Loose Women, Lecherous Men (26 page)

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Authors: Linda Lemoncheck

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Page 102
does it deny that consent and coercion have real meaning within specific contexts of exploitation, intimidation, and violence against women. The notion of choice is a vital one for feminism of any form, since it is only within the realm of real and accessible alternatives to women's sexual subordination that the feminist project of women's liberation can be achieved. A feminist sexual ethic from the "view from somewhere different" abjures the personal practices and social forces that attempt to stifle women's sexual agency and self-definition. This ethic is one of care respect, detailed in the concluding section of this chapter.
Sexual Ethics from the "View from Somewhere Different"
In chapter 2 I described a woman's sensitivity to the particular sexual desires of her partner and an active willingness to promote those desires as constitutive of a care respect for her sexual partner. I have also noted that while most cultural and sex radical feminists would agree on the inclusion of care respect in a comprehensive feminist sexual ethic, they disagree as to the nature, purpose, and extent of that respect. In this chapter, for example, a cultural feminist is understood as advocating the kind of care respect that recognizes the desire in many women for affectionate personal bonding with their sexual partners. From a cultural feminist's point of view, such affection precludes the adoption of power-polarizing sexual roles. On the other hand, a sex radical feminist advocates care respect by recognizing the desire in many women for the freedom to explore their sexuality, which can foster experimentation with consensual, power-polarizing sexual roles. In the previous section I suggested that the "view from somewhere different" can negotiate the tensions between these two feminist perspectives by circumscribing them within a feminist philosophy of sex that appreciates the dialectic between gender and sexuality.
In this remaining section I will expand on the sexual ethic of care respect introduced in chapter 2. I will show how a feminist program for promoting women's sexual agency and self-definition is a fundamental feature of this sexual ethic, in part by showing how care respect in sex encourages "world"-traveling and in part by showing how care respect informs and is informed by Marjorie Weinzweig's "autonomous relating to others." This autonomy further recommends what Joyce Trebilcot refers to as women "taking responsibility for [our] sexuality," a responsibility that encourages individual women to take an active role in determining their own sexual needs and to understand the social context in which those needs arise.
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Like the ''view from somewhere different" from which it derives, a sexual ethic of care respect can negotiate the tensions between cultural and sex radical feminists by recognizing in both perspectives the goal of sexual agency and self-definition for women whose lives are circumscribed, but not determined, by individual and institutionalized male dominance. Such a goal can then be incorporated into a feminist philosophy of sex that encourages resistance to, and transformation of, women's sexual subordination. Thus, a sexual ethic of care respect may serve as a normative guide to the examination of other issues in feminist philosophy of sex in subsequent chapters.
Robin Dillon describes care respect as "valuing an individual in her specificity, seeking to understand her in her own terms, and caring about and seeking to promote her well-being."
107
For Dillon, valuing an individual merely for some capacity
 
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she shares with all other persons may make all persons equally valuable but ignores the ways in which each individual is special. Ignoring these, we tend to forget that not everyone has the same specific needs and interests that we do, encouraging what I have referred to as a "view from nowhere" that can be coercive or intrusive of the needs of others. Moreover, we typically regard our lovers, friends, and family as valuable in ways we do not regard all other people. Thus, there will be some people in the world about whom we feel it is appropriate to care more than others or to whom we feel we ought to be partial. Since all persons are unique, valuing a person in her specificity has the advantage of valuing her not only for the ways her uniqueness makes her equally valuable among persons but also for the particular ways in which she is unique. Thus, care respect promotes a fundamental equality among persons by particularizing individuals instead of generalizing about them. This fundamental equality is important for establishing a moral baseline of respectful treatment of persons from whom we may otherwise be very different, a baseline below which no moral agent may fall without censure. In so doing, care respect balances an ethic of justice that prescribes universal respect for persons with an ethic of care that recommends considerations of context and particularity in personal relations. In Dillon's words, "[C]are respect has the resources to maintain a constructive tension between regarding each person as
just as valuable
as every other person and regarding this individual as
special
.
108
The "view from somewhere different" specifies the nature of this dialectical tension. A sexual ethic of care respect asks us to value the particularity of each person's sexual desires, pleasures, and preferences as well as the shared particularity of all of us. From the "view from somewhere different," this shared particularity translates into a shared partiality of social location that individually biases the interests of every person. As I argued in chapter 1, unless we acknowledge this shared partiality, we are liable to adopt the "view from nowhere," which mistakes the bias of social location for the assurance of absolute truth. On the other hand, from the "view from somewhere different," I, like everyone, am always ''somewhere," different in my particular situation, yet the same in my being situated contextually, politically, historically in ways that will inevitably bias my worldview.
However, one of a sex radical's complaints against cultural feminism is its apparent advocacy of a politically correct sexuality that refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of alternative sexual preferences. If an equality of moral worth among very different individuals were not established, a sexual ethic of care respect that consisted solely of recognizing the particularity in all of us as well as the particularity of each of our sexual needs would still be consistent with the claim from the "view from somewhere better" that some persons' needs are more worthy of pursuit than others. Therefore, Dillon's care respect not only includes valuing what is the same and different in all of us but also includes trying to understand the worldview of others. A sexual ethic of care respect recommends that I treat my sexual partners as moral equals by recognizing that their particular and perhaps very different sexual desires, pleasures, or preferences are no less worthy of satisfaction than my own. The feminist philosophy of sex advocated thus far neither advocates a single sexual preference as the "right" one nor treats any one person's social location as superior in sexual privilege or access. Care respect assures that we will acknowledge the particularity of
 
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worldviews without assuming that our own worldviews are the only ones worth knowing. The "world"-traveling of the "view from somewhere different" recommends that we ask ourselves what it is like to be someone else and what it would be like to be ourselves in someone else's eyes. Dillon quotes Elizabeth Spelman, who writes, "We treat others as the persons they are just insofar as we try to respond to the way they choose to be seen, and not through our favored ways of seeing them."
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By trying to see the world from the social location of my sexual partner, I can then begin to understand what my partner's sexual desires are
as my partner sees them
and seek to promote their satisfaction in ways that do not disregard the care respect of others.
A sexual ethic that encourages "world"-traveling in this way is one that encourages women's sexual agency and self-definition. A woman's care respect for her sexual partner involves actively attempting to discover what her partner's individual sexual desires, pleasures, or preferences may be and realizing the value of listening and responding to those desires. "World"-traveling in her sexual relations means that a woman will learn more about others' sexual preferences and so expand her own awareness of the sexual differences open to her. By asking "What is it like to be myself in my partner's eyes?," she may also expand her sexual awareness of herself and so be better able to match what she values in sex with her actual sexual experience. A sexual ethic of care respect also encourages respecting the limits of others' sexual privacy and experimenting with ways a woman can understand her partner from her partner's perspective without invading anyone's "personal space." This kind of understanding could facilitate dialogue regarding such issues as using contraceptives, asking partners to use protection against sexually transmitted diseases, and asking partners to be tested for the AIDS virus.
From the "view from somewhere different," gender, race, class, and sexual preference, among other social locations, intertwine to create distinctive sexual perspectives among each of us. The objections that many women of color lodge against sex radical feminism suggest that persons adopt a sexual ethic of care respect that recommends both acknowledging the interlocking of women's social oppressions and understanding the complex ways in which a woman's sexuality is affected by her social location. The resulting diversity of voices suggests that it is not enough to treat our sexual
partners
with care respect. A sexual ethic of care respect acknowledges the feminist goal from the "view from somewhere different" that women and men respect each other's sexual agency and self-definition within a larger social framework of a caring and cooperative community. Within such a community, women and men can begin to define our own particular sexual needs and help each other do the same.
This means that
listening
to the diversity of women's voices is not sufficient for a feminist sexual ethic. I may understand what your particular needs are but do nothing to help you pursue them. A feminist sexual ethic of care respect is an
activist
one, because it advocates that I not only attempt to understand the sexual needs of others but also do my best to help fulfill those needs. Thus, a feminist sexual ethic of care respect reinforces the larger feminist project of promoting the sexual agency and self-definition of women in all their multiplicity. Dillon suggests that care respect recommends that we do more than simply not interfere with a particular individual's pursuit of her well-being. We are responsible for making a positive contribution to it. According to Dillon, in doing so we acknowledge the need in each of us for the
 
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help and support of others. Dillon writes, "[C]are respect can be seen as connecting individuals together in a community of mutual concern and mutual aid, through an appreciation of individuality and interdependence."
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Thus, a sexual ethic of care respect is not limited to personal sexual relations alone but is an ethic that extends outward to individuals and institutions that are a part of one's larger community. Dillon is the first to remark that we will extend care respect to persons in different ways and to varying degrees. We have neither the time, energy, nor resources to understand and promote the well-being of
everyone
; indeed, family and close friends cannot always be cared for in the ways they or we would like. Perhaps more to the point, we cannot promote everyone's well-being even if we restrict our energies solely to promoting everyone's
sexual
well-being; and not everyone will want
us
to help
them
discover their own sexual interests, much less promote or pursue them. What an ethic of care respect does suggest is that we approach all human relationships with the kind of sensitivity to individual context and individual needs that can help guide us in our judgments of whether and how to care for the persons in those relationships. This ethic does not provide a set of abstract principles for making such judgments, nor does it provide the terms and conditions of "world"-traveling that would be applicable to every case. Such abstractions would be antithetical to the appreciation of context and particularity that is definitive of care respect. What this ethic does provide is a framework for treating our sexual partners and understanding others' sexualities in ways that allow them to be the agents and defining subjects of their sexual experience. My claim is that with such an approach, we can better determine whose needs should be met and how than if we assume a moral superiority in deference to the "view from somewhere better," invoke a set of abstract moral principles applicable to all in deference to the "view from nowhere," or assume that all perspectives are of equal value in deference to the "view from everywhere."
For example, I may listen to what your sexual needs are, only to find out that pursuing those needs violates the care respect of other persons that the "view from somewhere different" advocates. An ethic of care respect would be self-defeating if we did not insist that the feminist promotion of the sexual agency and self-definition of others be consistent with an ethic of care respect. Rape, sexual harassment, sexual battery, or other forms of sexual violence against, and intimidation of, women are neither tolerated nor promoted from this point of view, since the encouragement of sexual oppression as well as the oppression itself constitute a violation of the care respect of the one oppressed. On the other hand, a sexual ethic of care respect recommends that we not automatically disdain the sexual pleasures or preferences of others simply because we do not like or agree with them. A sexual ethic of care respect from the "view from somewhere different" expands our worldviews precisely because this perspective does not commit us to a single interpretation of a satisfying sexual life. As a result, such an ethic will be extremely unsatisfying for anyone determined to find a set of moral principles that will prescribe what persons ought and ought not do in every case of sex. Some anonymous sexual partners may share intimate sex; other partners' sexual intimacy will require time and familiarity. For still others, intimacy will not be a prerequisite for safe and satisfying sex at all, while the most exciting sex for some will be
unsafe
sex to which applying standards of care re-

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