Death to Tyrants! (41 page)

•  Free foreigner (
xenos
): he will receive the same rewards as a citizen tyrannicide and will be made a citizen, enrolled in whatever tribe he chooses.
¹⁷

•  Slave (
doulos
): he will be freed, be allowed to participate in the regime (
politeia
), receive thirty
minai
, and (as reasonably restored) receive a daily stipend of one drachma. It is unlikely that he received full citizenship rights.
¹⁸

•  Fellow soldier of the tyrant (
sustratiōtēs
): he will be pardoned for the acts he did with the tyrant and will receive a talent of silver provided that he establishes democratic rule in the polis after killing the tyrant.
¹⁹

There is precedent for several of the elements contained in the Ilians' “tyrannicide incentive package.” Grants of the
megalai timai
(statue,
sitēsis
,
proedria
), for example, were a well-established reward for tyrant killing: the Athenians erected a statue of Harmodios and Aristogeiton and granted both
sitēsis
and
proedria
to their descendants (and recall that the oath of Demophantos mandates that, should someone die as a result of having killed a tyrant,
he will be treated like Harmodios and Aristogeiton and his descendants treated like the descendants of the two tyrannicides);
²⁰
such incentives are restored by Knoepfler in the Eretrian tyrant-killing law (lines 8–15, old fragment). There also is precedent for a grant of a lump sum payment: the Athenians, it will be recalled (chap. 1, n. 54), began their festival of Dionysos by announcing that anybody who kills a tyrant will receive a talent (Ar.
Av
. 1072–75); in the mid-fifth century, the Milesians decreed (
ML
43) that the assassin of certain named individuals will receive 100 staters; the Thasians included (late fifth century) a lump sum payment in their laws regarding informants (
ML
83). And a third standard element is explicitly incentivizing noncitizens or even a member of the coup to defend the regime that was previously in power. As shown in
chapter 2
(in the “General Layer of Defense” section), the Eretrian tyrant-killing law incentivized noncitizens to kill a tyrant; and the aforementioned law from Thasos also incentivized both slaves and the participants in a conspiracy (except the originator) to alert the authorities.
²¹

In addition to those standard elements, the Ilion's incentive package contains a couple of unprecedented features. The first such feature is the grant of a daily stipend to a tyrannicide.
²²
The Ilion tyrant-killing law is also unique in directly incentivizing the tyrant's soldiers to commit an act of tyrannicide.
²³
But the late-fifth-century law from Thasos (
ML
83) comes close: as noted above, it incentivized members of a conspiracy to inform the authorities about their plans.
²⁴

The Ilians clearly included provisions 1 and 4 in their law in order to increase the likelihood that, should anti-democrats overthrow or attempt to overthrow the democracy, someone would kill one of the coup's prominent members. That likelihood was increased, of course, by the fact that every male person in Ilion was explicitly incentivized to become a tyrannicide. Thus, wherever in the city a prominent member of a nondemocratic regime might go, there would be someone there who would be greatly rewarded for killing him. The “tyrant” would not be safe even around his own men. And the greater the number of opportunities for an assassination, the greater the likelihood that an assassination would occur.

There is an interesting potential consequence to provision 4 that should be noted. Since mercenary soldiers would receive a talent of silver for killing a prominent member of an anti-democratic regime, the regime might be forced to pay a higher price for mercenaries than it otherwise would. That does not automatically follow, of course. But, if we make the crucial assumptions that the mercenary soldier survives and that the assassination quickly leads to the establishment of a democracy, it likely would be more profitable for a mercenary soldier to kill the tyrant than to protect him (cf. Xen.
Hier
. 6.11). Knowing that, the tyrant might pay his mercenaries more money in order to alter their risk-reward calculus: the risk is still great, the reward less so.

All that can be said about provision 2, the second part of the law's first section, is that it records a monetary reward and, apparently, a grant of citizenship.
²⁵
It should be noted, however, that the rewards listed in this provision are also included in provision 1: a talent (as restored) of silver, thirty minas, a citizenship grant. It thus appears that, like in provision 1, an individual's reward is based on his status. But for what is he to be rewarded? Frisch (1975: 73–74) suggests that the provision might have incentivized individuals to tell the authorities of a plot against the democracy. (And he suggests that the grant of citizenship might have been directed toward the metic population.) It is also possible that the provision stated the reward that the polis would give to the children of an individual who died as a result of killing, or trying to kill, a tyrant.

The fragmentary provision 3 allows for the confiscation of property, no doubt originally owned by a prominent member or members of a nondemocratic
regime.
²⁶
All that can be said for certain is that the polis will take part of the property and use it to compensate victims for what they suffered during the tyranny. It is quite possible that the other part of the confiscated property, likely one-half of the original total, would be given to the tyrannicide (or maybe his children, if he died): perhaps the cash payments promised in provisions 1 and 4 would be taken from this money.
²⁷

SECOND SECTION

The second extant section of the law (provisions 5–13) prescribes punishments for certain actions committed while the Ilian democracy is overthrown. There are five parts to this complex and lengthy section.

ECONOMIC OR FINANCIAL MATTERS

Provision 5 is the first of four provisions (5, 6, 7, 10) that address economic or financial matters concerning which the anti-democratic regime is implicated. This particular provision forbids everybody from acquiring anything in any way from either magistrates who handle public money or individuals who levied a tax on citizens or metics. If someone does acquire something from such individuals, the law states that that acquisition shall be invalid and “the victim (
τὸν ἀδικ
[
ηθέ
]
ντα
) may take compensation from the property of the offender (
τοῦ ἀδικήσ
[
αν
]
τος
) without an appraisal” (i.e., without ensuring that the values are equal). This is not entirely clear. The “victim” is likely the person who originally owned a piece of property that was subsequently acquired by a financial magistrate or taxing official. The implication is that the property was acquired against the “victim's” will: it might have been confiscated, for example; or the victim might have been somehow forced to sell it at a low price. The identity of the “offender” is less apparent. But he likely is the person who unlawfully acquired items from the financial magistrate or taxing official. Thus the sequence of events envisioned in this provision seems to be this: (1) magistrate or taxing official acquired something from victim; (2) at a later date offender acquired that something from magistrate or taxing
official; (3) the law thus states that victim might take compensation for his loss of that something from the property of offender.

The Ilian democrats likely crafted provision 5 in order to accomplish two related objectives. The first objective was to facilitate the “victim's” efforts to reclaim his property (apparently taken by the financial magistrate or taxing official). The logic is simple. Since it would be potentially quite costly for an individual (i.e., the offender) to somehow acquire property from the financial magistrate or taxing official, it is likely that, after the democracy is restored, the property would still be in the hands of those financial magistrates or taxing officials.
²⁸
Thus the victim could easily reacquire his property. The second objective was to prevent the members of the regime from using the property that they acquired from any “victim” to buy political support. Potential supporters might not accept those items because, again, it would be too risky: they likely would lose something of greater value once the democracy is reinstated.

Provision 6 states that anybody who serves in any office twice must pay back all of the money he managed while in office.
²⁹
Presumably the money referred to is the money that he spent during the illegal second term; although it is possible that the offender must pay back the money he spent during his first term too. The important point, however, is that the offending individual likely must pay back even the money that he spent on what otherwise would be considered justified expenditures.
³⁰

The Ilians crafted provision 6 in order to prevent the gradual overthrow of their democracy (i.e.,
katalusis
by evolution, not by revolution). As Aristotle noted (
Pol
. 1308a19–24), repeated tenure in office was a well-known method for an individual to become tyrant. By adding this provision in the law, the Ilians, first, made it clear that repeated tenure is, in fact, illegal: it is quite possible that the Ilians did not previously have a law on that matter. Henceforth,
there is a very clear “red line.” Second, the Ilians ensured that holding office for over a year would be potentially quite costly: the offender would be forced to pay back twice the amount of money that he spent while in office.
³¹

Provision 6 concludes with the stipulation that “anyone who wishes … may plead the case in the law court whenever he wants until the trial concludes while the Ilians are governed democratically.” This stipulation, as noted by Dittenberger (ad loc.), had two significant consequences. First, it ensures that there would be no “statute of limitations” for the crime: anyone may initiate a trial at any time after the democracy has been restored. Second, it ensures that a defendant can be acquitted lawfully only under a democratic regime. Thus if there were a coup during the trial and the defendant was subsequently acquitted under the nondemocratic regime, he could be tried again when the democrats retake the polis.
³²

Provision 7 forbids individuals from giving or receiving of money
ἐκ τού
|[
των
. The meaning of
ἐκ τούτων
is not immediately clear: in lines 59–60, 65, 158, “from them,” the translation offered for
ἐκ τούτων
, is
παρὰ τούτων
. Even Dittenberger chose not to offer an interpretation. But Friedel (1937: 90), Frisch (1975: ad loc.), Koch (1996: 57n73), and Dössel (2003: 203) are likely correct:
ἐκ τούτων
does mean “from them” and refers to the magistrates mentioned in provision 6 (i.e., those serving in a magistracy twice—although it might also refer to the individuals singled out in provision 5).
Should someone “give or receive” such money “from them,” (1) he may be tried in a law court (the extant part of the law does not indicate the punishment); (2) he is also liable to something else (
ὑπόδι
|[
κος δὲ ἔστω
), the substance of which is lost.
³³

The Ilians likely crafted provision 7 in order to accomplish two related objectives. The first objective is to prevent people from acting as a nondemocratic regime's “middlemen” (i.e., people who do things for the regime, in this case “give money” to other people). As a result of this provision, it might be too risky to perform such a service.
³⁴
The second objective is to prevent people from doing business with the regime's middlemen: they would be “receiving” money from the middleman. They, too, might choose not to engage in such activity because of the risk involved (although, again, we do not know the penalty). Thus the intention behind this provision was to prevent regime members from both buying political support and benefiting economically from their unlawful position.
³⁵

Provision 10 states that both high-level members of a nondemocratic regime (a “tyrant or leader of an oligarchy”) and their agents (those who “appoint the Ilians' magistrates with them” and “those who act on their behalf”) cannot buy anything.
³⁶
If they do, the acquisition is invalid and the item must be returned to the seller.

The Ilians likely crafted provision 10 in order to accomplish, once again, two related objectives. The first objective was to ensure that an individual would not permanently lose something that he was forced to sell or something that was sold while he was in exile. (This “forcing” seems to be implied since the sold item would be returned to the seller; thus he appears to be considered a victim.) The second objective was to prevent anyone from permanently possessing that illegally purchased item. The targeted individuals here are neither the tyrant nor the oligarchic leaders: they would either be dead or living in exile once the democrats regained control of the polis. Instead, the likely targets were regime supporters and their families. The provision seeks to ensure that they would not continue to benefit financially from the tyranny after it has been overthrown.
³⁷

There is an interesting unanswered question here: would the original “seller,” after he reacquires the item that he sold to the member of the nondemocratic regime, be required to return the money (to the polis?) that he made on the initial sale? One would think that he would have to do so. Otherwise, an individual could gain doubly (at the expense of the
dēmos
): he retains possession of both the item and the money—public money, likely—that the “tyrant” originally used to buy the item.