Dragonfire (35 page)

When Gorbunov called Hari Dixit again, the Indian Prime Minister had arrived in his office in Delhi’s South Block. Much of the rioting had given way to celebrations, but buildings in
Connaught Place were smouldering and communal killings were still continuing.

‘Will you move in on the Tibetan bases? At least make a show of doing it.’

‘While China is occupying our territory, it’s politically very difficult. We have about twenty million Buddhists in India. They are only two per cent of the population, but it is a
significant number of people. The Tibetan cause has a huge resonance here. There’s also a growing anger about China’s support for Pakistan. It might be defeated now. But it could rise
up again and it did resort to using a nuclear weapon.’

‘On Pakistani soil,’ interjected Gorbunov.

‘I’m not debating, Vlad, I’m explaining to you the issues with which we have to deal, so that you might be able to see a way to broker through a peace. If I announced a
crackdown on Tibetan exiles, while invading Chinese troops were still on our soil, I’m not sure the Indian people would allow it. I’m not sure the party would, or the
administration.’

‘You mean you couldn’t get it through?’

‘I honestly don’t think I could. On top of that, there would be an outcry from the Hollywood human rights activists on Tibet. That is not important domestically, but it has a huge
impact internationally.’

‘Tell me what you need, then.’

‘As soon as Tao gets off our turf, I will reaffirm our policy of not allowing Tibetan exiles to partake in armed activity on Indian soil. I’ll reinforce the border, put up air
patrols and pass on information to Chinese intelligence. In return, he would have to allow an international human rights mission with a substantive Indian component to visit Lhasa and report on the
consequences of the uprising.’

‘And you’ll keep the ceasefire?’

‘At least until you get back to me.’

Before talking to Tao again, Gorbunov telephoned John Hastings in the White House. ‘I think I have the makings of a peace agreement, but I need your guarantee that America will stay out
until it’s fixed.’ Gorbunov outlined what he had brokered so far.

‘Would Tao send the army into Tibet, Chechnya-style, or is he posturing?’

‘We’ve been in a similar position,’ said the Russian President. ‘My bet is that he would move in, secure the territory again and pick up the pieces later. It would be
twenty years before Tibetans get back the level of freedom they even have now. From the little I know of the American democratic process, it would put you in a very difficult position.’

‘That could be the understatement of the year. You have my word we will give you the space to try to push through an agreement. Good luck.’

Prime Minister’s Office, Wellington, New Zealand

Local time: 0500 Tuesday 8 May 2007
GMT: 1700 Monday 7 May 2007

Harriet Sheehan, the
Prime Minister of New Zealand, looked at the photographs on her desk and felt the pressure of the people at the meeting for a decision. It showed
the bruised face of Michael Hall, the SBS New Zealand commando sniper, who stayed behind on the Cocos Islands so his colleagues could escape. He had been shot in the leg and captured. The picture
had been taken from a video, first released through the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok to the television news agencies and then broadcast around the world. The video showed Hall being jeered at by
local citizens, and protected by Burmese troops. Then he was sitting at a table eating with the troops. The audio was clear and the Burmese conversation had already been translated. Sheehan felt
that odd twinge of national pride when it became clear that Hall was living through his capture with true grit. The enemy had no idea of Hall’s identity or his nationality. He could have been
a Serb mercenary for all they knew, and despite clear signs of torture, Hall had not spoken once.

The New Zealand Defence Minister, Benjamin Leigh, broke the silence. ‘The dead frogman was a Malay with no identification. I suggest, Prime Minister, that we say nothing
whatsoever.’

‘What about Hall’s family?’

‘They are in Palmerston North,’ said Leigh. ‘They are on side. Hall is dedicated to his work, so we don’t expect problems from friends. If there are, we will cross that
bridge when it happens.’

‘And the British are taking the flak?’ said Sheehan.

‘Correct. Given our sensitive relationship with South-East Asia, if we can keep this quiet, so much the better.’

‘We have one dead and one captured from the operation,’ said Sheehan.

‘I think it proves that this country can play with the biggest when the chips are down.’

Downing Street, London

Local time: 1700 Monday 7 May 2007

There was a
second set of photographs from the Cocos Islands raid which was classified for even the highest officials in the New Zealand government. Ever since New
Zealand banned nuclear-armed warships from its waters in the eighties, it had been cut out of much of the intelligence loop. ‘It appears this could be more serious than the capture of Michael
Hall,’ said Pincher, examining the picture taken with the infrared vision camera of the submarine surfaced next to the Great Cocos Island jetty.

‘It dived as soon as firing broke out,’ said John Stopping. ‘According to naval intelligence, its permanent home is at Tsing Tao, the headquarters of the North Sea Fleet. In
December last year it sailed down to Zhejiang, South Sea Fleet base, and was tracked by the USS
Hampton
, an American
Los Angeles
-class submarine. As far as we were aware, it was still
at Zhejiang, but – to the embarrassment of the Americans more than anyone – it slipped out and no one knows when.’

‘How?’ said David Guinness, the Defence Secretary.

‘Another
Los Angeles
-class submarine was redeployed from gate-keeping duties on Zhejiang because of budget cuts in February. The
Xia
must have gone out some time after that.
The Malacca Straits are too shallow to send a submarine through submerged. It probably went through at night under cloud cover in the wake of a Chinese freighter to conceal its signature. Or it
might have taken the longer route through the Sunda Straits, which divide Java and Sumatra. Either way it has got into the Indian Ocean theatre undetected.’

‘I’m sorry,’ said Christopher Baker to John Stopping. ‘I don’t see how one Chinese submarine changes the situation as dramatically as you make out. We knew the
Chinese maintain naval bases in Burma.’

Defence Secretary David Guinness had never rated the Foreign Secretary’s intelligence highly. ‘This is a photograph of a Chinese
Xia
-class type 92 strategic missile submarine
from the 9th Submarine Fleet,’ he told Baker bluntly. ‘John Stopping has circulated the brief, of which you must have a copy. In peacetime, the
Xia
comes under the command of the
People’s Liberation Army – Navy. In wartime, it is commanded through the Central Military Commission, of which President Tao is the chairman. We presume the
Xia
is now under
wartime command. It could be armed with the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile. JL stands for Ju Lang, meaning Giant Wave, and its land-based equivalent is the DF-31 – DF meaning Dong
Fang or East Wind. NATO knows it as the CSS-NX-4 with a range of 5,000 miles. It would either be kitted with three or four multiple re-entry warheads of up to 90 kilotons each, or a single warhead
of 250 kilotons. This is a new SLBM system which was fitted in 1999, and if it works it would be comparable to our three-stage solid fuel submarine-launched Trident C-4.

‘Up until now the
Xia
-class submarine has never been known to sail outside of the South China Sea. It is not clear whether this was because of operational difficulties or whether
the Chinese, aware of Western and Russian antisubmarine warfare capabilities in the Pacific theatre, chose to keep their powder dry. In 1985, shortly after the first missile test from a submerged
Xia
, there was an intelligence report through Japan that the vessel had been lost, but this was found out to be misinformation planted by the Chinese. The type 094 photographed at the Great
Cocos base was first deployed in 2003. The JL-2 was successfully tested in February 2004.

‘It is possible that the
Xia
could be carrying the shorter range two-stage solid-propellant missile the JL-1, for which Nato’s specification is CSS-NX-3. It had its first
successful test in April 1982, from a
Golf
-class submarine, followed by a launch from the
Xia
in 1985, when we were told the vessel had been lost. The first successful
Xia
launch was September 1988. It is possible that the Chinese don’t trust the bigger missile. The JL-1’s range is just over 1,000 miles, which would give it a good range into southern and
central India.’

‘This is a nuclear missile?’ the Prime Minister confirmed.

‘Correct. Or at least the option is there. What this picture shows is that China has moved its nuclear threat from land-based to sea-based and added an extra theatre of war to its
inventory.’

‘And the situation right now is that we don’t know where this submarine is.’

The Situation Room, The White House, Washington, DC

Local time: 1230 Monday 7 May 2007
GMT: 1730 Monday 7 May 2007

‘If it’s armed
with the JL-1 and Beijing wants to threaten a substantive population centre, then it would be heading towards the eastern coastline,’
said Alvin Jebb. ‘It was photographed four hours ago, after which it dived. If it is travelling at 20 knots, it would be eighty miles north-west of Great Cocos Island.’ Jebb put his
finger on a map of the Indian Ocean spread out on the table and circled the spot. ‘This is known as the area of probability where the
Xia
would be. The British have sent down their
Triumph
nuclear-powered attack submarine and the Australian
Collins
-class
Sheean
, which is diesel-electric. Luckily, they were with the HMS
Ocean
task force, about 200
miles north of Great Cocos Island. The
Triumph
has a dive speed of 32 knots. The
Sheean
’s is only 20 knots. They are the best chance we have at the moment of finding the
Xia
. The
Ronald Reagan
carrier group is still heading north, but is only off the coast of southern India. It could be another two days before it gets close to the area of
probability.’

‘What do the Indians have?’ asked John Hastings.

‘There is the
Bombay
, a
Delhi
-class destroyer inside the area of probability, which has begun searches, but its equipment is limited. The main eastern naval base is at
Vishakhapatman. The
Godavari
-class frigate
Brahmaputra
left there two hours ago, together with the
Shankul
diesel-electric submarine. I might add that Indian submarine
capability is not good.’

‘And our chances of finding it?’ said Hastings.

‘If we are talking about the shorter range JL-1 scenario, there is a possibility, but it’s remote. If the Xia is carrying the long-range JL-2 it could have gone anywhere from the
Great Cocos and still be a threat to anywhere in India. The chances of finding it then are almost impossible. Or, if President Tao believes he has time on his hands, he could have sent the
Xia
, even with the JL-1, due south, with the view to getting it to double back on itself and confuse our search.’

‘If the Chinese know that we know they have the
Xia
in the Bay of Bengal,’ said Joan Holden, ‘shouldn’t we quit playing diplomatic cat and mouse, call President
Tao and ask him what he’s playing at?’

Hastings shook his head. ‘A bad idea, I think. It would give him so much more leverage if I make the call. Let’s try and find it first. I can’t see any motive whatsoever for
Tao to launch a nuclear strike against India. If he’s posturing, let him posture for a while.’

Zhongnanhai, Beijing, China

Local time: 0130 Tuesday 8 May 2007
GMT: 1730 Monday 7 May 2007

The Indian ceasefire
was open-ended and unilateral. President Tao had finished yet another conversation with the Russian President, whose peace brokering had become
bogged down in detail.

‘Hari Dixit will not hold on for ever,’ warned Gorbunov. ‘You will have to give him something.’

‘Han Chinese are being slaughtered in Lhasa, Shigaze, Gyangze and Rutog. Those are just the places we know about. The Tibetans are getting their arms from India. They are going into
Chinese areas, killing people and burning their houses. If you want, Vlad, send a Russian television crew in to show the world the atrocities that these so-called innocent Tibetans are committing.
Do you remember Kosovo, how the Albanians drove out the Serbs after NATO had won their war for them? Well, the Chinese people feel the same about Tibet. We have done more to raise the quality of
life for Tibetans than any other nation and we are being repaid with an orgy of killing. As the leader of China, I cannot agree peace with India until that stops. It would be impossible.’

Tao now looked out on the Central Sea from one of his offices, the smaller room which he used for thinking and which was decorated with some of his very personal momentos. It would take perhaps
an hour at the most for Gorbunov to talk to Hari Dixit, who would have to call an end to the ceasefire. Just as Tao could not surrender in Arunachal Pradesh while the Tibetan uprising continued,
the Indian Prime Minister could not move against the Tibetan fighters while Chinese troops were in Arunachal Pradesh. Both men had painted themselves into a corner, and neither’s bluff had
yet been called.

Briefly, Tao wondered whether he could have acted in any other way, but concluded he could not. Ultimately, India was to blame. Had it disbanded the Special Frontier Force years ago, the
Tibetans would never have had the resources to stage an uprising. The question now was not to look back, but to devise a way that China could win.

The People’s Liberation Army had grown up on the doctrine of
yilie shengyou
, pitting the inferior against the superior. Despite the move towards missiles, submarines and
high-technology warfare, that doctrine was very much in place. It assumed that China would opt to fight wars which other powers might not. It would take the risk of going into battle when it was
not quite ready and win on courage and imagination. Without
yilie shengyou
, the Communist Party would never have defeated the Nationalists in 1949. After that, the Chinese Communist Party
adopted another doctrine, of self-defence counter-attack, meaning that when it thought war was inevitable it should be fought on enemy and not Chinese territory. This was the pattern in the Korean
War of 1950, against India in 1962 and against Vietnam in 1979. In China it was known ‘to attack outside the door’ or ‘to strike beyond the gates’. The policy was loosely
known as
xianfa zhiren
, which also meant that China would make the first strike and gain the initiative. But the psychology remained unchanged. China saw itself not as an expansionist power,
but an inward-looking nation under threat, merely trying to protect itself.