Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (276 page)

2.
Yamada Akira,
Daigensui Sh
wa tenn
, p. 65; for slightly different, less detailed versions, Jonathan Haslam,
The Soviet Union and the Threat From the East, 1933–41: Moscow, Tokyo and the Prelude to the Pacific War
(University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), pp. 89–90; and Clark W. Tinch, “Quasi-War Between Japan and the U.S.S.R., 1937–1939,” in
World Politics
3, no. 2 (July 1951), pp. 177–78.

3.
Harada nikki, dai rokkan
, p. 30.

4.
Matsudaira Yasumasa, chief secretary to Privy Seal Yuasa, informed Saionji's secretary, Harada, of the emperor's linking of the Manchurian and Marco Polo Bridge Incidents during his scolding of Army Minister Itagaki Seishir
. Harada dutifully recorded the story a week later on July 28, 1938. According to Matsudaira, the emperor said, “Both at…the time of the Manchurian Incident and at the Marco Polo Bridge, the first episode of this incident, the field [officers] completely ignored their orders from the center and acted arbitrarily.” Hirohito could only have been referring to the regimental and the batallion commanders in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge who were directly responsible for expanding the incident, Mutaguchi Renya and Ichiki Kiyonao; but Harada's diary entry fails to name them. Hirohito's view of the war's outbreak directly challenged the Konoe cabinet's official version. See
Harada nikki, dai nanakan
, p. 51; Eguchi Keiichi, “Rok
ky
jiken to Ts
sh
jiken no hy
ka o megutte,” in
Kikan sens
sekinin kenky
25 (Fall 1999), p. 4.

5.
Kido K
ichi nikki, ge
, p. 802.

6.
Gaimush
hensan,
Nihon gaik
nenpy
narabi shuy
bunsho, ge
(Hara Shob
, 1969), p. 366.