Closing the Ring (56 page)

I then asked what it was he wanted. We had “Overlord” coming. I should like to have Sweden with us in the war and Finland out of the war by the spring. Stalin said that would be good.

The conversation then turned to territorial detail—Viborg (“Nothing doing about Viborg,” said Stalin), the Karelian Isthmus, Hangö. “If the cession of Hangö presents a difficulty,” said Stalin, “I am willing to take Petsamo instead.” “A fair exchange,” said Roosevelt.

I said the British wanted two things: first, that Russia should be satisfied with her frontiers; second, that the Finns should be free and independent and live as well as they could in those very uncomfortable regions. But we did not want to put any pressure on Russia. Stalin said that, after all, allies could squeeze each other if they wanted to from time to time. But let the Finns live. It would be all right so long as half the damage they had done was made good. Roosevelt asked whether it would be any use if the Finns were to go to Moscow without any conditions. Stalin said that if there were no assurances that an agreement would be concluded, then an expedition to Moscow would help Germany, who would make capital out of any failure. This applied also to the aggressive elements in Finland, who would say that the Russians did not really want peace.

I said that would be a lie, and that we would all say so loudly.

“All right,” said Stalin, “let them come if you insist.”

Roosevelt said that the present Finnish leaders were pro-German; if there were others we might get somewhere. Stalin thought it would be better to have others, but he did not object even to Ryti. Anyone, even the Devil, might come. He was not afraid of devils.

I said I hoped Marshal Stalin would handle the question of
Finland with due regard to the possibility of Sweden coming into the war in time for our general offensive in May.

Stalin agreed, but said that he could not diverge from several conditions: (1) Restoration of the 1940 treaty. (2) Hangö or Petsamo. (Here he added that Hangö was leased to the Soviet Union, but he would propose to take Petsamo.) (3) Compensation in kind as to 50 per cent for damage. Quantities could be discussed later. (4) A breach with Germany. (5) The expulsion of all Germans. (6) Demobilisation.

I replied about compensation that it was easy enough to do damage, but very hard to repair it, and that it was bad for any one country to fall into tribute to another. Stalin said that the Finns might perhaps be given an opportunity to repay the damage they had done in, say, five to eight years. I said, “Experience shows that large indemnities do not work.” Stalin proposed to occupy a region of Finland if the Finns did not pay, but if they did pay, the Russians would withdraw within the year.

“I have not yet,” I said, “been elected a Soviet commissar, but if I were, I should advise against this. There are much bigger things to think about.” We were behind the Russians and ready to help them at every turn, but we must think of the May battle. President Roosevelt said that he was ready to stand behind all that had been said (against large indemnities).

*  *  * *  *

Stalin now asked, “Are there any other questions?” The President replied, “There is the question of Germany.” Stalin said that he would like to see Germany split up. The President agreed, but Stalin suggested that I should object.

I said I did not object in principle. Roosevelt said that, so that there could be some discussion, he and his advisers had had a shot at a plan some three months before. This involved the dividing of Germany into five parts. Stalin, with a grin, suggested that I was not listening because I was not inclined to see Germany split up. I said that I considered that the root of the evil lay in Prussia, in the Prussian Army and General Staff.

Roosevelt then explained his plan for splitting Germany into five parts: (1) Prussia. (2) Hanover and the northwest part of Germany. (3) Saxony and the Leipzig area. (4) Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Cassel, and the section south of the Rhine. (5) Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg. These five sections would be self-governing, but there were two more that would be governed by the United Nations: (1) Kiel and its canal and Hamburg. (2) The Ruhr and the Saar. These would be under the control of the United Nations as trustees. He was only throwing this out as an idea which might be talked over.

“If,” I said, “I might use the American idiom, I would say that the President has ‘said a mouthful.’ Mr. Roosevelt’s plan is a new one to me. In my opinion there are two things, one destructive and the other constructive. I have two clear ideas in mind. First, the isolation of Prussia. What is to be done to Prussia after that is only secondary. Then I should like to detach Bavaria, Württemberg, the Palatinate, Saxony, and Baden. Whereas I would treat Prussia sternly, I would make things easier for the second group, which I should like to see work in with what I would call a Danubian Confederation. The people of these parts of Germany are not the most ferocious, and I should like to see them live tolerably, and in a generation they would feel differently. South Germans are not going to start another war, and we would have to make it worth their while to forget Prussia. I do not much mind whether there are one or two groups.” I asked Marshal Stalin whether he would be prepared to go into action on this front.

Stalin said he would, but he preferred a plan for the partition of Germany—something like the President’s plan, which was more likely to weaken Germany. When one had to deal with large masses of German troops, one found them all fighting like devils, as the British and American armies would soon learn. The Austrians by themselves were different, and he described the way they surrendered. All Germans were the same. It was the Prussian officers that provided the cement. But fundamentally there was no difference between North Germans and South Germans, for all Germans fought like fierce beasts. We should be careful not to include the Austrians in any kind of combination. Austria had existed independently, and could do so again. So also must Hungary exist independently. After breaking up Germany it would be most unwise to create new combinations, Danubian or otherwise.

President Roosevelt agreed warmly. There was no difference between Germans. The Bavarians had no officer class; otherwise they were exactly like the Prussians, as the American troops had already discovered.

I said that if Germany were divided into a number of parts as suggested by the President, and these parts were not attached to other combinations, they would reunite. It was not a question of dividing Germany so much as giving a life to the cut-off bits and making them content not to be dependent on the Greater Reich. Even if this were achieved for fifty years, that would be a lot.

Stalin said that a Danubian combination would not be able to live, and the Germans would take advantage of this by putting flesh on something that was only a skeleton and thus creating a new great state. Here he asked whether Hungary and Rumania would be members of any such combination. He then reiterated his views about the advantages which it would present to Germany in the future. It was far better to break up and scatter the German tribes. Of course, they would want to unite, no matter how much they were split up. They would always want to reunite. In this he saw great danger, which would have to be neutralised by various economic measures, and in the long run by force if necessary. That was the only way to keep the peace. But if we were to make a large combination with Germans in it trouble was bound to come. We had to see to it that they were kept separate, and that Hungary and Germany should not be coupled. There were no measures possible to exclude a movement towards reunion. Germans would always want to reunite and to take their revenge. It would be necessary to keep ourselves
strong enough to beat them if they ever let loose another war.

I asked Stalin if he contemplated a Europe of little states, all disjointed, with no larger units at all.

He replied that he was speaking of Germany, not Europe. Poland and France were large states. Rumania and Bulgaria were small states. But Germany should at all costs be broken up so that she could not reunite. The President said that what he proposed was a method of doing this. I said that I must make it clear that the present was only a preliminary survey of a vast historical problem. Stalin said that it was certainly very preliminary.

*  *  * *  *

I then brought the discussion back to Poland. I said I did not ask for any agreement, nor was I convinced on the matter myself, but I should rather like to get something down on paper. I then produced the following formula: “It is thought in principle that the home of the Polish state and nation should be between the so-called Curzon Line and the Line of the Oder,
¹
including for Poland East Prussia (as defined) and Oppeln; but the actual tracing of the frontier line requires careful study, and possibly disentanglement of population at some points.” Why not a formula on which I could say something like this to the Poles: “I do not know if the Russians would approve, but I think that I might get it for you. You see, you are being well looked after.” I added that we should never get the Poles to say that they were satisfied. Nothing would satisfy the Poles.

Stalin then said that the Russians would like to have the warm-water port of Königsberg, and he sketched a possible line on the map. This would put Russia on the neck of Germany. If he got this, he would be ready enough to agree to my formula about Poland. I asked what about Lvov. Stalin said he would accept the Curzon Line.

*  *  * *  *

The same evening, Roosevelt, Stalin, and I initialled the following document, which sets forth the military conclusions of our Triple Conference.

  The Conference:

(1) Agreed that the partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by Commando operations.

(2) Agreed that, from the military point of view, it was most desirable that Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the year.

(3) Took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that if Turkey found herself at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey or attacked her, the Soviet would immediately be at war with Bulgaria. The Conference further took note that this fact would be explicitly stated in the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war.

(4) Took note that Operation “Overlord” would be launched during May 1944, in conjunction with an operation against Southern France. The latter operation would be undertaken in as great a strength as availability of landing-craft permitted. The Conference further took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that the Soviet forces would launch an offensive at about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western Front.

(5) Agreed that the military Staffs of the three Powers should henceforward keep in close touch with each other in regard to the impending operations in Europe. In particular it was agreed that a cover plan to mystify and mislead the enemy as regards these operations should be concerted between the Staffs concerned.

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Thus our long and hard discussions at Teheran reached their end. The military conclusions governed in the main the future of the war. The cross-Channel invasion was fixed for May, subject naturally to tides and the moon. It was to be aided by a renewed major Russian offensive. At first sight I liked the proposed descent upon the French Southern shore by part of the Allied Armies in Italy. The project had not been
examined in detail, but the fact that both the Americans and the Russians favoured it made it easier to secure the landing-craft necessary for the success of our Italian campaign and the capture of Rome, without which it would have been a failure. I was of course more attracted by the President’s alternative suggestion of a right-handed move from Italy by Istria and Trieste, with ultimate designs for reaching Vienna through the Ljubljana gap. All this lay five or six months ahead. There would be plenty of time to make a final choice as the general war shaped itself, if only the life of our armies in Italy was not paralysed by depriving them of their modest requirements in landing-craft. Many amphibious or semi-amphibious schemes were open. I expected that the seaborne operations in the Bay of Bengal would be abandoned, and this, as the
next chapter
will show, proved correct. I was glad to feel that several important options were still preserved. Our strong efforts were to be renewed to bring Turkey into the war with all that might accompany this in the Aegean, and follow from it in the Black Sea. In this we were to be disappointed. Surveying the whole military scene, as we separated in an atmosphere of friendship and unity of immediate purpose, I personally was well content.

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The political aspects were at once more remote and speculative. Obviously they depended upon the results of the great battles yet to be fought, and after that upon the mood of each of the Allies when victory was gained. It would not have been right at Teheran for the Western democracies to found their plans upon suspicions of the Russian attitude in the hour of triumph and when all her dangers were removed. Stalin’s promise to enter the war against Japan as soon as Hitler was overthrown and his armies defeated, was of the highest importance. The hope of the future lay in the most speedy ending of the war and the establishment of a World Instrument to prevent another war, founded upon the combined strength of the three Great Powers whose leaders had joined hands in friendship around the table.

We had procured a mitigation for Finland, which on the whole is operative today. The frontiers of the new Poland had been broadly outlined both in the East and in the West. The Curzon Line, subject to interpretation in the East, and the line of the Oder in the West, seemed to afford a true and lasting home for the Polish nation after all its sufferings. At the time the question between the Eastern and Western Neisse, which flow together to form the Oder River, had not arisen. When in July 1945 it arose in a violent form and under totally different conditions at the Potsdam Conference, I at once declared that Great Britain adhered only to the Eastern tributary. And this is still our position.