From the Tree to the Labyrinth (41 page)

43
. See
Latratus canis
(“On Animal Language”), n. 30. This theme is developed in the
De anima
of Avicenna, where the opposition between human language and the
voces
of the animals is placed in relation with the diversity of ends toward which communication is ordered: among humans these are infinite since they are determined by our social existence, while among animals they are few and dictated by natural instinct (
Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus
V, ed. S. van Riet, Louvain, Leiden, 1968, p. 72, 42–48).

44
. “Interiectiones omnes sunt mediae inter istas voces nunc dictas scilicet: significativae naturaliter et inter voces plene significantes ad placitum … Interiectiones enim imperfecte significant ad placitum et parum significant per modum conceptus propter quod vicinantur vocibus illis quae solum per modum affectus subiect isignificant cuiusmodi sunt gemitus et cetera quae facts sunt. Gemitus enim et suspiria et huiusmodi naturaliter et per modum solius affectus excitantis animam intellectivam significant, quae per interiectiones gemendi et dolendi et suspirandi et admirandi et huiusmodi significantur per modum conceptus, licet imperfecti” (
De signis,
I, 9 in Karin M. Fredborg, Lauge Nielsen and Jan Pinborg, eds., “An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon’s
Opus Maius:
“De Signis,”
Traditio
34 [1978], p. 75–136). In general on the problems raised by the classification of interjections in the medieval grammatical tradition, see Pinborg (1961). And see also
Latratus canis
(“On Animal Language”).

45
. “Si vero obiciatur in contrarium quod Aristoteles in librum Perihermeneias dicit voces significare passiones in anima, ut Boethius exponat de speciebus et in libro illo loquitur de partibus enuntiationis vel enuntiatione, quae significant ad placitum et tunc partes orationis sive voces impositae rebus significabunt ut videtur species ad placitum, dicendum est quod Aristotele a principio capituli de nomine intendit loqui de vocibus, ut sunt signa ad placitum, sed ante illud capitulum loquitur in universali de signis sive ad placitum sive naturaliter, quamvis ascendat in particulari ad illa signa, quae intendit, scilicet ad nomen et verbum prout significant res ad placitum. Et quod loquitur in universali de signis, manifestum est per hoc, quod dicit quod intellectus sunt signa rerum et voces signa intellectuum ety scriptura est signum vocis, certe intellectus non est signum rei ad placitum, sed naturale, ut dicit Boethius in Commento, quoniam eundem intellectum habet Graecus de re, quam habet Latinus, et tamen diversas voces proferunt ad rem intellectam designandam. Voces autem et scriptura possunt ad placitum significare aliqua, et alia ut signa naturalia. Unde vox imposita rei extra animam, si comparetur ad ipsam rem, est vox significativa ad placitum, quia ei imposita est. Si vero ad speciem propriam ipsius vocis, tunc est signum naturale in triplici modo signi naturalis, ut habitum est prius. Si vero ad speciem rei nec antequam cognoscetur res per eam, quia opportet quod actu intelligatur res per speciem et habitum nominata et vocata et repraesentata per vocem, antequam vox sit signum speciei ipsius rei” (
De signis
V, 166, op. cit., p. 134.).

46
. Augustine was far more subtle in his
De doctrina Christiana
II, xxv, 38–39, where he recognized the largely conventional nature of images and mimic representations.

47
. “Vocem alia significativa, alia non, significativa. Non significativa est per quam nichil auditui representatur, ut ‘bubo’ etc.; vox significativa est per quam omne animal interpretatur aliquid omni vel alicui sue speciei—omne vero animal potest hoc facere, quia natura non dedit ei vocem ociosam. Et hoc possumus videre manifeste, quai gallina aliter garrit cum pullis suis quando invitat eos ad escam et quando docet eos cavere a milvo. Bruta autem animalia interpretantur omni individuo sue speciei, ut asinus omni asino, leo omni leoni, sed homo non interpretatur omni homini, set SED alicui, quia Gallicus Gallico, Graecus Graeco, Latinus Latino et hec solum. Nullum eciam animal interpretatur alicui individuo alterius speciei nisi inproprie adminus per suam vocem propriam nichil interpretatur nisi eis qui sunt de sua specie, tamen si ex industria et assuetudine posit aliquod animal uti voce alteriius, ut pica voce hominis, potest aliquo modo inproprie et non naturaliter significare alii quam sue speciei ut homini; et forte quamvis homo posit aliquid comprehendere per vocem pice, non tamen est illa vox proprie significativa, cum non fit a pica sub intentione significandi, et quamvis homo possit aliquid apprehendere per talem vocem , pica tamen pice nihil significat per illam. Similiter cantus galli nichil proprie nobis significat tamen vox significativa, set SED gallum cantare significat nobis horas, sicut rubor in mane significant nobis pluviam. Vocum significativarum alia significativa ad placitum, alia naturaliter. Vox significativa naturaliter est que ordinatur ad significandum, ut gemitus infirmorum et omnis vox ferarum vel sonus. Vox significativa ad placitum est que ex institucione humana aliquid significant” (
Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi,
fasc. XV, ed. R. Steele. Oxonii, Clarendon Press, 1940, p. 233, 20 234, 13).

48
. “Est tamen sciendum quod ad cuiuslibet vocis prolationem prencipalitur duo instrumenta naturalia sunt necessaria, scilicet pulmo et vocalis arteria. Ex isto patet quod latratus canum etiam est sonus vox et quando arguitur ‘tamen non fit cum intentione aliquid significandi’ respondetur negando assumptum. Neque oportet quod omnes intelligent illum latratum, sed sufficit quod illi intelligant qui sciunt proprietatem et habitudinem canum. Nam latratus canum uni significat gaudium, alteri autem iram.” (
Commentum emendatum et correctum in primum et quartum tractatus Petri Hyspani Et super tractatibus Marsilij de Suppositionibus, ampliationibus, appellationibus et consequentiis
(Hangenau, 1495, s. p.; reprint Frankfurt, Minerva, 1967 with title
Commentum in primum et quartum tractatum Petri Hispani.
) See
Latratus canis
(“On Animal Language”).

49
. We might add to the list a number of marginal phenomena (mentioned in
Latratus canis,
“On Animal Language”). Take, for example, Thomas’s observations on the miraculous or magical instances of talking animals reported by Scripture (
Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei,
VI, 5): “Ad tertium dicendum, quod locutio canum, et alia huiusmodi quae Simon Magus faciebat, potuerunt fieri per illusionem, et non per effectus veritatem. Si tamen per effectus veritatem hoc fierent, nullum sequitur inconveniens, quia non dabat ani daemon virtutem loquendi, sicut datur mutis per miraculum, sed ipsemet per aliquem motum localem sonum formabat, litteratae et articulatae vocis similitudinem et modum habentem; per hunc autem modum etiam asina Balaam intelligitur fuisse locuta (Numbers XXII, 28), Angelo tamen bono operante, (“
Reply to the Third Objection
. Speaking dogs and like works of Simon the magician were quite possibly done by trickery and not in very truth. If, however, they were genuine, it matters not: since the demon did not give a dog the power of speech miraculously as when it is given to the dumb; but by some kind of local movement he made sounds to be heard like words composed of letters and syllables. It is thus that we may understand Balaam’s ass to have spoken [
Numbers
, XXII, 28], although in this case it was by the action of a good angel”).
On the power of God
(
Quæstiones disputatæ de potentia Dei
) by Saint Thomas Aquinas. Literally translated by the English Dominican fathers. Three books in one. Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1952, p. 186. Dante too deals with talking animals in the
Convivio
(III, vii, 8–10), where he cites the magpie and the parrot, and in the
De vulgari eloquentia
(I, ii, 6–8), where he cites the examples
de serpente loquente ad priumum mulierem, de asina Balaam, de piscis loquentibus.

50
. It is a slow process. If, as late as 1603, Fabrici d’Acquapendente can compose a treatise
De brutorum loqui
in which he takes up once again the classical arguments concerning communication among animals and their passions, in 1650, Athanasius Kircher, in his
Musurgia Universalis
(I, 14–15), is interested in the sounds uttered by the various animals and makes an accurate study of the syntax, if not the semantics, of the monkeys of the Americas, of cicadas, grasshoppers, frogs, and various types of birds, with accurate pentagrammatical transcriptions that take into account different structures, including the
pigolismus,
the
glazismus,
and the
teretismus,
distinguishing the sounds made by the mother hen when laying and those with which she calls her chicks—and revealing himself to have been an expert pioneer bird watcher. His was no longer a philosophical reflection on the possibility of animal language, such as occurred in the Middle Ages: Kircher devoted a vast portion of his treatise to the examination of the various phonatory organs of the animals in order to explain the possibility or impossibility of their “languages.”

51
. The phrase
quasi liber et pictura
is a line from the Latin poem quoted in Chapter 3 (
section 3.3
). At this point we may even find ourselves annoyed by the barking of a dog which has abandoned the pages of the theologians and invaded the nights of lovers and robbers. Two centuries after Bacon (1544), Michelangelo Biondo will reveal a trick to stop a dog barking, which he apparently learned from the thieves themselves, interrupted in the course of their night’s work, as well as from lovers, disturbed as they attempted to scale their mistress’s balcony. All you have to do is to swallow or drink a dog’s heart, duly baked and reduced to a powder: “Accepimus a quibusdam, quod cum quis latratum canis vult cohibere ne illi sit impedimento in quibusdam peragendis (quod maxime amantibus ad amantes accedentibus nocere solet et furibus nocturnis) itaque cor canis edat, quamvis dicunt quidam quod potatum praestantius est; ideo ustum redigatur in pulverem et deglutiatur, quoniam latratum canis comprimet; quod furibus et amantibus dimittimus credendum.” Which is a bit like catching a bird by sprinkling salt on its tail. See
De canibus et venatione libellus,
“Ad latratum,” Rome 1544. Partial ed. in
Arte della caccia,
ed. G. Innamorati, vol. 1, Milano, Panfilo, 1965.

5

Fakes and Forgeries in the Middle Ages

The modern reader, nurtured on philology, is aware that many forgeries were perpetrated in the course of the Middle Ages. But were the people of the Middle Ages similarly aware? Did they recognize the notion of forgery? And if they recognized the notion, was it the same as our own?

In formulating these questions, we find ourselves compelled to analyze a series of terms—like falsification, fake, forgery, false attribution, diplomatic forgery, alteration, counterfeit, facsimile, and so on—that we nowadays take for granted. If we are to decide whether similar concepts existed in the Middle Ages, we are inevitably obliged to take a closer look at our own contemporary concepts.

It is no accident that dictionaries and encyclopedias, in defining falsification, place the emphasis on malicious intent, introducing—without defining them—concepts such as counterfeit, spurious, apocryphal, pseudo, and so on.
Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary,
for instance, defines
forgery
as “the act of forging, fabricating or producing falsely; especially the crime of fraudulently making, counterfeiting, or altering any writing, record, instrument, register, note and the like to deceive, mislead or defraud; as the forgery of a document or of a signature.”
¹

The dictionaries are also vague on the distinction between spurious, apocryphal, and pseudo. Spurious is used for nonauthentic or falsified works and documents, but also for an illegitimate child born from an adulterous relationship. In the natural sciences, it refers to organs that resemble other organs without having their function. For example, the spurious ribs are two lower ribs on either side of the skeleton that do not reach as far as the sternum; in zoology, the spurious or bastard wing (or alula) is a tuft of accessory flight feathers growing on the first digit of the bird’s wing, behind the wing’s angle, in some cases substituted by a nail or spur; in botany, it indicates an apparatus or organ that resembles another organ with a different structure or function.

In German the same phenomenon is rendered with the prefix
pseudo.
Webster gives
apocryphal
as a synonym of
spurious
(“Apocryphal: various writings falsely attributed … of doubtful authorship or authenticity … spurious”). In fact,
apokryphos
originally meant occult and secret; apocryphal gospels and other biblical writings got the name because people weren’t allowed to read them—and as such they were excluded from among the canonical books. Hence, “apocryphal” came to signify “excluded from the canon.” Subsequently, late Jewish authors attribute their writings to the ancient prophets, and these books are termed
pseudonymous
or
pseudoepigraphical.
It should be observed, however, that Catholics describe the noncanonical books as apocryphal, while the books accepted in the Greek version of the Septuagint are said to be
deuterocanonical.
For Protestants on the other hand it is the deuterocanonical books that are apocryphal while the ones Catholics call apocryphal are pseudoepigraphical.
²

Given the complexity of the notion of forgery, if we are to understand what might have been considered a forgery in the Middle Ages, we must proceed to clarify the various related concepts.
³

The first thing we must consider is the semiosic concept known as
replicability.
The most complete instance of replicability is the
double,
a physical
token
that has all the characteristics of another physical token, at least from a practical point of view, insofar as both possess all the pertinent traits prescribed by an abstract
type.
In this sense, two chairs of the same model or two sheets of office paper are both doubles of one another, and the perfect homology between the two tokens is established with reference to their type. Doubles do not lend themselves to the deceit of falsification in that every token has the same practical value as every other, and each one can substitute for the other. A double is not identical with another double (in the Leibnizian sense of indiscernibility), in other words, two tokens of the same type are—and are recognized as—two different physical objects. Nevertheless, they are considered interchangeable.