Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (63 page)

19.
We have little information on Carthaginian efforts to supply the Barcid brothers in Italy. Mago had sent over half his ships to Africa to protect it from Scipio’s invasion (Livy 28.46.10), and Carthage sent back to Mago 6,000 infantry, 800 cavalry and seven elephants in transports escorted by 27 warships. As Lazenby (1998, 196) points out, it is amazing that these reached Mago, given the overall poor success rate of the Carthaginian navy in the war; see also Rawlings, 2010. There is some confusion with a report in Livy (28.46.14) of 80 merchant ships captured off Sardinia in 205 – these may have been heading to Mago, although Livy’s sources say they were meant for Hannibal.

20.
See Hoyos, 2006, 693 n. 4.

21.
Her name is Saphonbal, in Punic SPNB’L, which means ‘Saphon is protected by Ba’al’, Halff, 1963–64. For the god Ba’al Saphon attested to at Tyre, see Bordreuil, 1986, 84–86.

22.
Appian (
Lib.
10) claims that she had previously been engaged to Masinissa.

23.
The inheritance pattern in Numidian kingdoms, horizontally through the male line, meant the kingdom fell to the oldest living brother, not son. Livy calls Masinissa’s father Gala (24.48.13) but his name is recorded in inscriptions as Gaia: see Hoyos, 2006, n. 29.29, p. 696, and for the family connections see Hoyos, 2005, 153–154. The complicated scenario is clearly set out by Lazenby, 1998, 198 and Livy describes Masinissa’s adventures before he met up with Scipio’s invasion in 29.29–29.33. For Masinissa’s visit to Laelius in 205 and encouragement to Scipio to invade see 29.4–29.5.

24.
Masinissa and Syphax had encountered each other in battle before. In 213/212 Masinissa and a Carthaginian army battled (possibly led by Hasdrubal, Hannibal’s brother, who had returned from Iberia) against Syphax (in a great battle, says Livy) which caused Syphax to flee westwards to the Mauri people. Masinissa pursued Syphax and ‘without any assistance from the Carthaginians, he covered himself with fame’ (Livy 24.49.4–6).

25.
Hoyos, 2006, 697 n. 29.31.

26.
See Fronda, 2010, 269–279 for a detailed assessment of the situation in Bruttium down to 203; see also Lazenby, 1998, 195–203, Goldsworthy, 2003, 289–290, Seibert, 1993a, 413–423 Lancel, 1999, 151–157 on the events surrounding Locri and the encounter between Scipio and Hannibal.

27.
As noted by Lazenby, 1998, 199, who suggests we might view this as a success for Hannibal. The victory was Scipio’s even if Hannibal had not intended to try to retake the town.

28.
Livy reports legions stationed in Bruttium through the second century, and see Lazenby, 1998, 199–202 for the impact of Pleminius on Scipio’s reputation; Livy details the aftermath and the political ramifications of the scandal in 29.8–9, 29.16, 17, 19.

29.
Livy 29.38.1 and 30.19.10 lists the cities lost along with ‘other unimportant cities’.

30.
Eckstein, 1987, 240–241 argues that up until the last minute Scipio had been trying to persuade Syphax back into alliance, which would have spelled the end of Masinissa’s hopes. However, Syphax remained loyal to Carthage and Masinissa’s power benefited. Scipio, according to Livy (29.27), had meant to land at Kelibia on Cap Bon, where both Agathocles and Regulus had landed their invading armies, but the wind had sent the fleet west to Cap Farina. Livy’s sources claim Masinissa either had 200 horsemen with him or 2,000 (29.29, 29.33.8) and Polybius 21.21 claims 60 horse.

31.
Clearly demonstrates the repetitive nature of Carthaginian names. The Romans had some similar issues when the consuls for 204 were the seemingly unrelated Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Servilius (Livy 30.1.1); see also Lancel, 1999, 165.

32.
These enormous numbers are generally considered to be fantastical, but there is little else to go on.

33.
Hoyos, 2006, 698 n. 29.35, Lancel, 1999, 158–169 for the invasion up to Hannibal’s recall; Lazenby, 1998, 202–213; Goldsworthy, 2003, 286–298; Eckstein, 1987, 233–246 on Scipio’s actions up until Zama; Seibert, 1993a, 429–442.

34.
The numbers vary. Lazenby’s (1998, 203) estimate and the breakdown of foot to cavalry are well reasoned and listed here but there are also numbers available in Goldsworthy, 2003, 287–88 for Scipio’s troops and 292–293 for the Carthaginian and Syphax’ numbers.

35.
As noted in Goldsworthy, 2000, 292–293 and Hoyos, 2006, 698 n. 29.35. For location of Scipio’s winter camp as the modern village of Galaat el-Andless see Lancel, 1999, 165.

36.
Livy 30.1.1 names the consuls as Gn. Servilius and G. Servilius – not related. The Etruscans had been agitating for some years (back to 208 and Hasdrubal Barca’s invasion of Italy).

37.
For Scipio’s ruse and the destruction of the camps see Goldsworthy, 2000, 293–294; Lazenby, 1998, 207–208; Siebert, 1993a, 437–442.

38.
Cirta was the inland capital and stronghold of the Numidians; it had changed hands over the course of the Punic Wars and was now held by Syphax. See also Lancel, 1999, 168–169; Kitouni-Daho, 2003, 95–96.

39.
A story in Appian (note 10 above) claims that Masinissa had been betrothed to Sophonisba as a young man in Carthage, but this is nowhere else repeated. It is much more likely that as Syphax’ wife she went with the kingdom into the power of Masinissa and it would have been his choice to marry her.

40.
Storm, 2001 35–45 on Masinissa’s kingdom; Poirel, 2003, 154–159.

41.
Ancient sources include Diodorus Siculus 27.7; Appian,
Lib.
27–28; Cassius Dio (Zonaras 9.11). Polybius’ only mention is of the daughter of Hasdrubal and wife of Syphax (14.7.6). She appears in Boccaccio
De mulieribus claris
, 1374; Petrarch,
Africa, c.
1396; Voltaire,
Sophonisbe
, premiered in 1774, originally by Jean Mairet but revised by Voltaire. Poirel, 2003, 154–159 provides an excellent assessment with reproductions. European fascination with the tragedy of Sophonisba has inspired plays and poems in English, French, German, Spanish and Italian from the fourteenth century through to the present day.

42.
For the run-up to Zama see Hoyos, 2005, 164–176, Lazenby, 1998, 213–221.

43.
Polybius 15.1.6–8. An inner council of the Carthaginian Senate, Lancel, 1995, 116; Hoyos, 2010, 30–31. Eckstein, 1987, 246–255 on Scipio’s motives and the ‘ad hoc’ diplomacy.

44.
Polybius’ narrative picks up again just after these negotiations took place.

45.
Polybius omits this detail of blaming Hannibal but Livy includes it. Livy comments that the kowtowing ‘derives from their country of origin’ and Polybius calls it the custom of ‘other men’, reflecting the Phoenician origins of the Carthaginians and their cultural alterity.

46.
Livy’s sources conflict on the amounts asked for, either 5,000 talents or 5,000 pounds of silver, or double Scipio’s men’s pay (30.16). Hoyos (2006, 704 n.16) comments that 5,000 pounds of silver, worth only about 60 talents, seems unlikely and that Polybius 15.8 mentions 5,000 talents. Appian (
Lib.
32) includes passages that granted Masinissa his own kingdom and Syphax’ realm as well as a limit to Carthaginian territory – but this may be conflated with the settlement after Zama.

47.
As Lazenby notes, 1998, 214.

48.
Appian,
Lib.
49 puts Mago still in northern Italy after Hannibal was defeated at Zama in 202; Cornelius Nepos seems to believe that he lived through to the 190s in
Hann.
7.3–4.

49.
Cassius Dio claims that no Carthaginian envoys would even be received by the Roman Senate until the Barcid brothers left Italy, and that terms were then discussed after the armies had departed.

50.
Lazenby, 1998, 215 recounts the key events of the last two years as far as we can tell; Livy 29.36.4–9, 29.38.1.

51.
Livy 30.20, Appian,
Hann.
58–59. It seems unlikely that the Romans were content to sit back and watch as Hannibal and his army built a transport fleet when they were under
orders to keep him in Italy; the suggestion that much of the transport actually arrived from Carthage in Hoyos, 2005, 170–171 makes sense.

52.
Hoyos, 2005, 166–170.

53.
Appian asserts that Hannibal killed 4,000 horses and also pack animals and that he committed atrocities before he left, slaughtering some of his soldiers who were unwilling to cross over with him. This certainly would not be in keeping with his acknowledged care and duty to his soldiers and is generally dismissed as slander, but given that the situation was desperate, it may well have happened (Appian,
Hann.
57–59, Diodorus Sic. 27.9). Livy 30.20.5–6 also mentioned his killing soldiers who would not accompany him.

54.
Lancel, 1999, 171 provides the higher estimate whilst Lazenby, 1998, 215 estimates 12,000 by back-calculating from Hannibal’s army at Zama.

55.
Note especially that Livy (42.3) makes it clear that the temple of Juno at Crotona had not been ‘violated’ by Hannibal. His words are: the ‘most venerable temple in the region, which neither Pyrrhus nor Hannibal had violated’, which seems to contradict this statement. The looting of the region by Fulvius Flaccus in
c.
173 is discussed by Miles, 2008, 76–82.

56.
Despite Livy’s hyperbole it does reveal underlying hostility between those in power at that time in Carthage and the Barcids. See Lancel, 1999, 171–172 and also Hoyos, 2005, 172, who calls him autonomous.

57.
According to Cassius Dio he did face prosecution after the battle of Zama, on charges of which he was cleared: see chapter 12, pp. 220–221.

58.
This may play into a Roman narrative more than the real situation and Livy may also be projecting the experiences of the Roman Senate’s opposition to Scipio’s success on to Hannibal.

59.
Livy 28.37.9 and Polybius 15.11.1 mention Balearic and Ligurian soldiers. Mago had both with him and his army must have continued back to Carthage after Mago’s death. Timing follows Hoyos, 2005, 170–171.

60.
Hoyos points out that the following events could also have occurred in the autumn of 203, (2006, 707 n. 24). The chronology of events here is not entirely clear – Livy contradicts himself on when Hannibal arrived, and we only have the aftermath of these events preserved in Polybius, so it is difficult to construct a precise, step by step, outline. I follow the chronology set out by Lazenby, 1998, 215–216 here.

61.
Equates to modern Korbous, across from Carthage where there are warm water springs (Aquae Calidae), and the island of Zembra (Aegimurus). It would be difficult to see the ships at Zembra as it lies to the north, but Korbous is clearly visible from Carthage across the bay of Tunis even with today’s less clear air (Hoyos, 2006, 707 n. 24). Ships may have been heading for Scipio’s camp, the Castra Cornelia near Utica, and to Tunes south of Carthage, which is why some ended up at Zembra and others at Korbous.

62.
Lazenby, 1998, 216–217; Hoyos, 2005, 170–174; Goldsworthy, 2003 298–300.

63.
A spontaneous attack or a pre-planned expedition? Livy 30.25.5–12 and Polybius 15.2.1–15 differ in their versions. For quadriremes and quinqueremes see Livy. Hannibal had returned to Italy before the envoys returned from Rome.

64.
Appian,
Lib.
34 claims some ambassadors were killed.

65.
At Hadrumentum, but according to Livy (30.25.12) Hannibal had just landed at Leptiminus but had camped near Hadrumentum and then gone directly on to Zama, not a likely scenario and carefully explained in Hoyos, 2006, 709 n. 29.

66.
Syphax’ son Vermina was expected but showed up late for the battle and approached Carthage some time later (on the first day of the Saturnalia –17 Dec.), according to Livy, which would make it some months later if the battle was in October: see below, note 75. If the Roman calendar was indeed off by a month then about a month exists between the dates. Vermina and his army were routed but the prince escaped; the battle may have happened but details are sketchy, see Hoyos, 2005, 175 (Livy 30.36). Eckstein, 1987, considers Hannibal to have acquired a force equal to that of Masinissa’s cavalry by the time of the battle.

67.
Many different versions of the location exist:
apud Zamam
(Cornelius Nepos,
Hann
. 6.3) was where Hannibal’s camp was, but the battle took place some distance from there. There
are a few towns in modern Tunisia that claim to be the location of this famous site, see
Map 1
for the rough location. A survey of opinions on the location in Hoyos, 2005, 172–178; Lancel, 1999, 172–176; Seibert, 1993a, 446–447 and map 7 and 1993b, 311–318 for a summary of the bibliography and analysis of the location; Lazenby, 1998, map 20.

68.
Laelius had returned to Scipio from Rome with news of some of his senatorial colleagues’ ambitions to unseat him from his command of the forces in Africa, which cannot have improved Scipio’s mood. His insistence on provoking a final battle may also have stemmed from criticism from Rome. Interesting to see the Romans upset with the Carthaginians for subterfuge and delay (although Scipio had used just those tactics to destroy the camps with fire in 203), and for refusing to give up when defeated, another noted Roman trait.

69.
See
Map 2
. Again on the location of the battle, Polybius is clear that it occurred closer to a place called Margaron, as he calls it; Livy (30.29.9) refers to Naraggara. This may be near Sidi Youssef, or somewhere on the Sidi Youssef–El Kef road: see the various possibilities in Walbank, vol. 2, 447–448, Lazenby, 1998, 218. The map in Scullard, 1970, 144 gives a clear picture of the camps and the battle.