Closing the Ring (24 page)

But the miners are worried about their future. His Majesty’s Government give the assurance to them that the present system of control, plus any improvements that may be made to it, will be continued after the war until Parliament shall decide upon the future structure of the industry. That means either that there will be a settlement by agreement between the great parties, or that there will be a General Election at which the people will be free to choose between political doctrines and political leaders. But anyhow, until all that is over there will be no decisive change in the present structure of the coal industry, or any removal of the many guarantees for the continuity of employment and wages and limitation of profits which are embodied in it. I am so anxious that we should all be together in this.

  This statement eased the tension which existed, and I am glad today to read it over again.

*  *  * *  *

Finally, on October 28, there was the rebuilding of the House of Commons to consider. One unlucky bomb had blown to fragments the Chamber in which I had passed so much of my life. I was determined to have it rebuilt at the earliest moment that our struggle would allow. I had the power at this moment to shape things in a way that would last. Supported by my colleagues, mostly old Parliamentarians, and with Mr. Attlee’s cordial aid, I sought to re-establish for what may well be a long period the two great principles on which the British House of Commons stands in its physical aspect. The first is that it must be oblong, and not semicircular, and the second that it must only be big enough to give seats to about two-thirds of its Members. As this argument has long surprised foreigners, I record it here.

There are two main characteristics of the House of Commons which will command the approval and the support of reflective and experienced Members. The first is that its shape should be oblong and not semicircular. Here is a very potent factor in our political life. The semicircular assembly, which appeals to political theorists, enables every individual or every group to move round the centre, adopting various shades of pink according as the weather changes. I am a convinced supporter of the party system in preference to the group system. I have seen many earnest and ardent Parliaments destroyed by the group system. The party system is much favoured by the oblong form of chamber. It is easy for an individual to move through those insensible gradations from Left to Right, but the act of crossing the Floor is one which requires serious consideration. I am well informed on this matter, for I have accomplished that difficult process, not only once, but twice. Logic is a poor guide compared with custom. Logic, which has created in so many countries semicircular assemblies with buildings that give to every member not only a seat to sit in, but often a desk to write at, with a lid to bang, has proved fatal to Parliamentary government as we know it here in its home and in the land of its birth.

The second characteristic of a chamber formed on the lines of the House of Commons is that it should
not
be big enough to contain all its Members at once without overcrowding, and that there should be no question of every Member having a separate seat reserved for him. The reason for this has long been a puzzle to uninstructed outsiders, and has frequently excited the curiosity and even the criticism of new Members. Yet it is not so difficult to understand if you look at it from a practical point of view. If the House is big enough to contain all its Members, nine-tenths of its debates will be conducted in the depressing atmosphere of an almost empty or half-empty chamber. The essence of good House of Commons speaking is the conversational style, the facility for quick, informal interruptions and interchanges. Harangues from a rostrum would be a bad substitute for the conversational style in which so much of our business is done. But the conversational style requires a fairly small space, and there should be on great occasions a sense of crowd and urgency. There should be a sense of the importance of much that is said, and a sense that great matters are being decided, there and then, by the House.

This anyhow was settled as I wished.

*  *  * *  *

During these busy days I thought it right, now that our ultimate victory appeared certain, to dwell upon what would descend upon us at the same time as victory. This chapter may well close with the two notes I wrote to my colleagues upon these problems, already looming ahead.

WAR—TRANSITION—PEACE
M
EMORANDUM BY THE
P
RIME
M
INISTER AND
M
INISTER OF
D
EFENCE

19 Oct. 43

It is the duty of His Majesty’s Government to prepare for the tasks which will fall upon us at the end of the war. The urgent needs are: (
a
) A sound scheme of demobilisation, having regard to the undoubted need of our keeping considerable garrisons in enemy-occupied territory. (
b
) The provision of food for our island on a scale better than the war-time rations. (
c
) The resumption of the export trade and the restoration of our mercantile marine. (
d
) The general turnover of industry from war to peace. And, above all, (
e
) The provision during a transition period of employment for all able-bodied persons seeking it, and especially for the ex-Servicemen.

Any decisions which are needed for the supreme objects of
food
and
employment
in the years immediately after the war must be taken now, whether they involve legislation and whether they are controversial or not.

2. Much work has already been done on these lines by the departments and committees concerned. We must be careful not to have these urgent practical duties confused and overlain by party politics or held up by endless discussions about long-term schemes for building a new world order, etc.

3. There are in fact three stages, namely, (i) War, (ii) Transition, and (iii) Peace and freedom. The present Government and Parliament are fully entitled to make all necessary preparations for the transition period, and we should be held severely accountable if found in default. As early as possible in the transition period
(for which all preparations will have been made) a General Election must be held, in order that the electors may express their will upon the form that is to be given to our post-war and post-transition society.

4. We do not know whether this election will be fought on an agreed programme by the parties now composing the Coalition Government or whether the leader of the majority in the present House of Commons will be forced to place his own programme before the electors. In either case it is probable that a Four-Years Plan will be announced, which, apart from carrying out the enormous administrative measures required in the transition period, will also comprise a series of large decisions on progress and reform which will, from one angle or the other, shape the post-war and post-transition period. There will therefore be no lack of work for the new Parliament.

5. In the meanwhile there are a number of important policies, such as education, social insurance, the rebuilding of our shattered dwellings and cities, on which there is or may be found a wide measure of general agreement. These steps must be brought to a high degree of preparation now during the war, any necessary preliminary legislation being passed, so that they are ready to come into force in the early days of the transition period.

6. It is impossible to tell how long the war against Japan will outlast the war against Germany. It would perhaps be safe, as a working basis, to make the transition period last for two years after the defeat of Germany, or four years from January 1, 1944, whichever period shall end the sooner.

  When this had been largely approved by the War Cabinet, I wrote a precise directive which is printed in the Appendix.
¹

A month later, I decided upon the appointment of a Minister of Reconstruction, whose office would be the focal point for all plans for the transitional period. Lord Woolton’s conduct of the Food Ministry had gained widespread satisfaction and general confidence. He seemed in every way equipped with the qualities and experience to concert and stimulate the activities of the many departments concerned. He took up his duties on November 12.

¹
See Appendix D, Book One.

10
Tensions with General de Gaulle

De Gaulle Arrives in Algiers, May
30___
My Telegram to President Roosevelt of June
6___
Conflict Between de Gaulle and Giraud___The Question of Recognition of the French National Committee___President Roosevelt’s Strong Opposition___Correspondence with Him___My Memorandum of July
13___
I Try to Persuade the President to Limited Recognition___He Suggests Instead a Formula of Co-operation___We Debate the Whole Position at Quebec in August___Qualified Recognition Is Accorded___The Struggle for Power Between de Gaulle and Giraud Continues___Corsica Liberated, October
3___
Formation of a Free French Consultative Assembly___Giraud Restricted to the Military Command___De Gaulle Becomes Sole President of the French National Committee___Violent Action in Syria___A Year of Disappointing Relationships with the Free French.

D
URING THE SUMMER OF
1943, the relations of the British Government with de Gaulle deteriorated. We had made great efforts to bring together Frenchmen of all parties at Algiers, and I had constantly pressed the Americans to accept General de Gaulle as a leading figure in the political arrangements which we were both trying to facilitate. In the strained atmosphere which pervaded French affairs after the signature of the Clark-Darlan agreements and the appearance of Giraud, de Gaulle became more than ever intractable. His position had strengthened in recent weeks. He had many supporters in Tunisia, which was now in Allied hands. News from Metropolitan France, together with the creation of the clandestine
Central Committee there, showed the extent of his prestige and an upsurge of the Gaullist movement. It was in these circumstances that Giraud agreed to meet his rival in North Africa.

On May 30, de Gaulle arrived in Algiers, and sharp and sulky negotiations were begun with the object of setting up a united Provisional Committee to administer the affairs of Fighting France. Wrangling centred round three main issues: Giraud’s assumption of supreme civil and military authority; de Gaulle’s determination to affirm formally the sovereignty of Fighting France—a step which would violate the letter of the agreements which Darlan had made with General Mark Clark in November 1942; and the question of the former Vichy administrators now in key offices in North Africa, particularly Noguès, Peyrouton, and Boisson. The latter was a special target. De Gaulle had never forgiven him for the events of 1940 at Dakar.

Tension mounted in Algiers as these bitter discussions were prolonged. On the afternoon of June 3, however, agreement was reached, and a French Committee of National Liberation was set up, which included Giraud and de Gaulle, Generals Catroux and Georges, and certain members of the Gaullist Committee from London, which had been dissolved when de Gaulle left for North Africa. The former Vichy governors were excluded from the new body, which was now to be the central provisional administration of Fighting France and her Empire until the end of the war.

*  *  * *  *

The reader will recall that I was in North Africa with General Marshall for conferences with General Eisenhower during these talks on the future of France, and just before my departure I had invited the new Committee to luncheon. When I got back to London, I received a telegram from President Roosevelt voicing his anxiety. “I want to give you,” he said on June 5, “the thought that North Africa is in last analysis under British-American military rule, and that for this
reason Eisenhower can be used on what you and I want. The bride evidently forgets that there is still a war in progress over here. We receive only the bride’s publicity. What is the matter with our British-American information services? Best of luck in getting rid of our mutual headache.”

I sent to the President in reply my impressions of Algiers:

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

6 June 43

We had the whole French Committee to luncheon on Friday (June 4), and everybody seemed most friendly. General Georges, whom I got out of France a month ago, and who is a personal friend of mine, is a great support to Giraud. If de Gaulle should prove violent or unreasonable, he will be in a minority of five to two, and possibly completely isolated. The Committee is therefore a body with collective authority with which in my opinion we can safely work.

2. I consider that the formation of this Committee brings to an end my official connection with de Gaulle as leader of the Fighting French, which was set out in the letters exchanged with him in 1940 and certain other documents of later date, and I propose, in so far as is necessary, to transfer these relationships, financial and otherwise, to the Committee as a whole. While I consider the Committee is a safe repository for arms and supplies, I feel that we should see how they conduct their business and themselves before deciding what degree of recognition we should give them as representing France. Macmillan and Murphy are working in the closest accord, and will keep Eisenhower, with whom the supreme and ultimate power rests, fully informed.

3. I should be strongly opposed to Boisson being dismissed from his post.

*  *  * *  *

But the wrangling did not cease. De Gaulle would not accept Giraud as Supreme Commander of the French forces. Giraud was anxious to keep the French Army of North Africa intact and clear of Free French influences. This attitude of de Gaulle on the question of military command exacerbated American dislike and distrust of him.