that is gender-sensitive to the partiality of social location takes great pains to be critical of such universalizing perspectives and to avoid them as much as possible.
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Moreover, I would argue that the "view from nowhere" may be a more distorted and insidious perspective than the "view from somewhere better," precisely because the ''view from nowhere" assumes that an unbiased, ahistorical, and universalizable vision of the world is both possible and desirable. No one knows the pain of prejudice better than women who struggle to form an identity of their own in a misogynistic and androcentric society. Feminists' advocacy for equal rights is in part an advocacy for fair and impartial treatment under the law. Nevertheless, I would argue that the "view from nowhere" too often disguises the very prejudices it is designed to mitigate by presupposing a "truth" about the world that in fact favors a particular social location.
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For example, the feminist theoretical perspective often called "liberal feminism" contends that gender blindness in the law encourages gender-blind social attitudes which, it is argued, will ultimately result in a more democratic and fully human community. It is claimed that as soon as men and women are given equal protection under the law, such crimes against women as men's sexual assault and sexual intimidation will be indefensible in principle and punishable in fact. From a liberal feminist's perspective, sex equality requires that pay equity and political parity be the rule and not the exception. I interpret this position as advocating the adoption of the "view from nowhere" in pursuit of sex equality for women, since a liberal feminist advocates gender-blind legal statutes not out of a recognition of the bias of her particular social location but because she believes that gender does not and should not matter in the distribution of social goods. 23
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The attraction of this "view from nowhere" is that unlike the "view from somewhere better," it eschews gender prejudice in the name of social equality. Reference to human beings or persons is preferred over references to women or men, because speech and action in human terms is believed to be objective, neutral, or impartialthe only perspective, a liberal feminist would argue, that can guarantee social justice for all.
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A prevailing problem with liberal feminism's "view from nowhere," however, is that it fails to acknowledge the bias of social location. Subjectivity and partiality cloaked in the morally superior guise of objectivity and neutrality is no guarantee that justice for all will be served, when justice itself is circumscribed by the social location of those who judge. Many feminists point out that questions about human nature, human knowledge, and human happiness are questions that are asked by someone or other who is socially situated by race, gender, and class, among many other things. To ignore or deny the claim that gender matters in determinations of social justice is to assume that women's interests are the same as men's, when they may not be. The failure in the "view from nowhere" to acknowledge the bias of every social location is the failure to acknowledge that one observer cannot speak for all. Susan Bordo writes:
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| | Professional women saw in the "neutral" standards of objectivity and excellence the means of being accepted as "humans," not women. . . . In a culture that is in fact constructed by gender duality, however, one cannot simply be "human." This is no more possible than it is possible that we can "just be people" in a racist culture. . . . Our lan-
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