Intel Wars (39 page)

79
     “like the small agency-run listening post called Cardinal” Report,
231200Z TF Rock Conducts Boarder Flag Meeting IVO Ghaki Pass
, June 23, 2007, WikiLeaks Kabul War Diary Files. Secret.

86
     “We now knew where all of the males in the village were” Personal Experiences Paper of Dwight C. Utley, SGM,
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Konar Valley, Afghanistan, May 15–December 1, 2004
, Combat Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, August 20, 2006, p. 10. Unclassified.

86
     “The people here have an incestuous relationship with the Taliban” “Facilitating Development and Governance in Kunar Province,”
Army
, May 2010, p. 66.

88
     “On September 8, 2009, several hundred Taliban guerrillas” A sanitized version of the army's postmortem investigation into the attack on COP Keating can be found in HQ, Combined/Joint Task Force (CJTF)-82, Memorandum for Record,
AR 15-6 Report of Investigation into Operations in the Gangjal Valley, Konar Province, Afghanistan, 8 September 2009 (Executive Summary)
, November 25, 2009, ISAF FOIA. Secret.

88
     “On October 24, 2009, the
Wall Street Journal
reported” Yochi J. Dreazen and Anand Gopal, “In One Province, Taliban Revive,”
Wall Street Journal
, October 24, 2009.

89
     “Since 2006, more Taliban attacks have occurred in Helmand” NATO, International Security Assistance Force,
Metrics Brief 2007–2008
, February 2009. FOUO.

90
     “with a declassified Marine Corps report admitting” U.S. Marine Corps, PowerPoint Presentation,
2nd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment OEF First 100 Days After Action Review
, November 2009. FOUO.

90
     “complete lack of security in the provincial capital” Cable, Kabul 001677, AMEMBASSY KABUL to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Helmand Governor Mangal Upbeat, Hopeful in Meeting with Ambassador,” June 27, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Confidential.

90
     “almost all officials [in Helmand Province] are assessed to be in some way involved in” Elizabeth Lee Walker, ISAF Rule of Law adviser,
Culturally-Attuned Government and Justice in Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(Washington, D.C.: International Media Ventures, April 2010), p. 5. FOUO.

91
     “When they got into the area that Daud controlled” Oral History,
Interview with Lt. Colonel Michael Slusher
, Combat Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, February 16, 2007, p. 15. Unclassified.

91
     “It was hard to determine if folks were actually no-joke Taliban or just criminals” Oral History,
Interview with Major Stuart Farris
, Combat Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, December 6, 2007, p. 7. Unclassified.

94
     “little was known by ISAF about the human terrain and insurgent dispositions in Marjah” Theo Farrell, Briefing Note,
Appraising Moshtarak: The Campaign in Nad-e-Ali District, Helmand
(London: Royal United Services Institute, June 23, 2010), p. 2. Unclassified.

95
     “Karzai doesn't get it” Cable, Kabul 000693, AMEMBASSY KABUL to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Ahmed Wali Karzai: Seeking to Define Himself as U.S. Partner?” February 25, 2010, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

96
     “demonstrates the fragility of European support for the NATO-led ISAF mission” CIA Red Cell, Special Memorandum,
Afghanistan: Sustaining West European Support for the NATO-led Mission—Why Counting on Apathy Might Not Be Enough
, March 11, 2010. Confidential/NOFORN.

96
     “The situation on the ground was increasingly grim” International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan (ISAF), PowerPoint Presentation,
ISAF Joint Command District Assessments
, April 8, 2010. NATO/ISAF Unclassified REL GIROA.

96
     “there are growing fissures between [the Taliban] groups” Major General Bill Mayville, USA, “Ops Update: The State of the Insurgency,”
The Afghan Hands Blog
, March 17, 2010, http://www.isaf.nato.int. Unclassified.

97
     “Even the Pentagon's April 2010 assessment” Department of Defense,
Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces
, April 2010, p. 34. Unclassified.

4: THE ROOT OF ALL EVIL

100
   “Pakistan's intermittent support to terrorist groups and militant organizations threatens to undermine” Cable, State 131801, SECSTATE WASH DC to AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI et al., “Terrorist Finance: Action Request for Senior Level Engagement on Terrorism Finance,” December 30, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

102
   “According to author Bob Woodward” Bob Woodward,
Obama's Wars
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), p. 3.

102
   “the lawless 10,000-square-mile area of northern Pakistan bordering Afghanistan called the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA” The FATA is an amalgamation of seven tribal agencies (Khyber, Kurram, Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, North Waziristan and South Waziristan) and six frontier regions (Peshawar, Kohat, Tank, Banuu, Lakki, and Dera Ismail Khan). The FATA has a population of approximately 4 million people, almost all of whom are ethnic Pashtuns who make no secret of their sympathy for their Afghan Taliban brethren.

103
   “I fear we are so mesmerized [by signals intelligence] that we find it impossible” Memorandum, Wolfowitz to Rumsfeld,
Al Qaeda Ops Sec
. July 19, 2002, DOD FOIA. Secret.

103
   “looking for a silver needle in a stack of 6 million needles.” Colonel Jasey Briley, U.S. Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca, PowerPoint Presentation to the 2009 Fires Symposium,
Army Intelligence in an Age of Uncertainty
, March 18, 2009. Unclassified.

104
   “some terrorist groups use family and communal relationships” Memorandum, “Visualizing the Intelligence System of 2025,” attached to Memorandum, Rumsfeld to Cambone and Haver,
Intelligence System of 2025
, June 23, 2001, Rumsfeld.com. Unclassified.

104
   “screen their recruits probably better than the U.S. government does” Michael J. Sulick,
Human Intelligence
, March 22, 2007, p. 8, Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Control, Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

105
   “Over the next four years (2004–8), CIA Predator drones conducted 46 missile strikes” A breakdown of these CIA drone attacks is as follows: 2004: 1 strike; 2005: 1 strike; 2006: 3 strikes; 2007: 5 strikes; 2008: 36 strikes. Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, “Analysis: A Look at US Airstrikes in Pakistan Through September 2009,”
The Long War Journal
, October 1, 2009.

106
   “Senior Pakistani military officials asked for access” See, for example, Report,
260000Z CJTF82 CJ3 KLE PAK Military 11th Corps Cdr & 7th Div Cdr
, March 26, 2007, WikiLeaks Kabul War Diary Files. Secret.

107
   “they are going to cooperate [with the CIA] to the least extent that they can get away with” Michael J. Sulick,
Human Intelligence
, March 22, 2007, p. 15, Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Control, Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

108
   “al Qaeda had succeeded in regenerating itself in the sanctuaries afforded it in northern Pakistan” Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate,
The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland
, July 2007, Unclassified.

110
   “by the time I left office (in January 2009), more than a dozen of those people [on the list] were dead” Mark Mansfield, “Reflections on Service: A Conversation with Former CIA Director Michael Hayden,”
Studies in Intelligence
, vol. 54, no. 2, June 2010.

110
   “shortly before dawn on the morning of September 3, 2008” This was the second known U.S. commando raid into Pakistan. Two years earlier, in March 2006, a forty-man U.S. special operation team was dropped inside Pakistan and attacked an al Qaeda camp near the town of Danda Saidgai in North Waziristan, killing Imam Asad, the Chechen commander of the Black Guard, the elite praetorian guard for Osama bin Laden and other senior al Qaeda leaders. A third cross-border commando raid by U.S. Navy SEALs in 2005, whose goal was to kill Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, according to newspaper reports was called off at the last moment by the Pentagon.

111
   “
may
still enjoy support from the lower echelons of the ISI.” Department of State, Issue Paper for Vice President,
Counterterrorism Activities (Neo-Taliban)
, December 9, 2005, State Department FOIA. Secret. On file at the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.

111
   “Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI) elements have an ongoing relationship with the Taliban.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, PowerPoint Presentation,
Strategy for the Long War: 2006–2016
, various dates between September 27, 2006, and November 3, 2006, p. 25, DOD FOIA. Secret.

111
   “The consensus opinion within the intelligence community at the time was” U.S. Army, TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA),
HB 9 Paramilitary Terrorist Insurgent Groups: Afghanistan
, March 1, 2009. FOUO.

111
   “But a restricted-access 2008 Marine Corps intelligence briefing concluded that Pakistani support” Captain Jamison, USMC, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Afghanistan Team, PowerPoint Presentation,
Afghanistan
, September 17, 2008. FOUO.

112
   “Despite ten years of fierce denials” See, for example, Cable, Islamabad 001515, AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD to SECSTATE WASH DC, “President Musharraf Meets with Codels Reyes and Tierney,” April 6, 2007, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

113
   “Mullah Omar is under Pakistani protection” Cable, New Delhi 001051, AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Indians Offer Bleak Assessment of Afghanistan and South Asian Region During CTJWG,” March 2, 2007, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

113
   “The November 2008 National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan” Cable, USNATO 000453, “Allies Find Briefing on Afghanistan NIE ‘Gloomy,'” December 5, 2008, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

114
   “The Pakistani military, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in particular, sees the Taliban” Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle,
How Is Afghanistan Different from Al Anbar?
, (Arlington, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses [CNA], February 2009), p. 16. FOUO.

114
   “Pakistan believes the Taliban will prevail in the long term.” Cable, USNATO 000453, “Allies Find Briefing on Afghanistan NIE ‘Gloomy,'” December 5, 2008, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

114
   “Instead of standing and fighting, the Pakistani Army and police forces in the Swat Valley had abandoned their posts and fled” Cable, Islamabad 000236, AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Scenesetter for Special Envoy Holbrooke,” February 4, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files, Secret; Cable, Islamabad 000270, AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD to SECSTATE WASH DC, “CODEL Biden's Meeting With COAS Kayani and ISI Pasha,” February 6, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

115
   “the decision to pull troops out of Swat was less about needed troops on the border with India” Cable, Peshawar 000002, AMCONSULATE PESHAWAR to SECSTATE WASH DC, January 3, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

115
   “The militant takeover of Swat in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) is the most striking example” Cable, Islamabad 000385, AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Focusing the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue,” February 21, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Confidential.

115
   “The CIA station chief in Islamabad, John D. Bennett, whose cover position was counselor for regional affairs” Sixteen months later, on July 21, 2010, Bennett was called out of retirement and named the chief of the National Clandestine Service by CIA director Leon Panetta.

116
   “get control of the ISI.” Cable, London 002651, AMEMBASSY LONDON to CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL, “USDP Edelman's October 15 Meetings in London,” October 21, 2008, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

116
   “the United States and Pakistan needed to have confidence in each other” Cable, Islamabad 000270, AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD to SECSTATE WASH DC, “CODEL Biden's Meeting with COAS Kayani and ISI Pasha,” February 6, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

117
   “The [Pakistani] government is losing more and more territory every day to foreign and domestic militant groups” Cable, Islamabad 000236, AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Scenesetter for Special Envoy Holbrooke,” February 4, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

117
   “does not want a reckoning with the past” Cable, Islamabad 000365, AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Scenesetter for General Kayani's Visit to Washington,” February 19, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

118
   “President Zardari and PM Gilani recognize Pakistan's greatest threat has shifted from India to militancy” Cable, Islamabad 000385, AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Focusing the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue,” February 21, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Confidential.