Lion of Jordan (47 page)

At the meeting Wilson and Brown expressed regret at the disaster that had befallen Jordan and inquired whether he was thinking of negotiating a separate peace with Israel. Hussein said that there were naturally grave tensions and difficulties in Jordan, an influx of refugees and the general shock to Arab morale resulting from their military defeat. There was also the danger of Soviet exploitation of the situation in an East–West context. But he was confident that he could hold the situation in Jordan satisfactorily, provided the Arab cause was not rebuffed at the United Nations and provided Israel were obliged to withdraw from the territories it had occupied. With regard to a separate peace, his first objective was, as he had said to Herzog the previous day, an Arab summit to try
to concert a common stand. If this failed, then he might indeed have to ‘go it alone', including some kind of separate settlement with Israel. Wilson commented that it would be a very rough summit meeting if it took place, and Hussein agreed. Brown thought the king had shown himself by his recent behaviour to be one of the bravest men alive; but he believed that the king could not afford, without serious risk to himself, to take any position in relation to Israel that put him too far ahead of his Arab colleagues in other countries.
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Wilson had a back channel to the Israeli Embassy in London that did not go through the Foreign Office. Before leaving London, Dr Herzog asked Wilson's contact man whether the prime minister would agree to convey to them his impressions from his talks with Hussein. Late on Monday night, the contact man relayed the following message: first, Wilson was impressed by Hussein as a man; second, Israel should not press for bilateral contact with him, as such contact would endanger his life, or, as Wilson phrased it, ‘put an end to the Hashemite kingdom'. This was Wilson's direct impression, which had been supported by a British Embassy report from Amman. The Israelis also received a report on the meeting through official channels. On the instructions of George Brown, a senior official at the Foreign Office gave details of Hussein's talks to the Israeli ambassador.
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On 10 July, Hussein flew to Cairo to report to Nasser on his talks in the West and to coordinate their diplomatic strategy. The Algerian president, Houari Boumedienne, was also there. Boumedienne supported the hard-line Syrian position of continuing the struggle against Israel with the help of the USSR. Nasser told Hussein that he now regretted cutting his links so completely with the West. In the interests of the Arabs as a whole, he agreed that Jordan should maintain its relations with the West. He himself was completely dependent on the USSR. His advice to Hussein was to get in touch with the Americans and to ask for their help in arranging negotiations between Jordan and Israel, advice that he later repeated, at Hussein's request, in front of the Egyptian, Algerian and Jordanian delegations.
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On his return from Cairo, Hussein informed both the UK and US ambassadors that, as no overall settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict was in sight, he might very discreetly seek a separate settlement with Israel. Before doing so, however, he wished to elicit the views of the two governments and the extent of their support in facilitating such a
settlement. Anglo-American discussions of Hussein's options revealed significant differences. Britain's prime interest in the Middle East was to get the Suez Canal reopened. The British were unwilling to encourage Hussein to enter separate negotiations with Israel. They wanted Hussein to continue to rule Jordan, but they were not prepared to invest much in supporting him. They were unwilling to intervene, as they had done in 1958, to save the Hashemite regime. Their advice to Hussein was to wait a while. America's view, on the other hand, was that, despite the risks involved, it was essential to encourage a settlement between Jordan and Israel. The Americans accordingly advised Hussein to enter into direct negotiations but they declined to lean on Israel to offer him terms that would enable him to survive.
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Hussein's reaction was one of deep disappointment at what he saw as inadequate American support for the course of action he had hoped to take. He felt unable to move forward in the direction of a bilateral settlement with Israel.
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Instead he took the lead in steering Arab policy towards a political solution to the crisis and in preparing the ground for an Arab summit.

The fourth Arab summit conference was held in Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, between 28 August and 1 September. It was the first meeting of the Arab leaders since their defeat in the June War. The conference ended with the adoption of the famous three ‘noes' of Khartoum: no negotiation, no recognition and no peace with Israel. These were a propaganda gift for Israel, and were often cited by critics as proof of the intransigence of the Arabs and of the inability of pan-Arabism to formulate a realistic policy. In fact, surprising as it may sound, the conference was a victory for the Arab moderates. The debates of the heads of state revealed profound disunity within the Arab fold. Algeria, Syria and the PLO wanted to continue the fight against Israel and the West with the support of the Soviet Union. The PLO, in particular, wanted the all-Arab aim to be the liberation of Palestine rather than merely the recovery of the territories captured by Israel in the recent war. The moderates, led by Nasser and Hussein, had a more limited aim and argued in favour of trying to obtain Israel's withdrawal by political rather than military means and in cooperation with the West. Nasser stated bluntly that the Arabs at that time had no military option and that the only hope of recovering the land lay in political action. He also pointed out that the recovery of the West Bank was a more urgent Arab need than the recovery of the Sinai; that America alone could compel
Israel to withdraw; and that Hussein should therefore approach the Americans. Hussein stressed that time was of the essence because the longer the West Bank remained in Jewish hands, the more difficult it would be to regain it.
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The Khartoum summit thus marked a real turning point in Nasser's attitude to Israel: a departure from the previous approach of military confrontation and the beginning of the quest not simply for dialogue but for a peaceful settlement. His moderate line earned him the support of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the hostility of his erstwhile allies.
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Hussein gave the following account of the realignment of Arab forces at Khartoum:

At Khartoum I fought very much against the three noes. But the atmosphere there developed into one where all the people who used to support Nasser… turned on him and turned on him in such a vicious way that I found myself morally unable to continue to take any stand but to come closer to him and defend him and accuse them of responsibility for the things that had happened. That was the first collision I had with many of my friends in the Arab world.

But then we talked about the need for a resolution and the need for a peaceful solution to the problem. And Nasser's approach was that ‘I feel responsible. We lost the West Bank and Gaza and they come first. I am not going to ask for any withdrawal from the Suez Canal. It can stay closed until such time as the issue of the West Bank and of Gaza is resolved and the issue of the Palestinian people is resolved. So go and speak of that and speak of a comprehensive solution to the problem and a comprehensive peace and go and do anything you can short of signing a separate peace.' And I said that in any event I was not considering signing a separate peace because we wanted to resolve this problem in a comprehensive fashion.
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At the close of the summit the following communique was issued: ‘The Arab Monarchs and Heads of State agreed on unifying their efforts in political action on the international and diplomatic level to remove the traces of aggression, and to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories that have been occupied since 5 June. This is within the framework of the basic principles by which the Arab states abide, namely: no peace with Israel, or recognition of her, no negotiation with her, and the upholding of the right of the Palestinian people in their homeland.'
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The first sentence opened the door to diplomatic activity. The last sentence was inserted to reassure the Palestinians that their interests would not be abandoned in the climate of accommodation
that followed defeat in the June War. Arab spokesmen interpreted the Khartoum declarations to mean no formal peace
treaty
but not a rejection of a state of peace; no
direct
negotiations but not a refusal to talk through third parties; and no
de jure
recognition of Israel but acceptance of its existence as a fait accompli.
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Israeli propaganda, however, seized on the last sentence to discredit the summit and to portray the Arab position as incorrigibly rejectionist, absolutely uncompromising and threatening.

Hussein returned from Khartoum well satisfied with the success of the moderates in imposing their views on the extremists and with the support that Jordan obtained, both moral and financial, from the other Arab states. The oil-producing states pledged economic aid to the confrontation states until ‘the traces of aggression' had been removed, with the sum of £40 million allocated to Jordan. King Faisal had never seen Nasser ‘so frank, humble, sincere or courageous'. Syria was isolated and saddled with most of the responsibility for having provoked hostilities. President Arif agreed to withdraw Iraqi troops from Jordan. President Nasser agreed to withdraw Egyptian troops from Yemen, where they had been since 1962. Hussein was asked to mediate in the Algerian–Moroccan dispute.
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And all the participants agreed to revive the Arab solidarity pact and conduct no hostile propaganda against each other.

The Khartoum summit effectively allowed Hussein to explore the possibility of arriving at an accommodation with Israel. The problem was one of timing, of choosing the optimal moment and the most promising avenue for negotiations. His instinct was that it was too soon to take the initiative on his own. Arab leaders were ahead of their people in appreciating the implications of their recent defeat by Israel. He and his advisers decided to wait for the next meeting of the Security Council in the hope that, with the support of the Great Powers, it would take a step towards imposing a solution. When the Americans suggested to Hussein direct negotiations with Israel, his reaction was that the time was not right. Hussein reminded the American ambassador that he never hesitated in the past to have direct contact whenever he felt it to be useful and assured him that he would not hesitate in the future.
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During a visit to Cairo on 30 September, Hussein secured Nasser's agreement to a draft resolution that he hoped the USA and the USSR would submit to the Security Council. In the early days of the following month Hussein made his first official visit to Moscow. According to an
Israeli intelligence report, the king was amazed by the honour and special treatment that he was accorded there. He discovered that the Russians were not quite the monsters he had assumed them to be. They made strenuous efforts to sell him arms, but he agreed only to economic aid and cultural relations. The primary reason for the visit was thought to be to form a personal impression of the Russians and to assess their ability to help break the Arab–Israeli impasse.
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According to Hussein's own report, he had found the Russians very understanding and ready to support an early Security Council resolution along the lines of the draft formulated by Arthur Goldberg, the American permanent representative at the UN, and Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister. Hussein submitted to the Russians a revised version of this draft, which they said they were ready to accept. They warned him, however, that the Americans were becoming increasingly intransigent and that he might have difficulty in securing their acceptance.
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Hussein wrote a long letter to President Johnson, giving his view of the Middle East situation following the Khartoum Conference and his subsequent trips to Cairo and Moscow. It was a strongly worded but dignified letter. Hussein expressed his deep hurt at America's pro-Israeli position and lamented the double standard it applied to Arabs and Israelis. This kind of discrimination, he said humbly, was not worthy of a great leader or a great nation. He pointed out that at Khartoum the Arabs reached a reasonable and responsible position. Now it was up to the great powers to act, since they were the ones who had created Israel in the first place. In conclusion, Hussein strongly urged the US government to cooperate with others in convening the Security Council and adopting without delay a resolution along the lines of the draft he had discussed in Moscow.
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Hussein intensified his efforts to influence American policy during a visit to Washington in the early part of November. In a series of meetings with US officials he succeeded in obtaining a promise that America would exert its influence to preserve the territorial integrity of Jordan. At a meeting in New York on 3 November, Ambassador Goldberg gave Hussein the following summary of US policy: ‘The United States as a matter of policy does not envisage a Jordan which consists only of the East Bank. The United States is prepared to support a return of the West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications. However, the US would use its influence to obtain compensation to Jordan for any
territory it is required to give up… In short, we are prepared to make a maximum effort to obtain for Jordan the best possible deal in terms of settlement with Israel.' Secretary of State Dean Rusk formally confirmed these assurances to Hussein and President Johnson was also informed. When Hussein went to the White House on 8 November, Johnson pressed him hard to support the resolution that America was about to submit to the Security Council, despite its lack of precision on the withdrawal of Israeli forces.
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Hussein left Washington with the clear impression that he had reached an understanding with the administration that if he supported the American resolution, they would see to its implementation and that the Israeli forces would be withdrawn from the West Bank within six months.
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