From the Tree to the Labyrinth (39 page)

16
. “Nullus peccat ex hoc quod utitur re aliqua ad hoc ad quod est. In rerum autem ordine imperfectiora sunt propter perfectiora, sicut etiam in generationis via natura ab imperfectis ad perfecta procedit. Et inde est quod sicut in generatione hominis prius est vivum, deinde animal, ultimo autem homo; ita etiam ea quae tantum vivunt, ut plantae, sunt communiter propter omnia animalia, et animalia sunt propter hominem. Et ideo si homo utatur plantis ad utilitatem animalium, et animalibus ad utilitatem hominis, non est illicitum, ut etiam per philosophum patet, in I Polit. Inter alios autem usus maxime necessarius esse videtur ut animalia plantis utantur in cibum, et homines animalibus, quod sine mortificatione eorum fieri non potest. Et ideo licitum est et plantas mortificare in usum animalium, et animalia in usum hominum, ex ipsa ordinatione divina, dicitur enim Gen. I, ecce, dedi vobis omnem herbam et universa ligna, ut sint vobis in escam et cunctis animantibus. Et Gen. IX dicitur, omne quod movetur et vivit, erit vobis in cibum” (
Summa Theologiae
II–II, 64, 1).

17
. Though it may not be the first, the most famous gesture of renewed respect for animals is the celebrated passage in Montaigne (“Apology for Raymond Sebond,”
Essays
II, 12), in which, in addition to defending the existence of a linguistic faculty in animals (since he does not see how their ability to complain, rejoice, call upon each other for help and utter amorous invitations can be defined otherwise), he observes how the constructive behavior of birds and spiders evinces a capacity for choice and thought: “Take the swallows, when spring returns; we can see them ferreting through all the corners of our houses; from a thousand places they select one, finding it the most suitable place to make their nests: is that done without judgment or discernment? And then when they are making their nests (so beautifully and so wondrously woven together) can birds use a square rather than a circle, an obtuse angle rather than a right angle, without knowing their properties or their effects? Do they bring water and then clay without realizing that hardness can be softened by dampening? They cover the floors of their palaces with moss or down; do they do so without foreseeing that the tender limbs of their little ones will lie more softly there and be more comfortable? Do they protect themselves from the stormy winds and plant their dwellings to the eastward, without recognizing the varying qualities of those winds and considering that one is more healthy for them than another? Why does the spider make her web denser in one place and slacker in another, using this knot here and that knot there, if she cannot reflect, think or reach conclusions?” (
The Complete Essays.
Translated and edited with an introduction and notes by M. A. Screech, Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 508–509).

18
. Dante Alighieri,
Il Convivio
(
=
The Banquet), translated by Richard Lansing, New York: Garland, 1990.

19
. “Canis autem diversas significationes habet, nam ut diabolum uel Iudeum siue gentilem populum significant. Vnde propheta dominum precatur dicens in Psalmo: Erue a framea anima meam, et de manu canis unicam meam. Nam in meliore parte canis ponitur, ut in Ecclesiaste ubi scriptum est: Melior est canis uius leone mortuo. Hic leonem diabolum, canem uero gentilem vel hominem peccatorem accipiendum puto, qui deo melior dicitur: Quod ad fidem et pententiam posit venire, hinc de Iudeis scrptum est: Conuertantur ad uesperum et famem patientur, ut canes circuibunt ciuitatem. Canes intelleguntur muti sacerdotes uel inprobi ut in ecclesia: Canes muti non ualentes lactare. Canes Iudei in Psalmo: Quoniam circumdederunt me canes multi. Canes populus gentium ut in euangelio: Non est bonum sumere panem filiorum et mittere canibus ad manducandum. Canes heretici ut in Deuteronomio: Non inferes precium canis in domum dei tui. Et in apostolo: Videte canes uidete malos operarios uidete concisiones. Canis uero uoracissimum animal, atque inportunum, consueuit illas domus latratibus defendere, in quibus edacitatem suam nouit, accepto pane saciate, his merito conparantur Iudei qui Christianae fidali munere salo contigit, ut qui ante fuit persecutor Christiani nominis, postea diuino munere iungeretur apostolis. Canes homini rixosi uel detractors alter utro se lacerantes, ut in apostolo: Quod si inuicem mordetis et comedetis uidete ne ab inuicem consumamini. Catuli abusiue dicuntur, quarumlibet bestiarum filii, nam propriae catuli canum sunt, per diminutionem dicti. Lynciscile dicuntur ut ait Plinius canes nati ex lupis et canibus. Cum inter se forte miscuntur, solent et Inde feminas canes noctu in si alligatas admitti, ad tigres bestias a quibus in siliri et nasci, ex eodem faetu canes adeo acerrimos et fortes, ut in complexu leones prosternant. Catuli ergo significant gentiles, unde est in evangelio, quod Sirofaenissa mulier, cui dominus ait: Non est bonum sumere panem filiorum et mittere canibus, respodit ei dicens: Etiam domine. Nam et Catelli edunt de micis quae cadunt de mensa dominorum suorum. Mensa quippe est scriptura sancta quae nobis panem uitae ministrat. Mice puerorum interna sunt misteria scripturarum, quibus humilium solent corda refici. Non ergo crustas, sed micas de pane puerorum edunt. Catelli quia conversi ad fidem, qui erant despecti in gentibus non littere superficiem in scripturis sed spiritalium sensuum, quia in bonis attibus proficere ualeant inquirunt” (Rabanus Maurus,
De naturis rerum
VIII).

20
. To complicate things further, another element comes into play. Medieval thought is to put it mildly obsessed with two objects of investigation, God and man. Observe what happens in the theory of definition from Porphyry’s
Isagoge
down to Ockham. Porphyry’s tree ought to be seen as a logical artifice that permits us to define every element of our cosmic furniture, but in fact it is invariably exemplified in abbreviated form, in such a way as to distinguish unequivocally man from the divinity. As we observed in
Chapter 1
, none of the available examples of the
Arbor Porphiriana
serves to define unambiguously the horse or the dog, to say nothing of plants and minerals. Irrational animals find a place there only to furnish a pole of comparison with the rational animals. Whereupon the medieval theory of definition leaves them to their fate and fails to provide pointers for distinguishing a dog from a horse, let alone a dog from a wolf. In order to have adequate taxonomical instruments at our disposal, we must await the naturalists and theorists of artificial languages of seventeenth-century England (see Slaughter 1982 and Eco 1993).

21
. I refer the reader to the chapter on “Signs” in Eco (1984b: 14–45), which was based on my entry “Segno” in volume 12 (1981) of the
Enciclopedia Einaudi.
See also Todorov (1982).

22
. “For a sign is a thing which, over and above the impression it makes on the senses, causes something else to come into the mind as a consequence of itself: as when we see a footprint, we conclude that an animal whose footprint this is has passed by; and when we see smoke, we know that there is fire beneath; and when we hear the voice of a living man, we think of the feeling in his mind; and when the trumpet sounds, soldiers know that they are to advance or retreat, or do whatever else the state of the battle requires. Now some signs are natural, others conventional. Natural signs are those which, apart from any intention or desire of using them as signs, do yet lead to the knowledge of something else, as, for example, smoke when it indicates fire. For it is not from any intention of making it a sign that it is so, but through attention to experience we come to know that fire is beneath, even when nothing but smoke can be seen. And the footprint of an animal passing by belongs to this class of signs. And the countenance of an angry or sorrowful man indicates the feeling in his mind, independently of his will: and in the same way every other emotion of the mind is betrayed by the tell-tale countenance, even though we do nothing with the intention of making it known. This class of signs, however, it is no part of my design to discuss at present. But as it comes under this division of the subject, I could not altogether pass it over. It will be enough to have noticed it thus far. Conventional signs, on the other hand, are those which living beings mutually exchange for the purpose of showing, as well as they can, the feelings of their minds, or their perceptions, or their thoughts. Nor is there any reason for giving a sign except the desire of drawing forth and conveying into another’s mind what the giver of the sign has in his own mind. We wish, then, to consider and discuss this class of signs so far as men are concerned with it, because even the signs which have been given us of God, and which are contained in the Holy Scriptures, were made known to us through men—those, namely, who wrote the Scriptures. The beasts, too, have certain signs among themselves by which they make known the desires in their mind. For when the poultry-cock has discovered food, he signals with his voice for the hen to run to him, and the dove by cooing calls his mate, or is called by her in turn; and many signs of the same kind are matters of common observation. Now whether these signs, like the expression or the cry of a man in grief, follow the movement of the mind instinctively and apart from any purpose, or whether they are really used with the purpose of signification, is another question, and does not pertain to the matter in hand. And this part of the subject I exclude from the scope of this work as not necessary to my present object” (Augustine,
On Christian Doctrine,
II, 1–3, online trans. by J. F. Shaw, from
Select Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,
at
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/augustine/doctrine.iv.iii.ii.html
). On the doctrine of the sign in Augustine, see Manetti (1987), Vecchio (1994), and Sirridge (1997).

23
. “Liquet autem ex suprapositis significativarum vocum alias naturaliter, alias ad placitum significare. Quecumque enim habiles sunt ad significandum vel ex natura vel ex impositione significative dicuntur. Naturales quidem voces, quas non humana inventio imposuit sed sola natura [contulit], naturaliter [et non] ex impositione significativas dicimus, ut ea quam latrando canis emittit, ex qua ipsius iram concepimus. Omnium enim hominum discretio ex latratu canis eius iram intelligit, quem ex commotione ire certum est procedere in his omnibus que latrant. Sed huiusmodi voces que nec locutiones componunt, quippe nec ab hominibus proferuntur, ab omni logica sunt aliene” (Petrus Abaelardus,
Dialectica,
First complete edition of the Parisian manuscript, With an introduction by L. M. De Rijk, Ph.D., Second, revised edition, Assen: Van Gorcum 1970, p. 114).

24
. “Significare Aristotelis accipit per se intellectum constituere, significativum autem dicitur, quidquid habile est per se ad significandum ex institutione aliqua sive ab homine facta sive a natura. Nam latratus natura artifex, id est Deus, ea intentione cani contulit, ut iram eius repraesentaret; et voluntas hominum nomina et verba ad significandum instituit nec non etiam res quasdam, ut circulum vini vel signa quibus monachi utuntur. Non enim significare vocum tantum est, verum etiam rerum. Unde scriptum est: nutu signisque loquentur (Ovid,
II Trist.
453). Per ‘significativum’ separat a nomine voces non significativas, quae scilicet neque ab homine neque a natura institutae sunt ad significandum. Nam licet unaquaeque vox certificare possit suum prolatorem animal esse, sicut latratus canis ipse esse iratum, non tamen omnes ad hoc institutae sunt ostendendum, sicut latratus est ad significationem irae institutus. Similiter unaquaeque vox, cum se per auditum praesentans se subgerat intellectui, non ideo significativa dicenda est, quia per nullam institutionem hoc habet, sicut nec aliquis homo se praesentans nobis dum per hoc quod sensui subjacet, de se dat intellectum, sui significativus dicitur, quia licet ita sit a natura creatus, ut hoc facere possit, non est ideo creatus, ut hoc faciat. ‘Significativum vero magis ad causam quam ad actum significandi pertinet, ut sicut non omnia significativa actualiter significant, ita non omnia actu significantia sint significativa, sed ea sola quae ad significandum sunt instituta” (
Logica “Ingredientibus,”
Glosses on the Peri Hermeneias. In Bernhard Geyer,
Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften,
Münster, Aschendorff, 1927, pp. 335–336).

25
. An explanation of why in the case of animals nature acts as a sort of agent will (comparable to “agent intellect”) is provided by Albertus Magnus,
De anima
II [
De voce qualiter fiat
], iii, 22: “Et cum duo sint in anima, affectus scilicet doloris vel gaudii et conceptus cordis de rebus, non est vox significans affectum, sed potius conceptum. Cetera autem animalia affectus habentia sonos suos affectus indicantes emittunt et ideo non vocant; et quaecumque illorum plurium sunt affectuum sunt etiam plurium sonorum, et quae levioris sunt complexionis, et ideo aves plurium sunt garrituum quam gressibilia. Et illae quae inter aves sunt latioris linguae, et melioris memoriae, magis imitantur locutionem et ceteros sonos, quos audiunt. Licet enim bruta habeant imaginationem, sicut superius ostendimus, tamen non moveretur ab ipsis imaginatis secundum rationem imaginatorum, sed a natura et ideo omnia similiter operantur; una enim hirundo facit nidum sicut alia, et haec imitatio est naturae potius quam artis.Ideo anima imaginativa in eis non regit naturam, neque agit eam ad opera, secundum diversa imaginata, sicut facit homo, sed potius regitur a natura et agitur ad opera ab ipsa, ei ideo fit quod licet habeant apus se imaginata, tamen ad exprimendum illa non formant voces. Affectus autem laetitiarum et tristiarum magis profundatur in natura quam in anima, et ideo illos exprimunt sonis et garritibus.”

26
. According to this reading the affections of the soul are not mental images of things, but modes of being of thought, cognitive modalities (like thinking, being afraid, or experiencing joy). The
pragmata
are not real things or facts in general (otherwise how could we explain why Aristotle says elsewhere in his works that we can think of nonexistent or false hybrids like the
hircocervus
or phenomena whose existence we are unable to prove (such as squaring the circle or the
commensurability
of the diagonal). Likewise, “those things that are in the voice” could be transformations, differentiations, or articulations that are proper to the human voice. Finally, an expression like
kata syntheken
does not mean that linguistic
voces
are related to the affections of the soul by means of convention, but that they are articulate, the effect of a syntactic composition (and for this very reason the
voces
emitted by animals, which are inarticulate, cannot express thoughts). At the same time the interpretation of the
omoiomata
is also called into question. It would refer to the fact that there exists a relationship of structural similarity between logical-cognitive operations and events in the world. In conclusion, the passage from Aristotle should be reinterpreted as follows: “The articulations of the human voice and the logical-cognitive operations of the human soul are different from each other and complementary, just as written articulations and articulations of the voice are. And just as the minimal units with which and in which writing is articulated are not the same for all mankind, neither are the minimal units in which the linguistic voice is articulated. On the other hand, the logical-cognitive operations of which the vocal and graphic units are the natural physiognomic signs are the same for all mankind, and likewise the same for all mankind are the facts with which the logical-cognitive operations of the human soul are in a relation of similarity” (Lo Piparo 2003: 187).