Intel Wars (38 page)

37
     “According to a leaked State Department cable” Cable, USNATO 000453, “Allies Find Briefing on Afghanistan NIE ‘Gloomy,'” December 5, 2008, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

38
     “situation [in Afghanistan] has deteriorated” General David H. Petraeus, USA, PowerPoint Presentation to Center for a New American Security,
CENTCOM Update
, June 11, 2009. Unclassified.

2: LIBERTY CROSSING

41
     “dismayed about the work of the intelligence committees” Memorandum for Record,
Meeting of Vice Chair Hamilton with SSCI Vice Chair Jay Rockefeller
, October 16, 2003, 9/11 Commission Files, NARA, Washington, D.C. Unclassified.

42
     “an almost unworkable bureaucracy.” Memorandum for Record,
Interview of Carl Ford
, October 22, 2003, 9/11 Commission Files, NARA, Washington, D.C. Secret.

42
     “The intelligence community that Blair inherited” Confidential interviews. See also Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Conference Call with Dr. Ronald Sanders, Associate Director of National Intelligence for Human Capital,
Results of the Fiscal Year 2007 U.S. Intelligence Community Inventory of Core Contractor Personnel
, August 27, 2008; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Media Roundtable with Mr. Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, ODNI Headquarters, McLean, Virginia, March 26, 2009; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Media Conference Call with Director of National Intelligence Mr. Dennis C. Blair,
2009 National Intelligence Strategy
, September 15, 2009, all Unclassified.

45
     “The CIA's 5,000-person National Clandestine Service” The National Clandestine Service had been created in May 2006 by merging CIA's old Cold War clandestine organization, the Directorate of Operations, with the U.S. military's smaller clandestine organization, the Defense HUMINT Service.

45
     “Pat Hanback, the CIA's former” Memorandum for Record,
Interview of Pat Hanback
, September 12, 2003, 9/11 Commission Files, NARA, Washington, D.C. Top Secret/HCS/NOFORN.

45
     “The Clandestine Service's performance prior to 9/11” Memorandum, Meigs to Secretary of Defense,
Answers to SecDef “23 Questions,”
July 28, 2001, DOD FOIA. Secret/Close Hold/NOFORN.

45
     “diplomatic cover isn't going to get” Michael J. Sulick,
Human Intelligence
, March 22, 2007, p. 9, Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Control, Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

47
     “There were also a couple of hundred FBI agents” For example, see Cable, Madrid 000154, AMEMBASSY MADRID to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Spain Details Its Strategy to Combat the Russian Mafia,” February 8, 2010, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

47
     “According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records” The FBI aviation front companies are Northeast Aircraft Leasing Corp., Northwest Aircraft Leasing Corp., Southeast Aircraft Leasing Corp., Southwest Aircraft Leasing Corp., National Aircraft Leasing Corp., and Worldwide Aircraft Leasing Corp.

48
     “Unlike its larger cousins” National Reconnaissance Office,
Mission Ground Station Declassification Questions and Answers
, October 15, 2008, NRO FOIA via Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson. Top Secret.

48
     “As it was during the Cold War” Cable, Kyiv 001942, AMEMBASSY KYIV to SECSTATE WASH DC, “U.S.-Ukraine Nonproliferation Meetings September 23–24, 2009,” December 24, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

49
     “NSA was a shambles” Memorandum,
The Threats and Opportunities: 9/11, al Qa'ida and Other 21st Century Challenges
, undated, p. 4, Records of the 9/11 Commission, NARA, Washington, D.C., Unclassified; Memorandum for the Record,
Interview with Rich Taylor, Former NSA Deputy Director for Operations, 1997–2001
, December 10, 2003, p. 6, Records of the 9/11 Commission, NARA, Washington, D.C. Top Secret COMINT.

49
     “According to General Montgomery Meigs” Memorandum, Meigs to Secretary of Defense,
Answers to SecDef “23 Questions
,
”
July 28, 2001, DOD FOIA. Secret/Close Hold/NOFORN.

50
     “In 2009, the president of Panama” Cable, Panama 000905, AMEMBASSY PANAMA to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Guidance Request: DEA Wiretap Program,” December 24, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

51
     “27 people, no capability—a total mess” Memorandum for Record,
Interview of Patrick M. Hughes, Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, DHS
, April 4, 2004, 9/11 Commission Files, NARA, Washington, D.C. Unclassified.

51
     “The U.S. State Department itself has become” Cable, State 080163, SECSTATE WASH DC to USMISSION UN ROME, “Reporting and Collection Needs: The United Nations,” July 31, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

52
     “As of 2009, the U.S. Army had a staggering 54,000 men and women” U.S. Army, Director of Military Intelligence, PowerPoint Presentation,
A Strategy to Rebalance the Army MI Force
, December 15, 2009, slide 7. Unclassified.

53
     “But it was the unmanned reconnaissance drone” Unless otherwise noted, all data in this section were derived from Dr. Daniel L. Hauman,
U.S. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Combat, 1991–2003
(Bolling AFB: Air Force History Office, June 9, 2003), Unclassified; Headquarters U.S. Air Force, PowerPoint Presentation,
Air Force Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Flight Plan 2009–2047
, July 23, 2009, Unclassified; U.S. Army UAS Center of Excellence, Fort Rucker, Alabama,
“Eyes of the Army”: U.S. Army Roadmap for Unmanned Aircraft Systems: 2010–2036
, April 2010, Unclassified.

53
     “The growth of the military's drone fleet” As of 9/11, the U.S. Army had only 54 Hunter and Shadow drones in its inventory. Today, the Army has 4,034 drones (42 medium-sized and 3,992 small drones) deployed in the United States and overseas. As of July 2009, the USAF had 158 drones in its inventory (118 Predator, 27 Reaper, and 13 Global Hawk).

59
     “more data than we can translate into useable knowledge” Memorandum, “Visualizing the Intelligence System of 2025,” attached to Memorandum, Rumsfeld to Cambone and Haver,
Intelligence System of 2025
, June 23, 2001, Rumsfeld.com. Unclassified.

59
     “This is parochialism at its worst.” Colonel Barry Harris, U.S. Army,
Intelligence Transition in the United States Army: Are We on the Right Path?
(Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, August 2009), p. 27. Unclassified.

59
     “a hysterical group of Talmudic scholars” Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. 7,
Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010), p. 466.

60
     “According to a restricted-access Pentagon briefing” Colonel Jack Jones, Military Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, PowerPoint Presentation,
ISR Trends & Challenges
, undated but circa 2010. FOUO.

60
     “Information is like confetti” Brigadier General Michael Shields, Director, National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (NJOIC), PowerPoint Presentation,
NJOIC Collaboration and Web 2.0
, April 22, 2010. Unclassified.

60
     “fundamentally unreformed” Patrick C. Neary, “Intelligence Reform, 2001–2009: Requiescat in Pace?”
Studies in Intelligence
, vol. 54, no. 1, March 2010.

61
     “be a train wreck” Memorandum, Rumsfeld to President,
Intelligence “Reform,”
September 11, 2004, Rumsfeld.com. Unclassified.

61
     “looked at the reform brouhaha with detached bemusement” Patrick C. Neary, “Intelligence Reform, 2001–2009: Requiescat in Pace?”
Studies in Intelligence
, vol. 54, no. 1, March 2010.

62
     “This reality was summarized succinctly” Draft Study, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
Study of the Mission, Size, and Function of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
, March 2010. Secret.

63
     “undermining ODNI's credibility” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Office of the Inspector General,
Critical Intelligence Community Management Challenges
, November 12, 2008. Unclassified.

63
     “According to Patrick G. Eddington” Patrick G. Eddington,
Long Strange Journey: An Intelligence Memoir
(Shelbyville, Kentucky: Wasteland Press, 2011), p. 17.

63
     “received a lot of resistance from [within] the FBI” Memorandum for Record,
Interview of Admiral David Jeremiah, USN (ret.)
, October 22, 2003, 9/11 Commission Files, NARA, Washington, D.C. Top Secret Codeword.

63
     “doubts whether the FBI can carry out reform” Memorandum for Record,
Meeting of Vice Chair Hamilton with SSCI Vice Chair Jay Rockefeller
, October 16, 2003, 9/11 Commission Files, NARA, Washington, D.C. Unclassified.

64
     “Take the example of Thomas A. Drake” Indictment,
United States of America v. Thomas Andrews Drake,
April 14, 2010, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Maryland. Unclassified.

64
     “On June 9, 2011” DOD, Office of the Inspector General,
Requirements for the TRAILBLAZER and THINTHREAD Systems
, December 15, 2004, p. 27. Top Secret/COMINT.

65
     “a culture that is emphatic about secrecy” Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Captain Matt Pottinger, USMC, and Paul D. Batchelor, DIA,
Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan
(Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, January 2010), p. 9.

67
     “For example, the U.S. Air Force had 34 Predator drones” Brigadier General Walt Davis, USA, Director of Army Aviation, PowerPoint Presentation,
Army Aviation
, January 13, 2009. FOUO.

67
     “We also spent a lot of time, money, blood, and treasure” Russell W. Glenn and S. Jamie Gayton,
Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan
(Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, November 2008), p. 194. FOUO.

68
     “the results of such missions were “lackluster” at best” Captain Kyle Greenberg, “Unmanned Aerial Systems: Quality as Well as Quantity,”
Military Review
, July–August 2010, p. 53.

68
     “a minimum of 72 hours” U.S. Army,
Operation Enduring Freedom: Combat Aviation Brigade in Afghanistan Initial Impressions Report
, November 2008. Unclassified/FOUO.

68
     “Over 90% [of all detainees were] released due to insufficient evidence” U.S. Marine Corps, PowerPoint Presentation,
Military Police Support of the MAGTF: Case Study: 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit Operation Azada Wosa, Afghanistan 2008
, November 2008. FOUO.

69
     All the information we need is available in ISAF.” Brigadier General Michael Shields, Director, National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (NJOIC), PowerPoint Presentation,
NJOIC Collaboration and Web 2.0
, April 22, 2010. Unclassified.

3: THE SWORD OF DAMOCLES

70
     “He was referring to the Soviet military's disastrous” G. F. Krivosheev,
Grif sekretnosti snyat
[The Secret Seal Is Removed] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1993), pp. 401–5.

71
     “The decision [to invade Afghanistan]”
CC CPSU Letter on Afghanistan
, May 10, 1988, in Svetlana Savranskaya, ed.,
Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Russian Documents and Memoirs,
October 9, 2001, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 57, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html

72
     “In June 2006, the top Pentagon official” Memorandum, Vickers to President,
Transitioning to an Indirect Approach in Iraq
, June 12, 2006, Rumsfeld.com. Unclassified.

73
     “many indicators suggest the overall situation” Memorandum, Headquarters, NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan (ISAF) to Secretary of Defense,
Commander's Initial Assessment
, August 30, 2009, p. 2-1. Confidential.

75
     “I don't want to say we're clueless, but we are.” Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Captain Matt Pottinger, USMC, and Paul D. Batchelor, DIA,
Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan
(Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, January 2010), p. 9.

77
     “The embassy of virtually every major foreign power in Kabul” ISAF CJ2,
Threat Report Other Rpt Kabul
, August 25, 2007, WikiLeaks Kabul War Diary Files. Secret.

78
     “The CTPT teams, which are deployed at twenty-six firebases” The largest CTPT teams are based at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Asadabad in Kunar Province, Camp Dyer outside the city of Jalalabad in Nangarhar Province, FOB Salerno and FOB Chapman outside the city of Khost in Khost Province, FOB Lilley and FOB Orgun-e in Paktika Province, Spin Boldak in Kandahar Province, and FOB Geckho in central Helmand Province. There is also a CTPT Quick Reaction Force at Bagram Air Base that can be rapidly sent by helicopter anywhere in eastern Afghanistan at short notice.