Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis (31 page)

The Austrian government’s nearly total suppression of overt Nazi activity was destined to be short-lived. The Ethiopian War, which began in October 1935, turned Italy from being a defender of Austrian independence into a partner of Nazi Germany. Encouraged by these international developments, the Austrian Nazis regained their confidence and momentum. The government of Kurt von Schuschnigg lacked both the internal strength and the external backing to crush the Nazis. Instead, it felt compelled to appease them. One method of doing this was a program that might be called “positive fascism,” which was designed to imitate what appeared to be the more popular features of fascism in Germany and Italy. The other approach was the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” with Germany concluded in July 1936. Of course, neither policy worked in the long run. But the short-term effects of each policy are not so easy to evaluate.

*

The Nazis’ Neo-Renaissance

If domestic developments during most of 1935 gave the Austrian Nazis small cheer, the same could not be said of the news from abroad. While the employment rate in Austria continued its steady decline in 1934 from 79.8 percent of the 1929 level to
66.8
percent in 1935 and 64.6 percent in 1936, Germany’s masses were rapidly gaining employment. The percentage of employed in 1934 (compared with the 1929 standard) was already 85.5. In 1935 it rose to 90.6 and then to 97.2 in 1936.
¹
In January 1935 the Austrian Nazis were encouraged by the perfectly free League of Nations’ plebiscite in the Saar district, where over 90 percent of the inhabitants voted to return to German rule. By March 1935 the monthly report of the Security

Directorate admitted that “while one couldn’t speak of the masses being enthusiastic about National Socialism, the public was nevertheless growing lethargic toward the policies and undeniable dynamism of the-Nazis
.”
²

But what really turned the situation around for the Austrian Nazis was Mussolini’s unquenchable thirst for empire and glory. With the legions of Austria’s one-time protector bogged down in the mountains and deserts of Ethiopia, Austria stood defenseless before the growing might of Nazi Germany. Nor were the Western Democracies willing to fill the military breach. Their timidity was graphically illustrated by their insipid response to Hitler’s reoccupation and remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936.

The impact of these developments on Austria’s internal tug of war was both swift and profound. As late as May 1935 Styrian Nazis were attempting to organize a boycott of Italian imports. But the very next month they were encouraged by improving Italo-German relations, and by July they were confidently expecting to benefit from an Ethiopian War that had not yet even begun. In stark contrast, government loyalists were fearful already in September about possible damaging repercussions from the impending war; they became even gloomier following the Rhineland reoccupation the next March
.
³

The effects of the diplomatic revolution, together with an increase in Nazi spying activities, were soon reflected in the reports of the previously optimistic Austrian Security Directorate. In his detailed report dealing with the Austrian Nazi party dated 4 April 1936, Eduard Baar-Baarenfels observed that frequent acts of treason made it difficult to fight the Nazis. The Nazis had little reason to fear arrest because they could anticipate being rewarded with a job in Germany once they were released. Nazis were increasingly reluctant to betray their party for fear of being assassinated by the Nazi Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service), which was operating on Austrian soil, Baar-Baarenfels observed
.
⁴
A month later he noted that even government supporters were unwilling to fight the Nazis, apprehensive that their businesses might be boycotted or they themselves murdered
.
⁵

*

Taking the Wind out of Nazi Sails:

The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Dictatorship

The Austrian government responded to this renewed Nazi threat with a two-sided defense, neither aspect of which was new. The first of these policies was purely domestic: the development of a one-party dictatorship.

; Chancellor Dollfuss had once remarked that what was “good and healthy” in National Socialism was already a part of his Christian Social party’s program- Basically, what he and his successor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, did was to emphasize such “good and healthy” points by imitating German Nazism and ' Italian Fascism in hopes of “taking the wind out of the Nazis’ sails
.”
⁶
The
chancellors
hoped an Austrian Nazi would no longer envy Germany if he
could find
the best features of Nazism in his native country.

Chancellor Dollfuss was already well advanced in fulfilling this policy of positive fascism by the time of his assassination. After the unexpected dissolution of Parliament in March 1933, further moves to the right by Dollfuss were caused not only by his desire to deflate the Nazis but also in large measure by extreme pressure placed on him by the Austrian Heimwehr and Benito Mussolini. The Heimwehr was eager to increase its own influence through the establishment of a dictatorship and the elimination of its hated opponents, the Socialists; meanwhile, Mussolini foolishly wanted Dollfuss to alienate the Western Powers and thus become more dependent on Italy.

In September of 1933 Dollfuss partially yielded to this coercion when he delivered a major speech in Vienna denouncing the social and economic weaknesses of liberalism, capitalism, and Marxism. There was nothing in this triad, at least as far as it went, with which even the most fanatic Nazi or Heimwehr man could disagree. After having rid himself of the Socialist opposition in February 1934, the chancellor, aping Hitler’s pseudolegality, had a new authoritarian constitution confirmed by the Christian Social and Heimwehr members of the old Parliament on 30 April. This constitution (never fully implemented) provided for a highly centralized state with few powers either for the state parliaments or for the federal assembly, which represented seven fascist-style economic corporations. The latter could not initiate or even debate legislation. The federal president appointed the chancellor, who had sweeping emergency powers
.
⁷

Dollfuss and Schuschnigg were both careful to distinguish between Austria’s “authoritarian system” and Germany’s dictatorship. Postwar historians, especially in Austria during the Allied occupation, were equally reluctant to call the constitution of 1934 “fascist” for fear it would be equated with the systems of Fascist Italy, or still worse, Nazi Germany
.
⁸
The difference with Germany, however, was more a matter of personalities and national traditions than clear-cut powers. Both the German and Austrian regimes suppressed democratic elections and political representation. Freedom of the press and of speech were abolished and detention camps were used to coerce political enemies.

Yet the differences were real enough, too. Most strikingly, there was

no blanket persecution of religion in Austria. In fact, the Roman Catholic Church flourished during the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg era. Several historians have pointed out the distinctly temporary and defensive nature of the two regimes. According to these writers, neither chancellor had any desire to set up a permanent dictatorship. Instead, they saw their one-party rule as a kind of necessary evil until the twin challenges of Marxism and National Socialism could be contained
.
⁹
There was no talk about making the new system last for a “thousand years.”

Moreover, neither Dollfuss nor Schuschnigg fit the mold of a typical fascist or totalitarian dictator. Both men were sincere, practicing Catholics, although they were in no real sense clericalists. Neither had the slightest interest in military glory (even if Austria had had the capacity). Nor is there any evidence that they lusted for sheer power. Dollfuss resembled Hitler and Mussolini only in “coming from the people.” But unlike them he never became aloof from the masses. Schuschnigg, on the other hand, by his birth, education, and personality, was very decidedly
not
one of the crowd. On the contrary, he was a well-born, well-educated, dignified gentleman. But unfortunately, his reserve—he rarely even smiled—and natural shyness made him appear cold and disdainful at a time when charisma was very much in vogue on the Continent. If his personality made him incapable of being a demagogue, it also prevented him from becoming a really popular leader
.
¹⁰

Chancellors Dollfuss and Schuschnigg clearly wanted a government strong enough to subdue Nazi radicals (and Socialists) but mild enough to appeal to the more moderate Nazis. Had economic conditions in Austria been healthier and international circumstances more favorable, perhaps they would have succeeded. As things were, however, the two dictators were anathema to genuine democrats, an outrage to Socialists, and merely pale imitations of real totalitarian dictators to hardened Nazis. Only Christian Socials and Heimwehr men were pleased with Dollfuss. And Schuschnigg managed to lose the support of even the Heimwehr in 1936. In short, Austria between 1933 and 1938 had a mild but unpopular semifascist dictatorship.

Hitler himself, of course, had nothing but contempt for the Austrian “system.” On 9 February 1934 he explained his concept of totalitarianism
[Totalit'at]
to the German envoy to Austria at that time, Kurt Rieth. “It depended,” the Fiihrer said, “on a strong leadership personality whose authority can be trusted. . . . The government in Austria,” he went on to say, “would be able to exercise authority only if it were based on the clearly expressed will of the people
.”
¹¹

Dollfuss and Schuschnigg were authentic anti-Nazis who did their best to revive an Austrian patriotism. Dollfuss, to be sure, had long been an

I Anschluss
partisan and remained one for a time even after Hitler’s takeover in
l! Germany.
But he eventually perceived Hitler’s irrationality and feared his
anticlerical
and totalitarian claims. And when Dollfuss switched from being a pro-
Anschluss
to a pro-Austrian and anti-Prussian, the conversion was genuine. Schuschnigg, on the other hand, though very much an Austrian patriot, could never quite rid himself of his pan-German sympathies. He often
spoke
of creating a “true Christian Germanism” as a bastion against the secular, pagan, ultranationalistic character of Nazism. In his book,
My Austria
, written in November 1937, Schuschnigg stressed the “Germanness” of both
Austria
and himself.

Neither Dollfuss nor Schuschnigg should be censured too severely for his pan-German proclivities. Most German-speaking Austrians had been aware of their Germanness since the rise of nationalism in the late monarchy. Even President Miklas repeatedly referred to the “German” character of Austria during patriotic ceremonies. The duty of the two chancellors, as Baar-Baarenfels saw it, was to convince the Austrian people that “the concept of Austria contained the idea of Germanism and that the fight against National Socialism was not directed against that Germanism
”
¹²
It would not be easy.

The Fatherland Front

The idea of “Germanism” was in fact one of the major ideological pillars of the Fatherland Front or Vaterlandische Front (VF), the concept of which Dollfuss announced in May 1933. This all-encompassing “umbrella” organization was created for the purpose of rendering the old political parties, including the chancellor’s own Christian Social party, superfluous. Like the semifascist state parties in Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, the Union Patriotica of Primo de Rivera in Spain, and the Uniao Nacional in Portugal, the Front was artificially created from “above” in sharp contrast with the true fascist parties of Italy and Germany, which conquered power for their leaders and supporters. The idea evidently originated with Prince Starhemberg, who became the Front’s first Fiihrer (his actual title). But it was Dollfuss who launched the Front shortly before his assassination. And it was during Schuschnigg’s rule that it reached its maturity.

Superficially the organization looked impressive. Membership was widespread, reaching a peak of 3 million in November 1937.
¹³
But because the VF was a creature of the government, it never had the kind of spontaneous enthusiasm enjoyed by the fascist parties of Germany and Italy. And un-

like the Fascists and Nazis the VF never commanded the state, but was commanded by it.    ,

Membership in the Fatherland Front was all but compulsory. “Every kind of moral, social, and financial pressure was brought to bear on every Austrian to join
.”
¹⁴
The long-run value of this sort of pressure is extremely doubtful, as it simply led to closet Nazis joining the Front to protect their jobs. This phenomenon in turn seriously weakened the VF and provided the Nazis with still another camouflage for their activities
.
¹⁵
Some Nazis even became VF functionaries. An example was the director of the University of Graz library, who tried to sabotage all efforts to resist the Nazis in the Styrian capital. Ultimately VF pressure tactics backfired as it became increasingly difficult fb'r the government to identify its enemies
.
¹⁶