“Joseph Foy. Joseph Foy has inconsistencies in his testimony that the prosecutor will make some excuses for. “The car. A Ventura versus a Grand Prix. Brown, tan, the color of the car.
“The beard, well, it’s not that full beard, maybe it’s that partial beard.
“The purse. Didn’t really ever say he saw the purse. “It’s justifiably understandable that Mr. Foy wouldn’t
be able to see everything; after all, it is a dark alley. But she also wants you to believe that, not withstanding the fact that he has these inconsistencies and inabilities to see certain things, was able to make a positive ID. A positive ID. ‘That’s the guy! I recognize him, I recognize him now, I recognized him then.’” The attorney punctuated his statements with his right hand, thrusting it toward the jury.
“Ultimately the case comes down to a credibility analy-sis for Mr. Foy.
“Frankly, I think Mr. Foy honestly believes he saw Mr. Watts. But we’ve all known people who have had honest convictions about a fact and it turns out that they’re wrong. Every single one of you have been in that situation. Somebody you deal with at home, work, socially, you get into a discussion. They’re certain about something. You get into a dispute with them, a debate, an argument, a conversation, and they tell you, ‘This is what it is.’ This is absolutely what it is. They honestly believe what they’re telling you.
“Except later it’s discovered, they were wrong!
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“These people aren’t lying. They’re mistaken.
“And that has to do with the second part of credibility. The question in this case is not whether or not Mr. Foy is being honest, but whether or not Mr. Foy had ample ability to make an accurate identification.
“Accuracy, reliability. Ability to be able to make a valid identification.” Kaplovitz disputed the fact that Foy could see Watts from eighty feet away.
“You’ll be the ones that will have to decide whether or not you can even make an accurate identification of a person from that distance.
“There are other inconsistencies,” Kaplovitz continued. “There was no sound. Prosecutor will probably tell you, ‘Well, she was being stabbed, and she, her lung was penetrated so she couldn’t make any sound.’ She had enough time to put up a defensive wound.
“Ms. Aguilar heard the sound of Lori Lister outside screaming. Mr. Foy says he didn’t hear any sounds whatsoever.
“An inconsistency. The car, the purse, the beard. All, inconsistent.
“There’s one other interesting thing about Mr. Foy. It’s interesting how he described Mr. Watts. How he identified him based upon his ‘evil eyes.’
“‘Evil eyes.’ He had ‘evil eyes.’
“He could recognize him because he had ‘evil eyes.’ “What’s so interesting and fascinating about that is we heard the testimony from Tom Ladd, came up from Texas, about how Coral Watts often picked out his victims based upon their evil eyes. The exact same wording.”
Kaplovitz drew out each word in exasperation.
“Now, we had a chance to see from three of the victims: Miss Sanchez, Miss Lister, Miss Aguilar. I looked at their eyes. They looked pretty normal to me. I wasn’t able to
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see evil in their eyes. Reason I’m not able to see evil in their eyes is probably twofold: One, there is no evil in their eyes, and second of all, seeing evil in somebody’s eyes is a subjective thing. It is not an objective thing.
“I can look at every single jury [member] here and I can see your eyes. Might be able to tell the color of your eyes if I got a little closer. But to say that I can see evil or goodness in one of your eyes, or sets of your eyes, that’s purely subjective. That’s purely my opinion. Somehow, I’m venturing my opinion as to what your eyes look like,” Kaplovitz delivered with a slightly sarcastic lilt.
“‘Evil eyes’ is not an objective, concrete description of anything.
“It wasn’t when Mr. Watts said it. It isn’t when Mr. Foy said it.” Again he slowly drew out the words.
“It is, however, interesting that Mr. Foy chose to use the same language that Mr. Watts used in 1982. Interesting. “Mr. Foy, as I said to you, honestly believes he recognizes Coral Watts. Yet, if you look at the situation as to how he made this identification, we sparred a little bit, not that badly, but we sparred a little bit about whether it was a glance or a look. From eighty feet away, twenty-five years ago, I’ll give him a look.
“So what Mr. Foy wants you to believe is, at night, in the dark, from eighty feet away, he had a chance to look at this person, see his eyes, and then, two-and-a-half years later, when Mr. Watts comes on TV and walks in the door, he instantaneously recognizes him,” Kaplovitz said, his voice dripping in sarcasm.
“I’m sorry. That is just simply not possible. It is simply not possible,” he slowly and condescendingly spat out each syllable to each word. “It cannot be an accurate description. It cannot be. What it is, is a stereotypical generalization. The story was about Mr. Watts. We know that. I
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stipulated to it. It was clearly Mr. Watts who was on TV about his crimes in Texas. Something to do with Michigan. Mr. Foy made a leap. He made a leap.”
Kaplovitz then had the unenviable task of dealing with the 404 (b) evidence of Coral Watts’s confessions. “Certainly you can conclude there are some similarities, if you so desire,” Kaplovitz stated in regard to the murders of the other women. “But those similarities don’t prove anything. The last part of the instruction says, as follows, and I’m going to read it to you: ‘You must not consider this evidence for any other purpose, for exam-ple, you must not decide that it shows that the defendant is a bad person or that he is likely to commit other crimes. You must not convict the defendant here because you think he is guilty of other bad conduct. All the evidence must convince you beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant committed the alleged crime or you must find him not guilty.’ That’s what the jury instruction says.
“Now, I’ll concede he’s a bad person. But the key part of that jury instruction is that not withstanding those other bad acts they cannot be the basis for your conviction. The basis for your conviction has to be evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of what occurred on December 1, 1979.” The defense attorney paused for seven seconds to drive his point home.
Kaplovitz flipped over another page in his legal pad and informed the jury about their burden of proof. “We’re never going to be certain what happened here. There’s no way of proving at a hundred percent that this was Coral Watts. The prosecutor can’t do that. Now, I know she’s writing here furiously and she’s going to stand up and tell ya, if she doesn’t, I’ll tell ya, she doesn’t have to prove beyond any doubt that it was
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Watts, one hundred percent sure. They only have to prove beyond any reasonable doubt. That’s the law and that’s correct.
“You have to start looking backwards. Okay, we know, we’re never going to know for sure, so now are we gonna be able to know beyond a reasonable doubt, which would mean you would convict? Or, are we gonna have some reasonable doubt, which means you have to find him not guilty?”
Kaplovitz wrote a note on his pad and continued, “Basically, there are two types of evidence in this case. There’s the evidence from 12/1/1979 . . . and then there’s the 404 (b) evidence.
“The 404 (b) evidence is the pink elephant. I talked about it in my opening statement. I’ll never be able to get you to get that 404 (b) evidence out of your mind because it’s the pink elephant, it won’t go away. But when you think about that evidence, I want you to also think about the pink elephant. Because if you eliminate the 404 (b) evidence in this case, and you had to make your decision based strictly upon the evidence about what happened on December 1, 1979, if you knew nothing about these prior bad acts, you would come back with an acquittal and it would take you no time whatsoever and you would do that because, although Mr. Foy may really believe it, his ability to give you an accurate description is simply impossible.” The attorney shook his head.
“Your verdict would be not guilty if it wasn’t for the 404 (b) evidence and there is absolutely no doubt about that. None, whatsoever. I know it. You know it. Prosecutor knows it.”
Kaplovitz jotted down one more note, took a quick pause, and addressed the jury. “This is my last chance to talk to you. The prosecutor’s gonna get one last chance
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to talk to you. Judge is then gonna give you, the jury, instructions. And then the case is yours. I’m done. Ms. Pendergast is done. You guys got to really get started. Not to say that you haven’t gotten started already, because you’ve been paying attention and listening, but now you really gonna have to get started.
“You’re gonna have a huge responsibility. A very huge responsibility in this case. Because you see, when this case began, it began as
The People
v.
Coral Watts,
an admitted murderer of many people. That’s what the case began as. High profile, publicity, television, media, it’s all there. We know that the society has this desire to want to convict. I know that.
“But what’s important to you to remember is that this case has become even bigger than
People
v.
Coral Watts
. This is no longer just about trying to convict a man who’s confessed to other murders. This case is fundamentally about the integrity of our jury system and of our judicial system. It has become huge. It has become huge because when you weigh the two bodies of evidence: the 404(b) versus the evidence of the incident on 12/1/1979, the evidence on that day of 12/1/79 would cause you to issue an acquittal. Yet, society wants you to issue a conviction.
“You know that the evidence is insufficient in regard to December 1, 1979. You know it is. You know it cannot be a valid, reliable identification. You know it’s a stereotypical generalization. That’s the description of the individual who committed this crime, on December 1, 1979.” Kaplovitz began to close his argument. “In the end integrity is all we have. The integrity of our judicial system is all we have. And as much as you might hate Mr. Watts, the integrity of our judicial system is fundamentally far more important than convicting Mr. Watts.
“You know you have to do the right thing. You have to
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do the right thing in this case. And you’re not gonna like it. But you’re gonna have to do the right thing. And, like it or not, the right thing is to return a verdict [of] not guilty.
“Thank you.”
Several heads shook in the gallery as Kaplovitz stepped away from the lectern.
Coral Watts simply rubbed his forehead over and over.
Early in the morning of November 17, 2004, Kala-mazoo assistant district attorney James Gregart held a press conference. He announced that the Kalama-zoo District Attorney’s Office would bring a murder charge against Coral Eugene Watts for the October 30, 1974, murder of Gloria Steele, regardless of the outcome of the Helen Dutcher case.
Just minutes later, in Oakland County, after less than two weeks of testimony, the case against Coral Watts went to the jury, a group that consisted of only twelve jurors, as one more member was booted. Apparently, a male juror went to the crime scene of his own accord, which he was not allowed to do. As a result there were no more alternate jurors left. If one more would be released, a mistrial would have to be declared.
The gallery got nervous after hearing the news.
There would be no reason for anyone to worry. After less than three hours, the jury returned with a verdict. The overflowing gallery once again waited with bated breath. Joseph Foy sat next to Harriett Semander, his
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hand encased in a yellow Lance Armstrong “Livestrong” bracelet. Harriett grabbed his arm as Joseph Foy leaned forward. He seemed more nervous than he had been during his entire testimony.
“Will the remainder of the jurors please rise?” the courtroom bailiff asked. “Members of the jury, listen to your verdict as recorded. You do say upon your oaths that you do find the defendant guilty of first-degree premeditated murder.”
The audible sigh sounded like a rush of hot air ex-pelled out of an expanding balloon. Backs were slapped, fists were pumped, but voices were subdued.
“So say you, Ms. Foreperson,” the bailiff inquired. “Yes, we do.”
“So say you all?”
The jurors all nodded and stated in unison, “Yes, we do.”
Joseph Foy buried his head into his hands. The tears of joy freely flowed.
Coral Watts, slumped in his chair, simply rolled his eyes. He was then cuffed and removed from the courtroom. As he walked past the gallery, he could not help but attempt one last act of defiance. He boldly glared at the families as he shuffled away, the sounds of tinkling metal escorting him out of the room.
Judge Kuhn then dismissed the jury. The gallery, which remained seated, burst into applause as soon as the jury left the room. Several victims’ family members jumped up and cheered, hugged one another, and burst into tears of happiness.
Joseph Foy stood with his fists clenched. He smiled in victory as Maria Semander Crawford jumped into his arms. Harriett Semander, Jane Montgomery, Lori Lister
EVIL EY ES 417
Baugh, Julie Sanchez, and Michael Clyne stood by with cautious smiles on their faces.
Julie Sanchez, who wore dark sunglasses throughout the rest of the trial after her testimony, removed her glasses. A large grin began to spread across her face.
Less than one month later, on December 7, 2004, Coral Eugene Watts faced Judge Richard Kuhn for sentencing. The convicted felon was ushered into the courtroom, this time wearing the prison-issued orange jumpsuit.
Just as he had endured more than twenty-two years earlier, Watts received a verbal tongue-lashing from a judge. “This case cries out for the death penalty,” Judge Kuhn implored. “No, it screams for the death penalty, but Michigan does not allow it.”