Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (355 page)

38.
Within a few hours of Truman's statement, naval Capt. Ellis M. Zacharias began a series of weekly broadcasts to Japan reiterating Truman's message but without mentioning the emperor. See Allan M. Winkler,
The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942–1945
(Yale University Press, 1978), p. 145.

39.
The “queen bee” analogy comes from Grew's speech to a U.S. Senate committee hearing on December 12, 1944. See Nakamura Masanori,
The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the ‘Symbol Emperor System,' 1931–1991
(M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992), p. 66.

40.
Joseph C. Grew,
Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904–1945
, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1952), p. 1435. Grew endorsed the Truman administration's decision to retain the emperor for postwar purposes, but even he never imagined that Hirohito would be able to absolve himself of war guilt and not step down.

41.
Ibid., pp. 1425–26.

42.
Nakamura,
The Japanese Monarchy,
pp. 70–77.

43.
The declaration was largely the work of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and his aides, but Secretary of State James Byrnes polished it, eliminated the clarification of the emperor's status, and influenced the timing of its release.

44.
The direct repatriation home of Japanese military forces was a major difference between Japan's unconditional surrender and Germany's. The official American policy at the time of the declaration was that unconditional surrender applied “to Japan” and “thus cover[ed] not only the armed forces, but also the emperor, the government and the people. All are to acquiesce in any acts which the allies consider appropriate in carrying out their policy.” See the undated State Department memorandum, “Comparison of the Proclamation of July 26, 1945, with the Policy of the Department of State,” prepared on July 30, in
FRUS, Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945
, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1960), p. 1285.

45.
The deleted lines included the following: “(1) We…agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war…. (4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.”

46.
Minomatsu J
, ed., Takagi S
kichi copy,
Kaigun taish
Yonai Mitsumasa oboegaki
(Kojinsha, 1978), pp. 143–44, as cited in Tanaka Nobumasa, p. 434. Churchill did indeed lose the British general election of July 5, 1945. A Labour Party cabinet headed by Clement Attlee replaced Churchill's Conservative-dominated coalition government on the twenty-seventh.

47.
Truman notes in his memoirs, “On July 28 Radio Tokyo announced that the Japanese government would continue to fight. There was no formal
reply to the joint ultimatum of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China. There was no alternative now. The bomb was scheduled to be dropped after August 3 unless Japan surrendered before that day.”
Memoirs by Harry S. Truman
, vol. 1,
Year of Decisions
(Garden City, N.Y.: 1955), p. 421.

48.
Tanaka,
Dokyumento Sh
wa tenn
, dai gokan
, p. 449. Needless to say Stalin did not need Suzuki's
mokusatsu
statement or the Yalta agreement to enter the war against defeated Japan. He would have done so in any case. Walter LaFeber,
The Clash: U.S.-Japan relations throughout History
, p. 248.

49.
LaFeber,
The Clash
, p. 247.

50.
The Soviet declaration of war stated: “Japan remains the only great power after the defeat and surrender of Hitlerian Germany which still insists on continuing the war, and has rejected the demand for the unconditional surrender of its armed forces, put forth on July 26 by the three nations: the United States of America, Britain, and China.” Nihon Jy
narizumu Kenky
kai, ed.,
Sh
wa “hatsugen” no kiroku
(Toky
jensh
Shuppan Jigy
bu, 1989), p. 94.