Dragonfire (32 page)

A single artillery shell or mortar landing in a crowded market place can do appalling damage. The destruction of a conventional missile warhead is unimaginable. The market was not a big one, nor
was it buried within the warren of streets of old Srinagar, where the casualties would have been far higher. But it was by the Dal Lake, where traders set up stalls around the bus station, a place
of transit, meeting, talking and buying, the first flavour of Kashmir which many visitors saw when they arrived.

More than two hundred soldiers died at the military headquarters, including the corps commander. By noon, it was clear that the missile strike had killed at least seven hundred Kashmiris in
central Srinagar. Many more were expected to die, and by the end of the day the dreadful pictures of the aftermath of the attack were formulating the international policy which would last for
generations.

Indian military HQ, Karwana, Haryana, India

Local time: 1015 Monday 7 May 2007
GMT: 0445 Monday 7 May 2007

Prabhu Purie, the
Foreign Minister, and Chandra Reddy were on the line from Delhi with Hari Dixit and Chief of Army Staff, Unni Khrishnan. ‘We have to kill his
command and control centre,’ said Hari Dixit.

‘That is Chaklala, sir. Hamid Khan’s bunker,’ said Unni Khrishnan.

‘Then we must strike it.’

‘You could only be sure of success with a nuclear weapon.’

‘Mani, what is your view?’

‘Can’t we bring in the Americans or the Russians and keep our own slate clean?’

‘Chandraji?’

‘He’s made big blunder. My guess is he didn’t intend to use multiple warheads. That was a cock-up. The missile we shot down was heading for the airfield. The one we failed to
get was heading for the military headquarters. He would not have targeted the market. He has killed his own people. He could go one of two ways. Admit it and surrender. Or carry out another strike
immediately to dampen the impact of this one. My guess is he’s going to strike again.’

‘Inside or outside Kashmir?’

‘Impossible to say.’

The Rose Garden, The White House, Washington, DC

Local time: 1155 Sunday 6 May 2007
GMT: 0455 Monday 7 May 2007

Question
: President Hastings, the statements so far from the State Department and the Pentagon have not made clear where your support lies – with India or
Pakistan. Could you clarify your position, please?

Hastings
: I want a ceasefire then negotiations. But I want to say something about conflicts, and this one in particular. The grievances which caused this conflict go back
to the partition of India in 1947. It is not a forward-looking issue, like the issues which tied us up during the Cold War. That was about the future, whether the political and economic system in
the Western democracies or that of the Soviet Union was the more powerful one. The conflict between India and Pakistan is about the past. They have no issue with each other over their political
systems and the basic concepts of democracy. This is not Pakistan fighting against the repression of Muslims in India as a whole. Or India defending Hindu rights in Pakistan. This war is about a
piece of land called Kashmir. It’s run by India, but claimed by Pakistan and it should have been sorted out as part of the overall independence deal, but it wasn’t and that’s why
I’m standing here now.

It would be farcical if the American people were drawn into any kind of war over Kashmir, and we have to bear that in mind. A nuclear weapon might have been used, but the cause of the conflict
remains the same.

Question
: Sir, we’re getting reports that Pakistan has launched a missile strike on the city of Srinagar in Kashmir. It was conventional, but the Indians were
seconds away from retaliating with a nuclear weapon.

Hastings
: Yes. I saw those reports as I was coming here. Many innocent Indians have been killed and it might help me answer the first question, about which side I
support. America and the American people support democracies. I spoke directly to General Hamid Khan about an hour ago. It is not my practice to talk with dictators, but these were exceptional
circumstances. If you remember, President Clinton met directly with one of the former military rulers during his visit to South Asia in 2000. General Khan wanted my support in bringing about peace.
I told the General that we needed an unequivocal declaration of a ceasefire. Hamid Khan’s statement, which many of you might have heard, fell far short of that mark. Since then, he has
launched a missile strike on Kashmir. It seems to me that we have a nightmare scenario of a desperate military dictator in a bunker with his finger on the nuclear button. In India, we have an
elected Prime Minister, working with his democratically appointed ministers and institutions.

Question
: Mr President, could you clarify—

Hastings
: Sorry, Clarissa, for interrupting, but I want to add one detail, to give you an example of how this thing has played out over the last few hours. We are working
with the Indians through normal channels, their ambassadors here and at the United Nations and their officials in Delhi. The Pakistani officials, on the other hand, say they have received no
instructions from Islamabad. That situation speaks for itself, Clarissa.

Question
: Yes. Thank you. Russia seems to be playing it neutral.

Hastings
: Yes. I have spoken to President Gorbunov. We offered to help each other in whatever way would bring about peace quickest.

Question
: But China seems to be taking a different line.

Hastings
: Yes. And we expect it to. China is a long-standing ally of Pakistan’s. It has a problem with India over Tibet. There is also healthy competition for these
two great nations in their race for modernization. I know Joan Holden has been speaking to their Foreign Minister, Jamie Song, in Beijing and I don’t see a problem with this. You are all
probably more familiar with the way we worked with Russia in Europe and the Middle East. Our alliances might be different, but we are all working towards peace.

Question
: Mr President, can you envisage any circumstances in which the United States will become militarily involved in this conflict?

Hastings
: Only to save lives. And, I’m really sorry, I’ve just had a message that the Indian Prime Minister needs to speak to me urgently. I have to go.

RAF Upper Heyford, Gloucestershire, UK

Local time: 0530 Monday 7 May 2007

The suggestion of
using the F-16 multi-role combat aircraft either from Incirlick in Turkey or one of the bases in the Gulf was dismissed in less than fifteen minutes.
The host governments all had significant Islamic opinion to take into account. This strike was not worth upsetting it.

The second option, of using F-18 Hornets on board the 102,000 tonne USS
John C. Stennis
in the Gulf of Oman, was thrown out equally quickly. The aircraft’s range was 1,600
kilometres and they could have completed their mission by refuelling 500 kilometres from the carrier and again on the way back, using tankers from Kuwait and Turkey. But with both options, American
pilots’ lives would be put at unnecessary risk. The aircraft would be over hostile territory, and liaising with Indian pilots who might have to provide cover would be impossible.

The aircraft chosen for the mission was a single American B-52 bomber flying out of RAF Upper Heyford in England. It carried twenty BGM-109 Conventional Airborne Cruise Missiles (CACMs) with
special warheads. For four decades, the B-52 had been the mainstay of the American bomber force and when it was due to be finally scrapped in 2038 it would have been in service for eighty-two
years. Technology had advanced tenfold since it flew its first mission. The B-52 was adapted accordingly and it remained the most versatile bomber in the American order of battle.

Shortly before it took off from the base in Gloucestershire, the crew saw the latest 116 Keyhole spy satellite photographs of the Rawalpindi cantonment area, under which Hamid Khan operated from
the Pakistani war room. Throughout the night, other equally sensitive satellites had passed over the area, with optical equipment which cut through the darkness.

They also had access to special Doppler radar imagery gathered by a stealth AWACs aircraft flying high above Rawalpindi. It was the first time the United States had used the facility in a real
conflict situation. Known as Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) it could produce three-dimensional images of objects as far as 45 metres below ground or sea. Trials were as yet incomplete, but the
implications were already enormous. Not only would it allow surveillance inside enemy bunkers, such as suspected nuclear facilities in North Korea or biological weapons bunkers in Iraq, it might
also make the submarine, particularly those carrying nuclear missiles, a far more vulnerable weapon of war.

Ideally, the GPR is used on board a helicopter. The stiller it is the clearer the picture. But over enemy territory this is too risky. So the images fed back to Washington of the General
Headquarters in Rawalpindi were not as clear as they could be, but the information was enough to characterize the target and therefore determine whether the special warheads to be used would be
able to take it out of action. The underground tunnels linking the various Pakistani bunkers showed up clearly and confirmed for the first time the actual command and control centre being used by
Hamid Khan.

The Americans’ main concern was that Khan had taken to a mobile strategic communications system, of which the Pakistani DEFCOM was the most sophisticated, embracing both satellite and
microwave links. It remained in the field and, as yet, undetected. Given that Khan was also head of government, he might have opted to use the Joint Operations Command (JOC), the centre for the
Joint Services, which was better placed for direct liaison with the civilian government. But it was equally possible that Khan would feel more at home and physically secure on his own turf, which
would be the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi – and this was confirmed by the GPR.

Analysts had picked out images of movement within that bunker and other specific targets believed to be the entrances, the control tower at the airfield, the officers’ mess, the clinic and
others. In one picture, three men were photographed going into the clinic, carrying boxes of supplies.

Indian Mirage-2000Hs, MiG-27MLs and SU30s continued to pound Pakistan air defences, and shortly before the B-52 was ready to launch aircraft descended to destroy key buildings in the complex,
using fire and deep-penetration bombs.

The B-52 flying outside of Pakistan airspace over international waters south of Karachi carried twelve missiles externally and they launched those first. They were followed by four more from the
bomb bay and four were held back in reserve. The type of warhead had never been used in modern conflict. John Hastings had told Dixit that the United States would not be involved in any offensive
lethal action against Pakistan. But on advice from Alvin Jebb, the American Defence Secretary, he had agreed to use non-lethal weapons to neutralize Hamid Khan’s command and control of
nuclear weapons. Jebb was keen to test the weapons in a combat situation which he saw as a perfect, high-profile use of non-lethal weapons.

As the Tomahawks exactly hit their target, there was no fireball or wrenching explosion. That had been carried out by the Indians. Instead, almost farcically, a thin, fog-like foam was dispersed
over specific areas. Immediately, it began hardening and within minutes had become as immovable as concrete, sealing the exits to the bunker like a glue. The Indian bombs had left hundreds of
anti-personnel mines on the ground, demanding an exhaustive process before Hamid Khan and his staff could be got out.

It was impossible to know what contingency plans – if any – Khan had
drawn up for this type of attack. But American SIGINT operators confirmed that Pakistan’s command and control structure had gone dead, leaving individual commanders to fend for themselves.
There was no communication from Hamid Khan’s bunker, and, only when the conflict had ended did it become clear what had happened to him.

Eastern Air Command, Shillong, India

Local time: 1100 Monday 7 May 2007
GMT: 0530 Monday 7 May 2007

‘Pakistan neutralized,’ read
the encrypted message.

Air Marshal Commodore Ravi Thapar received it in the code which had still not been deciphered by the United States and European experts. It was a simple message, leading to a battle plan he had
already drawn up. The Chinese forces which had pushed into Arunachal Pradesh would now be cut off from behind and then destroyed.

Part of it was revenge for the dreadful defeat China inflicted on India in 1962. Part of it was sensible military strategy. The key targets were the bridges north and south of the Burmese town
of Namya Ra, cutting off supplies for the Chinese troops coming in from Lashio and Mytkyina. Airfields at Mogaung and Bhamo were hit, destroying Chinese aircraft on the ground and rendering the
runways unusable for several hours.

Then, after several hours’ lull in the front-line fighting, Indian artillery opened up on the Chinese positions. Chinese aircraft from bases in Tibet were intercepted by India fighters and
engaged in dogfights, leaving the ground troops vulnerable. Sensing defeat, the Chinese troops began a tactical withdrawal into Burma, but were cut off by three thousand Indian troops landed by
helicopter and parachute behind the Chinese lines. Indian ground-attack aircraft took out Chinese anti-aircraft positions, then moved in with cannon fire, strafing the positions and the light
armour the Chinese had brought in with them.

Once the element of surprise had ended, the Chinese dug themselves in well. But they were running low on ammunition and supplies and it would be only a matter of time before they were defeated.
Their attackers fought ferociously, taking huge risks in the mountainous terrain. In the first hours of fighting, they refused to take prisoners, even after the Chinese had shown the white
flag.