 | Lies about Prostitution," in
The Sexual Liberals and the Attack on Feminism
, ed. Dorchen Leidholdt and Janice G. Raymond (New York: Teachers College Press, 1990), 6872; also see Barry,
Female Sexual Slavery
, 45117.
|
| 13. Elliston, "In Defense of Promiscuity," 225.
|
| 14. Ibid.
|
| 15. In fact, a former mistress of then-married U.S. Congress member Newt Gingrich reported to the press that Gingrich preferred oral sex, because then he could say that he hadn't slept with her. See the
San Francisco Chronicle
, 10 August 1995.
|
| 16. Elliston, "In Defense of Promiscuity," 226.
|
| 17. See, for example, Elliston's claim that "[i]f one partner is a child, then their behavior is pedophilia. If the child is a son or daughter, it is incest. In neither case is it promiscuity." Ibid.
|
| 18. Ibid.
|
| 19. Ibid.
|
| 20. Marriages can be based on social convenience in the absence of sexual desire, while others may involve partners whose capacity for sex has dissipated through age or accident. For a discussion of the variety of scenarios that one might legitimately call marriage, see Wasserstrom, "Is Adultery Immoral?", and Michael J. Wreen, "What's Really Wrong with Adultery?," in Soble,
The Philosophy of Sex
, 18285.
|
| 21. For example, see Barry,
Female Sexual Slavery
; Susan Brownmiller,
Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape
(New York: Bantam Books, 1975); Andrea Dworkin,
Right-Wing Women
(New York: Perigee Books, 1983); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
|
| 22. See Wasserstrom on loving several adults at a time, in "Is Adultery Immoral?," 100104. For reasons against simultaneous romances, see Bonnie Steinbock, "Adultery," in Soble,
The Philosophy of Sex
, 191.
|
| 23. For a discussion of the ways in which privacy enables us to establish and maintain intimacy characterized as the sharing of information, see Charles Fried, "Privacy: A Rational Context," in
Today's Moral Problems
, ed. Richard Wasserstrom (New York: Macmillan, 1975). For a critique of this characterization, see Jeffrey H. Reiman, "Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood,"
Philosophy and Public Affairs
5 (fall 1976):
|
|
