Closing the Ring (5 page)

Hitler:
What are the “better purposes”?

Neurath:
Well, my Fuehrer, sometimes the Italians explain, “When the war is over”; others say, “You never know what’s going to happen next.”

The German troops in Sicily have undoubtedly become rather unpopular. That can be explained very easily, because the Sicilians hold the view that we have brought the war to their country. First, we have eaten up everything they had, and now we are going to cause the English to come themselves, although—and I must emphasise this—the Sicilian peasant really wouldn’t mind that. He thinks that this will end his suffering. The general opinion all over Southern Italy is that the war will be over when the English come, and that the presence of the Germans just delays this.

Hitler:
What is the Italian Government doing to counter this attitude?

Neurath:
My Fuehrer, as far as I know the prefects and officials who are still around are not doing much about it. Whenever I
directed their attention to it and complained that German soldiers were being cursed in the streets, I was told that they didn’t know what to do about it, since this represented the popular view. They said, “That’s how the people feel; you have made yourselves unpopular; you have requisitioned things and eaten up all our chickens.” But I do think that the officials could make more of an effort, and make examples of the more flagrant cases.

Hitler:
They won’t take action?

Neurath:
It is very difficult. They just won’t take action. The Sicilian temperament is different from the North Italian. But on the whole it is very unpleasant to see how they let things slide.

The threat to Sicily from the enemy air is extremely strong.

  The discussion then turned on the fidelity of General Roatta and other Italian leaders, and the increasingly difficult position of Mussolini. Altogether a very disquieting picture was presented to the Fuehrer.

*  *  * *  *

In the channel between Tunisia and Sicily lay the small island of Pantelleria, which served as an enemy base for aircraft and E-boats. In January 1941 we had planned to assault and capture it, but the opportunity passed and it remained a thorn in our side throughout the hardest period of the siege of Malta. Now it became necessary, not only to subdue it, but to use it ourselves for our fighter aircraft. Attacks by air and sea began immediately after the fall of Tunis. Bombardment continued until June 8, when unconditional surrender was demanded. This being refused, a landing from the sea was carried out on June 11, supported by heavy naval and air bombardment. Much had been made beforehand of the magnitude and perils of this enterprise. It was entirely successful, with no casualties except, according to sailors’ stories, one soldier bitten by a mule. Over eleven thousand prisoners fell into our hands. During the next two days the neighbouring islands of Lampedusa and Linosa also capitulated, the former to the pilot of an aircraft who had been compelled to land by lack of fuel. No enemy outpost now remained south of Sicily.

*  *  * *  *

Intense air attack upon Sicily began on July 3 with the bombing of airfields both there and in Sardinia, which made many unusable. The enemy fighters were thrown onto the defensive and their long-range bombers forced to withdraw their bases to the Italian mainland. Four of the five train ferries operating across the Straits of Messina were sunk. By the time our convoys were approaching the island, air superiority was firmly established, and Axis warships and aircraft made no serious effort to interfere with the seaborne assault. By our cover plans, the enemy were kept in doubt until the last moment where our stroke would fall. Our naval movements and military preparations in Egypt suggested an expedition to Greece. Since the fall of Tunis, they had sent more planes to the Mediterranean, but the additional squadrons had gone, not to Sicily, but to the Eastern Mediterranean, Northwest Italy, and Sardinia. In the critical period while the convoys were approaching their target, General Eisenhower established his Headquarters in Malta, where communications were excellent. Here he was joined by General Alexander and Admiral Cunningham. Air Chief Marshal Tedder remained near Carthage to control the combined air operations.

July 10 was the appointed day. On the morning of July 9, the great armadas from east and west were converging south of Malta, and it was time for all to steam for the beaches of Sicily. Admiral Cunningham says in his dispatch:

  The only incidents which occurred to mar the precision of this remarkable concentration were the loss by U-boat attack of three ships in convoy. The passage of the convoys was covered most effectively; the majority were not sighted by enemy aircraft.

  On my way to Chequers, where I was to await the result, I spent an hour in the Admiralty War Room. The map covered an entire wall and showed the enormous convoys, escorts, and supporting detachments moving towards their assault beaches. This was the greatest amphibious operation so far attempted in history. But all depended on the weather.

*  *  * *  *

The morning of the 9th was fine, but by noon a fresh and unseasonable northwest wind sprang up. During the afternoon the wind increased, and by evening there was a heavy swell, which would make landings hazardous, particularly on the western beaches in the American sector. The landing-craft convoys, plunging northward from Malta and from many African ports between Bizerta and Benghazi, were having a rough voyage.

Arrangements had been made for postponing the landing in case of necessity, but a decision would have to be taken not later than noon. Watching anxiously from the Admiralty, the First Sea Lord inquired by signal about the weather conditions. Admiral Cunningham replied at 8
P.M.
, “Weather not favourable, but operation proceeding.” “It was,” he says, “manifestly too late for postponement, but considerable anxiety was felt, particularly for the small-craft convoys making up against the sea.” They were indeed much delayed and became scattered. Many ships arrived late, but fortunately no great harm resulted. “The wind,” says Cunningham, “mercifully eased during the night, and by the morning of the 10th had ceased, leaving only a tiresome swell and surf on the western beaches.”

The bad weather helped to give us surprise. Admiral Cunningham continues:

The very efficient cover plan and the deceptive routeing of convoys played their part. In addition the vigilance of the enemy was undoubtedly relaxed owing to the unfavourable phase of the moon. Finally came this wind, dangerously close at the time to making some, if not all, the landings impracticable. These apparently unfavourable factors had actually the effect of making the weary Italians, who had been alert for many nights, turn thankfully in their beds, saying, “Tonight at any rate they can’t come.” B
UT THEY CAME
.

The airborne forces however met hard fortune. More than one-third of the gliders carrying our 1st Air Landing Brigade were released too early by their American towing aircraft and many of the men they carried were drowned. The rest were
scattered over southeastern Sicily, and only twelve gliders arrived at the important bridge which was their aim. Out of eight officers and sixty-five men who seized and held it until help came twelve hours later, only nineteen survived unwounded. This was a forlorn feat of arms. On the American front the air landings were also too widely dispersed, but the many small parties creating damage and confusion inland worried the Italian coastal divisions.

The seaborne landings, under continuous fighter protection, were everywhere highly successful. Syracuse and Pachino on the British front, Licata and Gela on the American, were captured. The Eighth Army took Augusta on the 12th. On the American front very heavy counter-attacks were made on the United States 1st Division by part of a German armoured division. For a time the position was critical, but after a stiff fight the enemy were beaten off and our Allies pressed on to capture the important airfields east of Gela.

The major effort of the Eighth Army was now directed against the airfields at Catania and Gerbini. Aided by more airborne and seaborne landings of parachute and Commando troops, which captured vital bridges, the army crossed the river Simeto. But now German troops from farther west reinforced the Italians and progress beyond the river was stopped. On the 16th, the left flank of the Eighth Army reached Caltagirone, in close touch with the Americans, who were also pressing westward along the coast and had taken Porto Empedocle.

Twelve airfields were now in our hands, and by July 18 there were only twenty-five serviceable German aircraft in the island. Eleven hundred planes, more than half of them German, were left behind destroyed or damaged. Our air forces tried hard to stop the passage of troops from the mainland to Messina. They were only partly successful against the heavy anti-aircraft fire.

On July 16, General Alexander ordered the Eighth Army to attack the western side of Mount Etna, and the Seventh Army to seize the roads around Enna and cut the west-east highway at Petralia. The 50th Division could make little progress, and
the Germans had brought reinforcements, including six battalions of the redoubtable 1st Parachute Division, from the mainland. On its left we made some ground, but it was clear that a new plan and more troops were needed. There was a lull on the British front till the 78th Division arrived from Tunisia.

*  *  * *  *

Our next strategic move was still in suspense. Should we cross the Straits of Messina and seize the toe of Italy, should we seize the heel at Taranto, or should we land higher up the west coast, in the Gulf of Salerno, and capture Naples? Or, again, must we restrict ourselves to the occupation of Sardinia? In June, General Eisenhower had been asked for his opinion. The problem was a difficult one. At the Washington Conference in May (“Trident”), we had decided to transfer to India about August much of the assault shipping and certain air forces then allotted to the Sicily attack. He had also been warned that after November 1 four American and three British divisions would have to be withdrawn to Britain for the cross-Channel invasion in 1944. On June 30, he proposed that when the capture of Sicily had been completed, we should attack either the toe of Italy, or Sardinia. If Sardinia were chosen, he could probably be ready by October, but he did not expect to be able to invade the mainland of Italy before November, and by then the weather might be too bad for amphibious landings. To justify so late a descent upon Italy there had to be a good prospect of a speedy advance.

The progress made in Sicily clarified the scene. The contrast may be judged from the telegram in which I set the whole position before Smuts on July 16:

Prime Minister to General Smuts

16 July 43

In our May talks at Washington we found serious American misgivings lest we should become deeply involved in the Mediterranean, and a hankering for winding up the campaign there with the capture of Sardinia. This we combated, and, as our forces in the Mediterranean far outnumber the American, we were able to
have the matter left open till after the capture of Sicily. Not being satisfied with this, I requested the President to send General Marshall with me to North Africa and there upon the spot to convince Eisenhower and others that nothing less than Rome could satisfy the requirements of this year’s campaign. We agreed that the decision should be taken when it was seen how the fighting in Sicily went. If it was severe and prolonged, then only Sardinia might be possible. If however our enterprise prospered and Italian resistance was seen not to be formidable, then we were immediately to invade the Italian mainland.

2. The moment is now approaching when this choice must be made, and I need not tell you I shall make it a capital issue. I believe the President is with me; Eisenhower in his heart is naturally for it. I will in no circumstances allow the powerful British and British-controlled armies in the Mediterranean to stand idle. I am bringing the very fine Polish army from Persia into Syria, where it can also participate.

3. The situation in the Balkans is also most hopeful, and I am sending you a report from the Middle East Headquarters showing the Italian forces on the verge of collapse. Not only must we take Rome and march as far north as possible in Italy, but our right hand must give succour to the Balkan patriots. In all this there is great hope, provided action is taken worthy of the opportunity. I am confident of a good result, and I shall go all lengths to procure the agreement of our Allies. If not, we have ample forces to act by ourselves.

4. When are you coming over here? You know what a warm welcome awaits you and how close is our community of ideas on war. All the above is for your eye alone and of operational secrecy.

*  *  * *  *

Meanwhile, Allied air forces were harrying the enemy communications and airfields in Southern Italy, and the port of Naples. On July 19, a strong force of American bombers attacked the railway yards and air port at Rome. Havoc was wrought; and the shock was severe. In Sicily itself the Americans were advancing steadily under the spirited leadership of General Patton. Their 3d Infantry and 2d Armoured Divisions were given the task of reducing the western end, where
only Italians now remained, while their IId Corps, comprising the 1st and 45th Divisions, was directed to gain the northern coast and then to thrust eastward along the two main roads towards Messina. Palermo was taken on July 22, and by the end of the month the Americans had reached the line Nicosia-San Stefano. Their 3d Division, its task in Western Sicily completed, had been brought in to support the coastal drive, while the 9th Division was brought over from Africa, where, like our 78th, it had been in reserve.

The field was thus disposed for the final battles. These were certain to be severe, since, apart from what remained of the Italian garrison, more than three German divisions were now in action under a well-tried German Commander, General Hube. But the speedy collapse of Italy became probable. There was a marked change of feeling in our circles in Whitehall, and we decided on the bolder plan of a direct attack on the west coast of Italy to seize Naples. Washington agreed, but insisted that no more forces could be provided than those agreed upon at the “Trident” Conference. The Americans held that none of the operations elsewhere, especially “Overlord,” should be prejudiced by more vigorous action in the Mediterranean. This reservation was to cause keen anxiety during the landing at Salerno.