Closing the Ring (26 page)

The French Committee was supposedly conceived on the principle of collective responsibility of individual Frenchmen for the prosecution of the war, and our relations with it should be kept on this basis, it being understood that as to matters of a military character the two Governments will deal directly with the French Commander-in-Chief of the French forces. French political questions must be left to solution by the people of France when they have been freed from the present domination of the enemy. …

This Government is most anxious to join with you and the other United Nations to move along the line of limited acceptance of the Committee, subject always to military requirements, but we should make it clear that the plain conditions of French unity must be properly met.

I do not think we should at any time use the word “recognition.” because this would be distorted to imply that we recognise the Committee as the Government of France as soon as we land on French soil. Perhaps the word “acceptance” of the Committee’s local civil authority in various colonies on a temporary basis comes nearer to expressing my thought. We must however retain the
right and continue the present practice of dealing directly with local French officials in the colonies whenever military advantage to the Allied cause so dictates. Martinique is an illustrative example.

Giraud’s visit here was very successful. We kept it on a purely military basis, and we are starting immediately to send additional equipment for his army with every North African convoy. …

  Roosevelt ended by suggesting a joint formula based on “cooperation with” instead of “recognition of” the French Committee.

I replied to the President’s telegram of July 22.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

3 Aug. 43

I thought first that your proposed formula was rather chilling and would not end the agitation there is for recognition in both our countries. Meanwhile, events have moved in our favour. The Committee have felt acutely being ignored while the whole Italian problem is open. De Gaulle, I feel, is now more enclosed in the general body of the Committee. The arrangements for command also seem more satisfactory to us than the previous deadlock.

2. I have therefore asked the Foreign Office to suggest a certain modification in your formula designed to bring our two views into harmony. … If we cannot agree, we will talk it over.

The Quebec Conference already described was now imminent. Meanwhile, we had reached a deadlock.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

4 Aug. 43

I earnestly hope that nothing will be done in the matter of recognition of the Committee of National Liberation until we have an opportunity to talk it over together.

*  *  * *  *

It was only after stubborn talks that I was able to persuade the Americans to make a declaration in general terms supporting the political arrangements which had already taken shape in North Africa.

Prime Minister (Quebec) to Mr. Macmillan (Algiers)

25 Aug. 43

After prolonged discussions of a laborious character, we reached
what I trust will be considered a series of satisfactory solutions about recognition. We thought it better that we should all express our thought in our own words rather than persevere in a joint declaration by the United States and United Kingdom.

2. In my opinion the President and Mr. Hull have gone a long way to meet our desires. You should tell my friends on the Committee that I am sure the right course for them is to welcome the American declaration in most cordial terms, and not to draw invidious distinction between any of the forms in which recognition is accorded. On the contrary, the more pleasure they show at the American declaration the more value it will have for them. This is a moment when a friendly attitude towards the United States would be singularly helpful to the interests of France. If, on the other hand, newspapers or radio polemics and reproaches are indulged in, the only effect will be to rouse new flames of resentment in the State Department.

*  *  * *  *

The announcement of the recognition of the French National Committee on the following day marked the end of a period, and though the French leaders were not brought into the armistice negotiations with Italy, nor into the Mediterranean Commission which was subsequently set up to deal with Italian affairs, they were now on formal terms with the Allies as the representatives of France.

*  *  * *  *

The struggle for power between de Gaulle and Giraud went on unabated as the weeks passed, and frequent clashes took place over both civil and military appointments. The fault did not lie always with de Gaulle, and there were unnecessary incidents over the liberation of Corsica, where Free French elements on the island had occupied Ajaccio on the night of September 13/14. Giraud ordered a French expedition to Corsica three days later, and the unfortunate disputer between his military commander and the de Gaullist leaders on the spot still further worsened relations. The liberation of the island, from the military point of view, was slowly but successfully accomplished.

Prime Minister to Mr. Harold Macmillan (Algiers)

3 Oct. 43

If you think well, you should give the following message from me to Generals Giraud and de Gaulle:

“Many congratulations on the successful progress of your troops in Corsica. I look forward intensely to this famous island soon being liberated and restored to France.”

  The occupation of the island by French forces was completed on the following day.

*  *  * *  *

Plans for summoning a provisional Consultative Assembly to broaden the basis of French administration advanced during the month of October. Giraud’s position steadily weakened. The only support he possessed lay in certain Army circles who valued American good will, and in his rôle of co-President of the National Committee this was fast disappearing. De Gaulle showed himself incomparably the more powerful personality. On November 3, the Assembly met for the first time in Algiers. French political life was crystallising into an embryo Government for the future. On November 8, one year exactly after the North African landings, Giraud resigned from the National Committee, but remained Commander-in-Chief of the French forces. I was disturbed at the possible consequences of these events. It was essential for the future unity of France that some balance of power between these divergent elements should be reached.

I therefore telegraphed to the President:

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

10 Nov. 43

I am not at all content with the changes in the French National Committee which leave de Gaulle sole President. The body we recognised was of a totally different character, the essence being the co-Presidency of Giraud and de Gaulle. I suggest we maintain an attitude of complete reserve until we can discuss the position together.

  I hoped, on my way through to Cairo to the Teheran Conference,
to bring the rival Generals together myself at a review of the new French Army.

Prime Minister to Mr. Macmillan (Algiers)

2 Nov. 43

In case I am able to find a few days in Africa between now and Christmas, I should like to see something of the new French Army. You might ascertain discreetly from both Generals de Gaulle and Giraud whether this would be agreeable to them. We might have an afternoon parade, spend the night somewhere, and see some exercises in the morning. In these circumstances I should like to be the guest of the French National Committee. It occurred to me they might take this as a compliment, which it is intended to be. I cannot fix dates at the present time, for many obvious reasons.

*  *  * *  *

My intention was frustrated by the rough and tragic behaviour of the Free French Administration in Syria. The formal independence of Syria and the Lebanon had been proclaimed by the Free French at the end of 1941. We had recognised these republics, and Sir Edward Spears had been sent as British Minister in February 1942. Throughout the year however no progress was made. Changes of Ministry took place in both countries, but no elections were held. Anti-French antagonisms grew. Provisional Governments were appointed in March 1943. The elections in July and August resulted in an overwhelming Nationalist expression in both republics. The majorities demanded the complete revision of the mandatory constitution. The weakness of the Free French Administration led the local politicians, who had little faith in French promises of after-war independence, to strike. On October 7, the Lebanese Government proposed to abolish the French position in the republic. A month later, the Free French Committee in Algiers challenged the right of the Lebanese to act in this one-sided manner. M. Helleu, General Catroux’s deputy, returned from Algiers to give orders for the arrest of the Lebanese President and most of the Ministers, thereby provoking disturbances, which led to bloodshed, particularly at Beirut. The British Cabinet was disturbed by these events.

The action taken by the French stultified the agreements we had made with the French, and also with the Syrians and Lebanese. It was contrary to the Atlantic Charter and much else that we had declared. It seemed that the situation would be distorted throughout the whole of the Middle East and the Arab world, and also everywhere people would say, “What kind of France is this which, while itself subjugated by the enemy, seeks to subjugate others?”

Accordingly, I felt that the British and United States Governments should react strongly together. Already the character of the body we had recognised at Quebec had been totally altered by de Gaulle’s complete assumption of power. But the outbreaks in the Levant were of a different character, and afforded full justification, with the support of world public opinion, for bringing the issue with de Gaulle to a head. I thought that the kidnapped Lebanese President and Ministers should be set at liberty and permitted to resume their full function, and that the Lebanon Assembly should meet again as soon as conditions of law and order could be guaranteed. If de Gaulle refused to do this at once, we should withdraw our recognition from the French National Committee and stop the process of arming the French troops in North Africa.

I was forced to give instructions to General Wilson to be prepared if necessary to take over control of the Lebanon and to re-establish order with British troops. Happily this was not necessary. General Catroux had arrived from Algiers on November 16 to act as mediator, and on November 22 the French authorities released the politicians under arrest, and protracted negotiations began for the ultimate independence of Syria and the Lebanon.

These incidents left their mark upon our relations with the Free French Committee and with General de Gaulle. The result of our year of effort to bring about a united policy founded upon a true sense of comradeship between the United States, Britain, and the Free French leaders had been disappointing.

11
The Broken Axis
Autumn 1943

Civil War in Italy___Need to Sustain the King and Badoglio Government___My Telegram to President Roosevelt of September
21___
Our Agreement___Mussolini Meets Hitler, September
14___
He Sets up the Republic of Salo___Fate of the Italian Forces in the Balkans and Aegean___I Explain the Situation to Stalin___He Favours Backing the Badoglio-King Government___Marshal Badoglio Signs the Surrender Agreement at Malta___Triple Declaration About Italian Co-belligerency by the President, Stalin, and Me___Count Sforza’s Changeable Attitude___Arrangements About Italian Prisoners and Shipping___Italy Declares War on Germany, October
13___
A Fragile Situation.

M
USSOLINI’S
bid for a Fascist revival plunged Italy into the horrors of civil war. In the weeks following the September Armistice, officers and men of the Italian Army stationed in German-occupied Northern Italy and patriots from the towns and countryside began to form partisan units and to operate against the Germans and against their compatriots who still adhered to the Duce. Contacts were made with the Allied armies south of Rome and with the Badoglio Government. In these months the network of Italian resistance to the German occupation was created in a cruel atmosphere of civil strife, assassinations, and executions. The insurgent movement in Central and Northern Italy here as elsewhere in occupied Europe convulsed all classes of the people.

Not the least of their achievements was the succour and support
given to our prisoners of war trapped by the Armistice in camps in Northern Italy. Out of about eighty thousand of these men, conspicuously clothed in battle dress, and in the main with little knowledge of the language or geography of the country, at least ten thousand, mostly succoured by the local population with civilian clothes, were guided to safety thanks to the risks taken by members of the Italian Resistance and the simple people of the countryside.

*  *  * *  *

From the moment when the Armistice was signed and when the Italian Fleet loyally and courageously joined the Allies, I felt myself bound to work with the King of Italy and Marshal Badoglio, at least until Rome should be occupied by the Allies and we could construct a really broad-based Italian Government for the prosecution of the war jointly with us. I was sure that King Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio would be able to do more for what had now become the common cause than any Italian Government formed from the exiles or opponents of the Fascist régime. The surrender of the Italian Fleet was solid proof of their authority. On the other hand, there were the usual arguments against having anything to do with those who had worked with or helped Mussolini, and immediately there grew an endless series of intrigues among the six or seven Leftish parties in Rome to get rid of the King and Badoglio and take the power themselves. Considering the critical nature of the battle and the supreme importance of getting Italy to fight with a good heart on our side, I resisted these movements whenever they came to my notice. In this I was supported by Marshal Stalin, who followed the Russian maxim, “You may always walk with the Devil till you get to the end of the bridge.”