Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (18 page)

After the fall of Saguntum Hannibal acted to secure Iberia and Carthage against the inevitable Roman attack. He also sent out envoys to test the opinion of the tribes on the land route to Italy. Hannibal had to understand how his army would be received along the path he planned to take if he was to seize the initiative from Rome. He may also have encouraged his envoys to stir up trouble among the restive Gauls of the north of Italy. The land route to Italy was his only real option since the Romans controlled the key ports and islands between Iberia and Italy, including the Ligurian coast and southern Gaul (see
Map 2
). A Carthaginian fleet had not matched the Romans for decades and with the loss of Carthage’s ports on Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, the sea options were severely limited.
⁵
Clearly Hannibal had little choice but to fight this war on land and would need the support of allies all along the road.

At New Carthage in the winter of 218
BCE
preparations were made. The spoils from the sack of Saguntum were divided among the victors, including a portion delivered to Carthage. Then Hannibal sent his troops to winter quarters or (for the Iberians) homewards for rest. Hasdrubal Barca, Hannibal’s younger brother, was deputized and ‘instructed … how to manage the government of Iberia and prepare to resist the Romans if he [Hannibal] himself happened to be absent’. Soldiers were sent from Iberia to Africa (13,850 infantry, 1,200 cavalry and 870 Balearic slingers) and from Africa to Iberia, ‘binding … the two provinces to reciprocal loyalty’ (Polyb. 3. 33.5–6).

Hasdrubal’s forces were made up of a fleet consisting of fifty quinqueremes, two quadriremes and five triremes (thirty-two of the fives and all the threes ‘fully manned’). Plus a further ‘2550 cavalry made up of Libyphoenicians, Libyans and Numidians and an infantry of 11,850 Libyans, 300 Ligurians and
500 Balearians as well as twenty-one elephants’ (Polyb. 3.33.5–16). In case his readers wondered about the accuracy of these very specific details, Polybius claims his source is impeccable. ‘I found on the Lacinian promontory a bronze tablet on which Hannibal had made out these lists himself during the time he was in Italy’ (3.33.17–18). The inscription, which no longer survives, was a kind of
res gestae
written down by the great man himself and then set up on a column for posterity.
⁶
The details of the numbers of soldiers and type of troops that he left for his brother provide a glimpse of Hannibal’s meticulous nature and his careful and structured planning. The march into Italy was a bold and risky strategy and his plans had to be perfect.

Early in 218
BCE
, before any official declaration of war but knowing what was coming, the opposing sides made their preparations.
⁷
The Roman Senate set out to raise two consular armies with the intention of sending one to Iberia and one to Africa (Polyb. 3.40.2; Livy 21.17 1–9). ‘They [the Romans] never thought that the war would take place in Italy’ and were preparing to fight in Iberia with Saguntum as their base (Polyb. 3.15.13). One consul, Publius Cornelius Scipio, was given Iberia as his ‘province’; the other, Tiberius Sempronius Longus, Sicily and Africa.
⁸
The Romans sent out a strong signal of purpose with the number of soldiers they raised to fight. That year they levied six legions (4,000 infantry in each) making up troops totalling 64,000 infantry (24,000 Roman and 40,000 from allies) and 6,200 cavalry (1,800 Roman and 4,400 from allies) and launched a fleet of 220 quinqueremes (Livy 21.17.1–9). The size of the Roman force tells us that Rome believed it was going to war with Carthage intending to capture her territory, and to win quickly.

The Romans planned a two-pronged attack. The largest portion of the fleet (160 quinqueremes) and two legions with allied troops were given to Sempronius, who went to Sicily and prepared to attack Carthage. Publius Scipio was ‘bound for Iberia with sixty ships’ (Polyb. 3.41.2) and two legions and allied troops. The remaining two legions were under the command of the praetor Lucius Manlius Vulso, who would head to northern Italy to continue to pacify the Gauls of the Po valley, for ‘at the same time as they were engaged in enrolling the legions … [the Romans] were also pursuing a scheme … for establishing two colonies in Cisalpine Gaul’ (Polyb. 3.40.3–8). News of Hannibal’s plans may have stirred up local anti-Roman feeling in Gaul, just as he had hoped it would. The Gallic tribe of the Boii had risen in revolt, ‘encouraged by the messages they had received telling them that the Carthaginians were close at hand’. Despite this trouble, the level of confidence among the Romans was high. They had raised a huge army and were well prepared, no doubt expecting a relatively straightforward victory and an extension of their territory.

At New Carthage the scouts sent to reconnoitre the route to Italy returned to Hannibal with a positive response from the ‘Celtic chiefs both on this side of the Alps and in the mountains themselves’ (Polyb. 3.34.3–6). He was no doubt kept informed of the Roman plans through the winter, and early spring of 218
BCE
began with a recall of troops from their winter quarters. Hannibal was ‘in high spirits’ as he rallied his soldiers and citizens for war with Rome.
⁹
The essence of Hannibal’s brilliance lies in how he changed the paradigm of the war before it had even begun.

The army Hannibal took with him on his adventure into Italy was made up of ‘Africans, Spaniards, Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians and Greeks’ (Polyb. 11.19.4).
¹⁰
It was not simply a matter of a hired army but there was certainly a mix of different forces and types of soldiers, some under their own command and others under the control of Carthaginian commanders. The army was a multicultural and varied force, with individual units wearing their own traditional uniforms of battle, heterogeneously attired and perhaps to outsiders looking uncoordinated. Hannibal’s troops were not merely mercenary soldiers but ‘a paid professional force’ organized into units who were committed and loyal to their leader. If we believe an offhand comment by Cicero, ‘Hannibal … thought that in his army there ought to be no rivalry of birth, but only of merit …’ (
Verr.
2.5.31), there was an egalitarian approach to his military command, which valued talent (and commitment) rather than just status. Many of the troops in Hannibal’s army were levied from territories now subject to Carthaginian rule and this connected them to Carthaginian power, although military obligation did not necessarily form part of their subject agreements.
¹¹
The lack of citizen involvement in the army, the antithesis of the Roman system, is often cited as a reason for the ultimate lack of success of the Carthaginians. This is a highly Romano-centric viewpoint and most soldiers, citizen or not, were inspired by and loyal to their commander. A leader of Hannibal’s stature and ability was able to combine the disparate parts of his army into a successful and unified machine.
¹²

Under Hannibal’s leadership this army was considered equal to the Romans and the most effective force of the age.
¹³
In Livy’s portrait Hannibal was ‘possessed of enormous daring in facing dangers, and enormous resourcefulness when in the midst of those dangers. He could be physically exhausted or mentally cowed by no hardship. He had the ability to withstand heat and cold alike; his eating and drinking depended on the requirements of nature, not pleasure’ (Livy 21.4.5–8). Livy described Hannibal as a tough soldier who lived by example and never revelled in the luxuries of command.
¹⁴

Ancient descriptions of Alexander the Great also emphasized his ability to endure physical toil and go without food and drink (Arrian,
Anabasis
7.28, Plutarch,
Alex.
4.4).
¹⁵
The characterization of Hannibal’s abstinence and concern for his soldiers and allies may be more than a literary conceit in Livy. This could very well reflect more formal aspects of Hannibal’s approach to command. The attributes Livy recorded may have been part of a philosophy of leadership that Hannibal consciously adopted, based on the role model of Pyrrhus and, of course, Alexander. We know that in the fourth-century treatises on the ideal form of command, such as that of Xenophon, preached abstinence and sobriety in a leader.
¹⁶
This type of manual must have informed Hannibal’s education in military leadership and in the actions of great generals. Hannibal certainly cultivated this style of leadership; he was a soldier’s man and a student of great military commanders.
¹⁷

Like a virtuoso chess player Hannibal moved the diverse groups in his army in a coherent strategy. Each cohort had a different role to play in the field. Cavalry were essential in the battles that Hannibal would fight and it was the Numidians who made the difference.
¹⁸
The other troops that originated from across North Africa included Libyans, Libyphoenicians, Gaetulians and Moors. The Celts and Iberians in Hannibal’s army were renowned for their skill in war – they were ‘chieftain societies’ and thus their allegiance and motivations were driven by patronage and connection to an individual leader.
¹⁹
As far as we can tell these disparate groups seem to have maintained their own command structures and adhered to their own formations. Each of the ethnic groups in the army wore their own battle attire, so to an observer Hannibal’s forces would have looked like a patchwork of distinctive clothing and colour.

The chain of command and the top tier of organization of Hannibal’s forces are deduced mainly from comments in our sources about individual commanders whom Hannibal relied upon. We cannot therefore fully identify the overall structure of the army but can see that he had a group of highly talented, loyal and expert commanders upon whom he could rely to carry out his orders and take the initiative when needed. Most of all his two brothers were a key part of the wider military machine that Hannibal created. Hasdrubal was left in Iberia as Carthaginian commander and Mago would accompany Hannibal on his march across the Alps.
²⁰

The road to war would lead Hannibal along the coast of the Iberian peninsula, across the Pyrenees into southern Gaul and over the Alps into Italy. This route was known in antiquity as the ‘road of Herakles’, based on the myths and legends of Herakles in his tenth labour. To accomplish this labour the
hero was sent from Greece to collect the Cattle of Geryon that grazed on Erytheia, an island at the western edge of the world (Hesiod,
Theogony
980). This mythical island sat on the spot where Europe and Africa met. The island of Erytheia was linked by ancient sources to the city of Gades (Pliny,
NH
4.36).
²¹
In antiquity, the island now known as St Peter (Santi Petri), at the southern extent of the archipelago, housed a temple renowned across the Mediterranean, dedicated to the Phoenician god Melqart whom the Greeks and Romans equated with the hero Herakles.
²²
Before he departed on his journey into Italy, Hannibal first made a pilgrimage to the temple of the god.

Livy claims that ‘after a review of all his auxiliary troops, Hannibal set off for Gades. There he discharged his vows to Hercules, and bound himself with further vows for the continued success of his venture’ (Livy 21.21.9). This means that Hannibal went to the temple of Melqart and there pledged to the god the spoils from the siege of Saguntum and sought his continued support.
²³
In offerings made in worship the Carthaginians often included the phrase, ‘because he heard his voice’ when a prayer was fulfilled.
²⁴
Having made gifts to the god, Hannibal must have felt favoured by divine sanction. Every spring (February/March) the ritual of the rebirth of Melqart was celebrated at Gades and it may have been this ceremony that Hannibal attended (Silius Italicus 3.1–31).
²⁵
The Barcid family believed in the Phoenician god Melqart as their patron and protector. Hannibal would have been conscious that the journey he planned to undertake, by land to Italy, would emulate that of Melqart’s Greek counterpart, Herakles.

Popular legends described Herakles as ‘the greatest commander of his age’ (Dionysius,
Rom. Ant
. 1.41). In the myth Herakles voyaged at the head of a great army into Italy and when his way was blocked ‘a great a battle was fought’ (Dionysius,
Rom. Ant.
1.41). The story articulates how the Greek hero was woven into the traditions of the western Mediterranean at the time of the early expansion of both Phoenicians and Greeks. By the third century versions of Herakles’ tales were popular across the region of the Celts, the Celtiberians, the Gauls and into Italy. The legends served to connect the colonial settlements of the western Mediterranean and the indigenous peoples with the heartland of Greek/Phoenician mythology and religion. The myth was known to all along the route. Thus Hannibal, just as Alexander had gone to the oracle at Siwa for divine sanction, visited the temple sacred to Melqart/Herakles in Gades.
²⁶
From there he would follow the path of Herakles and cross the Alps with an army.
²⁷

Hannibal made this pilgrimage in part to seal the link between his upcoming endeavour and those adventures of Melqart/Herakles. He was
aware of his reputation and at one level deliberately engaged in something called ‘myth management’ or, in today’s world, public relations.
²⁸
Herakles of legend was the great commander, the superhuman hero and, in the western Mediterranean, a saviour.
²⁹
His adventures involved freeing towns and cities from monsters, villains and tyranny. Many cities and towns in the western Mediterranean, including Rome, claimed a link with Herakles. Hannibal, or those who wrote his history, sought to link the legend of the Greek Herakles and the worship of Melqart to Hannibal’s reputation as a leader. This multivalent approach became an essential part of the ideology of Hannibal through which he could claim divine support for his war.
³⁰
More than ever before, Hannibal would need divine favour and this journey, if successful, would place his deeds among the ranks of the immortals and make him ‘the first after Hercules’ (Appian,
Syr
. 10).
³¹