Death to Tyrants! (42 page)

INDICTMENTS LODGED BY A LAY ACCUSER

Provision 8 articulates the punishments to be meted out against a lay accuser (
ὁ κατηγορήσ[ας]
[line 95]) who initiated legal action against another individual while the democracy is overthrown. Three scenarios are envisioned. In the first, the victim is executed after the trial.
³⁸
The extant portions of the
provision do not state the punishment that the lay accuser will suffer once the democrats regain control of this polis. But he almost certainly would be executed. The extant portions of the provision law do state, however that (1) the lay accuser's children are to be considered defiled (thus they are pariahs); (2) the victim's children (or his rightful heirs) shall receive one-half of the lay accuser's property, the other half given to the polis; (3) a trial on the matter my be convened at any time, the verdict of which must be rendered while Ilion is democratically governed.

It is difficult to determine the exact nature of the second scenario articulated in provision 8. There are actually two difficulties. The first concerns the nature of the punishment potentially inflicted on the defendant (i.e., the man unlawfully accused by
ὁ κατηγορήσας
). The meaning of
ἐὰν δὲ δεθῆι ἢ ἑρχθῆι
(line 92) seems clear: “if someone is bound or confined.” The problem is the following verb:
φεύγηι
. Frisch translates it as “go into exile.” He thus takes the following noun in the genitive case (
δεσμῶν
) to be dependent on
τιμάς
(see below).
³⁹
I, however, translate
φεύγηι
as “to be a defendant [sc., in a trial].” And take the genitive
δεσμῶν
—“imprisonment”—to be the punishment that would be inflicted on the defendant should he be unlawfully convicted.
⁴⁰
I prefer this interpretation because all three potential unlawful punishments listed in provision 8 would then explicitly concern some sort of confinement: binding, confining, being a defendant facing imprisonment. And, as is well known, the Greeks—or at least the Athenians—generally bound or kept people to prison only until they were executed or paid a fine.
⁴¹

The second difficulty concerns the punishment that would be inflicted on the lay accuser once the democrats regain control of the polis. Here is the Greek (lines 92–93):
τιμὰς
|
διπλασίας ὀφείλει
[
ν κ
]
αὶ ὅτι ἂν βλαβῆι διπλάσιον
. Thus the lay accuser will owe twice the
τιμαί
and twice the
βλάβη
(literally, “twice the damage he caused”). What are the
τιμαί
? Perhaps the
τιμαί
refer to
the penalties that the victim suffered (or would have suffered) as a result of the unlawful trial's verdict. Frisch, as mentioned above, takes the
δεσμῶν
with
τιμαί
: thus “twice the penalties of imprisonment.” That is a reasonable position, but it is, perhaps, too narrow: the penalties (
τιμαί
) likely included both the amount of time of confinement and any money that the victim might have paid to get out of prison or would have had to pay to get out of prison. What, then, does
ὅτι ἂν βλαβῆι
refer to? Maybe it refers to physical harm suffered by the victim. And it might also include any additional losses the victim incurred as a result of his imprisonment. In any case, the logic behind the punishment is “two eyes for an eye.”
⁴²

In the third scenario covered in provision 8, the victim paid money (presumably) to the lay accuser. Should that happen, the lay accuser must pay twice the amount that the victim was forced to pay. The law seems to imply that the original victim would receive that money.
⁴³

The Ilian pro-democrats obviously crafted provision 8 in order to prevent individuals from using the courts while the democracy is overthrown. The provision does so, first, by making such action potentially quite costly: as noted above, the consequences will be twice as bad for the accuser as for his victim, if the democracy is reinstated. Second, by ensuring that there will not be a statute of limitations, it is more likely that the offender eventually will be punished for his actions. And finally, it appears—and this is significant—that the lay accuser will be punished even if his victim was actually guilty of the alleged crime.

CAPITAL “TRIAL” LODGED BY A MAGISTRATE
(
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
)

Provision 9 addresses a situation wherein a magistrate successfully convinces members of the regime to execute an individual. Should that occur, everybody who voted for the execution will be considered a murderer and may be tried in court once the democrats regain control of the polis. If a regime member who voted for the execution goes into exile to avoid the trial, he and his descendants will be deprived of their rights and must remain in exile.
⁴⁴
And the relatives of the executed man are forbidden from accepting—from whom the law does not say—either money or offers of marriage to atone for the murder.
⁴⁵
If a family member does accept money or a marriage agreement to atone for the execution, he himself, along with his descendants, must “pay the same penalty.” That is not entirely clear, but it likely means that he and his children are to be exiled and deprived of their rights. It is possible, but perhaps unlikely, that they could also be tried as murderers, since that is the only other penalty articulated in this provision. But that penalty is articulated in the previous conditional sentence.

The apparent objective of provision 9 is to render special tribunals ineffective. It is necessary to realize that the votes referred to in this provision would have been conducted openly: if they were conducted by secret ballot, no one would know who voted for the execution and thus the provision would be impossible to enforce. In such a scenario, the votes of a few enthusiastic and influential radicals could put tremendous pressure on everybody else to vote for an execution: the less radical individuals think that others will also vote for the execution and thus do not want to be seen as dissenters. Thus the less radical individuals, too, would vote for the execution.
⁴⁶
The harsh penalties
included in this provision, however, might convince such individuals not to follow the lead of the more hardcore regime members. And that might prevent a cascade of votes in support of the execution.

SHAM ELECTIONS

Provision 11 addresses the possibility that someone, “during an oligarchy” (
ἐν ὀλιγαρχίαι
), might participate in a sham political processes (literally, misuse the laws) in order to make it look like he became a magistrate or council-member “during a democracy” (
ὡς ἐν δημοκρατίαι
). Should someone do that, his selection is invalid and he may be treated as a leader of an oligarchy—that is, he may be assassinated. There appear to be two possible imagined scenarios, depending on what “during an oligarchy” means.

In perhaps the most likely scenario, Ilion is obviously ruled by an oligarchy when the fraud takes place: “during an oligarchy” is thus stating the acknowledged political reality. In this situation an individual might manipulate the laws to make it look like the regime is liberalizing or somehow becoming more democratic. To accomplish that, someone might remove other candidates' “names from the hat” (technically, remove their
pinakia
from the
kleroterion
—or the Ilian analog thereof); lie about the selection results; bribe or use force to convince other people not to seek the office. In any case, he is working to maintain the status quo, while apparently participating in a fully democratic process.

Another possible scenario is that Ilion is a democracy when the fraud takes place: “during an oligarchy” is thus stating the postfraud political reality.
⁴⁷
In this situation an individual might manipulate the laws in order to disguise a silent oligarchic coup. For example, he might somehow convince the people to change the laws, thus allowing him to serve multiple terms in office.

The Ilians clearly crafted provision 10 in order to prevent anti-democrats from deceiving the population about the real nature of the ruling regime. This provision ensures that the people of Ilion will be aware of such tricks—that they will realize that “democracy in form” does not equal “democracy in substance.” And they warn anybody who might engage in such deceptive practices that he very well might be assassinated.

PARTICIPATION IN A REVOLT IN ANY CAPACITY

Provision 12 addresses, very generally, anybody who participates in an anti-democratic coup in any capacity: a tyrant, a leader of an oligarchy, someone who sets up a tyrant, someone who joins in a revolt, or someone who overthrows
the democracy. Such individuals will incur a “memory sanction” (often referred to as
damnatio memoriae
).
⁴⁸
Specifically, the law states that their names must be chiseled off priest lists, votive offerings, and tombstones. No further directions are given for names engraved on a tombstone: they would simply be chiseled off, it seems. If an offender's name is on a priest list, that spot—after chiseling off the name—will be sold, presumably to the highest bidder. And the spot's new “owner” may engrave the name of anybody he wants, provided that that individual is (or was?) eligible to serve as priest. If an offender's name is on a votive offering, the nature of the sanction depends on the type of votive. There are two possibilities.

•  It is a private votive offering—that is, one dedicated solely by the offender. In that case, the
dēmos
must ensure, first, that there will be no indication that it was, in fact, dedicated by the offender. It thus appears that the votive will still stand; perhaps the
dēmos
would rededicate it. The law also states that the
dēmos
must ensure that there is no
mnēmeion
. This is difficult to interpret since the word can mean “memory,” “monument,” and “record.” I have chosen to translate the word as “record.” Thus the people of Ilion must ensure not only that the offender's name is removed from the votive but also that there is no record of any kind that the offender made such a dedication.
⁴⁹

•  It is a public votive offering that is also inscribed with the names of non-offenders. In this case the
dēmos
must ensure that only the offender's name is chiseled off. Thus, the votive offering itself will remain.

The most obvious function of the memory sanction was to ensure that the people of Ilion would permanently forget that the anti-democratic revolutionaries ever existed.
⁵⁰
It is tempting to take that line of reasoning one step
further and conclude that the implementation of the sanction would also facilitate the Ilians' collective effort both to “forget” about their troubled past and to forge a present as a unified, successful, democratically governed polis. But that is likely only half true. On the one hand, the people of Ilion would, over time, perhaps forget the exact identity of those who participated in an anti-democratic coup d'état. Yet, on the other hand, the chiseled-off names would be a constant reminder that there had been a coup and that one must be vigilant in order to prevent another one.

THIRD SECTION

The third extant section of the law (provisions 14–17)
⁵¹
addresses the dispensation of honors and financial compensation to those who “contributed or spent money” (
εἰσενέγκας ἢ ἀναλώσας
) in an effort to overthrow a nondemocratic regime and reestablish the democracy.
⁵²
It is clear, and was perhaps explicitly articulated in a lost (early) section of the law, that the magistrates, after the democracy is reestablished, were required both to return to such men the money they contributed and to ensure that (1) their generosity is announced in the Great Dionysia; (2) they received an honorary crown; (3) they are officially recorded as benefactors of Ilion. The extant provisions of this section focus on four contingencies that might arise in those matters.

Provision 14 addresses the possibility that the archons do not ensure that deserving individuals are correctly compensated and honored. Should that occur, there are, first, fines: each archon must pay a fine of thirty staters; each member of the
boulē
must pay a fine of ten staters; the treasurer must pay a fine of one hundred staters. In addition to fines, the archons, the members of the
boulē
, the treasurer, and the members of the special boards (
τοῖς ἐνεστῶσιν ἀρχείοις
) shall be without rights (
atimoi
) until such matters are settled.
⁵³

Provision 15 addresses the possibility that an individual is improperly compensated after the restoration of the democracy. The provision articulates
three scenarios. First, someone is compensated despite the fact that he did not “contribute or spend money” to reestablish the democracy. Second, an individual “recovered what was not owed.” Dittenberger (ad loc.) provided a plausible explanation for this perplexing scenario: somebody might make two successful claims for reimbursement—in which case he was “not owed” the second payment. Third, an individual recovers more than what is due. In all three cases, the guilty party must pay back twice the amount of money that he received, if he is convicted in court.

Provision 16 addresses the possibility that someone does not properly spend money that a contributor gave him. Specifically, the provision targets, first, those who do not spend the money to reestablish the democracy. And, second, it targets those who do not demonstrate that they spent the money in order to reestablish the democracy. In both cases, the guilty party must pay back double the amount he received, if convicted in court. It is quite likely, but not certain, that he would pay the fine to the individual who gave him the money initially.