Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (176 page)

15.
Zaidan H
jin Chichibu no miya Kinenkai, ed.,
Yasuhito shinn
jikki
(Yoshikawa K
bunkan, 1972), p. 44.

16.
Twenty-Third Annual Statistics of the City of Tokyo
(Tokyo, 1927), p. 150;
Historical Statistics of Japan
, vol. 1 (Japan Statistical Association, 1987), p. 168.

17.
Takashi Fujitani,
Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pagentry in Modern Japan
(University of California Press, 1996), pp. 128, 131; Iwai Tadakuma,
Meiji tenn
“taitei” densetsu
, p. 156.

18.
Watanabe Osamu, “Sengo seiji no nagare ni miru tenn
to Nihon nash-ionarizumu no heny
,” in Nihon Jyânarisuto Kaigi, ed.,
Yameru masu komi to Nihon
(K
bunky
, 1995), pp. 98–99, 100.

19.
Masuda Tomoko, “Tenn
: kindai,” in
Nihonshi daijiten, yonkan
(Heibonsha, 1994).

20.
It
removed the top of the military chain of command from the prime minister's jurisdiction and deliberately weakened the prime minister's powers in order to enhance the emperor's. He also strengthened the independent advisory authority of ministers of state and made cabinet decisions depend on unanimous consent rather than on simple majority vote. In the final stage of his constitution making, It
established a privy council to deliberate on the constitution. Although Emperor Meiji actively participated in virtually all of its meetings, it is doubtful if he really understood the enormous political and military obligations he was foisting on himself—obligations that would fall with even greater weight on the shoulders of Hirohito. For details see Minobe Tatsukichi,
Chikuj
kenp
seigi, zen
(Y
hikaku, 1931), p. 523; Sakano Junji, “Naikaku,” in
Nihonshi daijiten
,
dai gokan
(Heibonsha, 1993), pp. 289–90; Masuda Tomoko, “Meiji rikken kunshusei ni okeru S
mitsuin,” in
Rekishi to chiri
355(March 1985), pp. 1–14; and Tanaka,
Tenn
no kenky
, p. 168.