Loose Women, Lecherous Men (6 page)

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Authors: Linda Lemoncheck

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Page 20
The perception that my worldview is neither better, nor nowhere, nor everywhere, but simply
somewhere different
is the perception that (1) my "world" is not the only social location worth knowing; (2) no matter how much or how often I "world"-travel, my "world" will always be partial, because I am always
somewhere
; and (3) there are other "worlds'' whose members may wish to travel to my own. For women and men engaged in the practice of philosophy, what I shall call the "view from somewhere different" is a celebration of the social locationthe partiality, particularity, and contextualityof all philosophical investigation. From this perspective, a philosopher of sex can locate both the subject and the investigator of her philosophical enterprise and begin to appreciate the complex and variable dialectic between them. The "view from somewhere different" also acknowledges that "world"-traveling will be intrusive if visits are involuntary. The "view from somewhere different" advocates not epistemological imperialism but a sharing of "world"-views in a collaborative and empathic effort of being and knowing.
If the "view from somewhere different" can acknowledge difference without presuming superiority and without devolving into dislocation, then such a perspective can offer philosophy of sex a more representative vision of women's sexual experiences, preferences, and desires than any of the other three perspectives discussed. Such a perspective will also recognize that different women will have very different experiences of sexual subordination by men and that some women may be more empowered to determine the course of their sexual lives than others. It will acknowledge that any one woman's life is a unique, complex, and variable mix of sexual subordination and empowerment under institutional and ideological constraints that limit the sexual choices she makes. Thus, the "view from somewhere different" incorporates the dialectic between gender and sexuality introduced earlier in the chaptera dialectic that understands individual women's sexuality as the contextual interplay between the gender politics of sexual subordination and the sexual politics of women's liberation. If one of the aims of a feminist philosophy of sex is to repair the distortions of patriarchal visions of women's sexuality, then the "view from somewhere different" seems tailor-made to a feminist philosophy of sex.
However, a counterargument could be made that the "view from somewhere different" only succeeds in oppressing women, not liberating them. This argument claims that for centuries, being a woman has meant being other to man's self, object to his subject, inferior to his superior. Woman has been marginal to man's centrality, trivial to his importance, somewhere to his everywhere. Indeed, it is the term "man" which is used to mean "human"; woman is someone
different
. In short, in a culture in which not only the social power and prestige but also the ascription of meaning and value is controlled by men, to be different from men means to be
inferior
to them. Therefore, it can be argued that by adopting the "view from somewhere different" within a patriarchal context, the feminist philosophy of sex advocated here only reinforces the notion that women are inferior to men.
This counterargument further suggests that by requiring all locations to be in some way biased or partial, the "view from somewhere different" condemns us to a world of racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, and imperialism. According to this line of reasoning, it is only by overcoming, not celebrating, our partiality that social prejudice will be eliminated. Instead of liberating women from the sexual subordi-
 
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nation of men, a feminist philosophy of sex that adopts the "view from somewhere different" only succeeds in keeping woman "in her place."
The success of this counterargument, however, relies on retaining the patriarchal notion that "different" means "inferior," "wrong," or "bad." One's pointing out my difference from men is indeed oppressive when it is used to make me feel inferior or less valuable. Yet feminist philosophers have often pointed out that we need not adopt the view that difference is bad. Indeed, when all selves are "others,'' the notion that one self is better than another cannot be justified by appeal to difference alone. When
everyone
is different, the value of difference is an open question.
Indeed, racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, and imperialism are the result of either believing we are superior to others who are different from us or believing there is no difference among persons when there
is
difference. Yet these are precisely the prejudices of the "view from somewhere better" and the "view from nowhere," respectively. On the contrary, the "view from somewhere different" recognizes difference without a presumption of superiority, thus avoiding the prejudice of both of the other perspectives. Furthermore, this recognition explodes any attempts to equate the polarities of superior/inferior, right/wrong, or good/bad with those of man/woman or male/female, without denying that there are differences between each pole. In so doing, the "view from somewhere different" avoids making the postmodern mistake of exploding the polarities themselves and deconstructing the notion of difference in a way that forces us to be all things to all people.
The "view from somewhere different" recommends that we perceive partiality and difference in all of us. A feminist philosophy of sex can justifiably adopt this view, because the "view from somewhere different" better represents the sexual experience of individual women than does ignoring or denying our partiality. This is not a claim that difference is good where once it was bad or that to adopt the "view from somewhere different" is to adopt the correct perspective, since to do so would be to recreate the prejudice that many feminists find so oppressive in the "view from somewhere better" and the "view from nowhere." Demands for so-called politically correct speech have made many people uneasy, precisely because those demands appear to be replacing one set of oppressive values with another. What the feminist philosopher of sex can argue is that the "view from somewhere different" provides more representative visions of women's sexuality, because this perspective suggests that no location has a lock on the truth about women's sexuality and that dislocation is impossible. From this perspective, we cannot please all of the people all of the time. As my critique of a postmodern epistemology suggests, we cannot even please all of the people
some
of the time. However, because difference from the perspective of the "view from somewhere different" no longer means inferiority or invisibility, a feminist philosopher of sex who adopts this perspective can encourage "world"-traveling as a way of sensitizing women and men to the diverse sexual experiences, preferences, and desires of individual women,
some
of whom we can please
some
of the time. Thus, the "view from somewhere different" promotes a woman-centered philosophy of sex that is less essentialist and less biased, thus more representative of women's sexual lives, than perspectives that fail to acknowledge the ubiquity of partiality. Indeed, it is this perspective that makes both women and men individual and visible members of the human community.
 
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Toward a Framework for a Feminist Philosophy of Sex
By adopting the perspective of the "view from somewhere different," a feminist philosopher of sex can understand her speculative and critical investigations into the nature, meaning, and value of women's sexuality as investigations into the contextual and dialectical relations between gender and sexuality. Her investigations are contextual when she perceives that gender is but one of many interlocking social relations informing women's sexuality. A feminist philosopher of sex who adopts this perspective believes that women's sexuality will mean different things to different women of different races, classes, and sexual preferences. Furthermore, this perspective asks a feminist philosopher of sex to investigate not only the network of social relations that situate the subject of her philosophical investigations but also those social relations that situate the philosopher herself. A feminist philosopher of sex will ask both (1) what is the subject context in which claims about women's sexuality are made? and (2) what is the investigative context in which such claims are evaluated? It is a perspective that asks a feminist philosopher of sex to attempt to gain an empathic understanding of others from whose sexual experience, preference, and desire her own location differs ("What is it like to be them?") and to acknowledge the partiality of all such locations (''What is it like to be myself in their eyes?").
31
Therefore, such investigations are also dialectical because they will engage a feminist philosopher of sex in a relationship with her subject whose interplay reflects the dynamic nature of that relationship.
As I argued earlier in this chapter, this dialectic also expresses itself in the interplay between a woman's sexual subordination and her sexual liberation under institutional and ideological conditions that constrain the sexual decisions she makes. Adopting this perspective asks us to notice that sex can be a source of victimization for individual women as well as a source for their resistance to, and transcendence of, that victimization. I remarked earlier in this chapter that heterosexual sex can take a variety of forms that are humiliating, if not brutal, to women: sexual harassment, rape, battering, and abuse, including degrading or abusive commercial sex work. On the other hand, feminists have also pointed out that to dwell exclusively or even primarily on the sexual victimization of women only serves to reinforce, if not confirm, women's identification as the dehumanized and exploited sexual objects of men. Therefore, a feminist philosophy of sex from the perspective of the "view from somewhere different" also needs a recognition of those aspects of women's erotic lives in which women identify and pursue what is erotically pleasurable
for them
.
This perspective acknowledges women as subjects with individual sexual histories to be celebrated and explored; women are properly seen as agents, many of whom create and prescribe their own sexual play. For some women, this means that sexual promiscuity becomes a safe and positive alternative for their active pursuit of sexual pleasure instead of the slur on women's sexuality that contemporary connotations of "slut" or "whore" suggest. For others, it means debunking the argument that sadomasochism is anathema to women because it re-creates the dominant/submissive gender roles of patriarchy. For still other women, it means creating woman-identified pornography and sex toys to open new avenues for women's sexual stimulation. Indeed, some women's idea of sexual liberation is in recognizing that men are little
 
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more than sexual predators whom heterosexual women should approach boldly, responsibly, and at their own risk.
32
In short, investigating the context of individual women's erotic lives from the "view from somewhere different" asks us to recognize as well as reconsider patriarchy's oppressive claim on women's sexuality. In subsequent chapters I will continue to explore the dialectical relationship between women's sexual oppression and our liberation by pursuing the kinds of issues in women's sexuality raised above.
Despite any one woman's capacity for sexual agency, the current context for renaming and revalorizing women's sexuality is still one of patriarchy. This context is inscribed by androcentric concepts and norms for women, many of whom remain far from sexual liberation. Therefore, feminists must be as location-sensitive to, and as philosophically demanding of, our new ways of thinking and acting as of our old ones. Some feminists have argued that to do any theorizing about women's sexuality at all requires the use of a fundamentally new language in order to reflect more accurately the nature of female eroticism.
33
Yet we must be just as wary of our
re
conceptualizations as our
pre
conceptualizations, since they will inevitably draw on the very social location from which we would liberate ourselves. This caveat is by no means an argument for delegitimizing the feminist enterprise. It is a strong recommendation for continuing to localize the discourse and particularize the context in women's efforts to effect change in our sexual lives.
Indeed, the many contextual differences in women's sexual experience remind us that a feminist philosophy of sex that adopts the "view from somewhere different" is woman-centered without being "Woman"-centered: such a philosophy can investigate the complexity and diversity of individual women's sexual lives without devolving into the essentializing prescriptions that have misrepresented women's sexuality using more traditional models. A feminist philosophy of sex from the "view from somewhere different" also recognizes the common ideological and institutional constraints under which women live and our shared capacity to resist and transform conditions oppressive to us. In this way feminists may simultaneously acknowledge the diversity of sexual experience among women and establish our common gender identity as women.
Moreover, a feminist philosophy of sex from the "view from somewhere different" recognizes that one woman's sexual experience can vary widely in different contexts; her sexual experience may also vary greatly over the course of her life. Sex can be scary, passionate, funny, unsuccessful, unsafe, painful, boring, publicly humiliating, privately beautiful, extremely personal, consciously political, cheerfully avoided, or regrettably absent, each in a different woman's life, or all in a single life. Gayle Rubin describes contemporary sexual norms as differentiating so-called good sex from bad: "good" sex is heterosexual, marital, monogamous, reproductive, and noncommercial sex, coupled, relational, within the same generation, and occurring at home; "bad" sex is practiced by the homosexual, the unmarried, the promiscuous, the nonprocreative, or the commercial sex worker, any of whom may masturbate, engage in orgies, have sex across generational lines, or have casual or public sex with or without the use of pornography, sex toys, or sadomasochistic sex roles.
34
A feminist philosophy of sex from the "view from somewhere different'' questions the value of universal prescriptions of sexual norms without deconstructing the norms themselves,

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