Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (14 page)

The account of the oath at the beginning of the Iberian campaigns is one of the most repeated from Hannibal’s life.
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It is also one of the few anecdotes that may have come from the mouth of Hannibal himself. The oath captures the Roman view of the motivation for Hannibal’s invasion of Italy. Early modern European art embraced the scene and there are many interpretations, especially from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that depict the innocent young boy, overshadowed by the altar and bloody sacrifice, towered over by his father and also the figure of a great deity. The use of the oath story was commonplace enough to extend to political satire in late eighteenth-century Britain, with the imagery being evoked to portray the Duke of Bedford as a contemporary Hannibal (Figs 3 and 4).

In the eyes of the Romans, the hostility of Hamilcar was passed on to his son and this drove Hannibal’s actions. The Roman writers of the Empire looking back on the history of the Punic Wars would make this hostility profound and personal.
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Valerius Maximus, who wrote during the reign of the emperor Tiberius, related a story of Hamilcar who, watching his three sons playing together, declared ‘these are the lion cubs I am rearing for the destruction of Rome’ (9.3. ext.2). We are also told that from his earliest boyhood, ‘he [Hannibal] had been trained to fight against the Romans’ (Zonaras 8.21). This reflects how Roman imperial memory looked back to the time of Rome’s rise to power, when the city flourished on the traditional values of the Republic.
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For the Romans, the more profound the hatred felt by the Carthaginians – and by Hamilcar and Hannibal personally – the greater was Rome’s triumph. It also made it easier for them to justify the eventual destruction of Carthage and her culture. Thus the emphasis on the hatred of Hamilcar and Hannibal became a literary construct. There is little reason to doubt that the Barcids and many other Carthaginians were suspicious of Rome; however, we should not see this as the driving force behind their subsequent conquests.
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When the correct religious observances had been carried out and fruitful omens observed Hamilcar left Carthage. It was the summer of 237
BCE
. He had with him an army recruited for conquest and his mission was that of ‘subjugating Iberia to the Carthaginians’ (Polyb. 2.1.5–7).
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It is difficult to define Hamilcar’s exact role as the Carthaginian context in itself is unclear, but
he has been compared to a Roman proconsul given an army to command and land to conquer.
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The Iberian peninsula was to be his challenge and Hamilcar’s mandate was the acquisition of territory for Carthage’s benefit. Six years later (in 231
BCE
), when he met a Roman delegation sent out to investigate Carthaginian power in Iberia, Hamilcar explained to the Romans why Carthage had been forced into the region: they had gone to acquire new territory to pay off their war debt (Cassius Dio, frag. 48). The debt, he might have added, which the Romans had unjustly increased after they had seized Sardinia.
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Following his success against the mercenaries Hamilcar had emerged as a dominant figure at Carthage and his supporters must have controlled the council and the people’s assembly. How much opposition existed to Hamilcar and his son’s subsequent policies is a matter of some debate.
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Resistance to Hamilcar’s Iberian expedition from within the Carthaginian elite is articulated through Hanno, the general outshone by Hamilcar in the Mercenary War. Hanno’s was the voice of opposition to the Barcid policies and he led an anti-Barcid faction through the whole period of their dominance. In 238/237
BCE
Hanno argued for a policy that would see Carthage consolidate its African power base in the aftermath of the mercenary rebellion.
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The Carthaginian conquest of Iberia and the creation of this new province set in motion a chain of events that culminated in the start of the Second Punic War and Hannibal’s invasion of Italy. In the twenty years between the two Punic Wars Carthaginian influence in the far west of the Mediterranean grew while Roman interests expanded into their neighbouring territories. Both states were expansive in their outlook and involved in increasing their wealth and influence at the expense of their neighbours. The geopolitical implications for those caught in the middle meant that their option was either to choose sides or play one power off against the other. The events during these decades would draw Rome and Carthage again into another war that would engulf the whole of the western Mediterranean.
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The expedition set out from Carthage and crossed to Iberia at the Pillars of Herakles, the closest point between Africa and Europe. They landed at the ancient city of Gades (Gadir/Cadiz) on the Atlantic coast.
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Gades, in the literary tradition, was the oldest Phoenician settlement in the western Mediterranean and situated on a series of islands in the estuary of the river Guadelete (
Map 2
).
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Long a prosperous city, it shared a language and culture of origin with Carthage and it is thought that the two centres had been closely allied before Hamilcar’s arrival in the 230s.
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Gades was a pilgrimage city in the ancient world and intimately connected with the worship of the Phoenician god Melqart, whose great sanctuary and temple occupied one of the islands in
the estuary and drew worshippers from across the Mediterranean. Early in the colonization of the western Mediterranean the Phoenician/Punic god Melqart was syncretized with the Greek Herakles and the annual spring festival of renewal at the temple at Gades was frequented by many cultures. As an adult, Hannibal considered this Melqart/Herakles his personal patron god, the all-conquering hero of the western Mediterranean. The worship of Melqart was also an important link between Gades, Tyre and Carthage. It is not unreasonable to assume that Hamilcar would have called upon the deity when he arrived at Gades for support in his upcoming campaign. A ‘son of Tyre’ bringing the power of Carthage to Iberia would have expected to make a pilgrimage to Melqart’s temple, just as his own son would do almost two decades later before his march into Italy.
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Gades was the closest port to the mineral-rich region known in the Hebrew Bible as Tarshish, in Greek as Tartessos and occupied by the Turdetani people. The motivation for the expedition to this region of Iberia is easily understood, given the fiscal difficulties at Carthage after the wars.
¹⁹
Control over the area, inland from Gades, was a driving force behind the Barcid campaigns in Iberia and, similarly, the later Roman conquest. In the third century southern Iberia was a mix of old Phoenician (and some Greek) coastal colonial settlements with Iberian and Celtiberian (name for the mixed zone between Celtic and Iberian) peoples living in inland urban settlements. The main regions that attracted the Carthaginian conquest were the Atlantic corner of Gades, inland along the river Baetis (Guadalquivir) and to the east along the coast through modern Andalucía into the region of modern Valencia (see
Map 2
). The area held great potential for the exploitation of its natural resources and agricultural land, whilst the people were not politically unified but divided into a myriad of kingdoms. Carthage had long employed Iberian soldiers in its armies and there may well have been personal connections between the Barcid leadership and certain peoples in the region.
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The situation on the ground made for fertile conquest and Hamilcar set about winning an empire using Gades as his base. Cornelius Nepos summed up Hamilcar’s tenure: ‘after crossing the sea and coming into Spain, [he] did great deeds through the favour of fortune. He subdued mighty and warlike nations and enriched all Africa with horses, arms, men and money’ (
Ham.
4.1). Hamilcar made a great name for himself in Iberia, conquering the warlike Iberians and carving a power base out of the southern hinterland of the peninsula. His original army may have numbered 20,000 but with conquest came further recruits so that a decade later the Carthaginian army in Iberia had more than doubled in size to 56,000.
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From 237
BCE
to 229
BCE
Hannibal grew from a boy to a young man while Hamilcar constructed a Carthaginian empire in Iberia. He came of age at his father’s side studying and learning, along with his two younger brothers Hasdrubal and Mago. The three boys were nurtured under the tutelage of Hamilcar and his lieutenants, absorbing the arts of war from a young age (Zonaras 8.21).
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Brought up in camp, the boys would have learned to ride and fight on horseback, and taken lessons in military strategy and command. Tutors were employed to teach them more traditional skills and we know that a Spartan named Sosylus was later named as one of Hannibal’s teachers of Greek (Cornelius Nepos,
Hann
. 13.3). Sosylus, as Hannibal’s tutor in political affairs, leadership and language, also influenced how he was portrayed by posterity.
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As conquest turned to consolidation, Hamilcar’s reputation and support at Carthage rose along with his successes in the field. The expectations placed on his sons, especially the eldest, Hannibal, must have increased with each success. Hamilcar brought his sons up to rule his newly acquired territory and to conquer.

Hamilcar’s approach to military conquest was straightforward. Towns and cities could choose to submit to the power of the Barcid general and be treated with relative clemency but if they decided to oppose then the consequences were harsh. In one passage Diodorus (25.10.1–3) claims that Hamilcar made war on various Iberian and Celtic tribes (including Tartessi) and destroyed their whole army, then ‘… he took over and enrolled the three thousand survivors in his own army’. Diodorus goes on to relate the story of Indortes, who raised an army to resist Hamilcar and was tortured and crucified. Hamilcar then released Indortes’ army and incorporated many of the soldiers into his own force. He used the policy of the carrot and the stick.
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This process was repeated over and over until there was a significant territorial base for the Carthaginians. Control over this territory relied very much on the personal prestige of Hamilcar Barca.

Hamilcar’s route to a Carthaginian province in Iberia went from establishing control to consolidation of the territory gained. Thus ‘after bringing many cities throughout Iberia under his dominion, he founded an important city … named Acra Leuka’ (Diodorus Sic. 25.10.3). This model of conquest followed the example set by Hellenistic monarchs whose acquisition of territory was accompanied by the foundation of new cities.
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Akra Leuka, which means the White Fort or the White Cape in Greek, is often identified as the modern city of Alicante because of the specific geography of the coast. There is almost no material evidence for the city and Diodorus is the only source to mention the foundation. Many arguments against its location at Alicante are
convincing, especially that no Punic remains have been uncovered at the ancient site there. The sparse evidence leaves the location and even existence of Hamilcar’s city open to question and exemplifies the problems with our sources for this period.
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The Romans kept a wary eye on expanding Carthaginian territorial hegemony to their west. They were surely informed of events by their close allies the Massalians (from Marseilles) whose view from the mouth of the Rhône was geographically closer to the action in Iberia. The Massalians may have been nervous about Carthaginian control expanding in their direction but during the period of Hamilcar’s conquests, the Romans were busy consolidating their power base elsewhere. Rome was committed to an attempt to control Illyrian piracy (
c
. 230/229
BCE
) across the Adriatic Sea from Italy and to dealing with the Gauls in the north of the Italian peninsula (the Po valley) (Polyb. 2.2.1–4). It is in this context that the late Roman historian Cassius Dio (frag. 48) mentions Roman envoys sent to Hamilcar in 231
BCE
. The veracity of the event is questioned because Dio is the only source to make reference to it. However, the brief account maintains that the Romans sent a delegation to ‘investigate’ Hamilcar. This official Roman visit to the Carthaginians in Iberia preceded an invasion of Illyria with ‘both consuls involved, a land army and an armada of 200 ships’ (Polyb. 2.11.1).
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The intention of the Roman delegation to Hamilcar may have been to secure all other frontiers before committing Rome to a large military excursion. Even more relevant may be that the final instalment of war indemnity from Carthage, the end of the ten-year period after the First Punic War, would have coincided with the visit of Roman envoys to Hamilcar.
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The delegation took the form of an official embassy. When the two sides met, Hamilcar told the Romans that their ‘theft’ of Sardinia (in 238
BCE
) and imposition of increased payments on Carthage had left him with no other choice but extension into other spheres. If a true representation of the event, this illustrates the Roman perception of Carthaginian Iberia as a potential threat a decade before Hannibal. The meeting implies that tensions between the two states simmered beneath the surface during the inter-war period. Hamilcar’s powerful position at Carthage may also have raised Roman interest in meeting the man. His growing influence became more apparent when a rebellion broke out in North Africa among the Numidians. Hamilcar sent Hasdrubal, his son-in-law, to deal with the revolt. Policy at Carthage was being influenced both in terms of financial and military support by Barcid Iberia.
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Some two years after the supposed embassy, in the winter of 229–228
BCE
, Hamilcar was killed. Many ancient authors record what Livy refers to as
Hamilcar’s ‘timely death’ (21.1.1) and there are different versions of the events. Diodorus’ romantic explanation is often cited: he tells us that Hamilcar, laying siege to a city called Helice, fell victim to trickery by a local king who had at first pretended to be friendly and then launched an attack.
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The heroic Hamilcar, with his army routed, and in order to save his two elder sons (Hannibal and Hasdrubal), single-handedly diverted the hostile troops from his army and plunged into a deep river on horseback. ‘He perished in the flood under his steed’ but his sons were saved (25.10.4). Polybius only tells us he died ‘bravely in a battle against one of the most warlike and powerful tribes’ (2.1.8), whilst Cornelius Nepos says that ‘he fell in battle fighting against the Vettones’, a tribe located in the vicinity of modern Toledo (
Ham
. 4.2).
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