Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (314 page)

54.
According to Kido's postwar prison diary, Konoe first spoke with Kido, telling him that “the military had forced the document upon him.” Kido then conferred with Hirohito and recommended that he summon General Sugiyama and Admiral Nagano.
In connection with their replies to the emperor's questions, the emperor scolded Sugiyama but…Nagano came to his defense, saying…“Sometimes an operation is needed.” His Majesty's biggest doubt concerned the fact that the first item in the draft document was the decision to decide whether to initiate hostilities while diplomatic negotiations came second.
Kido's account supports the image of an emperor who exhibited ambiguity because he was reluctant to initiate war with the United States and Britain. General Sugiyama's notes on the Sept. 5 briefing seem to validate this antiwar image. The notes have Hirohito saying, in a loud voice (and Konoe's later recollection of the meeting confirms this): “Do you think you can carry out the southern operations as planned?”…“When you were a minister of state, you told me that Chiang Kai-shek would give up right away, but you still can't beat him even today!”…“You say the interior of China is huge; isn't the Pacific Ocean even bigger than China?”
Konoe's question to the emperor, however, is not in the
Sugiyama memo
. See
Kido K
ichi nikki—Tokyo saibanki
(Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1980), part 3, “Kyokut
kokusai gunji saiban ni kansuru danwa,” pp. 461–62; Sanb
honbu, hen,
Sugiyama memo, j
, pp. 310–11; Yabe Teiji,
Konoe Fumimaro
(K
bund
, 1952), p. 361.

55.
Takagi S
kichi historical documents: “Seikai shoj
h
—Sh
wa j
ninen kara,” pp. 589, 591, 592–95. The first ellipsis after “you were army minister” and the second ellipsis after “big difficulties” are in Takagi's original text; this document, in the Takagi papers at the War History Archives in Tokyo, is also cited in K
ketsu,
Nihon kaigun no sh
sen k
saku: Ajia-Taiheiy
sens
no saikensh
, pp. 71–72.