Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (371 page)

15.
“Text of the Instrument of Surrender” in Ramond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, eds.,
Documents on American Foreign Relations,
vol. 3,
July 1, 1945–December 31, 1946
(Princeton University Press, Kraus Reprint Co., 1976), pp. 109–10.

16.
Theodore Cohen,
Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal
(Free Press, 1987), p. 4. MacArthur did not receive the second half of his reform directive until October 22.

17.
For nearly a year MacArthur had been hoping to get the emperor to call on him. In Manila, he had conveyed his wish to Col. Sidney Mashbir, the head of the Allied Translation and Interpreter Service (ATIS). “I'll start proceedings along that line as soon as we arrive in Japan,” Mashbir replied. See Sidney F. Mashbir,
I Was an American Spy
(Vantage Press, Inc., 1953), pp. 308–9. On Fujita's visit to GHQ, see
TN, dai hakkan
, p. 152.

18.
Takahashi Hiroshi, “Sh
ch
tenn
no sekkeishatachi,”
Shokun
(January 1995), pp. 66–68. Several excerpts from Sekiya's unpublished diary, cited by Takahashi, show how Sekiya, Kawai, and Fellers conferred on making sure that the emperor was not held responsible for the war.

19.
FRUS, Diplomatic Papers 1945: The Far East
, vol. 6, p. 720.

20.
New York Times
, Sept. 26, 1945.

21.
Ibid., Sept. 23, 1946.

22.
Cited in Awaya Kentar
, NHK Shuzaihan,
Tokyo saiban e no michi
(Nihon H
s
Shuppan Ky
kai, 1994), pp. 13–14.

23.
Frederick B. Wiener, “Comment:
The Years of MacArthur
, Vol. III: MacArthur Unjustifiably Accused of Meting Out ‘Victors' Justice” in War Crimes Cases,” in
Military Law Review
113 (Summer 1986), p. 217.

24.
Report of Government Section Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
Political Reorientation of Japan, Sept. 1945 to Sept. 1948
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1949), vol. 2, p. 423.

25.
Higashino Shin,
Sh
wa tenn
futatsu no “dokuhakuroku
” (NHK Shuppan, 1998), pp. 62–68. In his psychological warfare report entitled “Answer to Japan,” drafted in mid–1944, Fellers had written, “It is a profanity for Japanese to doubt the Emperor's correctness just as it is for Catholics to doubt the chastity of the Virgin Mary.”

26.
The final “Blacklist” plan, dated August 8, 1945, assumed an occupation
by acquiescence; what developed was an occupation in which Japan's leaders actively participated in influencing American policy from the very start. See
Reports of General MacArthur, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase
, Vol. 1 Supplement. Prepared by His General Staff (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1966), pp. 2–12.

27.
Toyoshita Narahiko, “Tenn
/Makk
s
kaiken no shoken” in Iwanami Shinsho Hensh
bu, ed.,
Sh
wa no sh
en
(Iwanami Shoten 1990), p. 81; Matsuo Takayoshi, “K
sh
Sh
wa tenn
, Makk
s
gensui dai ikkai kaiken,” in
Kyoto daigaku bungakubu kenky
kiy
, dai 29 go (Mar. 1990), pp. 46–48. The corrected answer, given afterward by a spokesman, was: “As to the strategic details of the war, such as the disposition of military and naval forces and the time, place, and manner of the attack, the emperor was not generally consulted, these being decided almost exclusively by the high command. At any rate, it was his majesty's intention to issue a formal declaration of war before the commencement of hostilities.”