Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (302 page)

45.
Ibid., pp. 73–74.

46.
Ibid., p. 74.

47.
Kido K
ichi nikki, ge
, p. 812.

48.
Yoshizawa Minami,
Sens
kakudai no k
zu: Nihongun no “Futsuin shinch
” (Aoki Shoten, 1986), pp. 68, 70, 72.

49.
Marshall,
To Have and Have Not: Southeast Asian Raw Materials and the Origins of the Pacific War
, argues that by 1940, if not earlier, both sides had come to define their national interests in mercantilist terms of control over raw materials.

50.
Kido K
ichi nikki, ge
, p. 821.

51.
Ibid., p. 825.

52.
For the text of the treaty, see James W. Morley, ed.,
Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany, and the USSR, 1935–1940
(Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 298–99.

53.
Inoue,
Tenn
no sens
sekinin
, p. 125.

54.
Harada nikki, dai nanakan
, p. 280.

55.
Kido K
ichi nikki, ge
, p. 822.

56.
Harada nikki, dai hakkan
, p. 347.

57.
Yasuda,
Tenn
no seijishi
, p. 270.

58.
In the “Monologue” Hirohito twice noted that “Prince Chichibu advocated the Tripartite Pact.” He added that “since [Chichibu] later became ill, I did not know his views [at the time]. Prince Takamatsu usually disagreed with the opinions of those in authority…. After the Tripartite Pact he glorified war, but with the coming of the T
j
cabinet he changed to an antiwar view.”
STD
, p. 129.

59.
On Oct. 19, 1940, Kido wrote that the emperor had informed Admiral Oikawa that “Prince Chichibu is recuperating from tuberculosis and we might have to ask Prince Takamatsu to become regent should an emergency arise. Do not send him to the front line.”
Kido K
ichi nikki, ge
, p. 830; Chichibu no miya Kinenkai,
Yasuhito Shinn
jikki
(Yoshikawa K
bunkan, 1972), p. 639.