Closing the Ring (44 page)

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

21 Oct. 43

Last night I received the following from U.J.:

“… Unfortunately, not one of the places proposed instead of Teheran by you for the meeting is suitable to me. It became clear
during the operations of the Soviet forces in the summer and fall of this year that the summer campaign may overgrow into a winter one and that our troops can continue their offensive operations against the German Army. It is considered by all my colleagues that these operations demand my personal contact with the Command and daily guidance on the part of the Supreme Command. Conditions are better in Teheran, because wire telegraph and telephone communications with Moscow exist there. This cannot be said about the other locations. My colleagues insist on Teheran as the place of the meeting for this reason.

“I accept your suggestion of November 20 or 25 as a possible date for the Conference, and I also agree that representatives of the Press should be excluded from the meeting. I hope that a great deal of good will be accomplished by the direct participation in Moscow meeting of Mr. Hull, who has arrived safely in Moscow.”

  The President had replied:

President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin

I am deeply disappointed in your message received today in regard to our meeting. I fully understand your reason for requiring daily guidance on the part of the Supreme Command, and your personal contact with the command, which is bringing such outstanding results. …

I wish you would realise that there are other vital matters which, in this constitutional American Government, represent fixed obligations on my part which I cannot change. Our Constitution calls for action by the President on legislation within ten days of the passage of such legislation. That means that the President must receive and return to the Congress with his written approval or his veto physical documents in that period. I cannot act by cable or radio, as I have told you before. The trouble with Teheran is the simple fact that the approaches to that city over the mountains often make flying an impossibility for several days at a time. This is a double risk—first, for the plane delivering documents from Washington, and, second, for the plane returning these documents to the Congress. I regret to say that, as head of the nation, it is impossible for me to go to a place where I cannot fulfil my constitutional obligations. I can assume the flying risks for documents
up to and including the low country as far as the Persian Gulf, through a relay system of planes, but I cannot assume the delays attending flights in both directions into the saucer over the mountains in which Teheran lies. Therefore, with much regret I must tell you that I cannot go to Teheran, and in this my Cabinet members and the legislative leaders are in complete agreement.

  The President suggested Basra.

I am not in any way considering the fact that from United States territory I would have to travel six thousand miles, and you would only have to travel six hundred miles from Russian territory. I would gladly go ten times the distance to meet you were it not for the fact that I must carry on a constitutional Government more than one hundred and fifty years old. … I am begging you to remember that I also have a great obligation to the American Government and to maintain the full American war effort.

As I have said to you before, I regard the meeting of the three of us as of the greatest possible importance, not only to our peoples as of today, but also to our peoples in relation to a peaceful world for generations to come. It would be regarded as a tragedy by future generations if you and I and Mr. Churchill failed today because of a few hundred miles. …

  Mr. Eden was still in Moscow, and was doing all he could to extract from Stalin an agreed place and time of meeting which would satisfy the President. It was clear that Stalin would insist on Teheran as the place of meeting, and, although it was yet by no means certain that the President would be induced to go there, I began to consider the planning of such a meeting.

*  *  * *  *

Several serious aspects of the impending Conference absorbed my mind. I thought it most important that the British and American Staffs, and above them the President and I, should reach a general agreement on the policy of “Overlord” and its impingement on the Mediterranean. The whole armed strength overseas of our two countries was involved, and the
British forces were to be equal at the outset of “Overlord,” twice as strong as the Americans in Italy, and three times as numerous in the rest of the Mediterranean. Surely we ought to reach some solid understanding before inviting the Soviet representatives, either political or military, to join us.

I therefore suggested such a plan to the President.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

22 Oct. 43

… There should be sufficient time allowed to analyse the results of the current Moscow Conference, and also I think the subsequent Conference we have in mind. For us to stage a meeting while the Moscow Conference is in progress, or at least before its results can be carefully considered, probably would have unfavourable results in Russia.

2. Combined planning teams are now planning an over-all plan for the defeat of Japan. It is important that this work be completed and that the respective Chiefs of Staff have an opportunity to study it before a general meeting.

3. Certain outline plans from Eisenhower and commanders in the Pacific covering operations approved at Quebec are to be submitted on November 1, and these should receive some consideration before we arrive at the moment for a combined meeting. …

  The President thus appeared to favour the idea, but not the timing. There was emerging a strong current of opinion in American Government circles, which seemed to wish to win Russian confidence even at the expense of co-ordinating the Anglo-American war effort. I therefore returned to the charge. I felt it of the utmost importance that we should meet the Russians with a clear and united view both on the outstanding problems of “Overlord” and upon the question of the High Commands.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

23 Oct. 43

The Russians ought not to be vexed if the Americans and British closely convert the very great operations they have in hand for 1944 on fronts where no Russian troops will be present. Nor do I think we ought to meet Stalin, if ever the meeting can be arranged,
without being agreed about Anglo-American operations as such.

2. I would be content with November 15 if this is the earliest date for your Staffs. I thought the Staffs would work together for a few days before you and I arrive, say 18th or 19th, and we could then go on together to “Eureka.” I do not yet know whether it is to be November 20 or 25. I had not imagined that “Eureka” would take more than three or four days or that large technical staffs would take part in it.

3. November 15 would be ninety days from the beginning of our Conference at Quebec. In these ninety days events of first magnitude have occurred. Mussolini has fallen; Italy has surrendered; her Fleet has come over; we have successfully invaded Italy, and are marching on Rome with good prospects of success. The Germans are gathering up to twenty-five or more divisions in Italy and the Po Valley. All these are new facts.

4. … The date of “Overlord” itself was fixed by splitting the difference between the American and British views. It is arguable that neither the forces building up in Italy nor those available for a May “Overlord” are strong enough for the tasks set them.

5. The British Staffs and my colleagues and I all think this position requires to be reviewed, and that the commanders for both our fronts should be named and should be present. In pursuance of the Quebec decisions, we have already prepared two of our best divisions, the 50th and the 51st, now in Sicily, for transfer to England. Thus they can play no part in the Italian battle to which they stood so near, but will not come into action again for seven months, and then only if certain hypothetical conditions are fulfilled. Early in November a decision must be taken about moving landing-craft from the Mediterranean to “Overlord.” This will cripple Mediterranean operations without the said craft influencing events elsewhere for many months. We stand by what was agreed at Quebec, but we do not feel that such agreement should be interpreted rigidly and without review in the swiftly changing situations of war.

6. Personally I feel that if we make serious mistakes in the campaign of 1944, we might give Hitler the chance of a startling come-back. Prisoner German General von Thoma was overheard saying, “Our only hope is that they come where we can use the Army upon them.” All this shows the need for the greatest care
and foresight in our arrangements, the most accurate timing between the two theatres, and the need to gather the greatest possible forces for both operations, particularly “Overlord.” I do not doubt our ability in the conditions laid down to get ashore and deploy. I am however deeply concerned with the build-up and with the situation which may arise between the thirtieth and sixtieth days. I feel sure that the vast movement of American personnel into the United Kingdom and the fighting composition of the units requires to be searchingly examined by the commander who will execute “Overlord.”

I wish to have both the High Commands settled in a manner agreeable to our two countries, and then the secondary commands, which are of very high importance, can be decided. I repeat I have the greatest confidence in General Marshall, and that if he is in charge of “Overlord,” we British will aid him with every scrap of life and strength we have. My dear friend, this is much the greatest thing we have ever attempted, and I am not satisfied that we have yet taken the measures necessary to give it the best chance of success. I feel very much in the dark at present, and unable to think or act in the forward manner which is needed. For these reasons I desire an early conference.

7. All that you say about the plans for Eisenhower and the commanders in the Pacific which are due to be submitted on November 1 would harmonise with a meeting on November 15 at latest. I do not know how long you consider is required for the long-term over-all plan for the defeat of Japan to be completed by the combined planners and studied by our respective Chiefs of Staff. I do not consider that the more urgent decisions to which I have referred above ought to be held up for this long-term view of the war against Japan, which nevertheless should be pressed forward with all energy.

8. I hope you will consider that these reasons for [an Angle-American] meeting are solid. We cannot decide finally until an answer is received from Uncle Joe. Should the Teheran meeting not be possible, it makes all the more necessary that we should meet in the light of the information now being received from the Moscow Conference [of Foreign Secretaries]. I am expecting Anthony to start home before the end of the month, and am ready myself to move any day after the first week in November.

9. You will, I am sure, share my relief that Leros has so far
managed to hold out. “The dogs eat of the crumbs which fall from their master’s table.”

*  *  * *  *

Before the President replied to this proposal, he sent me the following message, which showed that he was not yet decided to accept the idea of going to Teheran:

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

25 Oct. 43

It is a nuisenza to have the influenza. McIntire says I need a sea voyage.

No word from Uncle J. yet.

If he is adamant, what would you think of you and me meeting with small staffs in North Africa, or even at the Pyramids, and toward the close of our talks getting the Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek] to join us for two or three days? At the same time we could ask Uncle J. to send Molotov to the meeting with you and me. Our people propose November 20.

  Two days later he sent me his comments on my idea of a preliminary meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

27 Oct. 43

The present Moscow Conference appears to be a genuine beginning of British-Russian-United States collaboration, which should lead to the early defeat of Hitler. …

  He suggested sending Stalin the following:

  Heretofore we have informed you of the results of our combined British-American military Staff Conferences. You may feel that it would be better to have a Russian military representative sit in at such meetings to listen to the discussions regarding British-American operations and take note of the decisions. He would be free to make such comments and proposals as you might desire. This arrangement would afford you and your Staff an intimate and prompt report of these meetings. …

  The suggestion of including the Russians in such a meeting filled me with alarm.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

27 Oct. 43

Like you I rejoice in the good progress made at Moscow, and I greatly hope we may arrange “Eureka.”

2. I deprecate the idea of inviting a Russian military representative to sit in at the meetings of our Joint Staffs. Unless he understood and spoke English the delays would be intolerable. I do not know of any really high officer of the Russian Army who can speak English. Such a representative would have no authority or power to speak except as instructed. He would simply bay for an earlier Second Front and block all other discussions. Considering they tell us nothing of their own movements, I do not think we should open this door to them, as it would probably mean that they would want to have observers at all future meetings and all discussions between us would be paralysed. We shall very soon have six or seven hundred thousand British and American troops and airmen in Italy, and we are planning the great operation of “Overlord.” There will not be a Russian soldier in any of these. On the other hand, all our fortunes depend upon them.

I regard our right to sit together on the movements of our own two forces as fundamental and vital. Hitherto we have prospered wonderfully, but I now feel that the year 1944 is loaded with danger. Great differences may develop between us and we may take the wrong turning. Or, again, we may make compromises and fall between two stools. The only hope is the intimacy and friendship which has been established between us and between our High Staffs. If that were broken, I should despair of the immediate future. … I need scarcely say the British Chiefs of Staff fully share these views. I must add that I am more anxious about the campaign of 1944 than about any other in which I have been involved.