Closing the Ring (61 page)

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The brute fact of delaying the return to England of the fifty-six L.S.T.s for three weeks had to be faced. Against this towered up the date of “Overlord”—M
AY
. The reader will note in the following telegram the first appearance of J
UNE
6.

Prime Minister to Chiefs of Staff

26 Dec. 43

I am proceeding entirely on basis of keeping to the May “Overlord.”
I am sure this can be done and problem solved by persevering energetically. I may however say in strictest secrecy that both Eisenhower and Montgomery have expressed themselves entirely dissatisfied with what they have heard of the present plan for “Overlord,” and I gather they will demand a far larger first flight. I should think it very likely that when they have examined the plan, they will propose a delay. Our contract is “during May,” but I do not know whether if responsible commanders required the June moon around June 6, and could show much better prospects then, the extra week might not have to be conceded. Preliminary air bombardment would begin anyhow in May.

Beware therefore that we do not sacrifice our vital task in Italy in order to achieve a date which anyhow may be postponed on other and larger grounds. Eisenhower even spoke of telegraphing himself to Stalin, once he had assumed effective command and was master of the problem, demanding a reasonable measure of delay. I did not lend myself to this at all, as I am fighting the case on the Teheran [agreement] line. All the more do I expect you to help me. Be careful this is kept to yourselves and the three War Cabinet Ministers on Defence Committee, Mr. Attlee, Mr. Eden, and Mr. Lyttelton.

  At the close of this decisive Christmas Day Conference at Carthage, I sent the following to the President, and a similar telegram home. I was careful to state the root fact bluntly.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

25 Dec. 43

I held a conference today with Eisenhower, and all his high officers. Report as follows:

General Alexander is prepared to execute the landing at Anzio about January 20 if he can get a lift of two divisions. This should decide the Battle of Rome, and possibly achieve the destruction of a substantial part of enemy’s army. To strike with less than two divisions would be to court disaster, having regard to the positions likely to be achieved by that date by Fifth and Eighth Armies.

For this purpose eighty-eight L.S.T.s are required. These can only be obtained by delaying the return home of fifty-six L.S.T.s due to leave the Mediterranean from January 15 onward, sending them home by convoys starting February 5. Nothing less than this will suffice. The fifteen L.S.T.s from India cannot arrive
in time, though they would be invaluable to replace casualties and for the building-up of “Anvil.”

By various expedients it is believed that the lost three weeks can be recovered and the existing prescribed build-up for “Overlord” maintained.

Having kept these fifty-six L.S.T.s in the Mediterranean so long, it would seem irrational to remove them for the very week when they can render decisive service. What, also, could be more dangerous than to let the Italian battle stagnate and fester on for another three months? We cannot afford to go forward leaving a vast half-finished job behind us. It therefore seemed to those present that every effort should be made to bring off Anzio on a two-division basis around January 20, and orders have been issued to General Alexander to prepare accordingly. If this opportunity is not grasped we must expect the ruin of the Mediterranean campaign of 1944. I earnestly hope therefore that you may agree to the three weeks’ delay in return of the fifty-six landing-craft, and that all the authorities will be instructed to make sure that the May “Overlord” is not prejudiced thereby.

6. I recognise with regret that Rhodes and the Aegean policy must be side-tracked in these higher interests, and it may well be that “Pigstick” [the attack on the Arakan west of Burma] will require to be moderated into “Pigstuck,” in order to build up three divisions for the landing in the South of France. This has been most painful to me, but I could not face the Italian stalemate and disaster which will otherwise ensue.

  It was at this point, while all hung in suspense, that I flew from Carthage to Marrakesh, bearing my burdens with me.

8
At Marrakesh
Convalescence

Sinking of the “Scharnhorst”___By Air to Marrakesh___A Joyful Event: The President’s Telegram of December
28___
A Happy Landing___May
5
versus June
3
as Dates for “Overlord”___The American Parachute Brigade___Montgomery’s Visit___New Year Correspondence with the President___Conference at Marrakesh on the Anzio Expedition, January
7
and
8___
Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery Incline to the Moon Period of June
3
for “Overlord”___Agreement of the President___The Polish Question___Visit of President Benes___My Report to the President of January
6___
Friendly Contacts with General de Gaulle___The Disposal of the Italian Fleet___Correspondence with President Roosevelt___My Alternative Plan___Eventual Agreement___Home Before Anzio.

L
ORD
M
ORAN
thought it possible for me to leave Carthage after Christmas, but insisted that I must have three weeks’ convalescence somewhere. And where else could be better than the lovely villa at Marrakesh, where President Roosevelt and I had stayed after Casablanca a year before? All these plans had been made during the past few days. I was to be the guest of the United States Army at Marrakesh. It was also thought that I had been long enough at Carthage to be located. Small vessels had ceaselessly to patrol the bay in front of the villa in case some U-boat turned up for a surprise raid. There might also be a long-range air attack. I had my own protection in a battalion of the Coldstream Guards. I was too ill, or too busy, to be consulted about all this, but I saw in my beloved Marrakesh a haven where I could regain my strength. Tedder had planned the flight with great care. The doctors did not want me to fly above six thousand feet, and he had arranged our route through the Atlas Mountains on this basis. I was delighted when the morning of December 27 came and I dressed for the first time again in my uniform. As I was leaving the door, a telegram was put in my hand. The
Scharnhorst
had been sunk by Admiral Fraser in an engagement with the
Duke of York.
I stopped to dictate the following telegram to Stalin:

Prime Minister to Premier Stalin

27 Dec. 43

The Arctic convoys to Russia have brought us luck. Yesterday enemy attempted to intercept with battle-cruiser
Scharnhorst.
Commander-in-Chief Admiral Fraser with the
Duke of York
(35,000-ton battleship) cut off
Scharnhorst’s
retreat and after an action sunk her.

2. Am much better, and off to the south for convalescence.

  A very cordial reply to this was received a few days later, ending, “I shake your hand firmly.”

Outside the villa a magnificent guard of the Coldstream was drawn up. I had not realised how much I had been weakened by my illness. I found it quite a difficulty to walk along the ranks and climb into the motor-car. The flight at six thousand feet had been planned on the weather forecast that the skies would be clear. However, as we sailed on and the uplands of Tunisia began to rise about us, I saw a lot of large fleecy and presently blackish clouds gathering around, and after a couple of hours we were more often in mist than in sunlight. I have always had a great objection to what are called “stuffed clouds”—i.e., clouds with mountains inside them—and flying an intricate route through the various valleys before us in order to keep under six thousand feet seemed to me an unfair proposition for the others in the plane. I therefore sent for the pilot and told him to fly at least two thousand feet above the highest mountain within a hundred miles of his route. Lord Moran agreed. Oxygen was brought
by a skilled administrator, specially provided for the journey. We sailed up into the blue. I got along all right and we made a perfect landing at about four o’clock on the Marrakesh airfield. The second plane, which had adhered strictly to its instructions, had a very severe and dangerous flight through the various gorges and passes, many of which were traversed with only fleeting glimpses of the towering mountains. At this low height the weather was by no means good. The plane arrived safely an hour behind us with one of its doors blown off and nearly everybody very sick. I was sorry indeed they should have been put to so much discomfort and risk on my account. They could have flown it all out comfortably under blue skies at twelve or even eleven thousand feet.

Nothing could exceed the comfort, and even luxury, of my new abode, or the kindness of everyone concerned. But one thing rose above all others in my mind—what answer would the President give to my telegram? When I thought of the dull, dead-weight resistance, taking no account of timing and proportion, that I had encountered about all Mediterranean projects, I awaited the answer with deep anxiety. What I asked for was a hazardous enterprise on the Italian coast, and a possible delay of three weeks from May 1—four if the moon phase was to be observed—in the date of the Channel crossing. I had gained the agreement of the commanders on the spot. The British Chiefs of Staff had always agreed in principle, and were now satisfied in detail. But what would the Americans say to a four weeks’ postponement of “Overlord”? However, when one is thoroughly tired out, the blessing of sleep is not usually denied.

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It was with joy, not, I confess, unmingled with surprise, that the next day I received the following:

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

28 Dec. 43

It is agreed to delay the departure of fifty-six L.S.T.s scheduled for “Overlord” for mounting Anzio on January 20, and on the
basis that “Overlord” remains the paramount operation and will be carried out on the date agreed to at Cairo and Teheran. All possible expedients should be undertaken to overcome probable effect on “Overlord” preparation, to which end the other twelve L.S.T.s for “Overlord” should depart as now scheduled and the fifteen L.S.T.s
ex
Andamans arriving in Mediterranean on January 14 should proceed directly to United Kingdom. I agree that Rhodes and the Aegean must be side-tracked and that we cannot give further consideration to launching Rhodes prior to “Anvil” [Riviera]. In view of the Soviet-British-American agreement reached in Teheran, I cannot agree without Stalin’s approval to any use of forces or equipment elsewhere that might delay or hazard the success of “Overlord” or “Anvil.”

  I replied:

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

28 Dec. 43

I thank God for this fine decision, which engages us once again in wholehearted unity upon a great enterprise.

I have heard from the British Chiefs of Staff that the Admiralty can conform to the conditions provided the releases are made from the Anzio plan of the number which are agreed upon. The Chiefs of Staff will be telegraphing today in full detail to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Meanwhile, here the word is “Full steam ahead.”

After travelling quite unaffected at thirteen thousand feet, I arrived yesterday at our villa, where I am indeed in the lap of luxury, thanks to overflowing American hospitality. Max [Beaverbrook] has just flown in from London. I propose to stay here in the sunshine till I am quite strong again.

  Great efforts had indeed been made by the Staffs at home, and especially by the Admiralty, to accomplish the “cat-claw,” and I hastened to congratulate them. General Alexander had asked for eighty-eight landing-craft; they promised him all but one. The President’s telegram was a marvel. I was sure that I owed it not only to his good will, but to Marshall’s balance of mind, to Eisenhower’s loyalty to the show he was about to quit, and to Bedell Smith’s active, knowledgeable, fact-armed diplomacy.

On the same day Alexander sent us his plan. After conferring with General Mark Clark and General Brian Robertson, Chief Administrative Officer and son of the C.I.G.S. of the First World War, he had decided to use an American and a British division. Armour, paratroops, and Commandos would be on a fifty-fifty basis, and the whole would be under an American corps commander. The attack would go in on January 20. Ten days beforehand he would launch a big offensive against Cassino to draw off the German reserves. The forward plunge of the main armies would follow. I was well content. So far so good.

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I had however another small margin on which to draw. I wired to the Chiefs of Staff:

Prime Minister to Chiefs of Staff

29 Dec. 43

I am fighting the issue [of the date of “Overlord”] entirely on the Teheran basis. This assumed May 20 rather than May 5, which is an altogether new date. Our contract with Stalin would be fulfilled by any date up to May 31. It seems to me from what I have heard from Eisenhower that June 3, which is the corresponding moon phase, would be perfectly permissible, especially if it were asked for by the commanders now nominated for the operation. There is no need to discuss such matters now, but here is something to veer and haul on.

Pray let me have the alternative build-up comparing May 5 with June 3. I repeat this is not to be considered as anything in the nature of a decision for delay, and is not to go to anyone outside our circle.

  The Chiefs of Staff replied:

Chiefs of Staff to Prime Minister

29 Dec. 43

To fulfil the conditions of the plan made by existing commanders the “Overlord” assault should take place about May 5. However, this date cannot be regarded as final, and even if delays occur in the return and refitting programme of the L.S.T.s so that all have not joined their assault forces by April 13, this should not rule out a May date for the “Overlord” assault.