Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (43 page)

Hannibal and all that remained of his defeated army galloped back to Hadrumentum (Polyb. 15.15.3). Victory at Zama for Hannibal had never been very likely for he had fought with a vastly inferior army.
⁸⁰
Scipio’s superior force was trained in combat and had the power of momentum that successive victories bring. Hannibal was short of cavalry and allies, and although he had elephants and more infantry, he did not have a cohesive and unified force under his command. Indeed, his men were as destructive to each other as to the enemy. Scipio was a formidable military strategist and although Hannibal ‘had shown incomparable skill’
he would have needed more than just ability to pull off a victory at Zama.
⁸¹
For Scipio, success at Zama brought greater acclaim than any other deed in his career, for he was the first and only Roman to have defeated Hannibal in a large ‘set piece’ battle.
⁸²

CHAPTER 12

HANNIBAL INTO EXILE

A fine sight it must have been,

Fit subject for caricature, the one-eyed commander

Perched on his monstrous beast! Alas, alas for glory,

What an end was here: the defeat, the ignominious

Flight into exile, everyone crowding to see

The once-mighty Hannibal turned humble hanger-on,

Sitting outside the door of a petty Eastern despot

(
Juvenal,
Satire
10, 158–164
)

A
FTER ZAMA, SCIPIO REMAINED
the ‘unconquered’ and Hannibal, for the first time, was defeated.
¹
Few of the ancient accounts of Zama find fault with Hannibal’s command at the final clash and most praise both his bravery and ability. ‘For there are times when Fortune counteracts the plans of valiant men, and again at times, as the proverb says, “A brave man meets another braver yet”,’ was Polybius’ verdict (15.16.6). ‘Scipio,’ according to Livy, ‘and all military experts, had to admit that Hannibal had deserved credit for his remarkably skilful deployment of the battle line that day’ (30.35.5–6). So although no longer invincible, even in defeat Hannibal retained his status as a legendary military tactician and heroic leader.

Hannibal escaped the scene of the battle on horseback pursued by Masinissa as he galloped towards Hadrumentum with a few of his men.
²
Certainly wary of the fate that awaited a failed general at Carthage, Hannibal may have taken the opportunity to consolidate whatever support he had left.
From Hadrumentum he was summoned to Carthage and finally, for the first time in thirty-six years, at the age of forty-five, he set foot in the city where he was born.
³
He must have been as much of a curiosity to the people of Carthage as he had been to the Capuans fourteen years previously. In front of the Senate at Carthage Hannibal conceded defeat and advised the Carthaginians that their only hope now was to sue for peace. There were still some at Carthage who wanted to resist, but Hannibal forcefully opposed those he realized ‘did not want peace but were incapable of war’ (Livy 30.35–37).
⁴

Scipio became the first Roman commander ‘to be honoured with the name of the nation he defeated’ and was known as Africanus after Zama (Livy 30.45.6). He dictated the peace terms, and the treaty to end the Second Punic War was ratified by 201
BCE
. The conditions were, not surprisingly, punitive given the intensity and length of the war. In addition to the restoration of hostages and deserters, Carthage had to pay financial reparations to Rome in the form of 10,000 talents in instalments over fifty years.
⁵
On top of that Scipio chose one hundred hostages, young men between the ages of fourteen and thirty, to be taken to Rome as guarantors of the treaty. All of the war elephants at Carthage were surrendered and the entire Carthaginian fleet was burned in the bay off the city while the population looked on.
⁶
Their territory was restricted but left largely intact, although the Carthaginians were forbidden to wage war outside Africa, and within Africa they had to seek authorization from Rome to take military action against their neighbours (Polyb. 15.18.1–2; Livy 30.37.2).
⁷
It was a humiliating peace whose real beneficiary was Masinissa. He retained his ancestral kingdom and added that of his rival Syphax to his domains (Livy 30.44.12).
⁸
Masinissa had become the most powerful man in North Africa and a firm ally of the Romans.

Hannibal’s whereabouts in the direct aftermath of the peace debate in the Carthaginian Senate remain unclear and for a period of almost five years he is virtually invisible. He was no longer a focus for the Roman sources that tell his story. Their attention moved on to other foes. His biographer Cornelius Nepos claims that Hannibal remained at the head of the Carthaginian army but Nepos’ account of Hannibal’s life includes some significant errors of fact, which make his version of events rather suspect (
Hann.
7. 1–4).
⁹
Another story claims that Hannibal employed his troops in public works projects, planting olive trees in vast numbers in the period after Zama.
¹⁰
A surviving fragment of the later Roman historian Cassius Dio perhaps offers another glimpse into the aftermath of Hannibal’s defeat. According to Dio, ‘Hannibal was accused by his own people of having refused to capture Rome when he was able to do so and of having appropriated the plunder from Italy’ (Cassius
Dio 17, frag. 86; Zonaras 14–15). Like the other Carthaginian generals before him, Hannibal may have stood trial at Carthage, prosecuted for his management of the war in Italy. The accusation that Hannibal could have captured Rome but chose not to remains a part of the long-standing debate on Hannibal’s strategy. The idea that after Trasimeno or Cannae Hannibal could or should have attacked Rome was part of the popular narrative of the Second Punic War and the ancient historical debate.
¹¹
The charges laid against Hannibal also included the appropriation of plunder, which suggests an on-going dispute between Hannibal and Carthage over financial support for the war. Hannibal, as far as we know, had received virtually no support in terms of supply and reinforcement from Carthage for the whole time he fought in Italy.
¹²
He would have retained any plunder for his own resources out of necessity, to supply and pay his troops. Dio goes on to note that Hannibal was not ‘convicted’ of these charges and mounted a successful defence of his actions. The great general still had many supporters at Carthage.
¹³

It is worth considering whether Hannibal could have avoided the piecemeal war in southern Italy that played out after Cannae. Perhaps if he had managed to hold one of the three main cities he controlled, especially either port of Syracuse or Tarentum, there would have been a base from which to resupply and attack the Romans. The continued Roman dominance of the seas remained an intractable problem. Later, in exile looking back on his invasion, Hannibal remained convinced that his strategy had been the correct one. He encouraged the Seleucid king Antiochus III to invade Italy precisely because ‘it would provide both supplies and troops to an external enemy, but that if nothing was attempted there and the Roman people were allowed to wage war outside of Italy with Italy’s strength and forces, neither the king nor any nation was Rome’s equal’ (Livy 34.60.3).
¹⁴
If we are to believe Livy, even in defeat Hannibal still held that his strategy, although not successful, had been the only one worth attempting.

The fact that Hannibal was able to remain for so long in southern Italy is, in itself, an impressive statement of the talent of the man. The Roman forces in Italy vastly outnumbered the Carthaginian army. The unending replenishment of the manpower of the Roman legions illustrates what a formidable presence Hannibal was in Italy. Livy’s narrative focuses on the heroic nature of the Roman fightback after Cannae but this detracts from the equally heroic Carthaginian war effort and the skill of Hannibal himself. His adaptability, force of personality and creativity in constantly threatening situations were extraordinary. That it took the Romans four years to dislodge Hannibal from Campania alone, when he was largely without reinforcements from
Carthage or Iberia, speaks highly of his strategic abilities even though he ultimately failed.
¹⁵

At Carthage following the peace with Rome the atmosphere was fractious and divided, and many people blamed Hannibal for the woes of the city whilst Hannibal was embittered by his treatment there. He seems to have retired from the city and kept a low profile at this time. It is not until six years after Zama in
c.
196
BCE
that Hannibal reappears in the public sphere. Cassius Dio tells us that when his trial finished Hannibal was ‘entrusted with the highest office in Carthage’ and became one of the two
sufetes
in that year (Cassius Dio 17, frag. 86). This was Hannibal’s first and only attempt at civilian administration at Carthage. It would have been an excellent use of his many skills, given that during the years in Italy he had kept his army together throughout the war. The appointment of Hannibal as
sufet
was a step too far, however, for the families that had opposed him and now had ascendancy in the Carthaginian Senate. Rivalry among the elite families of Carthage was as intense and ruthless as that in Rome. The resurrection of Hannibal as a political leader in Carthage created turmoil among the enemies of the Barcids. There were those at Carthage so hostile to any revival of Barcid power that they were willing to plot with the Romans to bring down their most famous citizen.
¹⁶

Hannibal may well have applied the same rigour to government as he did to military matters (Cornelius Nepos,
Hann.
7.5). He introduced reforms to the Carthaginian constitution that would weaken the power of the ruling elites.
¹⁷
He set about reorganizing the state finances to help pay the war indemnity to Rome. It has often been commented, with some surprise, that Carthage seems to have been unusually prosperous in the period just after the end of the war.
¹⁸
There are visible changes in town planning that indicate growth in the urban centre and new, elaborately constructed ports that date to this period. Thus despite its losses and the financial reparations paid to Rome, Carthage was a viable and thriving market in the decades after the war. Hannibal cannot take all the credit for this prosperity but it is possible that much-needed reforms introduced during his
sufetate
had a positive impact on the Carthaginian economy in the post-war years.

Equally important to Carthage’s growing prosperity was the newly acquired prestige and developing identity of the Numidian kingdom of Masinissa. As Masinissa’s enlarged realm developed, an increased demand for luxury goods and commodities traded through the Mediterranean aided the Carthaginian financial recovery.
¹⁹
Carthage was ideally placed to capitalize on growing Mediterranean commerce. The rapid growth in trade across the region in the
second century saw the city prosper greatly. So although the Numidian kingdom of Masinissa would play an important part in bringing about the destruction of Carthage, in the short term its burgeoning wealth only added to Carthaginian prosperity. The Romans would have looked on with some alarm at the resilience of their recently defeated foes who appeared to be thriving. An offer from Carthage to pay off the entire indemnity in
c.
191
BCE
(forty years early) would have irked them even more (Livy 36.4.8).
²⁰

While acting as
sufet
, Hannibal accused some leading members of the Carthaginian Senate of embezzlement of public funds (Livy 33.46.3).
²¹
He must have been a divisive figure for the politicians in Carthage. Many would have resented his presence whilst others were intimately connected to the power system that sustained Hannibal. Livy comments that ‘whatever popularity he won among the common people by this move was matched by the resentment he provoked in the majority of the leading citizens’ (33.46.7). This suggests that Hannibal circumvented the hostility of some of his magisterial colleagues by appealing to the popular assembly. Once his year in office was finished, long-time enemies still active in the Carthaginian government conspired to get rid of Hannibal once and for all.

Concurrently, Rome was preparing for war in the eastern Mediterranean against the Seleucid king Antiochus III. Letters were sent to the Roman Senate claiming that Hannibal was conspiring against them and that he was in secret contact with the Seleucid monarch. On receipt of these accusations Scipio Africanus spoke on behalf of his old enemy in the Roman Senate but it was to no avail (Livy 33.47.4). The Senate at Rome sent an envoy to Carthage to ask that Hannibal be indicted on the charge of ‘plotting war’ with Antiochus. Hannibal was declared an enemy of the state at Carthage and was charged with breaking the treaty with Rome. He was outlawed in Carthage and his house destroyed by rival factions (Livy 33. 47–49; Cornelius Nepos,
Hann.
7; Justin 31.1–2).

Hannibal had been undermined from within his own city and he had allowed his enemies to gain the upper hand. At that moment he faced a choice: stay and deal with prosecution in Rome or flee for his life. He chose to flee and left Carthaginian territory in 195
BCE
. He travelled first (perhaps) to his home region near the city of Hadrumentum and then on to the sandy island of Kerkina, off the coast near the modern city of Sfax. On Kerkina, where merchants gathered to trade in the markets, he boarded a Phoenician trading vessel that carried him on to Tyre (Livy 33.48.3).

It is worth considering that Hannibal had been agitating against the Romans and as
sufet
would have had contact with many representatives from
across the Mediterranean. In this role he may well have listened to and encouraged those from the Hellenistic east who were hoping to put a halt to the expansion of Roman power.
²²
Nonetheless, there is the belief that the charges against Hannibal were politically motivated and trumped up. Whatever Hannibal’s real intentions, it might have been naïve to assume that by entering politics he would be allowed to escape the psychological impact of his years as Rome’s great enemy. His fellow Carthaginians and Roman enemies would not allow his family to rise once again to a position of influence at Carthage. Hannibal’s political ideas had always been based on keeping Carthage beyond the reach of Roman hegemony and retaining its existence as an autonomous state.
²³
These beliefs would have brought him into direct conflict with Rome’s increasing appetite for conquest.