Closing the Ring (74 page)

*  *  * *  *

As “Overlord” approached, a momentous question confronted us. What part was the mighty weapon of the air to play in the supreme operation? After prolonged technical controversy among the air authorities of both countries, the plan which prevailed was to destroy German railway communications in France, Belgium, and Western Germany by discharging 66,000 tons of bombs during the three months before D-Day, thus creating a “railway desert” around the German
troops in Normandy. This plan had already entered its early stages. The principal targets were the repair and maintenance depots and the locomotives in ninety-three key railway centres on the many approaches to Normandy. The Tactical Air Forces assisted in this general plan, and were given in addition the special task, as D-Day drew near, of destroying bridges and rolling-stock. I wrote to General Eisenhower on April 3:

Prime Minister to General Eisenhower
    3 Apr. 44

The Cabinet today took rather a grave and on the whole an adverse view of the proposal to bomb so many French railway centres, in view of the fact that scores of thousands of French civilians, men, women, and children, would lose their lives or be injured. Considering that they are all our friends, this might be held to be an act of very great severity, bringing much hatred on the Allied Air Forces. It was decided that the Defence Committee should consider the matter during this week, and that thereafter the Foreign Office should address the State Department and I should myself send a personal telegram to the President.

The argument for concentration on these particular targets is very nicely balanced on military grounds.

  General Eisenhower replied on the 5th:

General Eisenhower to Prime Minister
    5 Apr. 44

We must never forget that one of the fundamental factors leading to the decision for undertaking “Overlord” was the conviction that our overpowering Air Force would make feasible an operation which might otherwise be considered extremely hazardous, if not foolhardy. … The weight of the argument that has been brought against the bombing of transportation centres in occupied territories is heavy indeed. But I and my military advisers have become convinced that the bombing of these centres will increase our chances for success in the critical battle. … I personally believe that estimates of probable casualties have been grossly exaggerated.

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As the air offensive against the railways developed, the losses of French and Belgian civilians, though far less than the prior estimates, caused the British War Cabinet distress and anxiety.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
    7 May 44

The War Cabinet have been much concerned during the last three weeks about the number of Frenchmen killed in the raids on the railway centres in France. We have had numerous Staff meetings with our own officers, and I have discussed the matter with General Eisenhower and Bedell Smith. There were and are great differences of opinion in the two Air Forces—not between them, but criss-cross—about the efficacy of the “railway plan” as a short-term project. In the end, Eisenhower, Tedder, Bedell Smith, and Portal all declare themselves converted. I am personally by no means convinced that this is the best way to use our Air Forces in the preliminary period, and still think that the German Air Force should be the main target. …

2. When this project was first put forward a loss of eighty thousand French civilian casualties, including injured, say twenty thousand killed, was mentioned. The War Cabinet could not view this figure without grave dismay on account of the apparently ruthless use of the Air Forces, particularly of the Royal Air Force, on whom the brunt of this kind of work necessarily falls, and the reproaches that would be made upon the inaccuracy of night bombing. The results of the first, say, three-sevenths of the bombing, have however shown that the casualties to French civil life are very much less than was expected by the commanders. …

3. I am satisfied that all possible care will be taken to minimise this slaughter of friendly civilian life. Nevertheless, the War Cabinet share my apprehensions of the bad effect which will be produced upon the French civilian population by these slaughters, all taking place so long before “Overlord” D-Day. They may easily bring about a great revolution in French feeling towards their approaching United States and British liberators. They may leave a legacy of hate behind them. It may well be that the French losses will grow heavier on and after D-Day, but in the heat of battle, when British and United States troops will probably be losing at a much higher rate, a new proportion establishes itself in men’s minds. It is the intervening period that causes me most anxiety. …

4. The Cabinet ask me to invite you to consider the matter from the highest political standpoint and to give us your opinion as a matter between Governments. It must be remembered, on the one hand, that this slaughter is among a friendly people who have
with all their record of cruelty and ruthlessness. On the other hand, we naturally feel the hazardous nature of Operation “Overlord” and are in deadly earnest about making it a success. I have been careful in stating this case to you to use only the most moderate terms, but I ought to let you know that the War Cabinet is unanimous in its anxiety about these French slaughters, even reduced as they have been, and also in its doubts as to whether almost as good military results could not be produced by other methods. Whatever is settled between us, we are quite willing to share responsibilities with you.

  The President replied on the 11th:

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister
    11 Apr. 44

I share fully with you your distress at the loss of life among the French population incident to our air preparations for “Overlord.”

I share also with you a satisfaction that every possible care is being and will be taken to minimise civilian casualties. No possibility of alleviating adverse French opinion should be overlooked, always provided that there is no reduction of our effectiveness against the enemy at this crucial time.

However regrettable the attendant loss of civilian lives is, I am not prepared to impose from this distance any restriction on military action by the responsible commanders that in their opinion might militate against the success of “Overlord” or cause additional loss of life to our Allied forces of invasion.

This was decisive. Meanwhile, the rate of the casualties to French civilians continued to be less than had been feared. The sealing-off of the Normandy battlefield from reinforcement by rail may well have been the greatest direct contribution that the bomber forces could make to “Overlord.” The price was paid.

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This chapter has been dominated by technical matters. The British and United States rival themes of air attack by night or day have been shown under the hard test of results. The improvements in our explosives and the intricacies of radar and all its variants have been presented, I trust, in a form intelligible
to the lay reader. But it would be wrong to end without paying our tribute of respect and admiration to the officers and men who fought and died in this fearful battle of the air, the like of which had never before been known, or even with any precision imagined. The moral tests to which the crew of a bomber were subjected reached the limits of human valour and sacrifice. Here chance was carried to its most extreme and violent degree above all else. There was a rule that no one should go on more than thirty raids without a break. But many who entered on their last dozen wild adventures felt that the odds against them were increasing. How can one be lucky thirty times running in a world of averages and machinery? Detective-Constable McSweeney, one of the Scotland Yard officers who looked after me in the early days of the war, was determined to fight in a bomber. I saw him several times during his training and his fighting. One day, gay and jaunty as ever but with a thoughtful look, he said, “My next will be my twenty-ninth.” It was his last. Not only our hearts and admiration, but our minds in strong comprehension of these ordeals must go out to these heroic men whose duty to their country and their cause sustained them in superhuman trials.

I have mentioned facts like “the Americans had 60 of their large Fortress aircraft destroyed out of 291,” and on another occasion “out of 795 aircraft dispatched by British Bomber Command against Nuremberg 94 did not return.” The American Fortresses carried a crew of ten men, and the British night bombers seven. Here we have each time six or seven hundred of these skilled, highly trained warriors lost in an hour. This was indeed ordeal by fire. In the British and American bombing of Germany and Italy during the war, the casualties were over a hundred and forty thousand, and in the period with which this chapter deals there were more British and American aircrew casualties than there were killed and wounded in the great operation of crossing the Channel. These heroes never flinched or failed. It is to their devotion that in no small measure we owe our victory. Let us give them our salute.

¹
Details of the several devices mentioned in this chapter are given in Volume IV.
The Hinge of Fate
, Book One,
Chapter 16
, page 280.

²
Volume IV,
The Hinge of Fate
,
Chapter 15
, Book Two, “The Casablanca Conference,” pages 679–80.

13
The Greek Torment

Greek and Jewish Inspiration___Greece under German Occupation___Formation of E.A.M. and E.L.A.S.___Our Missions to Greece___Political Designs of the Communist Guerrilla Bands___General Smuts’ Advice___Danger of a Communist Coup d’Etat___The Question of the Monarchy___Our Ambassador, Mr. Leeper’s, Advice___M. Tsouderos Tenders His Resignation___King George II’s Decision to Return to Cairo___My Telegrams to Mr. Leeper, April
7
and
8___
Mutiny in the Greek Navy and of the Greek Brigade in Egypt___Our Policy Towards the Greeks___The Mutinous Brigade Surrounded___Arrival of the King of the Hellenes in Cairo___My Telegram to President Roosevelt, April
16___
His Most Helpful Message___Climax of the Greek Mutinies___General Paget’s Skilful Methods___Surrender of the Mutineers___Formation of New Greek Government under M. Papandreou___My Statement to the House, May
24.

T
HE
G
REEKS
rival the Jews in being the most politically minded race in the world. No matter how forlorn their circumstances or how grave the peril to their country, they are always divided into many parties, with many leaders who fight among themselves with desperate vigour. It has been well said that wherever there are three Jews it will be found that there are two Prime Ministers and one leader of the Opposition. The same is true of this other famous ancient race, whose stormy and endless struggle for life stretches back to the fountain springs of human thought. No other two races have set such a mark upon the world. Both have shown a capacity for survival, in spite of unending perils and sufferings from external
oppressors, matched only by their own ceaseless feuds, quarrels, and convulsions. The passage of several thousand years sees no change in their characteristics and no diminution of their trials or their vitality. They have survived in spite of all that the world could do against them, and all they could do against themselves, and each of them from angles so different has left us the inheritance of its genius and wisdom. No two cities have counted more with mankind than Athens and Jerusalem. Their messages in religion, philosophy, and art have been the main guiding lights of modern faith and culture. Centuries of foreign rule and indescribable, endless oppression leave them still living, active communities and forces in the modern world, quarrelling among themselves with insatiable vivacity. Personally I have always been on the side of both, and believed in their invincible power to survive internal strife and the world tides threatening their extinction.

*  *  * *  *

After the withdrawal of the Allies in April 1941, Greece was occupied by the Axis Powers. The collapse of the Army and the retirement of the King and his Government into exile revived the bitter controversies of Greek politics. Both in the country and in Greek circles abroad there was hard criticism of the Monarchy, which had sanctioned the dictatorship of General Metaxas, and thereby directly associated itself with the régime which had now been defeated. When King George II left Crete in May 1941, he took with him a Government which was mainly Royalist, headed by M. Tsouderos. Their long journey by Cairo and South Africa to London provided ample time for political discussion among Greek communities abroad. The Constitution had been suspended in 1936, and the debate upon the future régime when Greece should finally be liberated had to be conducted among refugees on Allied soil.

I had long realised the importance of this issue, and in October 1941, addressed a letter to the Greek Prime Minister, congratulating him on his first broadcast from London to occupied Greece, and expressing my gratification that Greece
had been declared to be a democratic country under a constitutional Monarchy. The King himself broadcast in the New Year to his country on the same lines. If a united nation was to rise out of the war, it was essential that links should be maintained between the exiles and Greek opinion at home.

During the first winter of Axis occupation, Greece suffered severely from famine, partially relieved by Red Cross shipments, and also from the exhaustion of the fighting which had ended in the destruction of her army. But at the time of the surrender, arms were hidden in the mountains, and in sporadic fashion, and on a minor scale, resistance to the enemy was planned. In the towns of Central Greece, starvation provided plenty of recruits. In April 1942, the body calling itself the National Liberation Front (known by its initials in Greek as E.A.M.), which had come into being in the previous autumn, announced the formation of the People’s Liberation Army (E.L.A.S.). Small fighting groups were recruited during the following year, particularly in Central and Northern Greece, while in Epirus and the mountains of the northwest remnants of the Greek Army and local mountaineers gathered round the person of Colonel Napoleon Zervas. The E.A.M.-E.L.A.S. organisation was dominated by a hard core of Communist leaders The adherents of Zervas, originally Republican in sympathy, became as time passed exclusively anti-Communist. Around these two centres Greek resistance to the Germans gathered. Neither of them had any direct contact with the Greek Government in London, nor any sympathy for its position.