Intel Wars (37 page)

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank the dozens of government officials who assisted in the preparation of this book. Unfortunately, the vast majority of these individuals cannot be named here because the Obama administration, despite promising the American public a new era of transparency in government, has authorized the Justice Department to file criminal indictments against a number of current or former government officials alleged to have leaked classified information to the press. The administration also quietly fired a number of officials, some of them quite senior, who provided information to author Bob Woodward for his 2010 book
Obama's Wars
. In this oppressive atmosphere, it seems prudent not to identify the sources who provided information for this book, even if they were willing to have their names used.

Those individuals who can be thanked include Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Dr. Michael Eisenstadt, Dr. Michael Elleman, Matthew Hoh, and the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. Three old friends, Dr. Richard J. Aldrich, Dr. Martin Rudner, and Dr. Cees Wiebes, directed me to a number of valuable declassified documents concerning the wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

First Lieutenant Ray “Radar” Geoffrey, USAF, Lieutenant Colonel Götz Haffke of the German Army, and Mr. Robert M. Hill of the ISAF Public Affairs Office in Kabul were very helpful in pointing me to declassified documents on a number of battles in Afghanistan. And Angela L. Moncur of the U.S. Army public affairs office at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, was a fount of knowledge about all things relating to U.S. Army intelligence.

I want to pay special tribute to Saleem Shahzad, one of the hardest working Pakistani journalists in Islamabad, who was of immeasurable help to me. His encyclopedic knowledge of the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI, was unparalleled. On May 29, 2011, he disappeared from his home in Islamabad. A few days later his body was found in an irrigation canal outside the Pakistani capital. He had been savagely beaten to death.

CIA officials in Washington are convinced that he was murdered on the orders of the director of the ISI because he had written a number of articles before his death alleging that the Pakistani Taliban had managed to infiltrate the Pakistani military and ISI. The Pakistani government has vehemently denied the charges, but friends in Islamabad report that the Pakistani police and security forces have done virtually nothing to find his murderers. His death says much about the tragic state of affairs in Pakistan today.

Special thanks go to Peter Ginna, my publisher at Bloomsbury Press, who suggested the subject of this book. Pete Beatty expertly edited the manuscript in record time, and Michael O'Connor put the manuscript in its final form. And, finally, my agent, Rick Broadhead, has my undying gratitude for fighting so hard on my behalf. Thank you.

Notes

GLOSSARY

AMEMBASSY = American Embassy

COMINT = Communications intelligence

DOD = Department of Defense

FOIA = Freedom of Information Act

FOUO = For Official Use Only

HCS = Human Intelligence Control System

NARA = National Archives and Records Administration

NOFORN = No Foreigners

SECSTATE = Secretary of State

INTRODUCTION

6
       “In November 2009” Cable, Bogotá 003435, AMEMBASSY BOGOTA to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Scenesetter for Admiral Roughead's Dec 2–6 Visit to Colombia,” November 24, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

6
       “In December 2009” Cable, State 130330, SECSTATE WASH DC to AMEMBASSY SANAA, “USG Policy Toward Yemeni Arms Acquisitions,” December 22, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

7
       “In January 2010” Cable, State 002634, SECSTATE WASH DC to AMEMBASSY BEIJING, “Demarche Following China's January 2010 Intercept Flight-Test,” January 12, 2010, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

7
       “In February 2010” Cable, Riyadh 000182, AMEMBASSY RIYADH to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Scenesetter for Special Representative Ambassador Holbrooke's February 15–16 Visit to Riyadh,” February 7, 2010, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

1: LIPSTICK ON A PIG

12
     “June 2008 Pentagon report to Congress” U.S. Department of Defense,
Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan
, June 2008, p. 5. Unclassified.

12
     “Afghanistan is clearly on the road to recovery” General Dan McNeill, “Commander's Foreword,”
ISAF Mirror
, March 2007. Unclassified.

12
     “McNeill caustically dismissed” John Ward Anderson, “Emboldened Taliban Reflected in More Attacks, Greater Reach,”
Washington Post
, September 25, 2007, p. A11.

13
     “According to an internal planning document” U.S. Embassy to Afghanistan and Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan,
United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan
, August 10, 2009, p. 2. Unclassified/FOUO.

14
     “By 2008, not only was corruption pervasive” Joint Chiefs of Staff, PowerPoint Presentation,
Strategy for the Long War: 2006–2016
, various dates between September 27, 2006, and November 3, 2006, DOD FOIA. Secret.

14
     “The venality of many of Karzai's closest advisers” Memorandum, McCaffrey to Meese,
After Action Report—General Barry R. McCaffrey USA (Ret): Visit to Kuwait and Afghanistan—10–18 November 2009
, December 5, 2009. Unclassified.

14
     “According to Dr. Thomas H. Johnson” Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Refighting the Last War: Afghanistan and the Vietnam Template,”
Military Review
, November–December 2009, p. 2.

15
     “A classified 2009 State Department survey” Cable, Kabul 004182, AMEMBASSY KABUL to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Pervasive Corruption Undermining Ghazni Province's Public Administration,” December 28, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Confidential.

15
     “And the governor of neighboring Paktia” Cable, Kabul 004150, AMEMBASSY KABUL to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Above the Law: Corrupt Governor Thwarts Governance and Development in Paktya Province, Afghanistan,” December 27, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

15
     “Captain Carl Thompson” Report, Captain Carl Thompson, Maryland Army National Guard,
Winning in Afghanistan
, April 9, 2009. Unclassified.

15
     “The situation was so apparent” Cable, USNATO 000453, “Allies Find Briefing on Afghanistan NIE ‘Gloomy,'” December 5, 2008, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

16
     “A March 2010 report” ISAF, PowerPoint Presentation,
ISAF Joint Command Helping Afghans Succeed
, March 14, 2010. FOUO.

16
     “Even the Pentagon's” U.S. Department of Defense,
Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan
, June 2008, p. 6. Unclassified.

17
     “A report prepared by” Elizabeth Lee Walker, ISAF Rule of Law adviser
Culturally-Attuned Government and Justice in Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(Washington, D.C.: International Media Ventures, April 2010), p. 5. FOUO.

18
     “the CIA assessment overstates.” Memorandum, Franks to Secretary of Defense,
Trends in Afghanistan
, October 1, 2002, DOD FOIA. Secret.

19
     “As a declassified CIA history put it” Robert M. Hathaway and Russell Jack Smith,
Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence: 1966–1973
(Washington, D.C.: CIA History Staff, 1993), p. 2. Secret.

19
     “According to Paul R. Pillar” Paul R. Pillar, “A Scapegoat Is Not a Solution,”
New York Times
, June 4, 2004.

20
     “August 2006, Defense Policy Board official” PowerPoint Presentation, Marin Strmecki,
Afghanistan at a Crossroads: Challenges, Opportunities, and a Way Ahead
, August 17, 2006, DOD FOIA. Secret/NOFORN.

20
     “According to Neumann” Cable, Kabul 000746, AMEMBASSY KABUL to SECSTATE WASH DC, February 21, 2006, State Department FOIA. Secret.

21
     “A secret NATO intelligence summary” Cable, USNATO 000115, USMISSION USNATO to SECSTATE WASH DC, “North Atlantic Council Readout—February 21, 2007,” February 23, 2007, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

21
     “Other classified reporting” Cable, Kabul 003719, AMEMBASSY KABUL to SECSTATE WASH DC, “PAG Makes First Recommendations to President Karzai,” August 21, 2006, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

21
     “These stark warning signs” Paul D. Miller, “Lessons for Intelligence Support to Policymaking During Crises,”
Studies in Intelligence
, vol. 54, no. 2, June 2010. Unclassified.

22
     “The intelligence community agreed” Seth G. Jones,
Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
(Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, June 2008), p. 37. Unclassified.

22
     “At the same time, the Pentagon was telling” See, for example, Lt. General Michael D. Maples, U.S. Army, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement for the Record Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,
Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States
, February 27, 2008, p. 6. Unclassified.

22
     “These divergent goals” Ismail Khan, “Omar Threatens to Intensify War: Talks with Karzai Govt Ruled Out,”
Dawn (Pakistan)
, January 4, 2007.

23
     “Mullah Sabir, a senior Taliban commander” Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Taliban Two-Step: Can't Sit Down Yet,”
Newsweek
, November 10, 2008.

23
     “According to Major General Mike Flynn” Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Captain Matt Pottinger, USMC, and Paul D. Batchelor, DIA,
Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan
(Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, January 2010), p. 9.

25
     “The quality of the intelligence” Cable, Kabul 000165, AMEMBASSY KABUL to SECSTATE WASH DC, “CENTCOM Commander Petraeus Jan 20 Meeting with President Karzai,” January 23, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

25
     “When asked about this problem” Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs),
Transcript of DoD News Briefing with Gen. McNeill from the Pentagon
, June 13, 2008. Unclassified.

25
     “According to Captain Daniel Helmer” Captain Daniel Helmer, USA, “Twelve Urgent Steps for the Advisor Mission in Afghanistan,”
Military Review
, July–August 2008, p. 76.

26
     “According to Robert Baer” Robert Baer, “Taliban Imposter: The U.S. Doesn't Know Its Enemy,”
Time
, November 28, 2010.

26
     “The current chief of intelligence in Afghanistan” Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Captain Matt Pottinger, USMC, and Paul D. Batchelor, DIA,
Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan
(Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, January 2010), p. 8.

26
     “In November 2007” Senlis Afghanistan,
Stumbling into Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink
(London: Senlis Council, November 2007).

27
     “According to General McNeill's spokesman” “Taliban Control No More than Five Afghan Districts: NATO,”
AFP
, December 3, 2007.

29
     “Dr. Thomas Johnson” Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan,”
Orbis
, vol. 51, no. 2, Winter 2007, pp. 82–83.

29
     “Marine Corps Lt. Colonel Chris Nash” Lt. Colonel Chris Nash, USMC, PowerPoint Presentation,
Observations and Opinions IRT Operations in Afghanistan by a Former ETT OIC
, August 2008. FOUO.

29
     “The parallels with the Soviet military's” U.S. Marine Corps, Battalion Landing Team
1
⁄
6
, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit,
After Action Review (AAR) and Lessons Learned from Operation Enduring Freedom Phase III
, September 25, 2008, pp. 23–24. Unclassified/FOUO.

29
     “In Helmand Province” Cable, Kabul 000140, AMEMBASSY KABUL to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Vice President-Elect Biden and Senator Graham Discuss Security in Helmand,” January 20, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Confidential.

29
     “In the summer of 2008, the British Army garrison” Gerald Meyerle,
Encirclement of Patrol Base Armagh, Helmand Province, July–August 2008
(Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses [CNA], November 14, 2008). FOUO.

30
     “Clear … go back to FOB” Captain Jamison, USMC, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Afghanistan Team, PowerPoint Presentation,
Afghanistan
, September 17, 2008. FOUO.

30
     “Major Fred Tanner” Oral History,
Interview with Major Fred Tanner
, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 4, 2010, p. 10. Unclassified.

30
     “According to declassified data” Major General Paul Dettmer, USAF, Assistant DCS for ISR, PowerPoint Presentation,
Strategic Challenges of the 21st Century
, July 8, 2009. Unclassified.

31
     “A restricted-access Marine Corps” Captain Jamison, USMC, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Afghanistan Team, PowerPoint Presentation,
Afghanistan
, September 17, 2008. FOUO.

31
     “On April 13, 2010” Colonel Joe Felter, PowerPoint Presentation,
COIN Advisory and Assistance Team & COIN in Afghanistan
, May 13, 2010. FOUO.

32
     “According to a restricted-access” Captain Jamison, USMC, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Afghanistan Team, PowerPoint Presentation,
Afghanistan
, September 17, 2008. FOUO.

32
     “According to Major Jim Grant” Major Jim Grant, USA, “One Tribe at a Time: A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan,”
Joint Center for Operational Analysis Journal
, vol. 11, no. 3, Fall 2009, p. 19.

32
     “For instance, a 2009 study” Gerald Meyerle and Carter Malkasian,
Insurgent Tactics in Southern Afghanistan
(Arlington, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses [CNA], June 2009). FOUO.

33
     “according to a September 2008 Marine Corps report” U.S. Marine Corps, Battalion Landing Team
1
⁄
6
, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit,
After Action Review (AAR) and Lessons Learned from Operation Enduring Freedom Phase III
, September 25, 2008. FOUO.

33
     “Even the lowliest Taliban fighters” Lt. Colonel Donald C. Bolduc, USA,
Bureaucracies at War: Organizing for Strategic Success in Afghanistan
(Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, November 13, 2008), p. 11.

34
     “The Americans have the wristwatches” Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan,”
Orbis
, vol. 51, no. 2, Winter 2007, p. 87.

34     Documentary sources for the Battle of Wanat are: Memorandum, TF Bayonet to Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 101,
AR 15-6 Investigation Findings and Recommendations—Vehicle Patrol Base (VPB) Wanat Complex Attack and Casualties, 13 July 2008
, August 13, 2008, Secret; U.S. Army,
Presentation of Collateral Investigation Results to the Family of 1LT Jonathan P. Brostrom
, October 23–24, 2008, For Official Use Only; U.S. Army,
Combined Responses from CJTF 101 and 173rd ABCT to Colonel David Brostrom
, October 23–24, 2008, Unclassified; Douglas R. Cubbison,
Battle of Wanat Historical Analysis
(Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, June 25, 2009), For Official Use Only.

35
     “Lieutenant Brostrom had no way of knowing it” Report,
14 JAN 2008 TF ROCK KLE (Waigul District Governor)
, January 14, 2008, WikiLeaks Kabul War Diary Files. Secret.