Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (9 page)

This long war played out in phases over the twenty-three years both ‘at sea and on land’.
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There were periods of intense fighting as the focus of the battle shifted clockwise around Sicily and then moved to North Africa. The momentum of the war swung back and forth between the two sides, with each suffering disaster and victory in turn. Cities were beseiged and enormous sea battles took place in the waters around the island. In the second year of the war (263/262
BCE
), the Senate at Rome decided to send both their consular armies to Sicily, a force of about 40,000 soldiers, illustrating Rome’s intentions towards Sicily and the intensity of the war’s first phase.
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When the Roman army arrived in Sicily ‘most of the cities rose against the Carthaginians and Syracusans, and came over to the Romans’ (Polyb. 1.16.1–3).
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After an initial victory the Roman consul Valerius Maximus Messalla laid siege to Syracuse. The Syracusan king Hiero quickly realized that, considering the size of the army he was confronted with, ‘the Romans’ prospects were far brighter than those of the Carthaginians’ and pursued a policy of peace (Polyb. 1.16.4–5). The Romans came to generous terms with Syracuse and from that point had a base from which to operate in Sicily. The Romans moved on from Syracuse to lay siege to the most important city on the south coast of Sicily, Agrigentum (Greek Acragas). They intended to collect food supplies for their own troops and disrupt the supply chain of the Carthaginian forces.
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The Carthaginians saw Agrigentum as a strategic base from which to defend the south-west corner of Sicily and they had held it for the previous decade (
Map 1
).
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The Carthaginian garrison in the city was now vastly overwhelmed as they faced a combined threat of the Roman consular armies allied with Syracuse. They sent news to Carthage and requested reinforcements. At Carthage a new army was raised made up of ‘Ligurians, Celts, and still more Iberians’. This force was sent to Sicily in the hope of defending Agrigentum from the impending Roman attack (Polyb. 1.17.4–5).
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The land army of Carthage has always been perceived as its weak point, judged so because it traditionally relied on mercenaries for its overseas fighting forces. ‘They had always been in the habit of employing hired soldiers,’ notes Polybius (1.71.1–2). The Carthaginians are believed to have used mercenary
soldiers to fight foreign wars, whilst citizen-levied troops were used for fighting at home and in their navy. It was certainly not as unambiguous in reality but the ancient writers make much of the difference between the Roman citizen army and the hired troops of the Carthaginians. The make-up of the Carthaginian army was in no way unusual for the time and would have been like that of many Hellenistic armies of the day. In the third century soldiering was a profession and men were recruited and paid to go where the fighting was.
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The fact that the Carthaginians were known to offer a high rate of pay for their military service meant that they had little trouble raising new forces to fight in Sicily (Diodorus Sic. 16.81.4).
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Up to 50,000 people were trapped within the walls of Agrigentum when the Roman troops set up a blockade. There was nothing to eat as the Romans disrupted the harvest and not long into the siege the people were ‘pressed by famine’ (Polyb. 1.18.7). When the newly raised Carthaginian army arrived it encircled the Roman troops, laying siege to the besiegers. Desperation inside the city eventually pushed the Carthaginian commander Hanno to engage the Romans in an attempt to relieve the population. In a closely fought pitched battle the Romans were victorious on the day. After a five-month siege the Carthaginian commander inside the city took the chance to evacuate his army, saving his soldiers from defeat and capture but leaving the population defenceless.
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The Romans, then, ‘finding nobody to oppose them burst into the city and plundered it, enslaving great numbers of the inhabitants and taking huge quantities of booty of every description’ (Polyb. 1.19.15). So great was the destruction that some claimed the Romans enslaved the whole population (Diodorus Sic. 23.9.1). ‘When the news of what had occurred at Agrigentum reached the Roman Senate, in their joy and elation they no longer confined themselves to their original designs’ (Polyb. 1.20.1–3). After the sack of the beautiful and richly adorned city the attitude of Rome towards Sicily changed. The Roman commanders shipped their victory loot back to Rome and the statues and gold of the treasury of Agrigentum were displayed to the Roman people in a grand triumph. Polybius asserts that the wealth that flowed to Rome from Agrigentum shifted Roman intentions and that what had started as a war for Messana turned into a ‘war for Sicily’.
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After the siege and sack of Agrigentum the first of many sea battles took place (in
c
. 260
BCE
) off the promontory of Mylae (Milazzo) that juts out from northern Sicily towards the Carthaginian base of Lipara on the Aeolian Islands (
Map 1
). For the previous four years the Carthaginians had been harassing the Romans and raiding Italy, using their maritime superiority to disrupt Roman
transports (Polyb. 1.20.1–9). The Romans addressed the issue by building a navy to match their enemy’s, ‘a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes’, with the larger ships based on a Carthaginian model (1.20.15) but with the benefit of an impressive-looking innovation. This was the
corvus
(or
corax
, Latin for crow), known otherwise as a boarding bridge. The
corvus
was a device fitted to the prow of a Roman warship that allowed the ship’s crew to grapple and then board an enemy vessel with greater flexibility. Third-century naval battle tactics relied on ramming, a strategy that meant that the Carthaginian fleet, with its superior skill and manoeuvrability, had the advantage. Carthaginian sailors were able to outrun and outmanoeuvre almost any ship but with the
corvus
the Romans could disrupt the seamanship of their enemies and fight land skirmishes at sea.
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A Carthaginian navy put to sea from its base at Lipari with 130 ships while the Roman navy had 100 quinqueremes and 20 triremes at their disposal.
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The Carthaginians sailed out with some confidence, their admiral in a ‘sevenbanked galley that formerly belonged to King Pyrrhus’ (Polyb. 1.20.9 and 1.23.3–4). The ships of the Carthaginian navy were fast and light, easily manoeuvrable and their seamen the best in the Mediterranean. Carthaginian sailors were, according to the sources, unaware of the new Roman adaptation and, as soon as any ships collided, the
corvus
grappled onto the Carthaginian vessel and held fast, allowing Roman troops to board the enemy ship quickly and efficiently. The Romans attacked the Carthaginian sailors ‘hand to hand on deck, some of the Carthaginians were cut down and others surrendered from dismay at what was happening, the battle having become just like a fight on land’. The quick seamanship and superior abilities of the Carthaginian sailors were useless when confronted with Roman legions boarding over the bridge (Polyb. 1.23.3–10).

Some thirty Carthaginian ships (including the admiral’s prized Hellenistic galley) with all their crews (except the admiral himself, who escaped on the ship’s tender) were captured.
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A further fifty Carthaginian ships (with estimates of 300 rowers on a quinquereme) were sunk completely. The efficiency of the Roman victory has raised some question about Polybius’ argument that the Romans were ‘sea novices’. There was obviously enough experience in the Roman command to manoeuvre ships and exploit to the full their new boarding bridge tactics.
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After Mylae, Carthaginian naval superiority seemed an illusion, and further losses followed off Sardinia. The war continued with skirmishes back and forth (Polyb. 1.24.8–13, 25.1–4). The Carthaginian defeats in the naval conflict are astounding when one considers that Carthage was the sea power and Rome the land power. The relative strengths and
weaknesses of the two sides may well be exaggerated for narrative effect in our sources, but the reversals suffered by Carthage speak of complacency in their leadership and a lack of ability to adapt their strategy. They were left vulnerable and in disarray.
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The Romans, feeling confident and aggressive, reasoned that by taking the war to Carthage itself they could best capitalize on their successes. If they blockaded Carthage in Africa then Sicily would surely fall quickly. The Roman army massed on the south coast of Sicily and prepared to sail across. The Carthaginians were determined to prevent this invasion at all costs, remembering the lessons learned from Agathocles decades previously. The result was the massive naval battle at Ecnomus in the summer of 256
BCE
, four years after Mylae. The battle saw the full complement of both forces ranged against each other off the southern coast of Sicily, just east of Agrigentum (
Map 1
).

Polybius records that the Carthaginians set out with a fleet of 350 decked ships and the Romans with around 320, plus ships carrying horses and supplies for the planned invasion (Polyb. 1.25.7–9). These numbers have been revised downwards by modern scholars to 230 ships for the Romans and perhaps 200 for the Carthaginians but there is no solid factual basis for this assessment. Ancient estimates put Roman forces at 140,000 men and the Carthaginians close to 150,000 (1.26.7–9). Even Polybius seems surprised by the numbers and notes that ‘these figures are bound to strike not only an eye-witness but even the reader with amazement at the vast scale of the encounter and the enormous outlay and resources of the opposing states’.
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Allowing for the exaggerations and scaled down to the modern estimates, there were still as many as 250,000 oarsmen and marines involved, which makes it, quite likely, the largest sea battle ever fought.
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A Carthaginian fleet had sailed across from Carthage to Lilybaeum and rounded the coast anticlockwise to their base at Heraclea Minoa (
Map 1
). They were positioned to block the Roman crossing. As the Roman fleet left port it was under the command of both the consuls, Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius Vulso, sailing side by side in flagship
hexiremes
(sixes) at the head of the convoy of ships. They were making for Cap Bon, the northernmost tip of Africa. The Carthaginians lined up with Sicily on their left and ‘extending their right wing to the open sea … with all their ships facing the Romans’ (Polyb. 1.27.3). Their tactics were intended to break through the Roman lines. This was a method they often used, sailing into the enemy ships, disrupting their formation and with their superior seamanship, outmanoeuvring them.
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Once they had broken up the Roman line, the Carthaginians felt they had a better chance of avoiding the
corvus
by engaging the Roman ships in
separate battles, giving themselves more space to operate. The Carthaginians initially succeeded in splitting up the Roman line, ‘thus the whole conflict consisted of three parts and three sea-battles were going on at a wide distance from each other’ (Polyb. 1.28.3). The battle was closely fought but resulted in a narrow Roman victory, with the capture of sixty-four Carthaginian ships. In addition the Carthaginians lost more than thirty ships and the Romans twenty-four.
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At Carthage the city walls were draped in black cloth, presenting to the world their deep mourning and the human price of this naval disaster.
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The cost was enormous both in terms of casualties from the loss, captured ships and also the financial outlay for supplies, weapons and vessels. The demographic loss to the city and citizenship alone must have numbered tens of thousands. The Carthaginians might well have sued for peace after the succession of defeats they had suffered and some of our sources suggest they did send envoys to Rome at this time. The main history for the events however, that of Polybius, makes no mention of any peace overtures.
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Thus the Carthaginians did not capitulate in the face of the defeat at Ecnomus and more soldiers were recruited, more ships built. A mission to recruit troops from Greece was dispatched from Carthage. The city was seeking manpower and military advisors to help turn the tide of the war. The tenacity of the Carthaginians, especially when confronted by an invading force, provides some insight into the general characteristics of their leaders, who displayed traits usually reserved for the Romans. Protecting Carthage was of paramount importance. The use of citizens in battles for the protection of the city reflects this as well.

Carthage readied herself for the inevitable after the defeat at Ecnomus. The invasion of Agathocles had certainly not been forgotten and the Carthaginians prepared for the onslaught of another army. The two Roman consuls had regrouped their armies and then ‘put to sea and continued their advance towards Africa’ (Polyb. 1.29.1). The Roman force touched land at Cap Bon just as Agathocles had done over fifty years earlier and perhaps the Syracusans were there to advise their Roman allies.
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Cap Bon is the nearest point to Sicily and the invading force proceeded south along the coast. The Romans set up base at the city of Clupea (
Aspis
in Polyb. 1.29.5–6, modern Kelibia), which has one of the few natural ports on the east side of the promontory (
Map 1
). We do not hear of any attempt at defending the Carthaginian countryside as the Romans plundered the ‘handsome and luxuriously furnished houses’. Properties were ‘ransacked, livestock confiscated and thousands captured by the Roman forces who were unchallenged’.
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After receiving
orders from Rome one consul Regulus remained on African soil while the other, Manlius Vulso, returned with the fleet to Rome carrying the plunder and prisoners they had captured (Polybius lists 20,000 slaves). Regulus was left with forty ships, 15,000 foot soldiers and 500 cavalry (Polyb.1.29.9).
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