Closing the Ring (30 page)

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I laid the issue before the President in its full scope.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

7 Oct. 43

I am much concerned about the situation developing in the Eastern Mediterranean. On the collapse of Italy, we pushed small detachments from Egypt into several of the Greek islands, especially Cos, which has a landing-ground, and Leros, which is a fortified Italian naval base with powerful permanent batteries. We ran this risk in the hope that the Italian garrisons which welcomed us would take part in the defence. This hope appears vain, and Cos has already fallen except for some of our troops fighting in the mountains. Leros may well share its fate. Our enterprises against Rhodes have not yet succeeded.

2. I believe it will be found that the Italian and Balkan peninsulas are militarily and politically united, and that really it is one theatre with which we have to deal. It may indeed not be possible to conduct a successful Italian campaign ignoring what happens in the Aegean. The Germans evidently attach the utmost importance to this Eastern sphere, and have not hesitated to divert a large part of their straitened air force to maintain themselves there. They have to apprehend desertion by Hungary and Rumania and a violent schism in Bulgaria. At any moment Turkey may lean her weight against them. We can all see how adverse to the enemy are the conditions in Greece and Yugoslavia. When we remember what brilliant results have followed from the political reactions in Italy induced by our military efforts, should we not be shortsighted to ignore the possibility of a similar and even greater landslide in some or all of the countries I have mentioned? If we were able to provoke such reactions and profit by them, our joint task in Italy would be greatly lightened.

3. I have never wished to send an army into the Balkans, but only by agents, supplies, and Commandos to stimulate the intense
guerrilla prevailing there. This may yield results measureless in their consequence at very small cost to main operations. What I ask for is the capture of Rhodes and the other islands of the Dodecanese; the movement northward of our Middle Eastern air forces and their establishment in these islands and possibly on the Turkish shore, which last might well be obtained, thus forcing a diversion on the enemy far greater than that required of us. It would also offer the opportunity of engaging the enemy’s waning air-power and wearing it down in a new region. This air-power is all one, and the more continually it can be fought the better.

4. Rhodes is the key to all this. I do not feel the present plan of taking it is good enough. It will require and is worth at least up to a first-class division, which can of course be replaced by static troops once the place is ours. Leros, which for the moment we hold so precariously, is an important naval fortress, and, once we are ensconced in this area, air and light naval forces would have a most fruitful part to play. The policy should certainly not be pursued unless done with vigour and celerity requiring the best troops and adequate means. In this way the diversion from the main theatre would only be temporary, while the results may well be of profound and lasting importance.

5. I beg you to consider this and not let it be brushed aside and all these possibilities lost to us in the critical months that lie ahead. Even if landing-craft and assault ships on the scale of a division were withheld from the build-up of “Overlord” for a few weeks without altering the zero date, it would be worth while. I feel we may easily throw away an immense but fleeting opportunity. If you think well, would you very kindly let General Marshall see this telegram before any decision is taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

  I was pained to receive from the President a telegram which he had sent to Eisenhower which practically amounted to the refusal of all help, and left me, already committed, with his and the American Chiefs of Staff approval, to face the impending blow. The negative forces which hitherto had been so narrowly overcome had indeed resumed their control.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

8 Oct. 43

I do not want to force on Eisenhower diversions which limit
the prospects for the early successful development of the Italian operations to a secure line north of Rome.

I am opposed to any diversion which will in Eisenhower’s opinion jeopardise the security of his current situation in Italy, the build-up of which is exceedingly slow, considering the well-known characteristics of his opponent, who enjoys a marked superiority in ground troops and Panzer divisions.

It is my opinion that no diversion of forces or equipment should prejudice “Overlord” as planned.

The American Chiefs of Staff agree.

I am transmitting a copy of this message to Eisenhower.

  I noticed in particular the sentence “It is my opinion that no diversion of forces or equipment should prejudice ‘Overlord’ as planned.” To pretend that the delay of six weeks in the return of nine landing-craft for “Overlord” out of over five hundred involved, which would in any case have had six months in hand, would compromise the main operation of May 1944 was to reject all sense of proportion. I therefore resolved to make a further earnest appeal to the President. Looking back upon the far-reaching favourable results which had followed from my journey with General Marshall to Algiers in June, from which the whole of our good fortune had sprung, I thought I might ask for the same procedure, and I made all preparations to fly at once to Tunis.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

8 Oct. 43

I earnestly pray that my views may receive some consideration from you at this critical juncture, remembering how fruitful our concerted action has been in the past and how important it is for the future.

2. I am sure that the omission to take Rhodes at this stage and the ignoring of the whole position in the Eastern Mediterranean would constitute a cardinal error in strategy. I am convinced also that if we were round the table together this operation could be fitted into our plan without detriment either to the advance in Italy, of which, as you know, I have always been an advocate, or to the build-up of “Overlord,” which I am prepared faithfully to support.

3. May I remind you of my anxiety at Quebec when we were informed that the build-up in Italy could not exceed twelve divisions ashore by December I? There are now by October 9, over fifteen divisions ashore, of which about twelve are in action. We know that the enemy is withdrawing to the north, fighting rearguard actions and carrying off booty; we cannot yet tell whether it is in October or November that we can occupy Rome; but it is certain that we shall not come in contact with the main German forces at the top of the leg till December, or even later, and we certainly have control of the rate of advance.

4. There is therefore plenty of time to provide a division for the conquest of Rhodes and restore it to the battle-front in Italy before we reach the German fortified line.

5. We must find some means of resolving these difficulties and making sure of what is the right thing to do. I am willing to proceed to Eisenhower’s Headquarters with the British Chiefs of Staff immediately, if you will send General Marshall, or your personal representative, to meet me there, and we can then submit the results of a searching discussion to you and your Chiefs of Staff. We can be there Sunday afternoon [October 10].

  And later in the day:

  I should have added that my estimate of the effect on “Overlord” to which I referred is limited to a delay of about six weeks in sending home nine landing-craft which were to have started from the Mediterranean this month, nearly six months before they would actually be needed for “Overlord.” There ought, I think, to be some elasticity and a reasonable latitude in the handling of our joint affairs.

2. The Quebec decision to send four landing-ships with the craft they carry from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Bay of Bengal also for training purposes has turned out ill. This decision should have been reviewed in the light of the new circumstances opened by the surrender of Italy. Unhappily this was not done, and in consequence the Middle East was stripped bare [of landing craft] at a moment when great prizes could be cheaply secured.

  It is important to note the date of these two telegrams, October 8. On that day our information fully justified the belief that the enemy were withdrawing under cover of rearguards towards or beyond Rome. It was not till a day or two afterwards that we began to apprehend that their intention was to stand and fight south of the city. Though that produced a new situation, it did not in itself involve any immediate peril to our forces in Italy.

President Roosevelt to the Prime Minister

9 Oct. 43

I have received your [telegrams of October 8] and given careful personal consideration to the points you make. I have given careful thought to them, and so has the Staff. I am concerned about the possibility of our armies suffering a reverse by the action of an enemy with superior forces except by air, under a commander of proved audacity and resourcefulness. This applies especially to the absolute safety of the line we hope to gain in Italy.

With a full understanding of your difficulties in the Eastern Mediterranean, my thought in sending [my previous telegram] was that no diversion of force from Italy should be made that would jeopardise the security of the Allied armies in Italy, and that no action toward any minor objective should prejudice the success of “Overlord.”

We have almost all the facts now at our disposal on which to judge the commitments probably involved in the Rhodes operation. As I see it, it is not merely the capture of Rhodes, but it must mean of necessity, and it must be apparent to the Germans, that we intend to go further. Otherwise Rhodes will be under the guns of both Cos and Crete.

I was in accord with obtaining whatever hold we could in the Dodecanese without heavy commitments, but the present picture involves not only a well-organised, determined operation, but a necessary follow-through. This in turn involves the necessity of drawing for the means, largely shipping and air, not ground troops, from some other source, which inevitably must be Italy, “Overlord,” or possibly Mountbatten’s amphibious operation. The problem then is, are we to enter into a Balkan campaign, starting with the southern tip, or is there more to be gained, and with security, by pushing rapidly to the agreed upon position north of Rome? It appears to me that a greater Allied threat against the Balkans is implied in this than by a necessarily precarious amphibious operation against Rhodes, with a lack evident to the enemy of the necessary
means for the follow-through. Strategically, if we get the Aegean islands, I ask myself, where do we go from there? and vice versa, where would the Germans go if for some time they retain possession of the islands?

As to the meeting you propose for Sunday [10th] in Africa, this would be in effect another meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, necessarily involving only a partial representation and in which I cannot participate. Frankly, I am not in sympathy with this procedure under the circumstances. It seems to me the issue under discussion can best be adjusted by us through our Chiefs of Staff set-up in better perspective than by the method you propose. We have most of the facts, and will soon have the results of the conference scheduled for tomorrow in Tunis.

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Mr. Roosevelt’s reply quenched my last hopes. All I could now do was to ask that the President’s original negative message should not prevent a free discussion of the issue at the conference of Commanders-in-Chief. This was accorded for what it was worth.

Prime Minister to General Wilson

9 Oct. 43

You should press most strongly at the Conference for further support for “Accolade” [Rhodes]. I do not believe the forces at present assigned to it are sufficient, and if you are left to take a setback it would be bad. It is clear that the key to the strategic situation in the next month in the Mediterranean is expressed in the two words, “Storm Rhodes.” Do not therefore undertake this on the cheap. Demand what is necessary, and consult with Alexander. I am doing all I can.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

9 Oct. 43

Thank you very much for your kindness in giving so much of your time and thought to the views which I ventured to set before you. At your wish, and as you cannot send General Marshall, I have cancelled my journey, which I told Harry on the telephone I would never undertake without your blessing.

2. I agree with the end of your telegram of today, namely, that we should await the result of the conference scheduled for today
in Tunis, which can then be considered and adjusted by us through the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee.

3. I am afraid however that your telegram of October 8 to me, a copy of which was sent to Eisenhower, will be taken as an order from you and as closing the subject finally. This I should find it very hard to accept. I hope therefore that you will make it clear that the Conference is free to examine the whole question in all its bearings, and should report their conclusions to you and me through Combined Chiefs of Staff. I ask that the Conference shall give full, free, patient, and unprejudiced consideration to the whole question after they have heard the Middle East point of view put forward by its representatives.

4. At the present time General Wilson is preparing to attack Rhodes on the 23d, with forces from his own command, or which have been assigned to him by General Eisenhower. He thinks these forces are sufficient, but I am doubtful whether they are not cut too fine.

The question, to my mind, therefore is whether he should have this modest reinforcement or whether the operation should be cancelled.

5. Cancellation will involve loss of Leros, even if they can hold out so long, and the complete abandonment by us of any foothold in the Aegean, which will become a frozen area, with most unfortunate political and psychological reactions in that part of the world instead of great advantages.