Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (22 page)

Hannibal would have expected the Romans to provide reinforcements with Publius Scipio wounded and confined to camp. In the meantime he had complete control of the plains of northern Italy. The Carthaginians set up camp about 40 stades (approx. 7 kilometres) away from the Romans across the Trebia on the west side of the river (Polyb. 3.68.7). More cities, towns and tribes flocked to Hannibal’s side. The commander of the garrison at Clastidium (modern Casteggio), about 50 kilometres west of Placentia, switched sides and gave the town up to Hannibal. The Romans had used Clastidium as their storehouse for grain and supplies, thus the defection was a much-appreciated boost for the Carthaginians (Polyb. 3.69.1; Livy 21.48.9). Hannibal spared the lives of the Roman garrison in the town and conferred honours on the man who had aided him. He approached the betrayal of the garrison with clemency in order to encourage others who might be willing to follow suit. This war for Italy would be won by the allies, and Hannibal was keenly aware how much he needed to manage the locals as well as win military engagements. Clearly the preparation in advance of the invasion had been extensive. There was a kind of domino effect brought about by Hannibal’s presence
which, combined with the weakened Roman reputation, succeeded in bolstering the Carthaginian cause.

The arrival of the new legions boosted the Roman morale, and the next skirmish between the two sides saw the Romans get the better of the Carthaginians (Polyb. 3.69.10–14). This encouraged the consul Sempronius, who was eager ‘to bring on a decisive battle as soon as possible’ while his colleague Publius Scipio held the opposite view (Polyb. 3.70.1–4). Hannibal too felt that a battle was essential. His new Celtic allies were fickle and the best way to make use of their ‘enthusiasm’ was to take on this newly raised Roman army that was untried in battle (3.70.9–11). Sempronius Longus was ‘urged on by his own ambition’ according to Polybius, whose hostility towards the man shines through his history.

The Roman system created a situation in which a consul’s military glory was limited to his sphere of influence and year in office. New consuls would take up office in March. Thus an early spring battle would not have suited Sempronius’ ambitions as he might not have been in control of the legions a few months later. Hannibal had no time limit on his generalship and there would be no Carthaginian commanders sent to relieve him. Polybius’ narrative is decidedly pro-Scipionic and portrays Sempronius’ desire to fight while his colleague was injured as a means of ensuring he claimed the glory for any victory that ensued.
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Hannibal was happy to let the rivalries in the competitive Roman system play out to his advantage. His meticulous planning meant that the crucial aspect of the situation would be controlling the place and time of battle.

It was around the winter solstice on a cold and snowy day that Hannibal ‘mustered his Numidian horsemen, all men capable of great endurance’ and ordered them to ride up to the enemy’s camp and draw out the Romans (Polyb. 3.71–74; Livy, 21.54–56).
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For ‘his hope was to get the enemy to fight him before they had breakfasted or made any preparations’ (Polyb. 3.71.10). Again the element of surprise was vital and Hannibal’s troops were well fed and had ‘anointed themselves around their fires’. This meant they had coated their skin in oil to protect them from the freezing water of the river they had to cross. In the Roman camp Sempronius’ confidence from his previous encounter was high and when he saw Hannibal’s troops he ordered his own to pursue. The day was exceedingly cold ‘… while the [Roman] men and horses nearly all left the camp without having their morning meal … and had to cross the Trebia, the water was breast high’ (Polyb. 3.72.1–4).

Breakfast, not something that we find discussed often in the ancient sources, seems to have played a key role in the battle of Trebia. Twice in the
lead-up to the battle the point is made that the Carthaginian side had eaten breakfast and the Romans had not. Polybius mentions breakfast in just one other part of the narrative.
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The story underlines the fact that Hannibal took great care of his troops, and this care meant that his troops trusted him. The emphasis on breakfast illustrates Hannibal’s skills as a leader and therefore the most likely origin for this information is a pro-Carthaginian source. As Trebia was the only battle fought in winter conditions in the war it may be that the importance of breakfast related to traditions of winter fighting that were commonly employed. It was rare for fighting to take place at that time of year and up until the Romans gained an overseas empire fighting had traditionally been seasonal.

When Hannibal saw that the Romans had crossed the river he drew up his infantry while a covering force of pikemen and slingers stepped forward. In his army, in addition to 20,000 infantry made up of Iberians, Celts and Africans, were 10,000 cavalry, including his Celtic allies. The cavalry were stationed on the wings, with the elephants in front. Sempronius recalled his cavalry and drew up his infantry in ‘the usual Roman order’. The consul’s forces numbered 16,000 Roman and 20,000 allied infantry with 4,000 cavalry (Polyb. 3.72.11–13; Livy 21.55.4 – their numbers differ slightly). Thus the Romans outnumbered Hannibal’s infantry but had significantly less cavalry.
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Not only had Hannibal chosen the field and manner of the battle but he had also added an element of surprise. Before dawn that morning he had sent out his brother Mago, ‘still quite young, but full of martial enthusaism’ (Polyb. 3.71.5) and a hand-picked force of 2,000 cavalry to position themselves in the watercourses that threaded their way through the plains. Thus concealed, they waited. The two lines engaged fiercely in the battle. Once the fighting had begun, Mago and his cavalry charged the Roman centre ‘from the rear, upon which the whole Roman army was thrown into the utmost confusion and distress’. The conditions for the Romans were awful – freezing and wet. They were overwhelmed by the more ‘numerous cavalry and hindered by the river and the force and heaviness of the rain …’ Whilst the Roman soldiers in the van had managed to break through the centre of the Carthaginian line, they were harried on all sides. It is fascinating to note how this development would play into the strategy Hannibal famously employed in a later battle. His first set piece with the Romans had been an immense learning experience. In the end, those Romans who still could retreated to Placentia and ‘of the remainder the greater part were killed near the river by the elephants and cavalry’ (Polyb. 3.73.1–74.8).

At Trebia Hannibal exhibited his tactical skill and brilliance. He lured the Romans into battle on his terms, understood the mind of his enemy and had
prepared his men for the conditions they had fought in. By following these tenets of military leadership he made himself the master of northern Italy.
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The Carthaginians had lost mainly Celts in the battle. Most of the African and Spanish contingents survived, but even greater losses came after the battle because of the cold, harsh conditions: many men and all the elephants except one perished (Polyb. 3.74.8–11). The psychological impact of the victory, despite the subsequent losses, was crucial as it built on the legend and added to the supernatural reputation of Hannibal. ‘Such was the panic brought to Rome by this debacle,’ says Livy ‘that people believed the enemy would immediately march on the city’ (21.57.1).

Hannibal was now in his winter quarters and had much to consider. These important early encounters had worked in his favour. The combined components of surprise, the weather and his aura intimidated the enemy and encouraged the local population, who were far from settled in their Roman alliance. His troops were fiercly loyal and trusted their leader. The next move, however, would be more complicated. Hannibal had to consider how to keep his allies on side and how to lure the Romans further into his strategic web.

That winter he kept his Roman citizen prisoners of war just barely alive but the Roman-allied prisoners were shown ‘the greatest kindness’. He made common cause with them and ‘called a meeting where he told the allied soldiers that he had not come to make war on them but on the Romans for their sakes’. He advised the allies that ‘if they were wise they should embrace his friendship, for he had come first of all to re-establish the liberty of the people of Italy’. His motive, he claimed, was to help the ‘allies recover the cities and territories that the Romans had taken from them’ (Polyb. 3.77.3–7). And with these words Hannibal dismissed the allied troops to their homes without ransom. His intention was to win both the military and the political war by making the allies believe that he offered a better option than the Romans. It was a strategy that proved effective over the next few years but would be extremely difficult to sustain in the longer term.
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There is an intriguing story of Hannibal in the winter of 218/217
BCE
, perhaps repeated by the Romans to show how little trust he could place in his Celtic allies. At winter quarters Hannibal was rumoured to have employed a typical ‘Punic deception’, going about camp in disguise. Fearing assassination by his Celtic allies he had wigs made in a number of different styles and colours that kept everyone guessing, ‘even those who knew him well’ (Polyb. 3.78.1–4). Livy offers a plausible explanation for the heightened level of Celtic hostility during the winter of 218/217
BCE
. For it was ‘their own lands [that] were the seat of war and they were burdened with the winter quarters of
both armies’ (Livy 22.1.1–4). According to Livy the Celtic leaders attempted many plots but Hannibal kept them guessing by changing his appearance and even speaking in different languages.
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The Roman narrative frequently repeats tales of Hannibal’s trickery and deception, and equally stories of the untrustworthiness of the Celts as allies, which makes this anecdote difficult to decipher. The tales of disguise may have been repeated to persuade the Romans that the Celts who had abandoned them were worthless allies and even Hannibal could not trust them. But there are also echoes of myth and legend in the story. If Hannibal could move about his camp unrecognized and could change his appearance, he was much like the gods in the ancient stories who could disappear and reappear at will, as Poseidon had, visiting the camp of the Greek soldiers at Troy in Homer’s
Iliad
.
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A closer truth may lie in how vulnerable the Carthaginian leader was in these first months to the whims of the Celtic allies upon whom he depended to supplement troops, supplies and food. Surely the Romans, who were not totally friendless in northern Italy, had let it be known that to capture or kill Hannibal would be a well-rewarded act.

Back in Rome Sempronius had made his way to the city to oversee the consular elections for the following year. The consul designates, Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius, busied themselves ‘mustering the allies and enrolling their own legions, sending depots of supplies to Ariminum and Etruria which they meant to be their bases in the campaign’ (Polyb. 3.75.5). There was no peace for the Roman army in winter quarters, according to Livy, who claimed that Hannibal’s cavalry roamed far and wide cutting off Roman supplies ‘from every quarter, with the exception of those things shipped up the Po’ (21.57.5).

The defeat at Trebia turned Roman minds towards religion. They felt abandoned by the gods, and details of prodigies and omens are recorded in Livy’s account of that winter. These things happen, Livy says, when bad news ‘has turned people’s minds to superstition’ (21.62.1–2). The defeat in the north weighed heavily on the population at Rome and some of these omens included glowing ship-like figures in the sky, the Temple of Hope being struck by lightning, a crow that settled on the couch of the goddess Juno at Lanuvium, and in Picenum stones that had fallen as a rain shower. This last omen caused ‘a nine-day sacrifice to be prescribed … and the city was ritually purified and full-grown sacrificial animals were killed for the gods’. There was a general supplication to the gods as the Roman people tried to win them over to their cause against Hannibal. Public prayers were offered, among other places at the temple of Hercules (the Latin for Herakles), who was specifically named.
This illustrates the impact Hannibal’s propaganda had on the people and the priests at Rome.
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In the Roman mind, Hannibal’s personal invocation of Herakles’ divine support made it essential for the Romans to work even harder to win him back to their side. Livy maintains that for the Romans ‘the making of these vows and expiations, as prescribed by the Sibylline Books, went far to alleviate men’s anxiety concerning their relations with the gods’ (21.62.11).

With the arrival of spring Hannibal made preparations to move and he departed for the south once the passes through the moutains were clear.
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He may have left his winter quarters as late as May.
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The route Hannibal took across the Apennines was the least expected and the one most likely to take the Roman consul by surprise. As Polybius explains, ‘Hannibal was always inclined by temperament to favour the unexpected solution’ (3.78.6).
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The Carthaginian army crossed over the mountains and passed through a mud-filled swampy marshland, believed to be the flooded Arno river valley (Livy 22.2.1–3.1; Polyb. 3.79.1–11). Hannibal would have been certain to avoid areas where the Romans were stationed, including Ariminum, Arretium and Luca (see
Map 1
).
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In the marshes of Etruria the Carthaginian general and his troops were bogged down by extremely wet ground, and experienced a four-day march of great hardship. The African and Spanish troops, who had crossed the Alps with Hannibal, managed better than the Celtic allies whose enthusiasm for the adventure waned as they trudged through sodden ground. The army marched across the wet terrain in a line with ‘the Africans, the Iberians and all the best fighting troops in the forward part of his column and interspersed [with] the baggage train among them … the Celts were stationed behind the troops, and the cavalry brought up the rear of the army, the command of the rearguard being entrusted to his brother Mago’ (Polyb. 3.79.1–4). This order was to ensure that the Celts would not turn back, tired of suffering through mud and water.