Death to Tyrants! (49 page)

80
Also, the tribute of the Lokrian maidens was revived in the middle of the third century. That practice, as suggested by Rose (2003: 57), “functionally … parallels the office of the
arrhephoroi
on the Athenian acropolis.” On Athens as the architectural model for Ilion, see Rose (2003).

81
Aylward and Wallrodt (2003: 96) also suggest that the people of Ilion followed the Athenian model in making the Acropolis the backdrop for their theater. And the koinon of Athena Ilias, founded, perhaps, in 310, appears to have looked to democratic Athens as its model: the festival of the Panathenaia was likely similar to the Athenian festival and the theater perhaps inspired by the Lykourgan-era example. See Rose (1992).

82
Lawall (1999: 215), Aylward (1999). Also, Antiochos II minted silver tetradrachms in Ilion (Magie [1950: 933n27]).

83
See Aylward (2005). Heirax held the Troad from 241 to 228. After he was defeated by Attalos, Ilion apparently entered into alliance with Attalos (Magie: 1950: 9).

84
The economic improvement is likely due to a better political equilibrium. Ober (2008: 13) writes: “because social cooperation produces economic value (as well as being valuable in nonmaterial ways), more cooperative and (in changing environments) more dynamically adaptive equilibria perform relatively well in economic terms.” Compare this to Herodotos's famous explanation for the Athenians' prosperity after the overthrow of the Peisistratids (5.78). A similar dynamic might have been operative in Ilion after the overthrow of their nondemocratic regime circa 280.

85
Ilion was a small polis: the city walls were 3.6 kilometers in length. For a discussion of the walls (built circa 250–220), see Aylward and Wallrodt (2003). On the population of Ilion in the first years of third century, Cook (1973: 100) suggests “about 5,000”—but the population soon increased significantly. The Ilians celebrated the Panathenaia by at least the end of the fourth century (
I. Ilion
24 line 18;
I. Ilion
1 lines 50–51). That festival would have performed the function of a “rational ritual.” And it is important to note that many of Ilion's inscriptions—including the one engraved with the tyrant-killing law—were likely placed in the temple of Athena; thus attendees were encouraged to discuss politics. On the placement of inscriptions in the temple of Athena, see Rose (2003: 60–63).

86
In their resistance to the tyrant Hiero, the exiles of Priene sent
psephismata
to King Demetrios, Lysimachos, and the citizens of Rhodes (
I. Priene
37 lines 73–77); that likely implies the sending of ambassadors to read them (cf. the fifth text in the dossier from Eresos). Lysias (in exile at Megara) provided funds and two hundred shields to help the democrats reclaim Athens during the reign of the Thirty Tyrants: Plut.
Mor.
835f. Aratos hired mercenaries to help reclaim Sikyon (Plut.
Arat
. 6).

87
The citizens of other cities in the koinon would presumably be among the first foreigners to help the citizens of Ilion since all of the cities were quite closely bound. See the brief remarks about the koinon in Frisch (1975: xv).

88
One should also recall (from
chapter 4
) that the people of Nasos (an Aeolian city) promulgated a law against overthrowing the
damos
(
τῶ νόμ
[
ω π
]
ερὶ τῶ καλλ
[
ύο
]
ντος τὸν δᾶ
[
μον
]. The law is referred to in
OGIS
4 (lines 106–10), an inscription dated 319–317. Also, an epigram celebrating Harmodios and Aristogeiton (and commemorating the Athenians' decision to build a grave monument for them) has been found in Chios. Trypanis (1960:70) suggests an inscribing date of late third or early second century, admittedly not during the “early” Hellenistic period.

Conclusion

The persistence of democracy within the ancient Greek world during the Classical and early Hellenistic periods was an achievement of profound historical significance. In scores of cities, from Attika to Euboia, from the Troad to Karia and beyond, the nonelite masses controlled their state; the elites were forced to share political power. It was the first time in history that democracy became a normal regime type within an international system of independent states. And it would be well over two millennia until anything even remotely like that would happen again. How were Greek pro-democrats able to maintain such a historical anomaly for so long?

I have argued in this book that the promulgation of tyrant-killing law contributed significantly to the persistence of democracy in the ancient Greek world. The previous six chapters demonstrated that that law type was effective in five different states in different times. And I also have demonstrated that those examples represent just the tip of the iceberg. In the conclusion to
chapter 6
, for example, I argued that tyrant-killing law contributed significantly to the successful democratization of Hellenistic western Asia Minor. And, as noted in the introduction to this book, literary sources indicate that, by the second quarter of the fourth century, tyrant killing became a widely accepted and celebrated means to overthrow nondemocratic regimes and usher in democracy.

In these concluding remarks, I provide a simple conceptual framework within which we might interpret the long and complex history of tyrant-killing legislation. The framework has two parts. The first focuses on the dynamics of learning and innovation in Athens. The second briefly explores the likely dynamics of learning and adoption outside Athens.

Learning and Innovation in Athens

The origin of ancient Greek tyrant-killing legislation is directly tied to the Athenians' failure to respond to the coup of the Four Hundred. In the years before that coup, pro-democrats had some reason to be confident in the long-term durability of their regime: they had already controlled the city for
generations, and even anti-democrats concluded that it could not be overthrown.
¹
It seemed invulnerable. But that confidence was shattered in the summer of 411, when a small number of committed anti-democrats overthrew the democracy and established a narrow oligarchy. The loss of power was no doubt a psychological blow to Athens's pro-democrats. But it did force them to seriously identify the foundations of their democracy and how they might defend their regime against future tyrannical threats. The coup, that is, was a learning experience.

The fundamental lesson that the Athenian pro-democrats learned from their experience in the coup of the Four Hundred is that the survival of their democracy ultimately depended on whether or not they could mobilize en masse even if their democracy was overthrown. It is not enough, that is, simply to have institutions that help individuals prevent a coup: people can be manipulated, and those institutions can thus fail. That lesson became clear when the pro-democrats, intimidated and misinformed by the anti-democrats' policies, annulled the
graphē paranomōn
, an institution specifically designed to prevent a coup d'état.
²
Again, Athenian pro-democrats realized that they must have the ability to draw upon their collective strength
after
a successful coup—when established institutions are no longer functioning. If they do not have that ability, their numerical superiority is meaningless.

In an effort to facilitate the pro-democrats' ability to mobilize even if their regime is overthrown, Demophantos invented and the Athenians then promulgated the first-ever tyrant-killing law. Passage of the law—especially the swearing of the oath that it mandated—accomplished that crucial objective by inducing what I have called a pro-mobilization threshold sequence. First, it generated common knowledge of widespread credible commitment to defend the democracy in the event of a coup. Second, it incentivized brave individuals to commit the first public act in defense of the democracy—to “kill a tyrant.” In the event of a coup, therefore, it would be more likely that someone would commit a conspicuous act in defense of the democracy and that that act would trigger an ever-growing cascade of pro-democracy resistance. Pro-democrats would thus be able to mobilize in the absence of a functioning democracy

The successful mobilization against the Thirty Tyrants demonstrated that the promulgation of the decree of Demophantos did, in fact, facilitate revolutionary mobilization and thus secured the foundation of the Athenians'
democracy. Despite the fact that the democracy was overthrown and the Thirty sought to atomize the pro-democrats, Thrasyboulos and his men set out from Thebes reasonably expecting that they would attract a sufficient number of supporters—that is, they believed that the Athenian population was defined by a pro-mobilization threshold sequence because of the oath and decree of Demophantos. They were right. The pro-democrats mobilized and soon overwhelmed the Thirty.

Thus the most powerful and influential democratic polis in the Greek world had invented an institution that gave pro-democrats a credible threat—second strike capability—against their anti-democrat opponents. Henceforth, anti-democrats knew that if they staged a coup, the pro-democrats would nonetheless be able to mobilize in sufficient numbers. Staging a coup would now be irrational. Pro-democrats thus proceeded into the fourth century with confidence, knowing that their domestic opponents were deterred: the
dēmos
had the
kratos
to impose their will on the state.

Learning and Adoption Outside of Athens

Despite originating in Athens and being deeply imbued with Athenian democratic ideology, the citizens of several poleis subsequently promulgated their own tyrant-killing law. How did this happen? What significant dynamics were involved? What, if anything, were the larger effects? In order to explore those questions, I present a diffusion model that is based on inter-polis social learning. It is admittedly hypothetical. But, as I will demonstrate below, it is quite plausible; and it does provide an efficient and effective means to explore what we might call the Nachleben of the decree of Demophantos.

At its most basic level, the dynamic of diffusion likely consisted of two steps. First, the citizens of city
x
learned from the citizens of city
w
that the promulgation of tyrant-killing law helps defend a democracy by inducing (what I, certainly not they, call) a pro-mobilization threshold sequence among the population. This implies, of course, a broader awareness: namely, that the pro-democrats' capability to mobilize is at the heart of the struggle for control of the polis. They (i.e., the citizens of city
x
) came to understand that if anti-democrats successfully implement practices of widespread disinformation and intimidation, pro-democrats would be unable to draw upon their collective strength, despite the fact that they all would like to do so. They learned, that is, that the revolutionary coordination problem constitutes perhaps the most serious threat to the viability of their democracy. But they also learned (from city
w
) that if they are able to generate and maintain common knowledge of widespread credible commitment to defend the democracy and if they properly incentivize brave individuals to take the all-important first steps in their defense, pro-democrats will be able to draw upon their collective strength and mobilize in defense of their regime, no
matter how thorough the anti-democrats' “anti-mobilization” practices might be. In brief, the citizens of city
x
would have learned from city
w
what the Athenians themselves learned in the late fifth century.

Second, the citizens of city
x
decided to promulgate their own tyrant-killing law.
³
This was their “Demophantos moment.” After having considered what they were doing and why they were doing it, the citizens generated common knowledge of their pledge to resist tyranny and to reward tyrant killers. They now were defined by a pro-mobilization threshold sequence: henceforth, individuals believed that, if they acted in defense of their democracy, a sufficient number of individuals would follow them. The foundation of their democracy was thus secure. The promulgation of the tyrant-killing law also made the citizens of city
x
more like the citizens of democratic Athenians, the paradigmatic tyrant killers: they too had fully adopted the ideology of tyrannicide—the call to act “just like” Harmodios and Aristogeiton—as a means to defend their democracy. Thus not only did the citizens of city
x
learn from city
w
what the Athenians learned in the late fifth century, they became what the Athenians then became.

As the number of cities that adopted tyrant-killing law increased (i.e., as city
x
learned form city
w
, and so on), cities that had not yet adopted would become more likely to do so. That would be due to a number of reasons. First, the citizens of a greater number of cities simply became aware of the law type; word spread, that is, thus making promulgation conceivable. Second, it would be easier for a citizen of city
x
to convince his fellow citizens to promulgate such a law if he could cite examples of such activity in other cities. The logic here, too, is simple: if tyrant-killing law were known to work in many poleis, it likely would work in polis
x
too; it would thus be worth the effort to craft and promulgate such a law in city
x
. And finally, as tyrant-killing law became more normal, individuals in city
x
likely would want to become part of the movement—to have their own tyrant-killing law and thus become committed tyrant killers themselves.

The inter-polis cascade of learning and adopting would have increased the credibility of pro-democrats' commitment to mobilize pursuant to the promulgation of their own tyrant-killing law. The single most important dynamic here is that people would have known that tyrant-killing law actually worked. If it were common knowledge in city
x
that the promulgation of tyrant-killing law helped the citizens of cities
v
and
w
defend their democracy, the credibility of the commitment of the citizens in city
x
would be increased: since everybody knows that tyrant-killing law works, people would be even more
convinced that, should they act in defense of their democracy, a sufficient number of individuals will follow them. Thus the citizens of polis
x
—both pro-democrats and, just as important, anti-democrats—would know that their population is in fact defined by a pro-mobilization sequence. It is important to note, however, that the increased credibility would not just flow to new adopters (like from city
x
to city
y
, to city
z
, and so on): as more and more cities adopted tyrant-killing legislation, the credibility of earlier adopters to enforce their law would also increase—they, too, would be emboldened by the success of others and thereby maintain their own pro-mobilization threshold sequence.