Loose Women, Lecherous Men (5 page)

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Authors: Linda Lemoncheck

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that is gender-sensitive to the partiality of social location takes great pains to be critical of such universalizing perspectives and to avoid them as much as possible.
Moreover, I would argue that the "view from nowhere" may be a more distorted and insidious perspective than the "view from somewhere better," precisely because the ''view from nowhere" assumes that an unbiased, ahistorical, and universalizable vision of the world is both possible and desirable. No one knows the pain of prejudice better than women who struggle to form an identity of their own in a misogynistic and androcentric society. Feminists' advocacy for equal rights is in part an advocacy for fair and impartial treatment under the law. Nevertheless, I would argue that the "view from nowhere" too often disguises the very prejudices it is designed to mitigate by presupposing a "truth" about the world that in fact favors a particular social location.
For example, the feminist theoretical perspective often called "liberal feminism" contends that gender blindness in the law encourages gender-blind social attitudes which, it is argued, will ultimately result in a more democratic and fully human community. It is claimed that as soon as men and women are given equal protection under the law, such crimes against women as men's sexual assault and sexual intimidation will be indefensible in principle and punishable in fact. From a liberal feminist's perspective, sex equality requires that pay equity and political parity be the rule and not the exception. I interpret this position as advocating the adoption of the "view from nowhere" in pursuit of sex equality for women, since a liberal feminist advocates gender-blind legal statutes not out of a recognition of the bias of her particular social location but because she believes that gender does not and should not matter in the distribution of social goods.
23
The attraction of this "view from nowhere" is that unlike the "view from somewhere better," it eschews gender prejudice in the name of social equality. Reference to human beings or persons is preferred over references to women or men, because speech and action in human terms is believed to be objective, neutral, or impartialthe only perspective, a liberal feminist would argue, that can guarantee social justice for all.
A prevailing problem with liberal feminism's "view from nowhere," however, is that it fails to acknowledge the bias of social location. Subjectivity and partiality cloaked in the morally superior guise of objectivity and neutrality is no guarantee that justice for all will be served, when justice itself is circumscribed by the social location of those who judge. Many feminists point out that questions about human nature, human knowledge, and human happiness are questions that are asked by
someone or other
who is socially situated by race, gender, and class, among many other things. To ignore or deny the claim that gender matters in determinations of social justice is to assume that women's interests are the same as men's, when they may not be. The failure in the "view from nowhere" to acknowledge the bias of every social location is the failure to acknowledge that one observer cannot speak for all. Susan Bordo writes:
Professional women saw in the "neutral" standards of objectivity and excellence the means of being accepted as "humans," not women. . . . In a culture that is
in fact
constructed by gender duality, however, one
cannot
simply be "human." This is no more possible than it is possible that we can "just be people" in a racist culture. . . . Our lan-
 
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guage, intellectual history, and social forms are "gendered"; there is no escape from this fact and from its consequences on our lives.
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Bordo's philosophizing about "this fact" of social location may come dangerously close to the kind of epistemological authoritarianism I have sought to avoid. What feminists can say is that in theorizing about women's sexuality, one must appreciate gender because one paints a more representative picture of women's sexuality with gender than without it.
By assuming that a universal epistemological ideal is possible, liberals and conservatives alike who adopt the "view from nowhere" fail to recognize that individuals from other travelable "worlds" may not share the same observations. Furthermore, if, by adopting the "view from nowhere," I ignore or deny that gender matters in determinations of social practice, I will have no incentive for the empathic understanding recommended by María Lugones's "world"-traveling. Even the "view from somewhere better'' must ultimately devolve into a denial of its own socially located bias, if its advocates make claims about human nature and human happiness that are purported to be true
The "View from Everywhere"
A postmodern response to both the "view from somewhere better" and the "view from nowhere" is to replace the
mis
location of gender prejudice and the
non
location of gender blindness with the
dis
location of gender deconstruction. In their pursuit of a philosophy that explodes the notion of a single, unifying reality, postmodern feminist philosophers celebrate diversity by celebrating the multiple possibilities of social location. We can call this third perspective, the "view from everywhere," since a postmodernist believes that in order to avoid the oppressive biases of either an assumption of superiority or the presumption of universal truth, we must embrace the multiplicity of
every
social voice.
25
Postmodernism has a strong appeal for feminists who perceive women's voices to be misunderstood by the commitment to rationality, objectivity, and truth of the "view from nowhere." In an era marked by a strong advocacy for multiculturalism within the academy as well as outside it, a postmodern vision holds out the promise of an inclusive global perspective that many feminists regard as crucial to their political vision of respect for diversity and difference.
26
A postmodern celebration of diversity in sexual preference has particular resonance for a feminist philosopher of sex interested in exploring the depth and complexity of women's sexual experience and desire. It is only through such an exploration, many feminists believe, that a woman can escape her identity as sexual victim of a misogynous and heterosexist patriarchy and begin to pursue a self-determined sexual identity.
27
However, if both the "view from somewhere better" and the "view from nowhere" suffer from appreciating too little about social location in assessments of women's sexuality, a postmodern vision suffers from the determination to appreciate too much. My contention that the human condition is socially situated implies that the human condition is a partial and incomplete condition of being and knowing. Therefore, no matter how much we learn about human diversity or no matter how
 
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much of an effort we make at "world"-traveling, as socially situated human beings living in a finite place and time, we cannot, at any one moment, travel to all worlds at once. Feminist progress can be made by moving away from the "view from somewhere better" or the "view from nowhere" to less partial ways of knowing; the nonpartiality of total knowledge is beyond us.
By regarding any partiality of location as necessarily prejudiced, postmodernists drive us to an impossible dislocation where no one can conceivably go. In celebration of the multiple possibilities of social location, postmodernism seems to require an impossible omniscience. Yet a postmodern philosophical claim is that we must dislocate ourselves, if we are to be free of the oppression of located knowledge. Ironically, by advocating what Susan Bordo refers to as a relentless heterogeneity,
28
postmodern feminists advocate an epistemological ubiquity that is not only impossible to achieve but is no less demanding of conformity than their modern Enlightenment counterparts.
Furthermore, by diffusing women's voices amid a sea of multiplicity, this postmodern view deprives feminism not only of a coherent political agenda but also of any identifiably gendered voice that could call for liberation and change for the speakers with that voice. Many postmodern feminists would contend that until we make the hierarchical and value-laden opposition of "man" versus "woman" incoherent, the inferiority and otherness ascribed to women will remain intact.
29
However, I would argue that it is impossible to condemn the patriarchal oppression of women without giving meaning and value to the injustice of hierarchical gender categories; and the apparent absence of any unifying postmodern vision of gender or sexuality makes a foundational framework for advancing a feminist dialogue in women's sexuality superfluous. Thus, the
deconstruction
of gender seems to make the
destruction
of a specifically feminist agenda inevitable.
The "View from Somewhere Different"
I have contended that a postmodernist incorrectly believes that any partiality of location requires deconstruction. Indeed, it is through the perception of the partiality of our own location that we perceive ourselves as different from others. Without this perception, as I noted in my critique of the "view from nowhere," there is no incentive for the empathic understanding of another's location, which is the essence of María Lugones's "world"-traveling. Yet I have also noted in my critique of the "view from somewhere better" that the mere perception of partiality or difference is not enough to keep from misunderstanding women's sexuality. A conscientious attempt at an empathic understanding of women's sexuality is also required. Social location becomes social prejudice when, in María Lugones's words, we "arrogantly" fail to recognize the existence of other social locations or when we refuse to "world''-travel in deference to a perceived superiority.
30
Yet "world"-traveling becomes impossible from a postmodern philosopher's "view from everywhere," since those who adopt this view are required to be in all places at once.
If none of these three epistemological perspectives can properly capture the importance of social location for a feminist philosophy of sex, what are the alternatives?

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