Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (12 page)

The soldiers remained unpaid and naturally suspected that Carthage was trying to avoid paying them altogether. The situation was explosive. The Carthaginian government persuaded the commanding officers of the various mercenary detachments to withdraw from the city, reasoning that they would be better supplied in the countryside. The fact that the soldiers were willing to leave suggests that rebellion was not yet on their minds. From Carthage the mercenaries were sent to the Libyphoenician town of Sicca, which lay 170 kilometres to the southwest (see
Map 1
). There they awaited their final payment. Libyphoenician refers to the culture that developed in the Libyan-populated regions that were controlled by Carthage and indicates a heterogeneous mix of the indigenous and Carthaginian populations (Pliny,
NH
5.24). The chosen destination probably reflects the fact that a majority of the mercenary soldiers were Libyphoenician or Numidian. Each man was provided with a gold stater to cover expenses for the journey. The coin, perhaps the equivalent
of a Greek stater, was probably worth about four days’ wages for a mercenary soldier.
²⁴
The removal of the soldiers with what Polybius refers to as their ‘baggage’, the wives and children and hangers-on, must have been a relief to the citizens of Carthage but enormously disruptive to the inhabitants of the countryside as the soldiers made their way to Sicca (1.66.6–9).
²⁵

Once at Sicca the soldiers remained idle, with nothing to do but keep drinking, ponder the amount of back pay owed and the promises made by their generals. They were now in a hinterland that had suffered harsh treatment by Carthage during the war. The twenty-three-year conflict had brought high levels of taxation and conscription to this important agricultural region. The combination of a discontented local population and unpaid soldiers led to rapidly growing fury. When Hanno, the Carthaginian commander in Africa, arrived at Sicca he was met with a clamour of new demands. Carthage could barely afford what was already due. The soldiers sensed they were not going to be paid and the generals who had made promises to them in the field were nowhere to be seen.
²⁶

In this atmosphere, rumour and disaffection grew to such an extent that 20,000 soldiers left Sicca and marched back to Carthage, camping 18 kilometres south-west of the city at the town of Tunes (modern Tunis) (Polyb. 1.67.13). At Tunes, the very large contingent of Libyans, along with an assortment of rebellious soldiers of many different ethnicities – Iberians, Celts and Ligurians and ‘a mixture’ of Greeks – could count on local support (Polyb. 1.67.10–11).
²⁷
Negotiators from the Carthaginian Senate met the rebels at their camp and crumbled before their demands. They acquiesced to all requests, even as these became larger and more exorbitant by the day. The Carthaginians were outnumbered, without resources and intimidated by the increasingly hostile mercenaries.

Hamilcar Barca, the general who had commanded these men in Sicily, had yet to be involved in the crisis (Polyb. 1.68.1–9). This raises the question of his whereabouts. The ancient sources do not convincingly explain Hamilcar’s movements after he left Sicily. As he sailed from the island at the end of the war he disappears from our view. Polybius argues that because he had promised the mutinous soldiers so much in Sicily and since none of those promises had been met, he was not a popular choice to placate them (1.68.12). There may be some truth in this but as Hamilcar was the most respected general among the troops, we might equally expect him to have been called upon at this moment. The historian Appian mentions that Hamilcar was involved in a prosecution for his actions in the running of the war in Sicily. Legal proceedings against him at home may therefore have been the reason for his abrupt departure from
the field in Sicily. This may also explain why he was not given command at the beginning of the subsequent insurgency (Appian,
Ib
. 4).
²⁸

The Carthaginian practice of holding military commanders to strict account through trial was widely known. ‘In their wars they advance their leading men to commands, taking it for granted that these should be the first to brave the danger for the whole state; but when they gain peace, they plague these same men with suits, bring false charges against them through envy, and load them down with penalties …’ (Diodorus Sic. 20.10.2–5).
²⁹
Although we know little about internal Punic politics and it is difficult to ascertain the motivation of the main players, there are strong indications of a real divide at this point between the government at Carthage and the generals returning from Sicily. It is highly likely that Hamilcar was defending himself against a prosecution in the courts at the beginning of the mercenary rebellion.

Eventually Gisgo, the commander from Lilybaeum, was called up to meet the rebels. On the mercenary side two leaders had emerged: Spendius, who was an ex-Roman slave from Campania, and a Libyan named Mathos. Both men were powerful voices with personal reasons for rebellion, and neither would have been inclined to come to a settlement with the Carthaginians. Spendius, as an ex-Roman slave and deserter from the Roman army, was intent on avoiding repatriation to Rome under the terms of the treaty of Lutatius. Mathos represented local discontent at the harsh conditions that had been imposed by Carthage on the Libyan homeland during war with Rome. Along with the other Libyans fighting in the rebellion, his became the voice of local independence against Carthaginian hegemony.

Gisgo’s attempt at arbitration was rejected and in the ensuing turmoil he was seized and held in chains. This marks the beginning of ‘open war’ between the mercenary troops and the city of Carthage (Polyb. 1.70.6). A critical blow to Carthage came when the Libyan contingent sent envoys to the Libyphoenician towns across Carthaginian territory urging their cooperation in rebellion. This was the land whence they derived their taxation income, surplus food supplies and their soldiers.
³⁰
The mercenary rebellion became an all-out revolt in the heartland of Carthage and meant that the city was ‘deprived of all these resources at one blow’ (Polyb 1.71.2). Carthage was now fighting a civil war.

Thus began what is often called the ‘Truceless War’, a term found in Polybius and elsewhere used with the sense of ‘relentless’. Both concepts characterize the lawless brutality of what was to unfold in Africa (1.65.6).
³¹
Polybius reasons that many of the Libyan allies joined the rebels because of Carthage’s system of government and taxation (1.72.1–6). The war against the
Romans over Sicily had been an extraordinary drain on the wealth and productivity of both Carthage and the towns of their African territories. Twenty-three years of naval and land warfare, and the invasion of African territory by the Romans, took their toll on the prosperity of Carthage’s agricultural production and allied territories of their heartland. The taxation burden had fallen heavily on the Libyans and Libyphoenicians, whose crops were confiscated and taxation doubled with harsh penalties for those who resisted. The general Hanno had enforced the policy of heavy taxation and subjugation in Africa while Hamilcar operated in Sicily. The consequence of Hanno’s policies was that the Libyan population ‘required no incitement to revolt’ (Polyb. 1.72.4).
³²

The Libyan leader Mathos had 70,000 troops with him and began the war with a multi-pronged attack in the spring of 240
BCE
.
³³
Carthaginian-allied cities to the north, Utica and Hippo Acra (modern Bizerte), were laid under siege while the main rebel camp at Tunes cut Carthage off from the rest of the countryside by blocking access to the peninsula (see
Map 3
). The Carthaginians were trapped behind their walls with very few supporters able or willing to supply help for the city. The rebels were seasoned soldiers ‘schooled in the daring tactics of the Barcids’ and Hanno, sent out to relieve the siege, was no match for them (Polyb. 1.74.9).

When Hanno’s preliminary headway against the rebels quickly gave way to disaster, a change of leadership was called for. Polybius’ criticism of Hanno is harsh: ‘he had no idea how to avail himself of opportunities and generally showed an entire lack of experience and energy’. Hanno is described as ‘heedless and lacking judgement’ and without any creativity he was limited to charging the enemy camp with ‘his strong force of elephants’. More criticism focused on his lack of ability to capitalize on any success. When Hanno proved incapable of dealing with the rebel army, Hamilcar Barca was brought back to a position of command (1.74.2–4).

The demolition of Hanno’s reputation should be read with caution as it reflects Polybius’ extremely pro-Barcid bias in this section of his narrative.
³⁴
Nonetheless, the result of Hanno’s failure to tackle the rebel army was that Hamilcar, once again, became the saviour of the Carthaginian military effort. Hamilcar did not replace Hanno but joined him in command with a newly recruited army. Reports of this force depict a motley crew. Hamilcar was given ‘seventy elephants, all the additional mercenaries they had been able to collect and the deserters from the enemy, besides their citizen forces, horse and foot, so that in all he had about 10,000 men’ (Polyb. 1.75.2–3). He immediately lured the mercenary army into an ambush and his quick success ‘restored some confidence and courage’ among the Carthaginians (1.76.1–9, 11). The
mercenaries, however, did not retreat and proceeded to encircle Hamilcar’s army while he was encamped on a plateau (Polyb. 1.77.6–7).

The timely arrival in Hamilcar’s camp of the Numidian prince Naravas of the Massyli changed the momentum and proved a key event in the campaign. The Massyli, the Masaesyli and the Mauri were the distinct Numidian peoples who occupied the area of North Africa westward from Carthaginian territory to the Atlantic in the third century.
³⁵
The family of Naravas had traditionally allied with Carthage and he was particularly interested in ‘the friendship of Barcas’.
³⁶
Polybius emphasizes that Naravas wanted to serve under Hamilcar personally (1.78.1–9). Hamilcar certainly welcomed the 2,000 highly skilled cavalry into his army at that critical moment. Naravas’ allegiance was so significant that Hamilcar promised his daughter in marriage to the prince if he remained loyal to Carthage. All of Hannibal’s sisters were married off in order to secure key political alliances and their links give us some insight into the importance of the Numidian alliance that Naravas offered. Hamilcar personally was able to command such allegiance among local leaders and their troops. His reputation and prestige maintained this alliance that would play a key role in his military conquests and in Hannibal’s later successes.
³⁷

Naravas and his cavalry made an immediate impact on the war. In their first battle they played an essential part in the victory that saw 10,000 enemy troops killed.
³⁸
With cavalry, elephants and foot soldiers, the Carthaginian military redeemed themselves under Hamilcar’s command. They regained authority in the region and the loyalty of some of the Numidian and Libyan troops. Captives were treated leniently. They were offered a place in Hamilcar’s army or freedom (with an oath not to take up arms against Carthage). This intelligent policy aimed at undermining the rebels’ support would turn out to be the beginning of the long fight for the restitution of Carthaginian power in their Libyan heartland (Polyb.1.78.9–15).

The Libyan rebel army, however, was not easily defeated, being determined, powerful and well organized. Polybius dismisses them as brigands and uncivilized barbarians fighting to overthrow the ‘civilized’ forces of Carthage. The idea of Libyan independence was embraced broadly across the territory and it was not the first time that the local population had risen up to support an army hostile to Carthage. When Agathocles invaded Africa in
c
. 310
BCE
he counted on the support of ‘the Libyan allies of the Carthaginians, who had for a long time resented their exactions’. Agathocles had correctly predicted they ‘would grasp any opportunity for revolt’ (Diodorus Sic. 20.3.3).

The political overtones of Libyan independence during the insurgency of 241–237
BCE
were clearly expressed in the coinage minted by the mercenary
troops. The rebels produced coinage in the name of an independent Libya. Whilst these coins were re-struck on Carthaginian issues and stylistically based on Carthaginian prototypes, some of them convey a strong political message of independence in their imagery and legends. Particularly noteworthy are the silver shekel and half-shekel that bear the symbol of the lion and the legend LIBYA, in a Greek script. Perhaps we can view these coins used to pay the rebel soldiers as a call to arms for the local population. The production of Libyan coinage can be seen to demonstrate an interest in political legitimacy and local identity as an alternative to Carthaginian hegemony.
³⁹

The flame of rebellion spread to the Carthaginian settlements on the island of Sardinia.
⁴⁰
At some point in 240/239
BCE
and ‘in emulation’ of the revolt of Mathos and Spendius, one insurgency led to another (Polyb. 1.79.1).
⁴¹
The garrisons on Sardinia had surely gone unpaid, given the situation at Carthage. Another commander named Hanno was sent with a newly raised army to re-garrison the island but on arrival these new troops promptly joined the rebels. The rebellious Sardinian troops crucified Hanno and set about torturing and murdering all the Carthaginians on the island (Polyb. 1.79.4). Carthage was powerless to respond; already engaged in a fierce fight for Africa, Sardinia was a battle too far.

The Mercenary War started in 241
BCE
and lasted until the end of 238
BCE
but the duration of its separate phases is not clear.
⁴²
Despite the detailed narrative preserved in Polybius, the chronology is difficult to pin down. It is clear that an extremely violent conflict developed, with escalating atrocities committed on both sides. Polybius describes a scene where Autaritus, a Gaulish leader, addressed an assembly of troops and argued for the execution of all their prisoners (Polyb. 1.80.6). The intention was to push the soldiers beyond any kind of possible reconciliation with the Carthaginian authorities. The leaders wanted to make sure there would be no surrender and ‘they set themselves to devise some infamous crime which would make the hatred of the troops for Carthage more savage’ (Polyb. 1.79.8). The decision was not unanimous and certain insurgents spoke against the executions but in the end they were carried out. The rebels set upon their captives, including the general Gisgo. First they cut off their hands then their ‘other extremities too and after this mutilation and breaking their legs’ finally threw the captives, still alive, into a ditch (Polyb. 1.80.13).
⁴³