Goebbels: A Biography (124 page)

221.
TB, 16 August 1939, also 12 August 1939.

222.
PA
1939, no. 2836 (special press conference, 20 August): “The newspapers must continue to focus on Poland; no. 2843, (21 August), “The press must go on focusing on Polish terror.” See, for example, the reporting of the
VB
and the
DAZ
during these days, which from 16 August onward was dominated by anti-Polish propaganda.

223.
TB, 20 August 1939. On the propaganda campaign, see also 22 August 1939.

224.
TB, 17 August 1939.

225.
TB, 22 August 1939. The only reference to a possible rapprochement with Moscow is in the TB for 9 July. During a visit to Obersalzberg Hitler had informed him that he “no longer [believed] that London and Moscow will come to an agreement. Then the way will be clear for us.” Now, after the conclusion of the negotiations he judged that the agreement “had taken long enough to sort out.” The fact that he was not actually informed about the negotiations is clear not only from the complete lack of references to them in the diaries but also from his total surprise at the diplomatic coup which Hitler was to tell him about on 23 August (TB, 24 August 1939).

226.
TB, 23 August 1939.

227.
TB, 24 August 1939,
ADAP
D VII, no. 200, note of 24 August 1939 concerning the conversation between Hitler and Henderson;
ADAP
D VII, no. 201, Hitler’s reply, 23 August 1939.

228.
TB, 24 August 1939.

229.
ADAP
D VII, no. 228, non-aggression pact 23 August 1939; no. 229 Secret Supplementary Protocol from the same day.

230.
TB, 25 August 1939.

231.
TB, 26 August 1939.

232.
ADAP
D VII, no. 265, Erklärung Hitler an Henderson, 25 August 1939 (quotation); Henderson,
Fehlschlag
, 298ff.

233.
ADAP
D VII, p. 237, editors’ note about the conversation of 25 August, of which there is no German record. But see Robert Coulondre,
Von Moskau nach Berlin
, 422f.

234.
ADAP
D VII, no. 271, 25 August 1939, Mussolini to Hitler; Schmidt,
Statist
, 461f.; Halder,
Kriegstagebuch
, 25 August 1939; Hofer,
Die Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges
.

235.
TB, 26 August 1939.

236.
ADAP
D VII, no. 324, 26 August 1939.

237.
TB, 27 August 1939, also 28 August 1939 concerning the letter.

238.
TB, 29 August 1939;
ADAP
D VII, no. 324, 26 August 1939, on this note p. 277 concerning confidentiality; no. 354, Hitler’s reply, 27 August 1939.

239.
British reply of 28 August,
ADAP
D VII, no. 384, Schmidt note of 29 August concerning the conversation between Hitler and Henderson at 22:30; the note is in the appendix; Henderson,
Fehlschlag
, 302f.

240.
TB, 29 August 1939; on Dahlerus’s attempt to mediate, see Kershaw,
Hitler. 1936–1945
, 304f.; Dahlerus,
Der letzte Versuch
, 75ff.

241.
ADAP
D VII, no. 421, note of 29 August 1939. TB, 29 August 1939.

242.
TB, 30 August 1939.

243.
PA
1939, no. 2986 (28 August), no. 3006 (29 August), no. 3019 (29 August), no. 3047 (30 August).

244.
ADAP
D VII, no. 461, Schmidt note of 31 August about the conversation between Ribbentrop and Henderson on 30 August at midnight.

245.
ADAP
D VII, no. 476, note of 1 September 1939 concerning the conversation between Lipski and Ribbentrop on 31 August 1939; ibid., no. 482, 31 August 1939, Weizsäcker note with appendix; TB, 1 September 1939.

246.
TB, 1 September 1939;
ADAP
D VII, p. 390 (note on the radio).

247.
ADAP
D VII, no. 493, 31 August, Hitler’s war directive, start of the offensive 1 September, 4:45.

1.
TB, 1 September 1939.

2.
Domarus II
, 1312ff., 1315.

3.
TB, 2 September 1939.

4.
ADAP
D VII, no. 513, Schmidt note about the conversation between Henderson and Ribbentrop on 1 and 2 September 1939, no. 515, Schmidt note of 2 September about the conversation between Ribbentrop and Coulondre of 1 September 1939; on these conversations, see TB, 2 September 1939.

5.
ADAP
, D VII, no. 560, British ultimatum of 3 September 1939, no. 561. German reply from the same day,
ADAP
D VII, no. 563, note about the conversation between Ribbentrop and Coulondre of 3 September; TB, 4 September 1939.

6.
TB, 4 September 1939; these appeals were published in
VB
(B) of 4 September.

7.
BAK, ZSg 109/3, V. I., in particular 6 September, no. 3, 7 September, no. 4, 8 September, 2. E., no. 2, 9 September, no. 4, 10 September, no. 3, 11 September, no. 1, 12 September, no. 3, and 14 September 1939, no. 1;
VB
(B), 8 September 1939, “Grauenhafte polnische Verbrechen an Volksdeutschen” (headline), 9 September, 1939, “Das Blut der Gemordeten in Bromberg fordert London vor das Weltgericht” (headline), and a page of photos, 10 September 1939, “Ganz Wirsitz sollte in die Luft gesprengt werden!” (headline), 13 September 1939, “Polens
schmutzige Waffen: Heckenschützenkrieg und Greuelpropaganda,” 14 September 1939, “Schärfste Maßnahmen gegen das polnische Heckenschützentum—Von jetzt ab mit allen Mitteln!” (headline), 15 September 1939, “Posen ein zweites Bromberg” (headline).

8.
Jansen and Weckbecker,
Der “Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz” in Polen 1939/40
, 27ff.; Jastrzebski,
Der Bromberger Blutsonntag;
Böhler,
Der Überfall
, 112ff.

9.
Broszat,
Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939–1945
, 48; Böhler,
Überfall
, 116.

10.
Jansen and Weckbecker,
Der “Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz,”
111ff.; Böhler,
Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg
. On the Einsatzgruppen, see Rossino,
Hitler Strikes Poland
, 88ff.; Rossino, “Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy During the Polish Campaign”; Krausnick, “Die Einsatzgruppen vom Anschluß Österreichs bis zum Feldzug gegen die Sowjetunion. Entwicklung und Verhältnis zur Wehrmacht,” 33ff.; Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers investigate the role of the order police and the Waffen SS in an edited volume,
Genesis des Genozids
.

11.
BAB, R 58/825, 8 September 1939.

12.
TB, 4 September 1939. TB, 5 September 1939: “Vigorously attack England’s government but leave the people alone. Don’t touch France.” A similar line appears in TB, 6, 7, 10, 13, and 15 September 1939; BAK, ZSg 109/4, 4 September, no. 1, 5 September, no. 7, and 15 September 1939, no. 2.

13.
Longerich,
Propagandisten
, 134ff.; TB, 18 August 1939.

14.
ADAP
D VII, no. 574.

15.
ADAP
D VIII, no. 31, Führerbefehl vom 8 September 1939; Otto Dietrich,
12 Jahre
, 129f.; TB, 7 and 9 September 1939.

16.
TB, 9 September 1939, and 14 September 1939.

17.
TB, 5 November 1939. Negative about Dietrich also in 13 January, 16 March, 18 April 1940. Some of the minutes of the ministerial briefings are edited in
BK
and in Boelcke (ed.),
Wollt Ihr den totalen Krieg?
(henceforth
BW
); a complete series for the years 1939–43 is in the Special archive in Moscow, Bestand 1363-3 (henceforth MK).

18.
Longerich,
Propagandisten
, 137.

19.
BK
, 140ff.; on his further disputes with the AA, see also TB, 28 October, 18, 19, 21, 23, and 24 November, 21 December 1939.

20.
TB, 6 October 1939.

21.
TB, 12 and 13 December 1939.

22.
Criticism also in TB, 16 September, and 5, 6 (quotation), 15 and 27 October, 17 and 26 November, 13, 15, and 22 December 1939 and 9–11 January 1940.

23.
TB, 29 and 30 December 1939; Uziel,
Propaganda Warriors
, 184ff.

24.
Uziel,
Propaganda Warriors
, 188.

25.
TB, 6, 12, and 18 September 1939.

26.
TB, 6 October 1939.

27.
TB, 9 and 15 September 1939.

28.
TB, 10, 11, and 13, also 3 September 1939; on the Italian initiative, see Thielenhaus,
Zwischen Anpassung und Widerstand
, 196ff.; and Knox,
Mussolini Unleashed
, 1939–1941, 49ff.

29.
TB, 3 and 4 October 1939.

30.
ADAP
D VIII, no. 176, Schmidt note concerning the conversation between Hitler and Ciano on 2 October 1939; no. 222, Weizsäcker note, 9 October 1939.

31.
TB, 4 and 22 September 1939; also 21, 24, 25, and 26 September.

32.
Domarus II
, p. 1317.

33.
RGBl
. 1939 II, 1683.

34.
Various documents in BAB, R 43 II/669, to some extent published and discussed
in detail in Latour, “Goebbels’ ‘Außerordentliche Rundfunkmaßnahmen’ 1939–1942”; here also the letter from Hess of 3 September (p. 420f.);
VB
(B), 2 September 1939, “Das Abhören ausländischer Sender ist verboten!”; TB, 2, 3, and 5 September 1939. On the origins of the decree, see most recently Hensle,
Rundfunkverbrechen
, 26ff., which emphasizes above all the role of Hess.

35.
On the legal proceedings, see Gruchmann,
Justiz im Dritten Reich
, 905. Only a few death sentences were actually carried out. TB, 14 December 1939: “A lot of people are listening to foreign broadcasts. I get a few draconian sentences passed and published. Maybe that will help.”

36.
Gruchmann,
Justiz
, 901ff.; on the Gestapo executions, see Broszat, “Zur Perversion der Strafjustiz im Dritten Reich.” On the publication of the sentences, see BAK, ZSg 109/4, VI, 4 October 1939, 8. This shows that the Reich propaganda offices decided which cases should be given publicity.

37.
Minutes in 2852-PS,
IMT
31, 224ff.

38.
TB, 13, 19, 20, 21, and 23 September, 8 and 10 October 1939. On the population’s concern, see the clear evidence in
Meldungen aus dem Reich 1938–1945
, Bericht zur innenpolitischen Lage, 11 October 1939, 339ff., esp. 345f.; 13 October 1939, 347ff., esp. 355f., 20 October 1939, 372ff., esp. 377.

39.
TB, 16 November 1939; Session of 15 November,
IMT
31, 236ff.; Müller,
Organisation und Mobilisierung
, 364ff.

40.
TB, 8 November 1939;
BK
, 20 November 1939, 3.

41.
Domarus II
, 1354ff. TB, 20 September 1939: “A terrific speech.” Also 21 September 1939 on the speech’s impact. Because of this speech Goebbels had to cancel a planned broadcast speech (18 September 1939).

42.
TB, 28 September 1939.

43.
TB, 28 and 30 September 1939.

44.
TB, 30 September 1939. The notes made on the same day by Rosenberg about Hitler’s plans for Poland are very similar. Rosenberg,
Tagebuch
, 81. When Goebbels writes in his diary “The Führer explains the situation to me,” he appears to be somewhat exaggerating the intimacy of this meeting.

45.
Details in Longerich,
Politik der Vernichtung
, 251ff.

46.
TB, 1 October 1939.

47.
ADAP
D VIII, no. 157.

48.
TB, 1 October 1939.

49.
TB, 4 October 1939.

50.
Domarus II
, 1377ff., quotation 1390; Kershaw,
Hitler, 1936–1945
, 364f.

51.
TB, 6 October 1939, and 7 October.

52.
TB, 12 October 1939.

53.
TB, 14 Otober 1939.

54.
Kershaw,
Hitler. 1936–1945
, 365.

55.
TB, 13 October 1939 (see also 14 and 18 October on his agreement with Hitler’s anti-British attitude).

56.
TB, 11 October 1939; see also the corresponding press directives: BAK, ZSg 102/19, 24 October 1939; BAK, ZSg 109/4 VI of 24 October 1939, and 25 October 1939.

57.
TB, 8 November 1939.

58.
TB, 5 and 7 September 1939; BAK, ZSg 102/19, 4–7 September 1939; Reuth,
Goebbels
, 431f.

59.
TB, 14, 15, and 19 October 1939; BAK, ZSg 102/19, 14 October 1939.

60.
VB
(B), 21 October 1939, “Churchill am Pranger”; 23 October 1939, “Schneidende Abrechnung mit einem Erzlügner. ‘Jetzt hat der Angeklagte Winston
Churchill das Wort’ ”; 24 October 1939, “Wann antwortet Winston Churchill? Erste faule Ausflüchte des Angeklagten nach der Rundfunkrede von Dr. Goebbels” (headline); TB, 20 October, 23 October, 24, 25, 26, 27 October; BAK, ZSg 102/109, 22 October 1939 (broadcast speech recommended to the press). On the
Athenia
incident, see ibid., VI, 19 October 1939, 1. E., no. 1, 20 October 1939, no. 6; 23 October 1939, no. 3. 912-D, published in
IMT
36, 3ff. (British minute of the broadcast speech). The
Athenia
incident continued to be used by German propaganda into the following year.

61.
TB, 10 October 1939.

62.
BAK, ZSg 102/19, 20 October 1939; see also 24 October: “Eine Berichterstattung in Polen ist im allgemeinen unerwünscht.”

63.
Dobroszycki,
Die legale polnische Presse im Generalgouvernement 1939–1945
, 66ff.; Frank,
Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen
, 52.

64.
TB, 2 November 1939; see also Reuth,
Goebbels
, 434f.

65.
TB, 3 November 1939.

66.
TB, 9 November 1939.

67.
TB, 10–15 November 1939.

68.
TB, 13 and 14 November 1939;
BK
, 11 November, 1; 13 November, 1, emphasizes England’s responsibility;
DAZ
, 10 November 1939 (E), “Hintergründe und Vorbereitungen”;
Der Angriff
, 11 November 1939, “Mit Pfund und Höllenmaschine.”

69.
TB, 16 and 17 November 1939.

70.
VB
(B), 22 November 1939, “Der Attentäter gefaßt” (headline); 23 November 1939, “Otto Straßer das Werkzeug des englischen Geheimdienstes: Wiederholte Anschläge auf den Führer” (headline); 24 November 1939, “Captain Stevens sagt aus: Intelligence Service organisierte 1937–1938 Schiffs-Sabotageakte” (headline); 25 November 1939, “So wurde Straßers Werkzeug Elser zur Strecke gebracht.” Similar line in the
DAZ
from 22 November and in
Der Angriff
on 22 November 1939.