Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (60 page)

1.
Polybius 7.14b, 8.3a.3–7, 37, 9.10; Livy 24.21–39, 25.23–31.11, 26.21.1–13; see also Plutarch,
Marc.
13–21. Lazenby, 1998, 119. Agrigentum falls in 210.

2.
Welch, 2006, 112 and McDonnell, 2006, 71–72.

3.
McDonnell, 2006, 78, see also Gruen, 1992, 94–108, who remarks on this ‘literary trope’ that appears again and again when Romans come into contact with the wealthy cities of the Hellenistic world. Wallace-Hadrill, 2008, 346 points out that Pliny believed that he was looking at ‘successive waves in a continuous process’ of growing wealth and luxury. For an excellent discussion see Wallace-Hadrill, 2008, 316–355, on ‘Luxury and the consumer revolution’ at Rome and the specific discussion on Hellenistic precedents for the impact of luxury on the fall of states, 338–345.

4.
Jaeger, 2008, 77–100 on ‘who killed Archimedes?’ Plutarch provides three different versions in
Marcellus
19.4–6, see Lazenby, 1998, 119.

5.
Compare Fabius’ sack of Tarentum below – it is an interesting motivation explored by McDonnell, 2006, 77–81; see also Eckstein, 1987, 169–171. Livy 26.21.1–5 on the deliberations in the Senate meeting at the temple of Bellona on Marcellus’ return.

6.
Fronda, 2010, 246–247 points out the many instances of the Romans taking advantage of Hannibal’s absence to reconquer cities that had defected. Hannibal would have needed a
grand unifying alliance of all his strategic partners for his policy to work but he does not seem to have been able to create that.

7.
Livy’s account does not drift far from Polybius’.

8.
For the source Polybius used for the Tarentum material thought by Walbank to be firmly pro-Hannibal see Walbank, vol. 2, 100–101. For the case of Tarentum and the region of south-east Magna Graecia during the war see Fronda, 2010, 188–233 and especially on the ‘tenuous loyalty of Taras’, 189–211 for the background.

9.
Venusia sat on the border between Samnium and Apulia, and was made a Latin colony in 291
BCE
; Brundisium, originally Messapic, was a Latin colony from 246
BCE
and was the most important port for embarkation to the East.

10.
Fronda, 2010, 190 note 9, and 208–211 on the specific conditions that kept Taras loyal from 216 to 214.

11.
See Fronda, 2010, 191; the Carthaginians in Iberia also kept hostages (or guests) of their allies at New Carthage to ensure their loyalty.

12.
Also consider that Livy tells of Hannibal’s appeal to the ‘young men’ not as a compliment; they would be considered rash, impetuous, unstable, and the wisdom rested with the elder men in Livian narrative.

13.
The Tarentum link with the treaty with Philip V is discussed in Fronda, 2010, 211–212.

14.
Casilinum typified Hannibal’s problems in Campania. Taken in 215, a strategic location at the crossing of the river Volturnus on the Via Appia, the city was recaptured the following year by the Romans – who threw their resources at it.

15.
The old city of Salapia had been abandoned by Pliny’s time, destroyed in the social war in the first century
BCE
(Appian,
BC
1.51). The population moved 6km from its original location and became a Roman
municipium
and colony.

16.
Appian seems to be conflating the story of Salapia in Apulia and the luxury of Capua in Campania here – as it is recounted in a passage where the details of elite infighting in Salapia occur.

17.
Lancel, 1999, 129.

18.
Fronda, 2010, 213; see Lancel, 1999, 127–130 and Lazenby, 1998, 110 for issues about the dating; see also Appian,
Hann.
32–33 for the story of the fall of the city.

19.
See Fronda, 2010, 210, 214–217.

20.
Hannibal’s unwillingness to impose any burden on his allied cities was in the long run to his detriment, as noted in Fronda, 2010, 211–217.

21.
Polybius (8.28.6) connects the tradition of intra-mural burial at Tarentum to its mother city Sparta, and to an ancient oracle. For Spartan intra-mural burial see Plutarch,
Lycurgus
27.1. On the origins of the Spartan tradition see Malkin, 1994, 131–132 and Sourvinou-Inwood, 1995, 437.

22.
See the discussion in Fronda, 2010, 221–228 for a detailed consideration of each case.

23.
Appius Claudius Pulcher and Quintus Fulvius Flaccus were the consuls for 212.

24.
If the total numbers of men lost by Hannibal in Livy were counted, his numbers would have diminished to nothing by this point. As noted, Livy’s numbers are either greatly exaggerated or Hannibal had a steady flow of recruits and numerous allied forces into his army, which maintained his army in sustainable numbers.

25.
People seem to be moving in and out of the city freely enough at this point.

26.
Once again Livy provides different versions of the death and burial that reflect the different disposition of his sources; the event is also put at different locations in Lucania (25.16.23–17.3). See Lazenby, 1998, 113, who suggests the differing traditions may obscure a larger defeat for the Romans.

27.
Fronda, 2010, 250–251.

28.
As noted by Lazenby, 1998, 113–114.

29.
Questions about the historicity of the first battle at Herdonea have been raised by some scholars and because of the similarity of the description of the second battle of Herdonea in 210, and the similarities between the names of the Romans involved, there may be some confusion (Livy 27.1.3–15). See Lazenby, 1998, 114; Lancel, 1999, 130; and Fronda, 2010, 258 n. 93, who provides an outline of the arguments for and against. Here
it is taken as historical, given the strategic location of Herdonea on the route between Beneventum and Brundisium: there could have been two battles here. Both of which Hannibal won.

30.
Lazenby, 1998, 119; Goldsworthy, 2003, 265; Seibert, 1993a, 296–299.

31.
Lazenby, 1998, 121–123, Goldsworthy, 2003, 234–235, Fronda, 2010, Lancel, 1999, 130–132.

32.
The details of this event differ quite significantly between Livy and Polybius, and there is a completely different scenario in Appian,
Hann.
38–42. See Seibert, 1993a, 304–311; Lazenby, 1998, 119–124. Salmon, 1957 details the differences in the versions presented.

33.
Sources (above, note 32) disagree on the routes taken by Hannibal and Flaccus to Rome from Campania and the time it took to march there.

34.
Livy mentions that Flaccus was granted consular imperium so as not to invalidate his own proconsular power by entering the city (26.9.10). The presence of Flaccus is questioned by Lazenby, 1998, 123.

35.
Miles, 2010, 294–296.

36.
Using deserters for espionage has been noted above, and the number of times this ruse was used by Livy suggests either a high desertion rate or a motif in Livy on the ease with which the Numidians were perceived to be turned. For the use of deserters see Austin and Rankov, 1995, 69–91.

37.
For the events in Iberia see Lazenby, 1998. The best summary of the war in Iberia in English may still be Briscoe, 1989; the yearly analysis laid out by Seibert, 1993a, provides a clear picture of the available information and source material, and of the confusion around the events recorded in Livy.

38.
If we believe that Hannibal’s intention when he invaded Italy was to defeat Roman hegemony, not to conquer and rule, whereas the Spanish territories had been the lifeblood of the Carthaginian economy in these decades since 237. The way he treated the Italian allies certainly bears this out.

39.
Part of Hannibal’s grand strategy, perhaps, which, had it been successful, given the events of 216 and victory at Cannae, might have been enough to force a peace on Rome.

40.
Livy says the revolt was among the Tartesii, long-time Carthaginian allies, but this has been rejected (originally by Scullard, 1930, 47), given Livy’s questionable knowledge of Spanish geography, and it is thought more likely that the Turdetani had rebelled (as noted in Lazenby, 1998, 128; Lancel, 1999, 134). Seibert, 1993b, 220–223 n. 201 goes with the Tartessi, seeing Ascua as the main city (equated with Osqua).

41.
Livy 23.13.7–8 also contains these exact same figures – and there seems to be a conflation of two sources; see notes in Hoyos, 2006, 650 n. 13 and 652 n. 32.

42.
When envoys from leading tribes in Sardinia arrived in Carthage, giving the Carthaginians hope of the recovery of the island (Livy 23.32.11–12), another army was raised with the prospect of wresting Sardinia from Roman control, and this was a further diversion of resources from Hannibal. While the Sardinian theatre soon fizzled out with the loss of a Carthaginian fleet there, the result left Hannibal to fend for himself in Italy.

43.
See Brett and Fentress, 1996, 25–27, on Syphax. The gifts were symbols of the power of a Roman magistrate. It is entirely possible that the Roman contact with Numidian kings began during the Mercenary War when Rome seems to have been supplying the enemies of Carthage (see above, chapter 3). Storm, 2001, 30–32 on the early encounters between Syphax and the Romans.

44.
Lancel, 1999, 134; Lazenby, 1998, 129; Goldsworthy, 2003, 246–253.

45.
See Briscoe, 1989, 57. Appian,
Ib.
16 implies that Hasdrubal has been withdrawn to North Africa and it is only after Carthage has ‘made peace with Syphax’ that he returns. This is disputed. Appian,
Ib.
3.15–17 for the elder Scipio brothers in Iberia.

46.
Lazenby, 1998, 129 details the claims made by Livy over the period discussed here; see also Lancel, 1999, 134; and Seibert, 1993a, 266–267, 299 and 318–322 who chronicles the events by year.

47.
Livy places the Roman success at Saguntum in 214, but since it fell in 219 to Hannibal, the date is thought to be 212: ‘the fall of the important town of Castulo to the Romans in 214’,
and then Saguntum, ‘seven years in enemy hands’, was taken back by the Scipio brothers (Livy 24.42.9). This reflects the confusion in Livy’s Spanish narrative and the sources he used. See Hoyos, 2006, 658 n. 42; Lazenby, 1998, 129; Lancel, 1999, 134; Seibert, 1993a, 266–267.

48.
By this time Carthage had made peace with Syphax in Africa, Appian,
Ib.
15.

49.
As suggested by Lazenby, 1998, 130–131, the argument that these events described took place in 211 is convincing, and that Livy compressed the events of two seasons into one.

50.
Hoyos, 2006, 663 n. 32 points out that, according to Appian, the Romans may have been based at Castulo at some point in this campaign (
Ib.
16), but this strongly pro-Carthaginian town was certainly considered hostile by Scipio when he mopped up after his victory in 206 so it is unlikely and again seems to reflect confusion with geographical references. Amtorgis is unknown otherwise, and its location is assumed to be in the upper Baetis region but that is not certain. Was Hasdrubal the son of the Gisgo who had been Hamilcar’s lieutenant in Sicily in the First Punic War and was killed by the Mercenaries (see above, chapter 3, p. 55)?

51.
Lazenby, 1998, 130 suggests that the Romans may not have known how outnumbered they were. This seems unlikely, given their tenure in Iberia and the dominance of the Roman navy.

52.
For more on Masinissa see his biography by Storm, 2001; see also Brett and Fentress, 1996, 25–27; Walsh 1965, 150 outlines Masinissa’s early career.

53.
Appian,
Lib.
10 also claims that Masinissa had been betrothed to Sophonisba before he went off to Iberia with Hasdrubal Gisgo, not an impossible scenario as the Carthaginian elite often employed marriage to form alliances – see more on Sophonisba in chapter 11 (pp. 201–207) below and in Storm, 2001, 30–34.

54.
Livy gives the age of Masinissa as 17 but this does not accord with his age at death, as recorded by Polybius (36.16.11). Masinissa is thought to have been born
c.
240, which would make him about 27, and he died in
c.
149/148 aged around 90, having fathered a child at 86. For a note on Masinissa’s age see Hoyos, 2006, 659 n. 49.

55.
Walbank, vol. 2, 114–115 places the narrative fragment from Polybius (8.38) just before Hannibal’s march on Rome.

56.
The destruction of the Roman armies in Iberia and the deaths of the commanders in 211 compelled Rome to focus attention there. The troops that remained after the defeat probably numbered around 8,000 (with 1,000 cavalry) and were led by two surviving lieutenants. For the calculations see Lazenby, 1998, 131.

57.
Following Lazenby, 1998, 133, see also Goldsworthy, 2003, 270. The debate between Fabius Maximus and Scipio in 205
BCE
over the strategy for the final phases of the war – where the options were to stay and defeat Hannibal in Italy vs invasion of Africa – may reflect similar views in the Senate at this earlier period (Livy 28.40.1–45.9).

58.
Scipio had been
curule aedile
in 213 (Livy 25.2.6–8); Walbank, vol. 2, 199–200 points out some of the errors of fact here. On Scipio’s status and imperium, see discussion in Lazenby, 1998, 132–133; Seibert, 1993a, 327; on Scipio’s career see Acimovic, 2007, 6–12 and Eckstein, 1987, 209–228, who provides an excellent summary of Scipio’s time in Iberia. For the careers of the Scipio family see entries in Broughton, 1951.