Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (26 page)

Minucius’ success against Hannibal was blown all out of proportion in Rome. The events were reported ‘in terms that exaggerated the true facts and so delighted the people’ since any good news was welcome (Polyb. 3.103.1).
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Different factions in Rome were struggling for control over the direction of the war and one of the tribunes (Metilius) ‘mounted the rostrum and delivered a rabble-rousing speech in which he glorified Minucius’ (Plutarch,
Fab
. 8.3–4). Pressure on the politicians must have been intense as the result was an unprecedented shift in policy that gave Minucius equal status to Fabius Maximus. The Romans seized upon any reason to feel better about the war, thus ‘all found fault with Fabius while Minucius’ reputation rose so much’. Consequently ‘two
Dictators were actually appointed for the same field of action’ at Rome. Once Fabius was back in the field, he and Minucius decided to split the army into two forces and they camped about 12 stades (
c
. 2 kilometres) apart (Polyb. 3.103.6–8).
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This division among the Romans reflected the more usual routine of the two consuls’ alternating command. It also played into Hannibal’s hands, for a divided and distrustful enemy gave him the advantage.

While the Romans divided their army, ‘nothing taking place amongst the enemy escaped the notice of Hannibal, for he had ample intelligence from deserters, as well as information from spies’ (Livy 22.28.1; Polyb. 3.104.1). Hannibal focused on provoking Minucius whom he understood to be overconfident, aggressive and just the sort of opponent he would choose to lure into a battle. Taking the initiative, Hannibal decided to occupy a small hill between his camp and that of Minucius, which ‘offered a strong position’. The hill was treeless but with hollows and bumps that provided an ideal location to conceal troops and draw Minucius into an ambush. Hannibal ‘sent out into the night bodies of troops’ to occupy strategic positions unseen and at dawn he moved with his light-armed infantry on to the hill. Minucius reacted as Hannibal expected. He dispatched his light infantry and cavalry and then set out at the head of his legions (Polyb. 3.104.1–7). The first wave of Roman light infantry was pushed backwards and fell on the legions behind throwing them into confusion. At this moment, the ambush was unveiled and Minucius found himself surrounded. From afar, Fabius Maximus watched the action unfold. He drew up his legions and came to the rescue, providing cover for Minucius’ retreat. Hannibal pursued, but abandoned the chase with the arrival of Fabius’ disciplined troops and the battle was brought to a close. The Romans had suffered heavy losses and Minucius had been taught a lesson (Polyb. 3.105.1–10).

Much of the narrative of the autumn of 217
BCE
is told by the Roman historians with hindsight, to justify Fabius Maximus’ policies. ‘And to those in Rome it became indisputably clear how widely the foresight, good sense and calm calculation of a general differ from the recklessness and bravado of a mere soldier’ is Polybius’ scathing assessment of Minucius and the populist politics that supported him (3.105.9). The wisdom of Fabius Maximus and the foolishness of Minucius are probably exaggerated for the purpose of narrative in Polybius, Livy and Plutarch. The two men and their different strategies reflect the extremes of the Roman political reaction to Hannibal. The political infighting at Rome was the result of Hannibal’s skilled tactics and creative abilities. He was playing the Romans like pieces in a board game. The assessment
of posterity is that Fabius Maximus, by delaying a full engagement with Hannibal in the crucial autumn of 217
BCE
, may have saved the Romans from total defeat. The poet Ennius in the second century would write, ‘one man alone, by his delaying, restored our state’ (
Ann
. 363).
²²

December 217
BCE
saw the term of office for the dictators come to a close (the appointment had been for six months) and new consular elections were held in January 216
BCE
. Rome’s constitutional state was hardly typical at the end of that year. There were two dictators and one surviving consul (Servilius) in the field. The newly elected magistrates came to power in March, and in the intervening period, Servilius and Marcus Atilius Regulus (elected to replace the dead Flaminius) were granted proconsular authority. They took control of the Roman forces in the field in Italy (Livy 22.25.1–19).
²³

Political and constitutional discord broke out at Rome during this period. A full account can be found in Livy, although he tends to simplify the arguments, presenting a straightforward battle between traditional factions of patricians and plebians in the Roman Senate, and portrays anyone who opposed Fabius’ tactics as a dangerous populist.
²⁴
Underlying these structural arguments were real disagreements between powerful individuals over the strategy to be adopted in the upcoming campaigning season. The resulting convoluted process of the election of the consuls for 216
BCE
reflects these disagreements and the unusual constitutional situation (Livy 22.32–33).
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Beyond the wrangling of the political elite at Rome there was a deep sense of anxiety among the population that exposes Hannibal’s infiltration of the popular imagination. Livy records the arrest of a Carthaginian spy at Rome, who was released after his hands were cut off, and the crucifixion of twenty-five slaves in the Campus Martius for conspiracy (22.33.1). Bad omens persisted, as well as more ‘showers of stones’, ‘blood had flowed profusely from statues amongst the Sabines, and also amid the waters at Caere … and a number of people had been fatally struck by lightning’ (Livy 22.36.7–9). These details in Livy give a sense of the atmosphere of paranoia in the city with political intrigue and turmoil among a population suspicious of each other and insecure about the future. Most of all the Roman people worried deeply that the gods had turned their backs on Rome.
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Hannibal had other things on his mind throughout the winter and early spring of 216
BCE
but his intelligence network would have kept him apprised of the situation at Rome. Meanwhile his army, the size of a small city, would have been organized and run like an urban community. For five months in camp this meant constant activity, with combat training continuing and economic activity growing up around this soldiers’ city. In the archaeological
record little evidence can be tied to these brief months but examples of Carthaginian coins minted ‘in camp’ for payment of troops have survived from other regions in Italy.
²⁷
Hannibal’s army would have had legions of followers, referred to as baggage by Polybius, including women, children, opportunists, deserters and slaves. Also by this point, along with the rest would be merchants, suppliers and blacksmiths aware of the demands to supply an army on the move. Taking all this together, we may assume that Hannibal’s managerial skills must have been formidable.
²⁸

And ‘all through the winter and spring the two armies remained encamped opposite each other’ (Polyb. 3.107.1). Hannibal could only move his forces out of camp once ‘the season was advanced enough for them to get supplies from the year’s crops’ (3.107.2). In Apulia crops are harvested in late May or early June.
²⁹
The newly elected Roman consuls Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro took up office in March but did not join the armies in the field until June/July. From March through to June they would have been recruiting soldiers for their new legions and calling up allies to supply auxiliary troops. The consuls were experienced men of the Republic although perhaps not the most battle-hardened. Aemilius Paullus, a few years previously as consul in 219
BCE
, had ‘conducted the Illyrian war with courage’ (Polyb. 3.107.8). Varro was the first man in his family to become a senator (a
novus homo)
. Livy’s derisive comment that ‘his father had been a butcher who had kept his own stall’ belies the fact that Varro had followed a traditional senatorial career leading to the top position in the Republic (Livy 22.25.18–19).
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How much experience of military command Varro had before the consulship of 216
BCE
is somewhat more debatable.
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Hannibal is certain to have scouted the entire countryside over the winter and made himself familiar with the lie of the land and the key strategic locations. His next move would be calculated to force the hand of the Romans. So when the Carthaginian army moved 96 kilometres south and east from their winter quarters, they arrived at the small walled town of Cannae near the banks of the river Aufidis (
Map 1
).
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Previously the Romans had held Cannae as a grain store for their supplies coming from Canusium. Hannibal seized Cannae for its strategically placed citadel that afforded a commanding position over the countryside. From Cannae he could disrupt the Roman supply lines (Polyb. 3.107.5). It was a tactically inspired move that cut the Romans off from their stores and made it difficult if not impossible for them to avoid engaging. Taking Cannae ensured that the Romans were provoked into battle, and the landscape around the town was ideally suited to make the most of Hannibal’s cavalry (Polyb. 3.107.5–7).
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At Cannae Hannibal waited for the Romans to respond. They had shadowed him from winter quarters and camped in the vicinity.
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Up to this point the two proconsuls, Servilius and Regulus, had been ‘expressly ordered not to risk a general engagement but to skirmish, so as to train the men and give them confidence’ (Polyb. 3.106.4). Once Hannibal had taken Cannae, the Senate decided to engage in battle and the new consuls arrived on the scene with their freshly recruited legions. The total troop numbers for the two sides are notoriously difficult to assess. Polybius (3.114.5) and Livy (22.46.4) both believe that Hannibal had 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. This nice round number of 50,000 leads to some suspicion over its accuracy but without alternative figures the number must be accepted.
³⁵

Estimates of the Roman troop numbers vary widely but all our sources agree they were high. Polybius claims that ‘they decided to bring eight legions into the field, a thing which had never been done before by the Romans’ (3.107.9). The intention was to overwhelm Hannibal with sheer numbers. Even in Livy’s time there was uncertainty and, whilst he notes the ‘discrepancies in the sources regarding number and kind of troops involved’, he records eight legions, but with ‘increased numbers in terms of infantry and cavalry’, providing an estimate of 87,200 including allied troops (22.36.1–2).
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The full complement of Roman troops could well have been over 80,000 but it is unlikely that all were available to fight Hannibal at Cannae, and most recent assessments have put the number at about 70,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry.
³⁷
Estimates for the total number of Carthaginians in the field on the day of Cannae rest at about 42,000, with around 8,000 left to garrison their camp.
³⁸
We cannot know the precise numbers, but if we bear in mind the Roman intent to end the war with this battle, they may have outnumbered Hannibal’s troops by close to 2:1 (Polyb. 3.109.4).

In late July 216
BCE
Hannibal would have seen this massive Roman army come into view and watched from Cannae as they set up a camp about 2.5 kilometres away.
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There would have been no mistaking the approach of the Romans in the dry summer heat of Apulia. An army of 80,000 would have raised a dust cloud visible for tens of kilometres. By the summer the hills and fields were bare, the crops harvested and the landscape of wide rolling plains would have provided good visibility in all directions.
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Hannibal may have been surprised by the size of the force ranged against him or perhaps excited by the challenge presented to him. His thoughts in the lead-up to battle are not recorded but for a risk-taker like Hannibal this was the ultimate gamble. The course to victory required very careful strategic thinking and deployment, with no detail left to chance.

Under the Roman system, when both consular armies were in the field, ‘each consul took command of the army on alternate days’ (Plutarch,
Fab
. 15.1). The problems inherent in this system in terms of continuity, strategy and coherence are obvious; nonetheless, it was the means by which the Romans dealt with the rivalry between the two most important men in the Republic when they were in the field. So on the day Aemilius Paullus took command, ‘seeing that the district round [their camp] was flat and treeless, [he] was opposed to attacking the enemy there as they were superior in cavalry’. We also learn that Terentius Varro ‘was of the contrary opinion’ (Polyb. 3.110.2).
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Hannibal was well placed to exploit strategic dissent in the Roman camp as he watched and waited. The following day, with Varro in command, the Romans ‘broke camp and advanced with the intent of approaching the enemy’. While the Romans were still marching Hannibal met them with his light infantry and cavalry, a skirmish broke out and only ‘nightfall … made them draw off from each other, the attack of the Carthaginians not having had the success they hoped’ (Polyb. 3.110.4–8). This engagement boosted Roman confidence, and perhaps Hannibal intended that it do so. Aemilius Paullus, in charge the next day, ordered the Romans to construct two camps, one on either side of the Aufidus river. This was to be the place of battle.

Hannibal readied his men for imminent confrontation. He spoke to his troops and encouraged them by evoking their bravery and depth of experience, and their trust in him. He wanted the men to be thankful, for although greatly outnumbered, ‘to fight here where the advantages are manifestly ours’ was considered something to be grateful for (Polyb. 3.111.4). The soldiers’ belief in their commander was paramount. A much later ancient military strategist wrote that Hannibal was successful in encouraging his men in battle because he had convinced them that those ‘who died courageously in war returned to life after a short period’ (Polyaenus,
Strat
. 6.38.2). A belief in the immortality of the brave soldier would have been useful and necessary when facing an opponent whose numbers were double your own.
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