

Reference should also be made to General Eisenhower’s offer of the return of Italian prisoners of war taken in Tunisia and Sicily, provided Allied prisoners are speedily set free.

2. The object of the above is to convey to the Italian Government the feeling that, while they have to make the formal act of submission, our desire is to treat them with consideration, so far as military exigencies allow. Merely harping on “unconditional surrender,” with no prospect of mercy held out even as an act of grace, may well lead to no surrender at all. The expression “honourable capitulation” has also been officially used by the President, and I do not think it should be omitted from the language we are now to use.

3. We have just arrived [at Halifax], after a most pleasant voyage filled with fruitful discussions.

I passed to the President Mr. Eden’s reply.

Former Naval Person (Quebec) to President Roosevelt

12 Aug. 43

Eden suggests that our Tangier representative reply to Badoglio’s emissary Berio as follows:

Badoglio must understand that we cannot negotiate, but require unconditional surrender, which means that Italian Government should place themselves in hands of Allied Governments, who will then state their terms. These will provide for an honourable capitulation.

The instructions will continue:

Badoglio’s emissary should be reminded at the same time that the Prime Minister and President have already stated that we
desire that in due course Italy should occupy a respected place in New Europe, when peace has been re-established, and that General Eisenhower has announced that Italian prisoners taken in Tunisia and Sicily will be released, provided all British and Allied prisoners now in Italian hands are released.

2. This is simply made up of our existing declarations. If you approve it in principle, please cable at once direct to Eden at the Foreign Office, as I shall be on the move. If text does not meet your view, we can discuss it on arrival. I think the Italian envoy ought to have an answer as soon as possible.

  The President telegraphed to Mr. Eden approving this language, and the Italian envoy at Tangier was so informed.

These tentative approaches by the Italian Government were now superseded by the appearance in Spain of a plenipotentiary from the Italian High Command. On August 15 General Castellano, Chief of Staff to General Ambrosio, called on Sir Samuel Hoare at the British Embassy in Madrid. Castellano said that he was instructed by Marshal Badoglio to say that as soon as the Allies landed on the Italian mainland the Italian Government was prepared to join them against Germany. If the Allies accepted the proposal, Castellano would immediately give detailed information about German troop dispositions. I at once passed this new information to the President.