Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (57 page)

25.
This allowed enough time for the Roman consuls to take up their offices and organize their troops and camps. The various calculations for the exact date rely on the date for the upcoming battle of Trasimeno, which Ovid places on 21 June (
Fasti
, 6. 767–8); see Walbank, vol.1, 413 for a May departure.

26.
Seibert, 1993b, 218–219 and Walbank, vol.1, 413: ‘the most probable pass is that via Bologna–Porretta–Pistoia’; see Hoyos, 2005, 114–115; Lazenby, 1998, 60–61; Seibert, 1993b, 218 points out that the swamp in Polybius is given no geographical reference and is the valley of the Arno in Livy. Goldsworthy, 2003 184 notes that ‘Hannibal moved quickly and in an unexpected direction’.

27.
Seibert, 1993b, 218; Lazenby, 1998, 60–61.

28.
Seibert, 1993a, 148–150, and Cornelius Nepos,
Hann.
4.3: ‘he never afterwards had equally good use of his right eye’, as opposed to Polybius 3.79.12: ‘severe attack of ophthalmia, which finally led to the loss of one eye’.

29.
The tradition of one-eyed generals in modern history includes Lord Nelson, the Russian Kutuzov, and Moshe Dayan. See Africa, 1970, for an article on ‘the one-eyed man against Rome’.

30.
The same Hiero II from the First Punic War, he lived close to 90 years.

31.
Conflicting with Polybius 3.75.5: ‘the consuls designate were busy mustering the allies and enrolling their own legions’ suggests they raised new legions instead of taking on the existing ones. An amalgamation of the two seems possible.

32.
There is some confusion about the location of the legions and the camps of the Romans: Livy (21.63.1) states that Flaminius sent written instructions to have the legions wintering in Placentia meet him at Ariminum, while Polybius (3.77.1–2) claims that he ‘advanced through Etruria and encamped before Arretium while Servilius advanced as far as Ariminum’. Lazenby, 1998, 61 who refers to Appian,
Hann,
8, says that Servilius had Publius Scipio’s old legions, while Flaminius had Sempronius’ (Livy. 21.63.1).

33.
Here following Lazenby, 1998, 65; Hoyos, 2005, 115; and Daly, 2002, 32, who notes ‘it is vital to bear in mind at all times that these figures are far from certain and by no means precise’ in regard to Cannae and that the troop numbers for the Carthaginians are ‘entirely without confirmation’. We cannot be sure of the numbers in any of these battles.

34.
See Derow, 1976, 275, who places these events in May based on the degree to which the Roman calendar was out. There is some debate as to whether these events took place in May or June; here we use Ovid’s date of 21 June for the battle, with the understanding that the calendar could have been out by a month.

35.
As noted by Walbank, vol. 1, 414, Hannibal could not have had Cortona and Trasimeno on the left and right simultaneously but would have first passed Cortona on the left and then had Lake Trasimeno on the right.

36.
Suggested by Lazenby, 1998, 65.

37.
The exact location is still unclear, Lancel, 1999, 93 follows an earlier reconstruction by De Sanctis (1917, vol. 3, 2, 109–115) to the west of Passignano; while Lazenby, 1998, 63 and Walbank, vol.1, 415–418 follow other earlier reconstructions by Kromayer and Veith (1912, 150–193) that put the battle closer to Torricella, which seems the more likely. See Seibert, 1993a, 152–156 for the battle and Hoyos, 2006, 640 for a summary of current thinking on the location.

38.
Again here suggested by Lazenby, 1998, 65.

39.
For the sound of battle in the ancient world see Daly, 2002, 168–170.

40.
This is suggested by Brizzi, 1984, 40–41 and mentioned by Lancel, 1999, 96.

41.
Daly, 2002, 89–90 on the Libyan troops at Cannae; and Rawlings, 1996 on the ‘warriors in a soldiers’ war’.

42.
Livy claims that he attacked Spoletum, a Roman colony (modern Spoleto) and then marched into the territory of the Picenum (22.9.1–3). There is a tendency to discredit this account in Livy.

43.
Why Hannibal did not march on Rome at this point has been discussed in detail. See Lazenby, 1996b, who suggests that the possibility of winning over allies in the south was the main motivation; Lancel, 1999, 96–97 takes Polybius at face value, adding that to lay siege to Rome would tie his army up for months and that the mobility of his forces was a key part of Hannibal’s plans. See also Hoyos, 2005, 118–121.

44.
Hoyos, 2005, 213 suggests this was part of a combined operation with the intent to attack Rome but that Hannibal changed plans after Trasimeno.

45.
Polybius places this event after Trasimeno. See Rankov, 1996, 49 on how the Roman control of the sea kept Hannibal isolated.

46.
Roth, 1999, 62 provides some interesting observations on the amount of fodder needed to keep horses healthy, which emphasizes how much the supply chain would have dominated Hannibal’s strategy.

47.
See discussion in Walbank, vol.1, 414; Seibert, 1993b, 220–221; and more recently in Fronda, 2010, who surveys each city and region in southern Italy in detail. The ethnic make up of the Italian peninsula before the complete conquest of Italy by the Latin Roman people is clearly laid out in Lomas, 2004 and 2011.

48.
Bonfante, 1990, 50:
hanipaluscle
in Etruscan means ‘with the ones of Hannibal’.

49.
See Seibert, 1993a, 158–164 on the Roman response.

50.
Lazenby, 1998, 67–69 makes this point following comments in Livy (22.8.5, 22.31.9) that a dictator could be appointed without the consul coming to Rome, and the suggestion that Fabius Maximus engineered his own election. His opponents therefore ensured that his second in command was a political opponent. For the careers of both men see Broughton, 1951.

51.
The Sibylline Books were sacred scrolls kept in the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus in Rome and used by the Romans as a kind of guidebook to the will of the gods. The decemvirs were the ten men charged with the consultation of the books and were drawn from the senatorial classes. On their role after 367
BCE
as well as on the Sibylline Books and their uses see Orlin, 1997, 76–97.

52.
A
lectisternium
was also to be held – where effigies of the gods were set out on banqueting couches in public and offerings were made to them. A divine feast was created.

53.
For a recent discussion see Malkin, 2011, 119–141; also Bonnet, 1996, 115–120 and 1986, 215–216 where she notes the epigraphic evidence for the connection, Melqart as the husband of Astarte. See also chapter 3, pp. 45 and 245
n
. 8, above. The Eryx was originally sacred to an Elymian goddess who was early on syncretised with the Phoenician/Carthaginian Astarte.

54.
See Miles, 2010, 274–275; see also Erskine, 2001, 198–205 on the Roman acquisition of a Trojan past and the connection to Sicily and Venus Erycina; also Palmer, 1997, 66–67. On the syncretism of the two goddesses Astarte and Aphrodite (and, by extension, Venus) see Bonnet and Pirenne-Delforge, 1999.

55.
Noted by Miles, 2010, 275, who observes that Fabius’ actions seem pragmatic in terms of public perception more than religious belief according to Plutarch,
Fab.
4.1–5.

56.
Erskine, 2001, 201 also points out that the great-grandfather of Fabius Maximus had vowed a temple to Jupiter Victor in 295 on the battlefield when victorious against the Samnites.

57.
See discussion in Erskine, 2001, 200–201 on the way that the establishment of a temple drew the Romans into illustrious victories of the past. For a discussion on the politics and temple foundations in Rome during the Republic see Orlin, 1997 especially 97–113 on the Sibylline Books and the construction of new temples.

58.
For the worship of Mens see Orlin, 1997, 102; in the context of Fabius Maximus see Miles, 2010, 435 n.66

59.
Seibert, 1993a, 131–134; Lazenby, 1998, 125–127; and Goldsworthy, 2003, 246–249 for the period between autumn of 218 and 217 in Iberia.

60.
Lazenby, 1998, 125.

61.
Walbank, vol.1, 409 placed this near Tarraco, with a discussion of some of the other options nearby.

62.
Appian’s comments therefore – ‘Gnaeus [Scipio] did nothing in Spain worthy of mention before his brother Publius [Scipio] returned there’ – seem a little unfair. Appian,
Hisp.
15.

63.
Strategy is discussed in Edwell, 2011, 321–322.

64.
Again following Walbank, vol.1, 410 from Polybius 6.37.11

65.
The one extant fragment of Sosylus (176F1) may or may not refer to this battle at the mouth of the Ebro.

66.
For the Balearic slingers see Daly, 2002, 107–108.

67.
Gn. Scipio’s further adventures described by Livy (22.20.4–10) are thought to be unhistorical by Lazenby, 1998, 127 and render the chronology of events too complicated to make any sense of.

68.
See Polybius 3.95–96 and Livy 22.19–20, which are summarized by Briscoe, 1989, 57; Edwell, 2011, 321–322.

Chapter 7 The Apogee: Cannae and the War in Italy

1.
Livy claims the Capuans came but there were certainly others who joined them in making enquiries.

2.
See also Livy 22.12.3–4. For Hannibal’s strategy on marching south see Fronda, 2011, 256; and specifically, for heading to where he might best accrue allies, see Lazenby, 1998, 68–69. See also Seibert, 1993a, 167–170 for Rome’s strategy under Fabius Maximus.

3.
An observation frequently made – most recently for example in Hill, 2010, 87.

4.
See Lazenby, 1998, 68; Seibert, 1993a, 167–170; Lancel, 1999, 99 on the new strategy and the scorched-earth policy. Goldsworthy, 2003, 192–194 comments on Fabius’ great skill in keeping an army close to Hannibal but not engaging. See also Zimmermann, 2011, 284–286 on Roman strategy and aims in the period of 218–216
BCE
.

5.
On the exact status of the towns noted here in Polybius see Walbank, vol.1, 425–426.

6.
See Livy 22.12–13 on Hannibal’s marching through the countryside with a guide leading him to the wrong location, noted by Hoyos, 2006, 641 n. 13 as possibly made up to expose Hannibal’s cruelty in crucifying the guide.

7.
As Walbank, vol.1, 426 notes Polybius’ exaggeration.

8.
Lazenby, 1998, 69–70 notes that Fabius’ troops would have been in a position to cover the ‘via Appia and via Latina’.

9.
Livy calls this a ‘crafty scheme’. However, Hannibal seems to have been kept very well informed of events and feelings at Rome, which has led to the assumption that he had a complex network of spies in place. See Sheldon, 1986. His lack of knowledge of the countryside left him very dependent on informers, scouts and spies: see p. 265
nn
. 3 and 4.

10.
Livy (22.13.2–3) makes the point that Hannibal’s being encouraged into Campania by Roman allies from Capua who convinced him the area was ripe for rebellion is entirely possible, although some details seem inaccurate (see n. 6 above). There would have been many who flocked to join Hannibal and he would have been constantly negotiating with his guides and local experts about where and how to get to places and which cities might
remain loyal to Rome. Hannibal’s dependence on local guides for his manoeuvres made him vulnerable.

11.
See Walbank, vol.1, 427–428 for Hannibal’s route into Campania. See also Seibert, 1993b, 224; Lazenby, 1998, 70–71; Goldsworthy, 2003, 194–195.

12.
Lancel, 1999, 100.

13.
Walbank, vol.1, 427–430 with a map showing two possible routes; see also Seibert, 1993b, 224–225; Lancel, 1999, 100; Lazenby, 1998, 70–71.

14.
Hasdrubal is mentioned elsewhere in Polybius 3.66.6, 3.114.7, 3.116.6, and Livy 22.46.7.

15.
This would be a remarkable coincidence, as mentioned by Hutchinson, 2000, 241.

16.
See Seibert, 1993a, 170–171, Walbank, vol.1, 429, and also Plutarch,
Fab.
6, 3–7, 2.

17.
Livy contradicts himself later (22.23.9), claiming that Hannibal took the town and burned it, leaving a few buildings for grain stores. On
Geronium/Gerunium
, see Walbank, vol.1, 432; Seibert, 1993b, 225–226. It lay 200 stades (approx. 36km) from Luceria, according to Polybius (3.100.3).

18.
On the timing of Fabius’ visit to Rome (Polyb. 3.94.9; Livy 22.18.8) see also Walbank, vol.1, 430 and 433 and Lazenby, 1998, 71. It makes more sense for Fabius to have visited Rome from northern Campania than to have followed Hannibal back to Apulia and then set off for Rome, which is Polybius’ version. See also Seibert 1993a, 173–175 on Fabius’ trip to Rome. Although
paedagogus
does not have to be considered an insult, that was implied in the use here.

19.
Livy’s account in 22.24.1–14; see also Lazenby, 1998, 71–72; Lancel, 1999, 100; Daly, 2002, 16; Seibert, 1993a, 175–177; Goldsworthy, 2003, 195.

20.
See also Livy 22.24.14 on the overblown report at Rome of Minucius’ victory.

21.
For Livy’s account see 22.25.1–25.11; for the discussion of the identity of Metilius and the constitutional position of Minucius see Lazenby, 1998, 72; Seibert, 1993a, 174–175. They were in fact behaving as the two consuls would have done.