Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (58 page)

22.
The Latin reads ‘
unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem’
. Here taken from Cicero,
de off.
1.84 but also in Livy 30.26.9; see Elliot, 2013, 165 and also Lancel, 1999, 101.

23.
Briscoe, 1989, 51.

24.
See Gruen, 1978, 62, and generally, for a detailed assessment of Livy’s account of these elections and whether it is credible. These are elections that have been discussed a great deal by scholars in relation to their implications for the Roman system and how it changed during the period of the Punic Wars.

25.
Debate on strategy and personal motivation was at the heart of the confusion, according to Gruen, 1978, 70; see also Lazenby, 1998, 73–74, who provides a clear assessment of the different appointments and factions at play.

26.
See Miles, 2010, 276 for the ‘damaging effect of Hannibal’s propaganda on the Roman people’.

27.
For the coinage that Hannibal minted in Italy see Alexandropoulos, 2000, 104–108 and Jenkins, 1987, and it must be said that the evidence points to the likelihood that the coins we have from Hannibal’s time in Italy were minted in the region of Bruttium.

28.
Perhaps giving rise to a recent book on success in management entitled
Hannibal and Me
, by Andreas Kluth, published in 2011.

29.
Early June, according to Walbank, vol.1, 441, and for the debate on the state of the Roman calendar and whether the dates here should be brought forward see Derow, 1976. The exact date of these events does not impact on the overall story.

30.
On the consular elections for 216 see Gruen, 1978, and for the lack of military experience among men elected consul in the mid-Republic see Rosenstein, 1993. Daly, 2002, 16–17 and Lazenby, 1998, 73–76 on the elections and the arrival of the consuls, plus further bibliography.

31.
Varro reportedly served in one of the Illyrian wars, probably in
c.
219, as noted in Rosenstein, 1993, 324 n. 34 following a reference in Servius,
Ad Aen.
11.743.

32.
On the location of Cannae see the map in Daly, 2002, 17 and extensive bibliography, also Goldsworthy, 2007, 78–79; Walbank, vol.1, 441. Seibert, 1993b, 227–228 provides a detailed bibliography of research on Cannae up to 1993.

33.
So many have written about Cannae that all cannot be listed here. There are excellent recent studies such as Daly, 2002 that provide detailed assessment of the entire battle, background and implications along with wide bibliographical resources. Here I have mainly consulted Daly, 2002; Goldsworthy, 2007; Lazenby, 1998; Seibert, 1993a; Walbank, vol.1, 435–449; Briscoe, 1989; along with Lancel, 1999, plus the useful articles in Hoyos, (ed.), 2011. There are excellent maps in Daly, 2002 and Goldsworthy, 2007.

34.
See Walbank, vol.1, 442.

35.
Numbers provided here generally follow the assessment given in Daly, 2002, 29–32; for a complete breakdown of all the options see Walbank, vol.1, 439–441; Seibert, 1993b, 228–229; Lazenby, 1998, 75 and 81 for the Roman troop numbers and for the Carthaginian strength.

36.
Again here see Daly, 2002, 25–29 for a detailed breakdown of the various arguments.

37.
Daly, 2002, 29; Walbank, vol.1, 439–441; Seibert, 1993b, 227–232; Lazenby, 1998, 75–76.

38.
Daly, 2002, 29–30.

39.
The traditional date given for the battle of Cannae is 2 August, which I adopt here while acknowledging the possible issues with the calendar and that it could have taken place a month earlier: see Derow, 1976; Lazenby, 1998, 77; Daly, 2002, 17; Lancel, 1999, 105. Polybius 3.107.1 believed it took place earlier in the summer, within a month of Hannibal moving out of camp and occupying Cannae.

40.
The prevailing summer wind from the south or south-west (called the Volturnus by Livy), would have raised the dust. Livy claims the wind caused problems for the Romans in the battle by getting in their eyes (22.43.10).

41.
Following Polybius, although the question of command on the day of battle has been raised: see Daly, 2002, 120–123. Given the connection to Aemilius Paullus (Polybius’ patron was Aemilius Paullus’ grandson) Polybius may have been recording a rather skewed version of the command structure, one that has absolved Aemilius Paullus and condemned Varro.

42.
This is probably what Polybius imagined he said rather than his actual words but as we do not know which source Polybius used here it is possible that Hannibal’s words were to that effect. Polyaenus,
Stratagems
6.38.2 discusses Hannibal’s claim about the reincarnation of brave soldiers. The theology of the dying and rising god Melqart is interestingly linked to Hannibal’s ideas presented here by Huss, 1986.

43.
The various hypotheses for the exact locations are surveyed in Daly, 2002, 33–35, with a map that lays out the different views of the locations. See also Goldsworthy, 2007, 86–94. This account follows Polybius’ narrative, discussed in Walbank, vol.1, and see also Lazenby, 1998, 77, who notes that ‘Polybius’ view is quite clearly stated and there is no good reason to doubt him’.

44.
Arguments for this day being the day of battle, with Paullus in command, presented in Daly, 2002, 120–121.

45.
See Daly, 2002, 36 for the suggestion that Paullus declined to fight the first time in order to deny Hannibal the ‘psychological advantage’ of picking the battlefield. See also Lazenby, 1998, 75–78 for the lead-up to the battle.

46.
Arguments for Paullus in command presented in Daly, 2002, 120–121, who points out that Appian,
Hann.
19 believed Paullus was in command on the day of battle.

47.
Much debated; see Daly, 2002, 36–37 for the varying opinions on the Roman tactics. Maniples were ‘the tactical sub-units of the Roman infantry’.

48.
See Daly, 2002, 145–155 for ‘commanders battle’.

49.
This very simplified version of the battle follows Daly’s synopsis, 2002, 38–41, which also provides excellent diagrams that mark out its various stages. For the battle strategy and plans for both sides see Lazenby, 1998, 78–86; Goldsworthy, 2007; Seibert, 1993a, 191–198; Lancel, 1999, 105–109.

50.
Lazenby, 1998, 84 and Goldsworthy, 2007, 191.

51.
Daly, 2002, 202 on Hannibal’s losses and Goldsworthy, 2007, 193–195 (appendix 2).

52.
As Daly, 2002 and Goldsworthy, 2007 focus specifically on Cannae; see also Lancel, 1999, 107.

53.
Many modern scholars have questioned the veracity of this story and some argue that perhaps it was after Trasimeno, when the road to Rome was clear and the city much closer, that it was suggested. Hoyos, 2006, 646–647; see discussion in Lazenby, 1998, 85–86 and 1996b; Lancel, 1999, 109; Seibert, 1993a, 198–204.

54.
See Hoyos, 2000 on this being spoken after Trasimeno, Hoyos, 2005, 119–120; Lazenby, 1996b, on ‘Was Maharbal Right’; see also Goldsworthy, 2003, 216, and Siebert, 1993a, 198–204.

55.
See Fronda, 2010, 34 n. 84 for a summary of the scholarship on Hannibal’s strategy.

56.
As set out by Goldsworthy, 2003, 156; see also Hoyos, 2005, 125. In 146 the Romans also destroyed Corinth.

57.
Plutarch,
Fab.
18.2: ‘it is the honours they receive from the fortunate that give most pleasure to the gods’.

58.
Livy 1.56 and 5.15–16 record the other instances when the Oracle at Delphi was consulted by the Romans.

59.
Várhelyi, 2007, 278 n. 2 provides a comprehensive list of references. Eckstein, 1982 argues against the sacrifices being directly connected to the sacrilege of the Vestals.

60.
As argued in Eckstein, 1982.

61.
For the renewal of the war effort see Eckstein, 1982, 75. This practice is attested to in 228, and also in 114/113
BCE
; see Várhelyi, 2007 for a recent approach to the issue.

62.
The use of slaves in the armies of the ancient world became more frequent over the course of the late Republic but was rare in the Imperial period. Gracchus freed his slaves before the battle of the River Calor, two years after they had served (Livy 24.14.3–10).

63.
Lancel, 1999, 111.

64.
Livy writes that ‘surely no other nation would not have been crushed by such an overwhelming disaster’ (22.54.10). The Roman determination to fight on was what made Polybius believe that they were destined to rule the world. ‘It was a lesson to their own men that they must either conquer or else die on the field’ (Polyb. 6.58.11). Translation here from Eckstein, 1995, 66–67, who writes on this particular passage in Polybius and its role in defining Roman power.

65.
Suggested by Hoyos, 2006, 649 nn. 10, 11.

66.
Seibert, 1993a, 215–216.

67.
The translation here notes that the manuscript is corrupt in places in this passage and neither the amount of silver nor who was sent to Iberia with Mago is clear: see Hoyos, 2006, 650 n. 23.13.

68.
Some of these reinforcements did eventually arrive in Italy but part must have been redirected to Iberia where the battle against the Romans was running into trouble.

Chapter 8 After Cannae

1.
Goldsworthy, 2003, 30–36 points out how difficult it is to describe a ‘typical’ Carthaginian army as there probably wasn’t one; see also Lancel, 1995, 361–362 on the two ‘weak’ points in the Carthaginian armour – its lack of a homogeneous territorial base and its mercenary army.

2.
Daly, 2002, 156–202 for the battle in detail; Lazenby, 1998, 77–86.

3.
There is discussion of Hannibal’s strategy, well synthesized in Fronda, 2010, 34–52; see also Fronda, 2011. The freedom agenda is discussed above, p. 270
n
. 20.

4.
The speech also accuses the Carthaginians of cannibalism, making them less than human. For Varro’s speech and the propaganda of Rome vs Hannibal see Lazenby, 1998, 88, who also notes that Fabius in Livy 24.47.5 refers to ‘foreigners and barbarians’.

5.
The list in Livy 22.61 includes towns and regions that switched sides in the period from 216 to 212 rather than immediately after Cannae.

6.
See Fronda, 2010, who analyses the specific circumstances of each city and its defection, and provides a thorough discussion of why some did and some did not go over to Hannibal.

7.
It is worth considering how much this reflects Livy’s own agenda and how much this was the reality of each situation or a reflection of the late Roman republican rivalries at Rome.

8.
See Fronda, 2010, 32–33 and 64–65, note 45 for Compsa.

9.
For Arpi and Apulia see Fronda, 2010, 53–99, who points out that neither Livy nor Polybius was concerned with the exact chronology, so any specific timing can only be assumed very generally, Livy for example lists all the defections from 216 to 212 rather than those in the immediate aftermath of Cannae.

10.
Lazenby, 1998, 89.

11.
A west coast port would remove the need to circumnavigate Sicily (where the Roman navy was based) to access supplies and communications with Carthage; a more direct route would then be available (
Map 1
). See Fronda, 2010, 130–146 for the Campanian cities that remained loyal; also Lazenby, 1998, 87–114.

12.
For the Etruscan origins see Livy 4.37.1–2. The foundation of Greek colonies dates from the eighth century
BCE
onwards.

13.
The term means ‘citizenship without the vote’: Crawford, 1992, 37; a detailed examination of Roman citizenship in Humbert, 1978. See Fronda, 2010, 117–119 for a discussion of the implications of the status in terms of the other allies.

14.
See Humbert, 1978, 167–170, and 173 on the possibility that some Campanian knights had received full Roman citizenship in the fourth century. Also Fronda, 2010, 117 nn. 77–118, who points out that the other cities with
civitas sine suffragio
in the region did not change sides so it is unlikely that status itself was a mitigating factor. See Fronda, 2007 on the revolt and its implications.

15.
As noted by Fronda, 2010, 124, the Capuans pursued their own agenda of conquest after their alliance with Hannibal.

16.
See Fronda, 2007 for the background to Roman–Capuan relations.

17.
On Capua in Livy’s narrative of the war see Levene, 2010, 354–375, and Capua siding against the Romans in previous wars, Fronda, 2010, 126–130; for intermarriage see Hoyos, 2005, 122, and on the prisoner exchange, Lancel, 1999, 114–115; also Goldsworthy, 2003, 224; Seibert, 1993b, 216–220; Lazenby, 1998, 89–90.

18.
Note a similar story about Nuceria in Cassius Dio (frag. 57.30), which may indicate some confusion about the details of this event, see Hoyos, 2006, 649 n. 7. They had public baths in Capua from the third century and it is always important to note that these cities in Campania considered themselves more ‘civilized’ than contemporary Rome.

19.
Late September or early October 216.

20.
It is entirely possible that this is an historically accurate depiction, Hannibal’s
adventus
, as pointed out in Fronda, 2010, 105, note 26.