Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (19 page)

Hannibal returned to New Carthage with the blessing of the god and set out along the coast with ‘90,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry and thirty-seven elephants’ (Polyb. 3.35.1).
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The army departed from New Carthage towards the end of May (or early June) and marched through Carthaginian territory towards the river Ebro, beyond which lay the unknown.
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As Hannibal’s journey continued, its significance grew until it attained a quasi-mythological status. This may indicate that the origin of the tales associated with the journey came from people close to the commander and implies that a pro-Carthaginian source we no longer have access to may have been the first to capture the heroic nature of the adventure.

Livy repeats a story of a dream that Hannibal had as his army approached the Ebro river near the town of Onussa.
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‘Hannibal saw in a dream a young man of godlike appearance who claimed he had been sent by Jupiter to guide Hannibal to Italy.’ In his dream the guide told Hannibal to follow and not take his eyes off him at any point.

At first, they say, Hannibal was frightened, and he followed without letting his gaze wander around, or back, at any stage; but then, with the curiosity of a human being, he began to wonder what it could be that he was forbidden to look back at. He could not help looking, and saw behind him a snake of an amazing size sliding along, and causing massive destruction to trees and bushes, a deafening thunderstorm following in its wake. Hannibal asked the young man what the monstrous apparition was and what the portent meant. He was informed that it was the destruction of Italy, and that he should simply proceed on his journey, asking no further questions and leaving destiny shrouded in darkness.
(Livy 21.22)

The story of this dream fascinated many ancient sources and equally engages modern historians of Hannibal.
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The tradition of a dream before battle can be traced back to the Persian king Cyrus and would continue through antiquity beyond the moment when the Roman emperor Constantine adopted Christian symbols after a dream he had before the battle of the Milvian Bridge in 312
CE
. The oldest extant version of Hannibal’s dream is found in Cicero, who claimed that his source was Coelius Antipater, who we know had access to the Greek historian Silenus’ work.
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The meaning of the dream has been open to interpretation since Cicero’s time. Hannibal’s guide in the dream, an escort granted to him by the gods for his passage through Gaul and over the Alps, imparted divine sanction to his mission. Herakles, who is a likely candidate, was never identified as such in the Roman versions of the tale. Nonetheless we can imagine that it would have been made explicit in a pro-Carthaginian version by the original author.
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The story of the dream gives us a further glimpse into the epic construction of the legend of Hannibal and how he claimed ownership of the myth.

In a very practical way the divine sanction implied in the dream would act as a unifying symbol for an army.
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The reporting of dreams and the dreams of a commander were key to morale. The culturally diverse members of Hannibal’s fighting force could connect to the Heraklean-inspired epic journey that they were about to undertake. The dream was a vehicle for the general to be seen as guided by the divine, and rumours of it would have spread among Hannibal’s troops, encouraging them to believe even further in their leader’s mission. A multicultural Hellenistic army needed the unifying force of a leader who was divinely sanctioned. The dream and the connection to the gods would also work on the minds of the Roman allies. Winning over the Iberians, the Celts, the Ligurians, the Greeks, the Samnites and Lucanians along the road was key to Hannibal’s strategy for success – all those diverse peoples and cultures that lay on the route to conquest.
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In the Hellenistic period armies were often personal and soldiers felt a direct and immediate loyalty to their commander. Hannibal had, in this group who set off with him from Iberia, the quintessential Hellenistic army loyal to him and dependent on his skills. Beyond just being paid to fight, the soldiers who would do battle under Hannibal’s command had a vested interest in the success of their general. They had to believe in the legend of their commander and his divine protection, for the mythic nature of their journey must have played a part in their commitment and identity.
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Inspired by his dream, Hannibal led his army across the Ebro in three divisions, stepping into a new world (Livy 21.23.1). The ethnic make-up north of
the river was not dissimilar to that in the south. Colonial foundations (mostly Greek) dominated the coastal regions and diverse Iberian and Celtic tribes occupied the inland areas. The Pyrenees, which divided Gaul from Iberia, formed Hannibal’s first barrier as he cut inland to avoid the Roman-allied Greek cities along the coast. The region between the Ebro and the Pyrenees was taken with some effort; heavy fighting ensued, with ‘many severe engagements and with great loss’ (Polyb. 3.35.3–4). Once the region was subdued, Hannibal left his commander Hanno in charge, with 10,000 foot soldiers and 1,000 cavalry. He sent an equal number of troops home as a goodwill gesture, to ensure loyalty behind him in Iberia and as a fallback, ‘if he ever had to call on them for reinforcements’ (Polyb. 3.35.6).

A different version of these events in the early part of the march in Livy describes how ‘3,000 of the Carpetani abandoned the march … and Hannibal sent home more than 7,000 men whose hearts he had felt were not in the campaign, and he pretended that the Carpetani too, had been discharged by him’ (21.23.4–6). In Polybius and Livy the numbers are the same – 10,000 troops left the march – and Hannibal’s goodwill towards his soldiers is evident in either scenario; what is fundamentally different is Livy’s portrayal of the soldiers deserting, whilst Polybius represents Hannibal as choosing to leave troops behind.

This disparity in the sources may reflect a change in Hannibal’s plans once the Ebro was crossed. If he had set out from New Carthage with the possibility of both Roman consular armies coming towards him and then had learned that only one was heading his way, Hannibal could rely on a smaller force. With the supply and maintenance of his army on the road a constant concern it was prudent to slim down his numbers and make his force more mobile, easier to manage and sustain.
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He also left a considerable amount of ‘the heavy baggage’ with Hanno, lightening the load of his soldiers and making his army more agile (Polyb. 3.76.5).

Thus Hannibal and a force now made up of ‘50,000 foot and 9,000 horse’ ascended the Pyrenees and moved on across Gaul to encounter the next barrier on the route, the Rhône (
Map 2
).
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Moving quickly, Hannibal marched towards the Rhône, avoiding Roman-allied Massalia/Marseilles. Modern estimates put his army’s progress at about 15 kilometres a day.
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The Roman consul Publius Scipio made his way towards Hannibal and sailed along the Ligurian coast with his two legions. He had been waylaid by a rebellion of the Celts in northern Italy and when he disembarked his troops near Massalia it was perhaps already early/mid-September (Polyb. 3.40.3–14). The last news he had of Hannibal was that ‘he … was … crossing the Pyrenees … but
because of the difficulty of the terrain on his route and the number of Celtic tribes lying between the Pyrenees and the Rhône, Publius Scipio felt sure that the Carthaginians were still many miles away’ (Polyb. 3.41.6).

Hannibal had however ‘continued his march, keeping the Sardinian Sea on his right, and suddenly appeared with his army at the crossing of the Rhône’ well ahead of the estimates made by the Romans for his progress (Polyb. 3.41.7). The consul was surprised that Hannibal and his army could have marched so quickly and sent out cavalry to reconnoitre the Carthaginian position and to confirm their whereabouts. The Roman army at Massalia decided that they would try to engage the Carthaginians in battle here in Gaul. Thus Publius Scipio ‘stayed behind … to discuss with the military tribunes what was the best ground on which to give battle to the enemy’ (Polyb. 3.41.8–9).

Hannibal, on the western bank of the Rhône, had no intention of waiting for the Roman army that was ‘four days’ march’ away at the sea and began to prepare his crossing. Polybius’ detail here is again specific and fascinating. He describes the scene as Hannibal made preparations to take his army of 50,000 infantry plus cavalry and elephants across the river. ‘He used every resource to make friends with the natives living by the bank, and bought up all their canoes and boats, of which there was a large number, since many of the inhabitants of the Rhône valley are engaged in sea-borne trade’ (Polyb. 3.42.1–4).

It took two days to build, borrow and buy enough craft and in that time ‘a large force of barbarians had gathered on the opposite bank to prevent the Carthaginians from crossing’. With the preparations continuing beside the river, part of the army (mostly Spaniards in Livy 21.27.2) were sent by night north under the command of Hanno (called the son of Bomilcar the
sufet
) in order to cross the river and circle back on the enemy waiting on the east bank of the Rhône. On the fifth day after arriving at the river, with the forces under Hanno now in place and ready to attack (signalled by a column of smoke in Polyb. 3.43.6), the crossing began. These manoeuvres again highlight Hannibal’s use of advanced communication techniques, with smoke signals and scouting key to preparing for the movement of his forces.
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Hannibal himself was in the front of the boats that raced each other across the river. The men ‘cheered and shouted as they tried to outstrip one another and strained against the current … The Carthaginians following the progress of the boats with loud cheers … while the barbarians [Celts] yelled their war cries’. Just at this moment the advance troops of Hanno set upon the Celts and their camp. The Carthaginians took them ‘completely by surprise’ and caused the enemy troops to fall into disarray. At the same time Hannibal
‘formed up his first division as it landed and at once engaged’. With the crossing won, the rest of the army was transported across and camped on the east bank of the river that night. Only the elephants and their minders still remained on the west bank of the Rhône.

The Carthaginian elephants had been an integral part of the army for almost forty years but had probably not been engaged in an adventure of this nature before.
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The elephant became synonymous with the ruling Barcid family and was an important part of their self-definition (see Plate 5). Certainly the effort Hannibal employed in bringing them along on the march gives us an idea of how important he considered them.
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The general consensus is that the Carthaginian elephants sitting on the banks of the Rhône were mainly African forest elephants, a species related to the African savannah elephant but slightly smaller. Ancient armies never used the sub-Saharan African savannah elephant, most familiar to a modern audience.
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The African forest elephants no longer inhabit North Africa but in the Carthaginian period were fairly common.
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The Indian species of elephant may also have made an appearance in the Hannibalic War – but the evidence is questionable.
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Whichever species was waiting on the banks of the river, the Carthaginians had long experience of their behaviour and reactions, and would have known how to make the most of their impact and also what they might do in water.

It was the next day when Hannibal learned of the presence of the Roman consul and his army at Massalia. He sent a body of 500 Numidian cavalry to observe their movements. That same morning Celtic chieftains from across the mountains in Italy were presented formally to his troops. One named specifically as Magilus and others spoke to the army, assuring them of the support waiting on the other side of the Alps. Hannibal’s words to his assembled troops on that day beside the river Rhône may come from the imagination of Polybius but are worth considering. The biggest psychological challenge, the physical strain and dangers, lay ahead. The risks they were going to take, the journey they would embark on, had to be worth it. Hannibal urged his troops to ‘take heart’ from their crossing and ‘from the news of their allies … and have confidence in himself … and show courage worthy of their own record’ (Polyb. 3.44.1–13).

The elephant crossing was still to come, and when that very afternoon the Numidian cavalry returned, ‘in headlong flight’ it became even more urgent not to delay (Polyb. 3.45.1). The Numidians had not gone far when Publius Scipio’s detachment of Roman cavalry arrived and the two sides engaged, with ‘courage and fury’. The Romans lost 140 in the engagement but pursued the Numidians, who had lost more than 200, right up to the camp and took a
good look around. They then turned and galloped back to the coast to inform the Roman command (Polyb. 3.45.1–3). At this moment Hannibal made a strategic decision that reflects his determination to fight the war in Italy. He could have stopped and engaged the Roman army at the Rhône but he decided to continue his march. Although Livy claims that Hannibal weighed up his options before deciding to march on, Polybius does not even entertain the question (Livy 21.29.6–7).

The next morning at dawn Hannibal dispatched all of his cavalry towards the sea to act as cover. He knew that the Roman army would be marching north as soon as their horsemen reached the commander. Hannibal moved the ‘infantry out of camp and set them on the march [north] while he himself waited for the elephants and the men who had been left to cross the river’ (Polyb. 3.45.5–6). Again this emphasizes the value that Hannibal placed on the elephants, especially if we factor in the elaborate scheme devised to get them across the river and the effort involved. Elephants can swim but according to our sources Hannibal did not consider the option. Even though in the late summer/early autumn the river would have been at its lowest, perhaps the elephant riders judged the current was still too strong.
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