Closing the Ring (75 page)

On the eve of Alamein, we decided to attack the German supply lines leading down through Greece to the Piraeus, the port of Athens and an important base on the German route to North Africa. In the autumn of 1942, the first British Military Mission, under Lieutenant-Colonel Myers, was accordingly dropped by parachute into Greece and made contact with the guerrillas. With their aid a vital viaduct on the main Athens railway line was destroyed. Simultaneously, brilliant and daring sabotage operations were carried out by Greek agents against Axis shipping in the Piraeus. The success of these operations
encouraged Middle East Headquarters to send more British parties with supplies of explosives and arms. Thus direct contact with occupied Greece was established.

During the spring of 1943, the British missions were strengthened. We had an added motive for stimulating activities in this area as a cover for our pending operations in Sicily. Special efforts were made to convince the enemy that, following on their defeat in Tunisia, the Allies were planning a major landing on Greek soil. Combined Anglo-Greek parties blew another railway bridge on the main Athens line, and other sabotage operations were successful. The result was that two German divisions were moved into Greece which might have been used in Sicily. This however was the last direct military contribution which the Greek guerrillas made to the war, and henceforward the scene was dominated by the struggle to gain political power at the end of hostilities.

Political quarrels hampered guerrilla warfare, and we soon found ourselves in a complicated and disagreeable situation. It was becoming clear that there were three divergent elements: E.L.A.S., now numbering twenty thousand men, and predominantly under Communist control; the Zervas bands, known as E.D.E.S., totalling five thousand; and the Royalist politicians, grouped in Cairo or in London round the King, to whom we had a special obligation as the head of a state which had fought as our Ally in 1941. All now thought that the Allies would probably win the war, and the struggle among them for political power began in earnest to the advantage of the common foe. In March 1943, a group of prominent politicians in Athens signed a manifesto enjoining the King not to return after the war until a plebiscite had been held. It was important that the King should make clear where he stood. On July 4, therefore, he made a conciliatory broadcast to the Greek people promising that a General Election would be held as soon as the country was liberated and that the Greek Government abroad would resign when it arrived in Athens in order that a broadly based administration could be formed. But opinion inside Greece sought more immediate action. Shortly afterwards, a minor
mutiny took place in the small Greek forces which we had assembled in the Middle East, where E.A.M. propaganda was now spreading. In August, a delegation of six leaders from the main resistance groups in Greece was brought to Cairo, and they too urged that a plebiscite should be held before the King returned, and that three places in the exiled Government should be held by politicians inside Greece. Neither the King nor his Prime Minister would agree.

While I was in Quebec, I had received the following message from King George II about these developments:

King of Greece (Cairo) to Prime Minister and President Roosevelt
    19 Aug. 43

On July 4, I declared to my people that after their liberation they will be invited to determine by means of free election the form of their Government.

I am now suddenly faced by the most curious situation, of the unexpected arrival of certain individuals from Greece who are supposed to represent various guerrilla bands; in addition, a representative of certain old political parties, who wish to press me to declare that I should return only after a plebiscite which would decide the form of the future régime. … In these circumstances I would much appreciate your advice as to the policy which would at this time best serve the cause of Greece and the United Nations.

My present personal inclination is to continue the policy agreed between us before I left England. I feel very strongly that I should return to Greece with my troops, even if I left my country after a short period to work for its national interests among our Allies, should subsequent developments make it politic for me to do so.

  I had minuted on this:

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary
    19 Aug. 43

If substantial British forces take part in the liberation of Greece, the King should go back with the Anglo-Greek Army. This is much the more probable alternative. If however the Greeks are strong enough to drive out the Germans themselves, we shall have a good deal less to say in the matter. It follows that the King should demand equal Royalist representation with the Republicans now proposed. In any case he would make a great mistake to agree in any way to remain outside Greece while the fighting for the liberation is going on and while conditions preclude the holding of a peaceful plebiscite.

Smuts, who followed Greek fortunes attentively, also sent a prescient comment:

General Smuts to Prime Minister
    20 Aug. 43

There appears to be strong suspicion that British Intelligence agents who brought Greek patriots and other party representatives to Cairo are anti-Royalist, and that patriot representatives even have Communist leanings. King George has always been strongly pro-Ally, and sacrificed much for Allied cause, and we have every good reason to stand by him in this crisis. It seems to me sound policy that you should once more make it quite clear to the Greek Government that the United Kingdom Government stands by the King, at least until such time as Greek people, under proper conditions of public tranquillity, are able to decide on their future régime. A plebiscite or General Election on the régime immediately on the Allied occupation of Greece should be ruled out as likely to lead to civil strife, if not to civil war, in the existing bitterness of feeling. Allied administration under military occupation should be continued until public opinion has settled down and safe conditions of public tranquillity have been established. During this interim period of Allied administration, King George and the Royal Family might well return to Greece to lend their moral support and authority to the Allied administration.

I very much fear that, in the inflamed conditions of public feeling, not only in Greece but also in other Balkan countries, chaos may ensue after the Allied occupation unless a strong hand is kept on the local situation. With politics let loose among those peoples, we may have a wave of disorder and wholesale Communism set going all over those parts of Europe. This may even be the danger in Italy, but certainly in Greece and the Balkans. It should therefore be made plain at this stage that we mean to maintain public order and authority under Allied control until the situation is safe for local self-determination. The Greek situation brings matters to a head, and you may now consider it proper to raise this matter with the President, as a very important question of future policy is involved. The Bolshevisation of a broken and ruined Europe remains a definite possibility, to be guarded against by supply of food and work and interim Allied control.

*  *  * *  *

The Italian surrender in September 1943 affected the whole balance of forces in Greece. E.L.A.S. was able to acquire most of the Italian equipment, including the weapons of an entire division, and thus gained military supremacy. The danger of a Communist
coup d’état
in the event of German withdrawal, which now became a practical possibility, needed careful attention. On September 29, I sent a minute to the Chiefs of Staff:

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee
    29 Sept. 43

I am in full agreement with the Foreign Secretary in this essentially political question. Should the Germans evacuate Greece, we must certainly be able to send five thousand British troops with armoured cars and Bren gun carriers into Athens. They need have no transport or artillery. The Greek troops in Egypt would accompany them. Their duty would be to give support at the centre to the restored lawful Greek Government. The Greeks would not know how many were coming behind them. There may be some bickering between the Greek guerrilla bands, but great respect will be paid to the British, more especially as the saving of the country from famine depends entirely on our exertions in the early months of liberation. The troops need not be organised to contend with more than rioting in the capital or incursion into the capital from the countryside. … Once a stable Government is set up, we should take our departure.

  This was the first suggestion that we might be forced to intervene in Greek internal affairs at the moment of liberation.

The pace of events now increased as E.L.A.S. developed its plans to take over political power as soon as the Germans withdrew and before an ordered constitutional Government could be established. During the winter there was little activity against the enemy. In October, E.L.A.S. forces attacked E.D.E.S. (Zervas), and the British Headquarters in Cairo suspended all shipments of arms to the former. Every effort was made by our missions on the spot to limit and bring to an end the civil war which had now broken out in the ruined and occupied country.

*  *  * *  *

The decisions of the conferences in Cairo and in Teheran indirectly affected the position in Greece. There would never be a major Allied landing there, nor was it likely that any considerable British forces would follow a German retreat. The arrangements to prevent anarchy had therefore to be considered. The one figure presented to us above party rancour was Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens. While in Cairo, Mr. Eden had impressed on the King the advantages of a temporary regency. At the same time we hoped by sending the Greek Brigade in the Middle East to fight in Italy to raise the prestige of the exiled Government, and also to have loyal troops to send into Western Greece if need be.

The King would not agree to a regency and returned to London. By now E.A.M., with its military component E.L.A.S., had formed a state within a state in the mountains of Central and Northern Greece. In February 1944, British officers succeeded in establishing an uneasy truce between E.L.A.S. and E.D.E.S. But the Soviet armies were now on the borders of Rumania. The chances of a German evacuation of the Balkans increased, and with them the possibilities of a return of the Royal Government, with British support. Assuming that both these events might take place in April, the E.A.M. leaders decided to act.

On March 26, a Political Committee of National Liberation was set up in the mountains, and the news broadcast to the world. This was a direct challenge to the future authority of the Tsouderos Government. An alternative Communist-controlled administration was thus formed as a rallying-point for all Greeks. This was the signal for trouble in the Greek armed forces in the Middle East and in Greek Government circles abroad. On March 31, a group of officers from the Army, Navy, and Air Force called on Tsouderos in Cairo to demand his resignation. Matters had now come to a head, but the Greek King in London did not appreciate their urgency. Mr. Leeper, our Ambassador to the Greek Government located in Cairo, telegraphed on April 6:

I feel I must express myself with some bluntness. The King of
Greece is playing with fire. He is endangering not only the interests of the Monarchy but those of his country by not realising in time the rapid trend of events. … E.A.M. have realised the danger to them of a united front between politicians in Athens and the Greek Government in Cairo. They have realised that the outcome of an agreement would be the reinforcement of the Government here and the end of their experiment to set up a separate Government in the mountains. They have therefore used the interval to strike at the Greek Government by subverting the Greek forces. Their agitation has had some success, and within the next few days it may have more. M. Tsouderos finds himself in a dilemma. He had secured a good basis of collaboration with his colleagues as a result of messages of support from the Archbishop and politicians in Athens, but this agreement was based on his being able to induce the King to sign a constitutional act appointing the Archbishop as regent. Some weeks have now passed, during which time M. Tsouderos has received no final reply from the King, but merely a preliminary view from him of a negative character. This he concealed from his colleagues in order to avoid an explosion. … The situation could have been held but for recent E.A.M. agitation in the Army.

  Later in the day M. Tsouderos resigned and recommended M. Venizelos, the Minister of Marine in his Government, as his successor. On April 4, disorders broke out in the Greek Army, the 1st Brigade of which I was hoping could take part in the Italian campaign. On the 5th, the office of the Greek Provost-Marshal in Cairo was occupied by a hundred mutineers, who had to be surrounded by British troops and Egyptian police and were removed without trouble in lorries to an isolation camp. At Alexandria, a leader of the Greek seamen’s union had barricaded himself in his house with thirty supporters, and was defying the police. Five ships of the Royal Hellenic Navy declared themselves in favour of a republic and demanded the resignation of every member of the existing Government. All the members of the Greek Government tendered their resignations to the King, but agreed to remain in office pending acceptance.

*  *  * *  *

I was at this time in charge of the Foreign Office, owing to Mr. Eden’s absence. I thus had all the threads directly in my hands. I had sent the following to the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean:

Prime Minister to General Wilson; repeated to General Alexander
    5 Apr. 44

It is now more than three months since we agreed that a Greek brigade, if necessary without its vehicular equipment, should be sent from Egypt to Italy to take part in the Allied offensive. I am told that one company has already got there, and that the others will be there during the month. Why is there all this delay and difficulty in moving this handful of men? They are very liable in Egypt to be contaminated by revolutionary and Communist elements there. Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do. Now do please try to get them shipped off out of Egypt as soon as possible and assembled in some suitable town in Southern Italy. I feel this small matter, which has large political significance, ought not to have hung fire so long.