Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (102 page)

Perhaps T
g
perceived in the spirit of Hull's memorandum a
tone of colonialist arrogance in the American position. Like everyone else in the room, he may have felt relief that the hard-line American position, grounded in abstract principles, had absolved them of moral responsibility for what they were about to do. Now they could claim that the United States government had “forced” them to opt for war in self-defense: We didn't do it of our own volition; the “Hull note” triggered the war, and hereafter we shall use this American document to prove it.
⁹⁴

Through every stage of the Hull-Nomura secret talks, under three foreign ministers—Matsuoka, Toyoda, and T
g
—the Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministries had practiced policy making by suspension, with nobody backing down and differences left unresolved but papered over. All three ministries blocked and checked one another, while the army especially never made meaningful concessions or acted in ways that might have begun to build trust by suggesting a new pattern of behavior.
⁹⁵
All three foreign ministers clung to an already existing agreement—the “Basic Treaty” with the client Wang Ching-wei regime, which guaranteed the stationing of Japanese troops in China. More important, they stuck to their system of policy making, which, because of bureaucratic conflicts and divisions, never consolidated and, in late 1941, could only make for continuous movement in the single direction of war.

Ultimately it was always more advantageous for each of the forces in this process, including the emperor and Kido, to move to expand war rather than risk paralysis and complete breakdown of their system of rule. This was especially true of Hirohito, who, at different times in the decade after the Manchurian Incident, had expressed fears that not taking some warlike action—like not pumping up the
kokutai
or not suppressing dissent—would jeopardize the imperial system of government and eventually damage the imperial institution itself. For Hirohito domestic conflicts were more dangerous than the escalation of war, for they carried the risk of eroding the monarchy. In the Japanese wartime system of decision mak
ing, the major players worked toward consensus by subordinating the nation's interests to their own bureaucratic, institutional interests, all the while mouthing the false rhetoric of harmony and consensus. Whenever they failed to reach agreement, they glossed over their differences in vague policy documents that placated all sides and allowed the exigencies of the situation, the preparation for war, and their own special interests to determine their final course of action.

As the time approached for his final decision for war, Hirohito requested a last round of discussions with government leaders and senior statesmen. On November 27 a large Japanese task force, with six aircraft carriers, set off from Tankan (Hitokappu) Bay in the southern Kurile Islands headed toward Hawaii, and the liaison conference decided on the “Sequence of Administrative Procedures to be Taken Regarding the Declaration of War.”
⁹⁶
On November 29 the leaders assembled at the palace, and he listened to their comments. Prime Minister T
j
and members of his cabinet spoke first. Next, the senior statesmen—Wakatsuki, Hirota, Konoe, Hiranuma, Okada, Yonai, Hayashi, and Abe—gave their opinions. Hirota, Hayashi, and Abe pushed for war. The majority argued that it was better to maintain the status quo and endure American pressure, but nobody expressed flat-out opposition to beginning hostilities.
⁹⁷

On November 30 Prince Takamatsu went to the palace and attempted to stop his brother from taking the empire into a new war. The navy had its hands full, he cautioned. Its leaders were not certain of ultimate victory and wanted to avoid war with the United States if at all possible. Although their encounter lasted only five minutes, Takamatsu would never forget his futile last-minute attempt to have a voice in the policy-making process. Afterward a puzzled Hirohito asked Kido, “What's going on?” Kido replied, “The decision this time [the next day] will be enormously important. Once you grant the imperial sanction, there can be no going
back. If you have even the slightest doubt, make absolutely sure until you are convinced.”
⁹⁸
After next checking with T
j
, Hirohito called in his top naval leaders, Nagano and Shimada, for yet another joint review. Both men reassured him that the war operation would be successful. Whether Hirohito also questioned them about the navy's confidence after the first two years of war—Takamatsu's concern—we have no way of knowing.

The last step in the countdown phase to war took place on the afternoon of December 1. Nineteen somber leaders, including the entire cabinet, assembled; the emperor entered, took his customary raised seat at the dais end of the room in front of a gold screen; and the meeting began.

An hour later, after everyone at the two long facing tables, at either side of and at right angles to the emperor, had completed his presentation, Privy Council President Hara questioned the cabinet and the military high command, presumably on the emperor's behalf. Hara's very first comment misrepresented Hull's statement by claiming that “the United States…has demanded that we withdraw troops from
all of China
[emphasis added],” when, in fact, Hull had used only the word “China.” “I would like to know,” said Hara, “whether Manchukuo is included in the term ‘China'? Did our two ambassadors confirm this point?”
⁹⁹

T
g
replied that the two ambassadors had not clarified the American meaning of “China” in their meeting with Hull on the 26th.