Goebbels: A Biography (121 page)

103.
PA
1938, nos. 1272 (2 May), 1311 (7 May), 1340 and 1366 (11 May), 1425 and 1433 (18 May).

104.
TB, 4–11 May 1938;
VB
, 4–11 May 1938.

105.
TB, 7 May 1938. The “liquidation” of Austria and the promise of Italy not to intervene in the event of a conflict between Germany and Czechoslovakia were in fact the main results of the visit:
ADAP
D I, no. 761, Ribbentrop’s circulars to embassies, and no. 762, Aufzeichnung Weizsäckers, 12 May 1938.

106.
TB, 6 May 1938.

107.
TB, 20 May 1938.

108.
PA
1938, no. 1435 (19 May). On the continuation of the campaign, see
PA
1938, no. 1445 (20 May 1938). For the implementation of these instructions see, for example, the reports in the
DAZ
, which, as ordered, changed the approach with the evening edition of 19 May, launching a series of attacks; the
FZ
followed suit by publishing an editorial on the 19th about the economic discrimination being allegedly practiced against the Sudeten Germans and on 21 May began to report “incidents.” The VB’s anti-Czech campaign was launched in a big way on 21 May. On this change, of course, see Schwarzenbeck,
Pressepolitik
, 293ff.

109.
PA
1938, no. 1440 (20 May).

110.
TB, 23 May 1938.

111.
TB, 22 May 1938; see
DAZ, FZ
, and
VB
of 21 May 1938.

112.
PA
1938, no. 1467 (23 May).

113.
On the weekend crisis, see Rönnefarth,
Sudetenkrise
, 277ff.; Scheil,
Churchill, Hitler und der Antisemitismus
, 193ff. It is still unclear where the false reports came from. See also Lukes, “The Czechoslovak Partial Mobilization in May 1938,” which rather unconvincingly attributes it to Soviet intelligence. On the German propaganda, see
DAZ
, 22–25 May 1938;
FZ
, 22–27 May 1938;
VB
, 22–26 May 1938. See
PA
1938, no. 1467 (23 May), nos. 1476, (24 May), 1487 and 1488 (25 May), no. 1504 (27 May).

114.
PA
1938, no. 1510 (28 May); in its editorial of 30 May 1938, the
FZ
saw “signs of an easing of tension”; in their editions of 26–31 May
(DAZ)
, and 29 and 30 May
(VB)
both papers dispensed with big spreads about alleged border violations.

115.
TB, 23 (Pussyfooter quotation), 25, 26, and 27 May 1938; 29 May 1938. Goebbels hurried to include these instructions in a speech he gave in Dessau on 30 May, after Hitler had thoroughly vetted the text (TB, 30 May 1938). On the speech, see
VB
(B), 30 May 1938, “Scharfe Abrechnung mit den Friedensstörern.”

116.
ADAP
D II, no. 221, 30 May 1938, Anlage: Führerweisung betr. Aufmarsch Grün; Rönnefarth,
Sudetenkrise
, 310; Smelser,
Sudetenproblem
, 201.

117.
TB, 1, 2, and 3 June 1938.
PA
1938, no. 1551 (2 June), no. 1565 (3 June);
VB
(B), 3 June 1938;
MNN
, 2 and 3 June 1938;
DAZ
, 2 June (M and E): Schwarzenbeck,
Pressepolitik
, 313f. His Königsberg speech of 17 June represented a particularly strong attack. TB, 17 and 18 June 1938,
FZ
, 19 June 1938, “Reichsminister Goebbels in Königsberg.”

118.
In his diary entries for 4, 5, and 8–12 June, Goebbels boasted of having continued
to mobilize the press against Prague. However, this is not reflected in his instructions to the press and only partially in the reporting of the press;
PA
1938, no. 1601, no. 1613, no. 1620. The
FZ
carried an editorial on 3 June 1938 dealing with the “problem of Czechoslovakia”; in the same edition and on 7 June there were articles about “incidents.” Up until 11 June the
DAZ
reported such events regularly on its front page, the
VB
(B) carried headlines on the issue from 2–9 and 11–13 June and on 18 June. There are entries on propaganda against Czechoslovakia in the TB for 15 and 21 June, 1 and 2 July 1938. During the second half of the month attacks by the
VB
and the
FZ
against Prague once again declined, as did those of the
DAZ
between 18 and 29 June. See also Schwarzenbeck,
Pressepolitik
, 314ff.

119.
TB, 17 July 1938.

120.
TB, 19 July 1938.

121.
PA
1939, no. 1974 (18 July), nos. 1981 and 1988 (19 July), no. 2008 (22 July). On the reduced continuation of the campaign in July, see
DAZ, FZ, VB
.

122.
On the start of the persecution of the Jews in Austria, see Gerhard Botz,
Nationalsozialismus in Wien
, 93ff.; Longerich,
Politik der Vernichtung
, 162ff.; Rosenkranz,
Verfolgung und Selbstbehauptung
, 20ff.

123.
Adam,
Judenpolitik
, 172ff.; Barkai,
Vom Boykott zur “Entjudung,”
233ff.; Friedländer,
Das Dritte Reich
, vol. 1, 262ff.; Longerich,
Politik der Vernichtung
, 155ff.

124.
TB, 25 May 1938.

125.
OA Moskau, 500-1-603, Wolf Gruner (ed.), “ ‘Lesen brauchen sie nicht zu können.’ ”

126.
TB, 21 April 1938.

127.
TB, 25 May (Helldorf), 30 May (Hitler’s agreement), 31 May 1938 (Helldorf).

128.
TB, 2, 3, and 4 June 1938.

129.
TB, 11 June 1938.

130.
Longerich,
Politik der Vernichtung
, 178ff.

131.
TB, 21 June 1938.

132.
TB, 22 June 1938.

133.
TB, 24 June; see also 26 June 1938.

134.
Longerich,
Davon
, 114; TB, 9 July 1938 (on Stuttgart).

135.
TB, 1 and 27 July, 31 August 1938.

136.
Longerich,
Davon
, 114.

137.
TB, 25 July 1938.

138.
On the Runciman mission, see Rönnefarth,
Sudetenkrise
, 407ff.; Vysny,
The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia;
TB, 28 July 1938: They were adopting a “neutral stance” toward the mission. This corresponded to the attitude adopted by the AA in the press conference:
PA
1938, no 2031 (26 July); no. 2039 (26/27 July), no. 2067 (30 July).

139.
On the reporting of the Runciman mission, see, for example,
VB
(B), 4, 6, and 21 August (editorial) and
DAZ:
2 August (E), 10 August (M); 11 August (M); 14 August (M) and 17–19 August 1938.

140.
At the beginning of August the so-called Glatz incident received widespread coverage in all the papers:
DAZ
, 3 August (E), 4 August (M and E), 5 August (M and E) 1938;
VB
(B), 4 and 5 August 1938. Further examples of aggressive reporting:
DAZ
, 9 August (M), “Sudetendeutscher von Tschechen ermordet” (headline); 9 August (E), “Der Mörder vom Glaserwald verhaftet” (headline); VB (B), 9 August, “Wieder ein Todesopfer tschechischer Mordhetze” (headline); also similar articles on the front pages of 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, and 19 August. On this campaign, see the following instructions to the press:
PA
1939, nos. 2112 and 2114 (3 August),
nos. 2118 and 2121 (4 August), nos 2125, 2138, and 2141 (5 August), nos. 2144 and 2150 (6 August), nos. 176 (9 August) and 2240, (16 August); Schwarzenbeck,
Pressepolitik
, 334f.; TB, 5 and 6, 10 August 1938.

141.
TB, 23–27 August 1938.

142.
Schwarzenbeck,
Pressepolitik
, 340ff.
PA
1938, no. 2353 (27 August), no. 2372 (29 August), no. 2382 (31 August). See also
VB
(B), 26–30 August;
MNN
, 29 and 30 August,
DAZ
, 26–30 August.

143.
On 27 August 1938 the
Abwehr
officer, Helmuth Groscurth, noted concerning a visit from Karl Hermann Frank, who informed him about his conversation with Hitler on 26 August: “Orders the creation of incidents in Czechoslovakia!” Groscurth,
Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938–1940
, 104.

144.
TB, 9 September 1938.

145.
PA
1938, nos. 2455, 2458, 2459 (7 September), no. 2460 (8 September); TB, 8 and 9 September;
VB
(B), 8 September 1938, “Prager Regierung nicht mehr Herr ihrer Polizei” (SZ); “Prags verbrecherisches Spiel mit dem Feuer” (domestic); 9 September, “Prag spielt mit dem Feuer”; see also Smelser,
Sudetenproblem
, 210f., Schwarzenbeck,
Pressepolitik
, 350, Rönnefarth,
Sudetenkise
, 478ff.

146.
Domarus I
, 897ff., quotation 904; TB, 13 September 1938; Schwarzenbeck,
Pressepolitik
, 354ff.; Rönnefarth,
Sudetenkrise
, 497ff.

147.
TB, 14 September 1938.

148.
Rönnefarth,
Sudetenkrise
, 493f.

149.
PA
1938, nos. 2524 and 2533, 14 September;
VB
(B), 14 September, “Feuerüberfälle, Morde, Standrecht” (headline); 15 September 1938, “30 neue Opfer tschechischer Mordschützen.”

150.
VB
(B), 14 September, “Wie lange noch?” See TB, 15 September 1938: “My article in the
VB
makes a very aggressive impression. That was my intention.”

151.
Smelser,
Sudetenproblem
, 212f.; TB, 15 September 1938.

152.
TB, 15 September 1939.

153.
PA
1939, nos. 2533, 2549–2553 (15 September), nos. 2558–2562, 2569, 2570f. (16 September), nos. 2572, 2574, 2575, 2580–2582 (17 September), no. 2583f. (18 September). According to the TB of 17 September, these attacks were intended to go on until the start of the Bad Godesberg meeting. 18 September 1938: “We make a big thing of[…] Czech terror. The atmosphere must be built up to boiling point.” See also Schwarzenbeck,
Pressepolitik
, 359f.

154.
VB
(B), 16 September 1938, “Die Besprechungen zwischen dem Führer und dem britischen Premierminister”;
ADAP
D II, Nr. 487, Aufzeichnung über Unterredung Hitler-Chamberlain, 15 September 1938; Rönnefarth,
Sudetenkrise
, 523ff.

155.
“He wants to have me near him during these days,” TB, 18 September 1938.

156.
TB, 18 September 1938.

157.
TB, 19 September 1938.

158.
TB, 20 September 1938; Rönnefarth,
Sudetenkrise
, 540ff.;
ADAP
D II, no. 523, Text of the joint message of the British and French governments to Beneš on the basis of the conversations of 18 September.

159.
TB, 20 September 1938; see also 21 September 1938.

160.
PA
1938, nos. 2613, 2614, 2615, 2623, 2627, 2628, and 2632 (21 September).

161.
TB, 21 September 1938; see also
PA
1938, no. 2596 (19 September), nos. 2606, 2607, 2608 (20 September);
VB
(B), 20 September, “Tschechenstaat kracht in allen Fugen” (headline); 21 September, “Offene tschechische Angriffe auf das Reich” (headline); 22 September, “Fort mit dem Benesch-Staat” (headline).

162.
Kershaw,
Der Hitler-Mythos
, 155ff.

163.
He had discussed it with Goebbels and Ribbentrop the night before: TB, 22 and
23 September 1938;
ADAP
D II, no. 562, Aufzeichnung Schmidt über Unterredung Chamberlain-Hitler, 22 September 1938; Rönnefarth,
Sudetenkrise
, 581ff.; Kershaw,
Hitler. 1936–1945
, 169ff.; Schmidt,
Statist
, 407ff.

164.
ADAP
D II, nos. 572–74 (23 September 1938) and no. 583 (23 September Evening); TB, 24 September 1938; Rönnefarth,
Sudetenkrise
, 585ff.

165.
TB, 25 September 1938.

166.
PA
1938, no. 2633 (21 September), nos. 2636–2640, 2646f. (22 September), nos. 2648–2650, 2657, 2660f. (23 September), no. 2665 (24 September): “Die deutsche Presse muss die Ruhe und Sicherheit der Staatsmänner in Godesberg den Panikmachern in Prag gegenüberstellen und den schreienden Gegensatz zwischen dem Verhalten der Prager Regierung und den Bemühungen Chamberlains und des Führers um den Frieden deutlich machen.” Also nos. 2663f., 2666f. (24 September).
VB
(B), 23 September, “Heute Fortsetzung der Besprechungen in Godesberg—Rote Militärdiktatur in Prag beginnt mit blutigen Verbrechen” (headline); 24 September, “Abschluß in Godesberg—Tschechische Armee besetzt die Grenzen” (headline).

167.
TB, 26 September 1938.

168.
Rönnefarth,
Sudetenkrise
, 615; TB, 27 September 1938.

169.
TB, 26 September 1938.

170.
VB
(B), 26 September 1938.

171.
Domarus I
, 923ff., quotation 927.

172.
TB, 28 September 1938.
PA
1938, no. 2683f. (26 September) and nos. 2686f. (27 September);
DAZ
, 27 September 1938 (E), Kommentar: “Der Spieler”;
VB
(B), 27 September 1938, “Wir sind entschlossen. Herr Benesch mag jetzt wählen!” (headline); Schwarzenbeck,
Pressepolitik
, 380f.

173.
TB, 28 September 1938; Kershaw,
Hitler. 1936–1945
, 174; Rönnefarth,
Sudetenkrise
, 618f.

174.
1780-PS,
IMT
XXVII, 345ff., Jodl, Official Diary, entry for 27 September 1938, 20:30 (p. 388).

175.
Andreas-Friedrich,
Schauplatz Berlin
, 5f.; Schmidt,
Statist
, 417; Shirer,
The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent 1934–1941
, 114f.: “It has been the most striking demonstration against war I’ve ever seen”; on the lack of enthusiasm for war, see also
SOPADE
1938, 913ff. (September 1938).

176.
Below,
Als Hitlers Adjutant
, 127.